unconstitutional because, in the opinion of the court, it was or might have been the result of improper considerations. (People v. Glenn Co., 100 Cal. 419, 35 Pac. 302; People v. Bigler, 5 Cal. 23.)

The motives of the authors of a statute are equally immaterial. (Stockton etc. R. R. Co. v. Stockton, 41 Cal. 147.)

Beneficial character.-In determining the constitutionality of a statute, its beneficial character cannot be considered. (Marsh v. Supervisors, 111 Cal. 368, 43 Pac. 975.)

On the other hand, in construing the constitution, the courts are bound to suppose that any inconveniences involved in the application of its provisions were considered in its formation, and accepted as less intolerable than those avoided, or as compensated by countervailing advantages. (People v. Pendegast, 96 Cal. 289, 31 Pac. 103.)

Impracticable statute.-A statute may also be declared void if it is impracticable. Thus an act providing for the appointment of three disinterested freeholders in the city and county of San Francisco to form an assessment district, which might include the entire city and county, and to assess the lands of the district for certain improvements, is void as impracticable, since it would be impossible to select

disinterested commissioners. (Montgomery Avenue Case, 54 Cal. 579.)

EFFECT OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITYSeparable provisions. The mere fact that certain provisions of a statute are in conflict with the constitution does not necessarily render the entire act void. Where the court can see that an act, after eliminating all unconstitutional features, is still such an act as it may be presumed the legislature would have passed had it known such parts were void, the remainder may stand. (Dwyer v. Parker, 115 Cal. 544, 47 Pac. 372.)

If the different parts are severable and independent of each other, and the constitutional provisions are capable of being carried into effect after the unconstitutional part has been eliminated, and it is clear that it was the intent of the legislature to enact these provisions irrespective of the other, the unconstitutional provisions will be disregarded, and the statute read as if such provisions were not there. (Hale v. McGettigan, 114 Cal. 112, 45 Pac. 1049; Lathrop v. Mills, 19 Cal. 513; French v. Teschemaker, 24 Cal. 518; Mills v. Sargent, 36 Cal. 379; Christy v. Supervisors, 39 Cal. 3; McCabe v. Jefferds, 122 Cal. 302, 54 Pac. 897; Rood v. McCargar, 49 Cal. 117; Johnson v. Tautphaus, 127 Cal. 605, 60 Pac. 172; People v.

Whyler, 41 Cal. 351; McGowan v. McDonald, 111 Cal. 57, 43 Pac. 418; Cahen v. Wells, 132 Cal. 447.)

Inseparable provisions. Where the constitutional and unconstitutional provisions of a statute are so inseparably blended together as to make it clear that either clause would not have been enacted without the other, the whole act is void. (San Francisco v. Spring Valley W. W., 48 Cal. 493; Reed v. Omnibus R. R. Co., 33 Cal. 212; Orange Co. v. Harris, 97 Cal. 600, 32 Pac. 594; Wills v. Austin, 53 Cal. 152; Purdy v. Sinton, 56 Cal. 133; People v. Perry, 79 Cal. 105, 21 Pac. 423; Marsh v. Supervisors, 111 Cal. 368, 43 Pac. 975; Lathrop v. Mills, 19 Cal. 513; Pioche v. Paul, 22 Cal.. 105.)

If a provision be unconstitutional it cannot be given effect in part, if the result of giving it such partial effect would be to accomplish a purpose which the law-making power never intended, or where the legislative intent is doubtful. (Robert v. Police Court, 148 Cal. 131.)

Contracts and other statutes.-No repeal by implication can result from a provision in a subsequent statute, when that provision is itself devoid of constitutional force. (McAllister v. Hamlin, 83 Cal. 361, 23 Pac. 357.)

A contract entered into in view of an act later held unconstitutional is not made under a mistake of law. (Cooley v. Calaveras Co.,

121 Cal. 482, 53 Pac. 1075.)

But a contract entered into by a public board or officer by sole authority of an unconstitutional statute is void, and not subject to ratification. (Phelan v. San Francisco, 6 Cal. 531.)

The legislature may refer to an unconstitutional act to indicate its will in respect to a constitutional purpose. (People v. Bircham, 12 Cal. 50.)