tection should be administered. This point really seems to me so clear and precise, that in dwelling upon it, my only fear is, that I shall be obscuring it, by using a multiplicity of words to illustrate it. It should however be remembered, that if obedience to the law be only the means of yielding protection, and that if there is no agreement on the part of those who obey, that they should be protected, that the advantages accruing from civil society are comparatively valueless. I have before shewn, that if the means of protection as defined by Non-Jurisconsultus were always possessed, that 'protection' would be a word without meaning, because if a state has obedience paid to its laws, there is no possible case which can arise that calls for protection. It was of no avail therefore to frame society, because if in a state of nature every man were disposed to observe that which is right, and eschew that which is wrong, all the evils and disadvantages which society was formed for the purpose of remedying, do not exist. I will not, sir, trouble you with more observations upon this part of the subject. I think I have said sufficient to shew the truth of the proposition with which I set out in my last paper, but which has met with censure from your correspondent. If my views are correct, and the arguments with which I have endeavoured to support them are tenable, if my reasoning shall appear to you and your correspondent as conclusive as I must acknowledge it does to me, I am entitled to claim at his hands an assent to the truth of my assertion, that mala prohibita are binding upon conscience, inasmuch as he himself confesses, that if the doctrine with which he cavils, and which I have above attempted to prove, be true, the inference which I have drawn necessarily ensues. As, however, your correspondent has disputed the accuracy of my sentiments upon the doctrine of punishments, I am afraid that I shall not be considered to have entirely disposed of the question, unless I make a few observations, in reply to his reasoning on the two points in which he considers me in errors. In the first place, he denies the truth of my observation, that punishment is an additional means to deter persons from the perpetration of offences;" but as he has the grace to admit that punishment is an after consideration with the legislature," it will not, I apprehend, be difficult to prove the correctness of my opi 66 nion. I really do think, that the former assertion is necessarily involved in the latter, and as we cannot suppose that the legislature would make laws, unless it believed that there was some principle in those to whom they were addressed, which should cause an obedience to them; and as according to the confession of your correspondent, the question of punishment is an after consideration, it seems to me, that the only ground upon which the legislature can expect obedience, prior to its making non-obedience penal, must be the belief that what it prohibits, it is binding upon the conscience of every person in the state to observe. It is surely not necessary to revert to the occasion of punishment, or to specify why it is, that it is necessary to resort to it. Suppose, with respect to the divine government, no punishment were held out as attending the breach of the rules, for the guidance of our conduct, which the Creator has laid down, will it be asserted that therefore those rules are not obligatory upon the conscience? Fear is a principle which actuates us almost as much as any thing, in the discharge of our duties; and consequently, our Creator has made use of this principle to subserve the wise and beneficent purposes which he has in view. It is upon this principle that the human legislature acts, in framing laws for the benefit of the whole community; he perceives that every member of that community has a duty to discharge towards the other parts of it, but knowing that personal considerations often sway the breast more powerfully than public good, in order to enforce obedience to his commands, he attempts to actuate the conduct by appealing even to selfish motives, those which spring from fear. The word punishment indeed, signifies the infliction of some evil for a breach of duty. It is quite ridiculous to say, that an individual is punished who has violated the laws, if the punishment consists in the mere exchange between him and the state of the payment of a penalty, for the sinister enjoyment of some advantage. But from the knowledge which we all have, that a state cannot prevent crime, Non-Jurisconsultus takes occasion to ask, "What then can it do but offer its conditions?" whatever he may say to the contrary, I am quite convinced that it is always bent upon the extirpation of crime, and that it assigns no limits beyond which its endeavours so to do shall not extend. But it would be perfectly useless, and would be a waste of labour for it to attempt to prevent crime, if it were enabled to offer conditions upon which it might be perpetrated. The real fact, however, is, that all those who are in the habit of committing offences, do so if possible without an observance of the conditions upon which, according to the words of your correspondent, it may be committed. Comparatively speaking, the payment of the penalty upon which the commission of an evil is supposed to be allowed, is hardly ever made; so that even in this view of the case, fraud and injustice are necessarily brought into exercise. it has in view in administering correction to the violation of its laws, to be referred solely to its own particular advantage? Surely not. On the contrary, it is done to prevent the commission of crime. Prevention is the main object which it looks forward to. All its energies are in fact directed to this end; and unless they were, it must be obvious that it would fail in its duties towards its members. The great cause of the constitution of society, as I have before repeatedly insisted upon, is, that mutual security may be afforded in the enjoyment of rights which we could not preserve in a state of nature To support the notion of Non-Juriscon--and it therefore follows, that the less sultus, that offences are allowed to be committed upon the payment of the stipulated penalty, it was necessary for him, I think, if he wanted to make use of the fact to prove his view of the question at issue, to shew that the penalty is uniformly paid and the conditions complied with. As this he has not done, it seems to me that if even such were the case, as that of the alternative being offered of abstaining from a particular act, or submitting to a certain penalty, that it avails him nothing, but proves still more conclusively the truth of what I before stated, that the laws of the state are binding upon conscience. He will perhaps reply to me, that the punishment is only to be inflicted upon the discovery of the offence; but that is not the fact. The penalty is awarded upon every transgression of the law, how oftentimes soever it may be repeated, and the transgression is equally heinous, and worthy of the same punishment, whether discovered or not. That it is not discovered, is the fault of the transgressor, and not of the law; and if he supposes, as does your correspondent, that his transgression is only allowable upon particular conditions, he is evidently guilty of a breach of duty, in not revealing his offence, and submitting to the fitting punishment. But I am also accused of being in error, in saying that the penalty inflicted on the transgression of the law, is not an adequate compensation for the civil inconvenience supposed to arise to the state. As your correspondent denies this proposition also, it is well to consider the object which the legislature has in view in awarding punishment. An attention to this point would, I conceive, have been sufficient to convince him of the fallacy under which he labours with respect to it. Now the question is, Does the state, in the infliction of punishment for a want of obedience to its commands, consider merely the benefits which it is likely to receive thereby? Is the end those rights are infringed upon, the object in view in the formation of society is the the better preserved that the more security we are possessed of, the more com pletely is the end proposed answered. If indeed I am protected in the enjoyment of those privileges for which mankind relinquished a state of nature-if I enjoy shelter from violence and oppression,-and if I enjoy tranquillity, secure from the iron grasp of lawless power-and if in an instant I were to be dispossessed of all these advantages, is it possible that any penalty inflicted upon the disturber of my peace can possibly atone either to me or to the state for the wanton wrongs of which I am thus made the subject. Non-Jurisconsultus indeed says, that a benefit arises from the example which is thus afforded of the punishment visited upon the offender. But he forgets that the whole scope and object of the punishment is to prevent the necessity of recurring to these examples. The example necessarily arises from the punishment, and only shews how wisely the Creator has ordained the constitution of human nature, and affords us an additional proof that it is an uniform principle of his government "out of evil still to bring forth good." But the necessity of having recourse to this example is in fact an evil, and there is no one, I am sure, but would willingly forego its benefits for the uninterrupted possession of those rights, the breach of which is the cause of its occurrence. To occasion this example, the laws must be infringed, so that to produce this benefit upon which your correspondent lays so much stress, the great injury is committed which it is the especial object of the law to prevent, and in the prevention of which the whole value of the example consists. To talk then of the benefit of example, when to occasion it all the evil must be performed, which not only the example is to be in some measure the means of remedying, but which the legislature uses every means to suppress, is, I profess, an anomaly in the administration of justice, which I must leave to Non-Jurisconsultus to reconcile, as I am quite unable to do so. But if the doctrine which your correspondent has laid down, that the penalty is an adequate compensation for the offence committed, and that the legislature is in the habit of measuring the degree of the penalty by the probability of its concealment, be true, then I think that the legislature commits an injury in so doing, if I can bring myself to believe the correctness of his assertion. Be it remembered that he insists upon the adequacy of the compensation which the state receives for the violation of its laws. But if such be the case, is it possible that the adequacy or inadequacy of the compensation can depend upon the mere fact of concealment? The transgression is equally injurious in its consequences, whether concealed or not; nor is it possible, I apprehend, that that circumstance can in any respect alter the nature of the crime. It remains for me only to make a few observations with respect to the charge which Non-Jurisconsultus brings against me of falsely accusing Blackstone of being guilty of a petitio principii, and of my having fallen into the error which I have charged upon the judge. As it relates to the first point, it is sufficient to say, in support of my assertion, that Blackstone does not refer, as your correspondent has wrongly stated, to "such things as having been in themselves matters of indifference, are made illegal by the state," but to the thing which when it is forbidden or enjoined is wholly a matter of indifference. Now, I say, that when a thing is forbidden or enjoined, it is not a matter of indifference, but that it is incumbent upon every member of the community to observe the law thus made. It is in this respect that I still insist that the learned judge is in error, and that he has assumed the question in dispute. He says, that the law when enacted may be a matter of indifference, which I deny. He however builds his conclusions upon his assumption, and is therefore chargeable with the accusation which I have brought against him. Again he rests his arguments upon the supposed fact, that the penalty inflicted is an adequate compensation for the civil inconvenience supposed to arise from the offence. This, however, is a mere assumption, and therefore also justifies my censure. I hope, sir, I am not one of those who am would be ashamed to acknowledge their errors, when discovered; but I do assure you, I am at a loss to discover the propriety of the charge which Non-Jurisconsultus brings against me, when he says, that I guilty of the fact charged upon the judge, The sentence, I presume, which he considers sufficient to convict me of a petitio principii, is as follows:-"Take away the punishment which conscience inflicts, how could he obtain retribution for his offences," &c. I should have thought that I might have defied the utmost ingenuity to pervert this expression in the way in which your correspondent has done. I should have supposed, that the most confused and perplexed understanding could not have failed to arrive at the meaning which it was my object to convey. If expressed in other terms, the meaning of the sentence merely is-If conscience do not inflict any punishment, where is the retribution for offences? &c. But does this expression assume the point in dispute? I apprehend not at all. I build no conclusions upon it, nor do I draw any inferences from it. The sentence, indeed, being in the form of an interrogatory, entirely precludes the possibility of my doing so. With respect to the last point insisted upon by my opponent, and which is, that " conscience cannot be bound by legal enactments, unless it can be shewn that legal enactments cannot possibly be miscalculated to the end proposed," I have but a few words to say. I readily admit with him, as I said in my former paper, that if a state enact laws contrary to the laws of God--if to the observance of human enactments it is necessary to lose sight of those more binding rules which the moral law and the law of nature have enforced, then there can be no doubt that individual opinion must be necessarily exercised, and that we are bound to sacrifice all obedience to human authority, if it tends to contradict the more potent commands of nature and revelation. But where a thing is in itself originally indifferent, and the end proposed in its being enjoined or forbidden is the general good, I apprehend that the case of individual opinion, so far as it regards the right which we have to act in conformity with that opinion, does not arise. To suppose that it did, would be at once to let in all that anarchy and confusion which it is the object of society to do away with; for as it not likely that the minds of all the members of the state will agree as to the expediency or inexpediency of every particular measure adopted by it, there would be no end of the occasions which would arise for individuals to resist compliance with the laws of society. I consider this matter so very clear, that it would be a waste of time to dwell upon it, and as the numerous reasons which concur to shew, that in the case supposed, the right of acting in conformity with individual opinion does not arise, must be familiar to the minds of most of your readers, I the more willingly leave the point to their consideration. I have now, sir, replied seriatim to all the arguments which have been urged by your correspondent Non-Jurisconsultus against my view of the question, that mala prohibita are binding upon conscience. Whether I have answered them satisfactorily I must leave to others to decide. I beg to assure him, however, that if I have not done so, it has not been owing to any disposition on my part to pervert his reasoning or to evade its force. I have examined his statements with the utmost candour, nor have I given any meaning to them, but that which I believed he meant to affix to them. I may perhaps have mistaken his meaning, but it certainly has not been designedly. His views, I confess, are to me somewhat novel and singular; and the necessity which I have been under, of multiplying arguments to meet them, have occasioned me to indulge in a more lengthened reply than I otherwise should have done. I have no disposition to renew the controversy, nor is it my intention to contend for the last word, and I must confess that until I find more cogent arguments against my views than I have yet found, I think that my sentiments formerly uttered, will remain unaltered. The discussion has certainly not been unattended with pleasure to me, and it has given me an additional proof of the truth and beauty of Cicero's observation. "Hæc studia adolescentiam alunt, senectutem oblectant, secundas res ornant, adversis perfugium ac solatium præbent, delectant domi, non impediunt foris, pernoctant nobiscum perigrinantur, rusticantur." I am sir, yours very respectfully, past. The footsteps of time have left sufficient traces of his course, which is adorned with monuments of literature, recording and perpetuating the exploits of past genius. Among these monuments w may profitably wander, and read their inscriptions with secret satisfaction. The age itself is also prolific, and seems resolute in its attempts to foil any strokes with which succeeding generations may endeavour to wound its character of ingenuity and intellect; for a variety of new publications are continually passing before us, offering to the student, to the votary of pleasure, and to the son of commerce, all the charms of science and the elegancies of literature. It may perhaps be asked,-"Are all these, vehicles which convey to public notice new discoveries and ideas?' They are not necessarily such; and I conceive it impossible for any one, though doubtless he very properly rejects the Pythagorean creed, to disbelieve the transmigration of ideas. "Quid novi?" is the inquiry of one who thinks that the great pyramid of taste and learning is not inverted,—that the ancients laid its broadest part, which is the foundation, while the moderns are piling up but a few more stones, and thereby sometimes defacing the structure. It is, however, unreasonable to expect that any individual, with the noblest endowments and most cultivated mind, should present the world with nothing but novelty; for this is neither necessary nor to be desired. Ought we to turn away from the established and tried excellencies, the lofty inspiration, and the permanent lustre of ancient genius, that we may please ourselves with the transitory meteors of the day? It would, on the other hand, be an absurd method of proceeding, to estimate the value of an idea by the date of its birth, and not by marks of its inherent character. Genius is oftentimes enchained by the fetters of contemporary modes. A great river has been imagined to flow through a lake with such velocity and impetuous motion as not to commingle waters; not so is it possible for the mind to pass through education and human intercourse, without blending its ideas with those of others, giving up part of its freedom, or feeling in some degree the influence of external agents. I had been amusing myself during the day, with meditations on authors, in a library of some extent. The place had been visited by the eminent of my country, whose productions, among those of poets and philosophers of different ages | and climes, contributed to enrich the collection; and in this abode the love of fame, or the spirit of philanthropy had been in operation, for the delight, profit, and reformation of mankind. On this spot, methought, genius darted a glance into future times, when his own progeny should be sought after here, when learning should have amassed a portion of her riches, and the intellectual powers of man have found their proper instruments. These considerations were interesting. I could bend my attention to no particular study, when reflecting on the generations of those important and influential characters of whom I speak. I returned to my lodgings. During the hours of repose, a recurrence of the images which filled my fancy in the day was experienced; and different combinations of them caused the most curious, and oftentimes the most agreeable visions, to flit in succession before me. As musical sounds are entertained for a considerable time after the instrument from which they were breathed has ceased its vibrations, so sentences and ideas which we have read and admitted to the mind, haunt us like apparitions almost without our consent, and sometimes to our discomfort, till we are compelled to say,—' Rest, rest, perturbed spirit.' I thought that there was stretched before me a plain of great extent, over the middle of which, from one end to the other, was the shadow of a large cloud; other parts also of the plain were enveloped in gloomy darkness. This expanse, which exceeded all my ideas of terrestrial magnitude, and appeared as if the firmament of heaven lay unrolled before my view, elevated my mind above its ordinary state, and imparted an intense feeling of sublimity. My surprise was increased when I saw different parts of the plain occupied by groups of men, some standing, some reclining; all of whom appeared enwrapped in contemplation, or engaged in eager converse with each other. On a more close attention to the scene before me, I observed folios, octavos, and other volumes of various sizes, lying, some open, and 'some clasped, beside the men: manuscripts also were there, wet with tears of by-standers, who manifested great concern for their mouldering condition. A female form now approached me. Her physiognomy was heautiful and grave. I could not help observing the chastity of her manner, and her complete loveliness, which seemed to be nothing else than mirror of the refulgence of her virtue, grace and majesty divine!' Her appearance answered to the fine language of the Mantuan bard. rosea cervice refulsit Ambrosiæque comæ divinum vertice odorem Spiravere, pedes vestis defluxit ad imos. She addressed me," Hast thou a wish to know The First Book?" This question, however strange, was put with so much sweetness of voice and benevolence of manner, that I was not at first much astonished at it. Upon my silence, the question was repeated, and then the strangeness of the idea struck me with full effect. The First Book,' said I, 'would not be of value to any but the curious, and the lovers of antiquity, even if it could be discovered, which I doubt. Experience, time, and refinement are necessary to the birth of what is excellent in knowledge.' 'You are partly mistaken,' answered she. I perceive you are liable to place too low an estimation on Truth. You know that nothing can be more certain than this proposition, "Two and two make four;' and if you consult that immortal work, the Principia, you find that the tides are the effect of attraction. Now there are truths equally certain; and though the first was discovered sooner than the second, yet the existence of each was alike antecedent to any notice or observation of man.' She continued, 'You behold this multitude-they are authors; most of them have derived their excellencies from The First Book, and many have supplied their own works with misquoted and misrepresented passages taken from that book.' Leading me towards a magnificent group of individuals of lofty mien,These,' said she, are the masters of past delight.' In the midst was one upon whom the eyes of the rest were fixed in earnest attention; he appeared blind, but characters of sublimity were read in his visage, and the whole force of genius was concentrated in its expression. His demeanour struck me with awful admiration. One of them, who was diminutive and rather ill-shaped, came near, and seemed willing to answer inquiries. Who's that,' said I, pointing to him in the midst. His |