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Woodland v. Pierce, 144 Cal. 434, 77 Pac. 1012.)

Judicial decisions.—Where a provision of the former constitution, which has received a judicial construction, is copied into the new constitution, it will be presumed that it was adopted in view of that construction. (Sharon v. Sharon, 67 Cal. 185, 7 Pac. 456, 8 Pac. 709; Thomason v. Ruggles, 69 Cal. 465, 11 Pac. 20; Lord v. Dunster, 79 Cal. 477, 21 Pac. 865; People v. Freeman, 80 Cal. 233, 22 Pac. 173; People v. O'Brien, 96 Cal. 171, 31 Pac. 45; Morton v. Broderick, 118 Cal. 474, 50 Pac. 644; Ex parte Ahern, 103 Cal. 412, 37 Pac. 390; People v. Edwards, 93 Cal. 153, 28 Pac. 831; Palache v. Hunt, 64 Cal. 473, 2 Pac. 245.)

The mere fact that a change is made in the phraseology of such provision by subsequent revision will not be deemed a change in the law, unless such phraseology evidently purports an intention to make a change. (Hyatt v. Allen, 54 Cal. 353.)

The same rule applies to provisions of the constitution borrowed from the constitutions of other states, and where such provisions have received judicial construction in such states, they are to be deemed to have been adopted in view of such construction. (People v. Coleman, 4 Cal. 46; People v. Webb, 38 Cal. 467; Ex parte Liddell, 93 Cal. 633, 29 Pac. 251.)

The exposition of the constitution by the highest court in existence under it, with regard to laws passed while it was in force, should be accepted by all succeeding courts, without regard to their own views as to the correctness of the doctrine. (Staude v. Election Commrs., 61 Cal. 313; Emery v. Reed, 65 Cal. 351, 4 Pac. 200; Davis v. Superior Court, 63 Cal. 581. See, also, Ferris v. Coover, 11 Cal. 175.)

Legislative construction.—Legislative construction of a constitutional provision is a method of interpretation. (Moran v. Ross, 79 Cal. 159, 21 Pac. 547; San Luis Obispo Co. v. Darke, 76 Cal. 92, 18 Pac. 118; Lord v. Dunster, 79 Cal. 477, 21 Pac. 865; Washington v. Page, 4 Cal. 388; Bank of Woodland v. Pierce, 144 Cal. 434, 77 Pac. 1012.)

But this does not mean that the hasty and inconsiderate legislation of three winters shall be conclusive of the constitutionality of such legislation. (People v. Wells, 2 Cal. 198, 208.)

Universal practice of assessors may be looked to in aid of the construction of provisions of the constitution relating to taxation. (Bank of Woodland v. Pierce, 144 Cal. 434, 77 Pac. 1012.)

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POWER TO DECLARE STATUTES UNCONSTITUTIONAL.-A government with no limits but its own discretion is not a constitutional government, in the true sense of the term. (Billings v. Hall, 7 Cal. 1.)

The constitution is a law, and must be construed by some one, and the judiciary possesses the power to construe it in all cases not expressly, or by necessary implication, reserved to the other departments. (Nougues v. Douglass, 7 Cal. 65; McCauley v. Brooks, 16 Cal. 11.)

But where the right to determine the extent and effect of a restriction in the constitution is expressly or by necessary implication confided to the legislature, the judiciary has no right to interfere with the legislative construction. (Nougues v. Douglass, 7 Cal. 65.)

In declaring a statute unconstitutional, the court cannot interfere with the exercise of the political power of the legislature. (Nougues v. Douglass, 7 Cal. 65.)

The courts can declare a statute unconstitutional only when the question arises as a pure matter of law unmixed with matters of fact. (Stevenson v. Colgan, 91 Cal. 649, 27 Pac. 1089.)

Therefore, the constitutionality of a statute can be determined only from the facts appearing upon the face of the law, taken in connection with matters of which the court can take judicial notice. (Bourn v. Hart, 93 Cal. 321, 28 Pac. 951; Stevenson v. Colgan, 91 Cal. 649,

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27 Pac. 1089; Coalin v. Supervisors, 99 Cal. 17, 33 Pac. 753; Fowler v. Peirce, 2 Cal. 165.)

But, while the courts may declare statutes unconstitutional, they have no power to avoid the effects of nonaction on the part of the legislature. (Myers v. English, 9 Cal. 341.)

Presumption of constitutionality.-An act of the legislature is presumed to be constitutional. (In re Madera Irr. Dist., 92 Cal. 296, 28 Pac. 272; People v. Hayne, 83 Cal. 111, 23 Pac. 1; In re Finley, 1 Cal. App. 198, 81 Pac. 1041; In re Bunkers, 1 Cal. App. 61, 81 Pac. 748.)

A statute will not be declared unconstitutional, except when the conflict between it and the constitution is palpable and incapable of reconciliation. (Stockton etc. R. R. Co. v. Stockton, 41 Cal. 147; People v. Sassovich, 29 Cal. 480.)

Where there is a reasonable doubt as to its constitutionality, its constitutionality should be affirmed. (University of California v. Bernard, 57 Cal. 612; Bourland v. Hildreth, 26 Cal. 161.)

An act is to be so construed, if possible, as to make it constitutional. (French V. Teschemaker, 24 Cal. 518.)

Conflict with the constitution.-In passing upon the constitutionality of a statute, the court is not required to imagine some possible contingency in which its provisions might con

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Aict with the constitution. (Woodward v. Fruitvale Sanitary Dist., 99 Cal. 554, 34 Pac. 239.)

In order to declare a statute unconstitutional, it is not necessary to find in the constitution some specific inhibition which has been disregarded, or some express command which has been disobeyed; but if the statute is contrary to the first principles of the social compact, it is void. (Britton v. Board of Election Commrs., 129 Cal. 337, 61 Pac. 1115.)

Nor is it necessary to find some specific inhibition which, in precise language, refers to the particular law. (People v. Lynch, 51 Cal, 15.)

But the courts cannot declare a law void upon the ground that it is contrary to the “spirit and policy of the constitution,” unless it is at variance with some express or clearly implied provision of that instrument. (Cohen v. Wright, 22 Cal. 293; Pattison v. Yuba Co., 13 Cal. 175.)

Conflict with another statute.—The constitutionality of one act cannot be tested by the provisions of another. (Reed v. Omnibus R. R. Co., 33 Cal. 212.)

Motives.—The motives which induce legis. lative action are not a subject of judicial inquiry, and a legislative act cannot be declared

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