cases of The King v. St. Laurence, Ludlow, and The King v. St. James, Bury St. Edmonds (3), seem to me to have been properly decided. Those cases decide that a pauper meeting with any accident in a parish is casual poor, and not a person to be removed, and the strong expressions of the Court to be found in these cases must be considered with reference to the particular facts. It is absurd to say, that because a pauper comes into a parish and is chargeable as casual poor, he is not, therefore, removable for the rest of his life. I think that as soon as he is in such a condition of health as that he might go out of the parish, and he chooses rather to remain, I think he must be taken to have made his election to become settled; and so being chargeable, he is removable under the 13 & 14 Car. 2. c. 12.

WIGHTMAN, J.-The circumstances of this case are peculiar, and I have had some doubt. It is difficult to say that a man who has met with an accident in 1847, and afterwards remains in the parish for seven years, does not remain with an intention to gain a settlement. It is also difficult to say that the pauper here might not at some period of the seven years have gone back to Bolney if he had wished. I was struck with the consequence of his being removable to the appellant parish as regards Bolney, the pauper having a status of irremovability in Bolney by reason of five years of residence, but the effect of holding the order bad would be to make him chargeable to the respondent parish for the rest of his life (4).

deeds as between the Isle of Dogs and Greenwich. Down to the year 1850, the use of the ferry appeared to have been exercised between an ancient landing-place in the Isle of Dogs and Garden Stairs opposite, and occasionally one or two other landing-places at Greenwich. Since 1850 a dock and wharf and public road have been constructed by C, in the Isle of Dogs, about 800 yards lower down the river than the said ancient landing-place; before this there was no other convenient way to the river nor any other landing-place than the said ancient landing-place. The society leased their right of ferry to D, who employed M, a freeman of the Watermen and Lightermen's Company, to carry passengers in his skiff. In alleged exercise of the said right, M. carried passengers for hire from C.'s dock and wharf to a point opposite at Greenwich, and not having a licence from the Master, Wardens and Assistants of the said Watermen's Company, as required by the 38th section of the 7 & 8 Geo. 4. c. lxxv, he was convicted in a penalty under the provisions of the said act-Held, first, that section 99. of the said act is not limited by section 101, and extends to except boats plying in the exercise of a right of ferry from the operation of the act; but, secondly, that the right of ferry in question did not extend to the landing-place at C.'s dock and wharf, and therefore that the 99th section did not apply, and M. was, properly convicted.

This was an appeal against a conviction by the above-named respondents of the above-named appellant, under the act of the 7 & 8 Geo. 4. c. lxxv. s. 38, entitled 'An act for the better regulation of the Watermen and Lightermen of the River Thames between Yantlet Creek and Windsor,' for that the said appellant, on the 4th of May, in the sixteenth year of the reign of Her Majesty Queen Victoria, being a freeman of the Company of the Master, Wardens and Commonalty of Watermen and Lightermen of the River Thames, and the owner of a certain boat called a skiff, unlawfully did use and work the said boat, and did carry passengers therein for hire at the parish of St. Alphage, Greenwich, in the county of Kent, on the said river there, between the town of New Windsor, in the county of Berks, and

Yantlet Creek, in the county of Kent aforesaid, without a licence for such purpose for the said boat having been first obtained from the Court of the Master, Wardens and Assistants of the said company, whereby the said appellant was adjudged to pay the sum of 10s. Notice of appeal against the said conviction was duly given by the said appellant to the said respondents for the General Quarter Sessions of the Peace to be holden for the city of London; and by agreement between the parties, and by order of the Honourable Mr. Justice Coleridge, the facts of the case were stated for the opinion of the Court of Queen's Bench, and it was agreed that a judgment in conformity with the decision. of the said Court should be entered on motion by either party at the Quarter Sessions next or next but one after such decision shall have been given.

CASE.

There is an ancient ferry, having legal origin, called Potter's Ferry, for the conveyance of foot-passengers and goods belonging to such foot-passengers from the Isle of Dogs, in the county of Middlesex, to Greenwich, in Kent. There is an ancient landing-place in the Isle of Dogs called and known as Potter's Ferry Landingplace, and the said right of ferry has been exercised between the said ancient landing-place and a place nearly opposite, at Greenwich, called Garden Stairs, and occasionally to the Horseferry and Ship Stairs, or any other landing-place at Greenwich. Upon one or two occasions people were taken off the mud bank in the boats of the Ferry Company at another point of the Isle of Dogs and conveyed across to Greenwich. There is and for many years has existed at the said Potter's Ferry landing-place, in the Isle of Dogs, a ferry stairs, and a causeway leading from the said ferry stairs to the water, at which the boats used in working the said ferry commonly have been and are kept; the trustees for the time being of the Society of Free Watermen of the River Thames residing at Greenwich, in the county of Kent, called "The Isle of Dogs Ferry Society,' are entitled to the fee simple and inheritance of the said ferry called Potter's Ferry. [The title-deeds of the said ferry

and the local statute 52 Geo. 3. c. cxlviii. were referred to as part of the case.]The existence of the said ferry was questioned and tried in the year 1849 in a certain cause of Blacketer v. Gillett (1), tried, in the Court of Common Pleas, at Westminster, when, by the judgment of the said Court, it was adjudged that the said ferry did exist, and that the fee simple thereof was vested in certain trustees for the time being, for the Society of Free Watermen of the river Thames, residing at Greenwich, in the county of Kent, called "The Isle of Dogs Ferry Society." An office copy of the record of the said case is annexed, and may be referred to as part of this case. The said trustees for the time being have always, since 1794, by their servants, licensees, and lessees, or by members of their own body, exercised the said right of ferry up to the date of the conviction of the appellant as above mentioned. They have been accustomed from time to time to demise the said right of ferry; and, on the 25th of February 1853, by an instrument of agreement not under seal, the said trustees, for the time being agreed to let, and one Thomas George Doust, party thereto of the second part, agreed to take the said ferry therein described, as all that ferry or ferry-place, commonly called or known by the name of "Potter's Ferry," situate and being at the Isle of Dogs, in the county of Middlesex, extending over and across the river Thames unto the town of Greenwich, in the county of Kent, and also the right of ferryage from the landing-place, at the point on the Isle of Dogs opposite Greenwich, together with all the profits and advantages of ferryage and wharfage of foot-passengers and goods belonging to such foot-passengers over and across the said river Thames, from the Isle of Dogs aforesaid to Greenwich aforesaid, from the 1st of March next, for one month, and so on from month to month, as mentioned and provided for in the said agreement; and the said T. G. Doust did by the said agreement agree to find and provide all proper and sufficient boats, and a sufficient number of men to work the same, both at the ancient landing-place of the said ferry,

(1) 5 Com. B. Rep. 26; s.c. 19 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) C.P. 307.

as well as at the landing-place at the point opposite Greenwich, on the said Isle of Dogs, and that he would work the said ferry at both the said landing-places as a public ferry for the conveying of foot-passengers and goods belonging to such footpassengers; and it was by the said agreement further agreed that the liberty and right of using the causeway at the said society's landing-place on the said Isle of Dogs was to be reserved to the said trustees of the Potter's Ferry Society, and to the trustees of the Poplar and Greenwich Ferry Road Company, for the purposes of repairing the said causeways, and for landing materials for that purpose, and also for landing gravel and other materials for the repairs of the Poplar and Greenwich Ferry Road, free from any payment to the said T. G. Doust. Since the year 1850, buildings have been erected, and a dock and wharf constructed by William Cubitt on the said Isle of Dogs lower down the river than the said ancient landing-place of the Potter's Ferry, and distant therefrom about eight hundred yards, measuring by land, and a still greater distance by water; and a public road has also been made, leading to the said dock and wharf; and until such buildings, dock, and wharf were constructed and made, there was no other convenient way to, nor any landingplace of any kind for passengers crossing the river, than the said Potter's Ferry landing-place. The said T. G. Doust was at the date of the said instrument, and thence to the period of the conviction of the appellant, a member of the Potter's Ferry Society, and the appellant W. C. Matthews at the time mentioned in the conviction was the servant of the said T. G. Doust, and was then employed by him to ferry foot-passengers from the said Isle of Dogs, in the county of Middlesex, to Greenwich, in the county of Kent, in the exercise of the said right of ferry. On the day mentioned in the conviction the appellant W. C. Matthews carried, in a boat called a skiff, rowed by himself, and of which he was the owner, several persons as passengers, for certain hire and reward, which he then received from each of the said persons, from the said dock and wharf of the said W. Cubitt, in the Isle of Dogs, to a place opposite, at Greenwich, called the NEW SERIES, XXV.-MAG. Cas.

Golden Anchor Stairs, and within the limits of the said act, the said Golden Anchor Stairs being distant from the usual landingplace of the said Potter's Ferry, at Greenwich, called Garden Stairs, opposite the said ancient landing-place, about six hundred yards. No licence for the said skiff had been first obtained by him the said appellant, or by any other person, from the Court of Master, Wardens and Assistants of the said company of "The Master, Wardens and Commonalty of Watermen and Lightermen of the River Thames," under the provisions of the 38th section of the said Act, 7 & 8 Geo. 4. c. lxxv. The said appellant is a freeman of the said company of watermen and lightermen, and was convicted on the oath of John Row, also a freeman of the said company.

If the Court of Queen's Bench should be of opinion that, under all the circumstances of the case, and notwithstanding the 99th section of the before-mentioned statute, the appellant was properly and legally convicted, then the conviction was to remain in full force and effect; but if the Court should be of a contrary opinion, then the said conviction was to be quashed without costs on either side, and a judgment in conformity with the decision of the said Court was to be entered at the sessions next or next but one after such decision.

Scotland, in support of the conviction. Two questions arise in this case. The first is, whether boats plying in the exercise of a right of ferry within the limits of the act are taken out of the operation of the 31st section of the 7 & 8 Geo. 4. c. lxxv., under which the appellant was convicted, by the operation of the 99th section, which provides that nothing in the act "shall extend to and prejudice or affect the rights and privileges to which the owner or owners of any ferry or ferries are now entitled by law." The words of this section cannot have been intended to have so general an operation, for, by the 101st section, a particular exception is made in favour of "ferry boats worked or rowed at any ferry or ferries over or across the said river, at or between the said town of Kingston and any place or places between the same and New Windsor." There would have been no necessity for this special exception, if the 99th section

с

had been intended to apply to ferry boats in all respects. Looking to the other sections of the act, a sensible meaning can be given to both these sections independently of each other. The act contains classes of sections providing for different matters. The earlier sections, to the 37th, refer to the regulation of the Court of the Master, Wardens and Assistants, and to the binding of apprentices. The 37th, 38th, 39th, 40th and 41st sections provide certain regulations as to the working of boats within the limits of the act, for the protection of passengers upon the river. Sections 42, 43, 46, 48, 50, 53, 54, 61, 62, 64, 66, 67, 68, 76. and 77. provide for the appointing of ferries plying on Sundays and regulation of fares, and these latter are provisions which would prejudice and affect the rights and privileges of the owners of ferries, and to which the 99th section may properly be taken as applying. The 101st section is one of several sections containing exceptions as to the working of boats, and must have been intended to refer to the other class of sections which relate to the regulation of boats without, strictly speaking, interfering with the rights and privileges of owners of ferries. The enactment in the 106th section confirms this construction of the 99th section. Secondly, assuming that the 99th section excepts for this purpose the boats of a ferry, the appellant was not in the exercise of a right or privilege to which the owners of the ferry in question were entitled. A right of ferry is in respect of the landingplace-Sav. Rep. 11, and Peter v. Kendal (2). In Peter v. Kendal it is laid down by Bayley, J., that "the owner of a ferry must have a right to land upon both sides." A ferry must also lead to a town or ville or some public place, or communicate with a highway-Com. Dig. tit. 'Action on the Case for a Nuisance.' The termini of a ferry must, therefore, necessarily be fixed, and the right of ferry can. only be co-extensive with the obligation of the owners of the ferry. Here the case shews that there was clearly no right of ferry, except to the point at the ancient landing-place in the Isle of Dogs. There

(2) 6 B. & C. 703; s. c. 5 Law J. Rep. K.B. 282.

is no other evidence of the exercise of the right, and the owners of the ferry could not be compelled to ferry passengers from any other point. The point from which the appellant carried passengers is much below the ancient landing-place. It cannot, therefore, be said that he was in the exercise of the right of ferry. What he did was not even an interference with the right of ferry so as to support an action, supposing the appellant to have acted independently of the owners- -Tripp v. Frank (3), Huzzey v. Field (4). He referred also to Blacketer v. Gillett.

Pigott, contrà.-It seems unnecessary to say anything on the first point. The question whether the appellant was in the exercise of the right of ferry is one for a jury and not for the Court. It would be very inconvenient to try the extent of the limits of the ferry upon a conviction like the present under a penal act.

[LORD CAMPBELL, C.J.-It lies upon. the appellant to shew that he was plying within the limits of the franchise.]

[WIGHTMAN, J.-As far as the appellant is concerned, the limits of the ferry are pointed out; the lease of the ferry defines it as between the lessee and the owners of the ferry.]

The right of ferry from a particular point as described in that lease is merely cumulative.

[COLERIDGE, J.-Suppose the owners of the ferry had a right of ferry from all parts of the Isle of Dogs, but had leased to the appellant the right from a particular point, and he worked the ferry from another point.]

[WIGHTMAN, J.-It appears from the case that, in point of fact, there was no other landing-place in the Isle of Dogs until 1850.]

The Court in this case will hardly bind the owners by a decision as to the extent of their rights.

[LORD CAMPBELL, C.J.-We shall only decide upon the conviction upon the facts stated in the case. The conviction, when affirmed, will be no estoppel upon the owners of the ferry.]

[COLERIDGE, J.-The conviction itself (3) 4 Term Rep. 666.

(4) 2 Cr. M. & R. 432; s. c. 4 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Exch. 239.

shews nothing as to the limits of the ferry; it might have been for plying for hire at Windsor, and if the special case should be put in evidence, it would only be evidence to the extent of the facts there stated.]

Blacketer v. Gillett shews that the right of ferry cannot be limited as contended on the other side. The deeds referred to in the case shew that the right of ferry extends over the whole of the Isle of Dogs. Scotland was not heard in reply.

LORD CAMPBELL, C.J.-I am of opinion that the conviction must be affirmed. As to the first point made by Mr. Scotland, I think it cannot be supported. If Doust was, at the time of the offence, working within the limits of the ferry, and exercising the rights belonging to the owners of the ferry, I am clearly of opinion that he is exempted from this penalty by section 99. That section, in the most express terms, enacts, that nothing in the act contained shall prejudice or affect the rights and privileges to which the owner of any ferry is entitled by law. The English language could not supply more general words. It leaves the rights and privileges of the owners of ferries in all respects just as if the act had not been passed. Some sections follow, which may be inconsistent and unnecessary; but whatever construction is to be put upon them, it is impossible that they can be taken to limit and defeat the effect of section 99, and therefore the rights and privileges of the owners of this ferry remain as if the act had never passed. But, as to the other point, looking to the facts, it is clear that the appellant was not within the limits of the ferry; it is the same as if he had been plying for hire between Westminster Bridge and Lambeth. The trustees let to Doust "all that ferry or ferry-place commonly called or known by the name of Potter's Ferry,' situate and being at the Isle of Dogs, in the county of Middlesex, extending over and across the River Thames unto the town of Greenwich, in the county of Kent, and also the right of ferryage from the landing-place at the point on the Isle of Dogs opposite Greenwich, together with the profits and advantages of ferryage and wharfage of foot-passengers, and goods belonging to such foot-passengers, over

and across the said River Thames from the Isle of Dogs aforesaid to Greenwich aforesaid; the lease is to be construed by the facts stated as to the manner in which the right has been exercised." It is an ancient ferry with "an ancient landing-place in the Isle of Dogs, commonly known as Potter's Ferry landing-place, and the said right of ferry has been exercised between the said ancient landing-place and a place nearly opposite, at Greenwich, called Garden. Stairs,' and occasionally to the Horseferry and Ship Stairs, or any landing-place at Greenwich." And further on it is stated, that the trustees "have been accustomed from time to time to demise the said right of ferry." Upon the facts found, it clearly was a right of ferry from a particular point. in the Isle of Dogs, and did not extend all over the island. It might just as well be claimed to extend down to Gravesend ; there is no distinction between Cubitt's buildings and wharf and twenty miles lower down the river; the appellant, then, was clearly not in the exercise of the right to which the owners of the ferry are entitled, and, consequently, is not within the exemption of section 99. And if not, it is admitted that there was an infraction of section 38. of the statute.

COLERIDGE, J.-I am of the same opinion as to the first ground, on which it is said that the conviction is invalid, in spite of the ingenious argument of Mr. Scotland on sections 99. and 101. with reference to the other sections of the act, and agreeing with him that there is some difficulty in reconciling the sections. Where there is an exempting clause in general terms in a penal act of parliament, we are bound to give a broad construction to it, and not to fritter away the exemption by ingenious arguments derived from the sections of the act.-[His Lordship read the 99th section.]-If the conviction tends to prejudice in any way the rights or privileges to which the owner of any ferry is entitled, it is wrong. If not, it is right. And it is clear that the enactment in question affects the rights of the owners of this ferry. Mr. Pigott says, in the next place, that we ought not to enter into the question, whether the party charged was exercising the right of ferry, and ascertain the disputed extent of the limits of