for this portion of the community we are bound to legislate. When honorable gentlemen inform us we overrate the cruelty and the dangers of slavery, and tell us that their slaves are happy and contented, and would even contribute to their safety, they tell us but very little; they do not tell us that, while their slaves are happy, the slaves of some depraved and cruel wretch in their neighborhood may be stimulated to revenge, and thus involve the country in ruin. If we had to legislate only for such gentlemen as are now embraced within my view, a law against robbing the mail would be a disgrace upon the nation; and, as useless, I would tear it from the pages of your statute book; yet sad experience has taught us the necessity of such laws-and honor, justice, and policy teach us the wisdom of legislating to limit the extension of slavery.

In the zeal to draw sectional contrasts, we have been told by one gentleman, that gentlemen from one district of country talk of their morality, while those of another practice it. And the superior liberality has been asserted of southern gentlemen over those of the north, in all contributions to moral institutions, for bible and missionary societies. Sir, I understand too well the pursuit of my purpose, to be decoyed and drawn off into the discussion of a collateral subject. I have no inclination to controvert these assertions of comparative liberality. Although I have no idea that they are founded in fact, yet, because it better suits the object of my present argument, I will, on this occasion, admit them to the fullest extent. And what is the result? Southern gentlemen, by their superior liberality in contributions to moral institutions, justly stand in the first rank, and hold the first place in the brightest page in the history of our country. But turn over this page, and what do you behold? You behold them contributing to teach the doctrines of Christianity in every quarter of the globe. You behold them legislating to secure the ignorance and stupidity of their own slaves! You behold them prescribing, by law, penalties against the man that dares teach a negro to read. Such is the statute law of the state of Virginia. [Mr. Bassett and Mr. Tyler said that

there was no such law in Virginia.]

No, said Mr. T., I have mis-spoken myself; I ought to have said, such is the statute law of the state of Georgia. Yes, while we hear of a liberality which civilizes the savages of all countries, and carries the gospel alike to the Hottentot and the Hindoo, it has been reserved for the republican state of Georgia, not content with the care of its overseers, to legislate to secure the oppression and the ignorance of their slaves. The man who there teaches a negro to read is liable to a criminal prosecution. The dark, benighted beings of all creation profit by our liberality-save those of our own plantations. Where is the missionary who possesses sufficient hardihood to venture a residence to teach the slaves of a plantation? Here is the stain! Here is the stigma! which fastens upon the character of our country; and which, in the appropriate language of the gentleman from Georgia, (Mr. Cobb,) all the waters of the ocean cannot wash out; which seas of blood can only take away.

Sir, there is yet another, and an important point of view, in which this sub

ject ought to be considered. We have been told by those who advocate the extension of slavery into the Missouri, that any attempt to control this subject by legislation is a violation of that faith and mutual confidence upon which our Union was formed, and our constitution adopted. This argument might be considered plausible if the restriction was attempted to be enforced against any of the slaveholding states which had been a party in the adoption of the constitution. But it can have no reference or application to a new district of country recently acquired, and never contemplated in the formation of government, and not embraced in the mutual concessions and declared faith upon which the constitution was adopted. The constitution provides that the representatives of the several states to this house shall be according to their number, including three-fifths of the slaves in the respective states. This is an important benefit yielded to the slaveholding states, as one of the mutual sacrifices for the Union. On this subject, I consider the faith of the Union pledged, and I never would attempt coercive manumission in a slaveholding state. But none of these causes which induced the sacrifice of this principle, and which now produce such an unequal representation on this floor, of the free population of the country, exist as between us and the newly-acquired territory across the Mississippi. That portion of country has no claims to such an unequal representation, unjust in its results upon the other states. Are the numerous slaves in extensive countries, which we may acquire by purchase, and admit as states into the Union, at once to be represented on this floor, under a clause of the constitution, granted as a compromise and a benefit to the southern states which had borne part in the revolution? Such an extension of that clause in the constitution would be unjust in its operations, unequal in its results, and a violation of its original intention. Abstract from the moral effects of slavery, its political consequences in the representation under this clause of the constitution, demonstrate the importance of the proposed amendment.

Sir, I shall bow in silence to the will of the majority, on whichever side it shall be expressed; yet I confidently hope that majority will be found on the side of an amendment, so replete with moral consequences, so pregnant with important political results.

Mr. Scott, of Missouri, said he trusted that his conduct, during the whole of the time in which he had the honor of a seat in the house, had convinced gentlemen of his disposition not to obtrude his sentiments on any other subjects. than those on which the interest of his constituents, and of the territory he represented, were immediately concerned. But when a question such as the amendments proposed by the gentlemen from New York, (Messrs. Tallmadge and Taylor,) was presented for consideration, involving constitutional principles to a vast amount, pregnant with the future fate of the territory, portending destruction to the liberties of that people, directly bearing on their rights of property, their state rights, their all, he should consider it a dereliction of his duty, as retreating from his post, nay, double criminality, did he not raise his voice against their adoption. After the many able and luminous views that had been taken of this subject, by the speaker of the house, and other honorable gentle

men, he had not the vanity to suppose that any additional views which he could offer, or any new dress in which he could clothe those already advanced, would have the happy tendency of inducing any gentleman to change his vote. But, if he stood single on the question, and there was no man to help him, yet, while the laws of the land and the rules of the house guaranteed to him the privilege of speech, he would redeem his conscience from the imputation of having silently witnessed a violation of the constitution of his country, and an infringement on the liberties of the people who had intrusted to his feeble abil ities the advocation of their rights. He desired, at this early stage of his remarks, in the name of the citizens of Missouri territory, whose rights on other subjects had been too long neglected and shamefully disregarded, to enter his solemn protest against the introduction, under the insidious form of amendment, of any principle in this bill, the obvious tendency of which would be to sow the seeds of discord in, and perhaps eventually endanger the Union.

Mr. S. entertained the opinion that, under the constitution, congress had not the power to impose this, or any other restriction, or to require of the people of Missouri their assent to this condition, as a pre-requisite to their admission into the Union. He contended this from the language of the constitution itself, from the practice in the admission of new states under that instrument, and from the express terms of the treaty of cession. The short view he intended to take of those points would, he trusted, be satisfactory to all those who were not so anxious to usurp power as to sacrifice to its attainment the • principles of our government, or who were not desirous of prostrating the rights and independence of a state to chimerical views of policy or expediency. The authority to admit new states into the Union was granted in the third section of the fourth article of the constitution, which declared that "new states may be admitted by the congress into the Union." The only power given to the congress by this section appeared to him to be that of passing a law for the admission of the new state, leaving it in possession of all the rights, privileges, and immunities enjoyed by the other states; the most valuable and prominent of which was that of forming and modifying their own state constitution, and over which congress had no superintending control, other than that expressly given in the fourth section of the same article, which read, "the United States shall guarantee to every state in this Union a republican form of government." This end accomplished, the guardianship of the United States over the constitutions of the several states was fulfilled; and all restrictions, limitations, and conditions beyond this, was so much power unwarrantably assumed. In illustration of this position, he would read an extract from one of the essays written by the late President Madison, contemporaneously with the constitution of the United States, and from a very celebrated work: "In a confederacy founded on republican principles, and composed of republican members, the superintending government ought clearly to possess authority to defend the system against aristocratic or monarchical innovations. The more intimate the nature of such a union may be, the greater interest have the members in the political institutions of each other, and the greater right to insist that the forms

of government under which the compact was entered into, should be substantially maintained. But this authority extends no further than to a guarantee of a republican form of government, which supposes a preëxisting government of the form which is to be guaranteed. As long, therefore, as the existing republican forms are continued by the states, they are guaranteed by the federal constitution. Whenever the states may choose to substitute other republican forms, they have a right to do so, and to claim the federal guarantee for the latter. The only restriction imposed on them is, that they shall not exchange republican for anti-republican constitutions; a restriction which, it is presumed, will hardly be considered as a grievance."

Mr. S. thought that those two clauses, when supported by such high authority, had they been the only ones in the constitution which related to the powers of the general government over the states, and particularly at their formation and adoption into the Union, could not but be deemed satisfactory to a reasonable extent; but there were other provisions in the constitution, to which he would refer, that beyond all doubt, to his mind, settled the question. One of those was the tenth article in the amendments, which said that "the powers not delegated to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively or to the people." He believed that, by common law and common usage, all grants giving certain defined and specific privileges or powers, were to be so construed as that no others should be intended to be given but such as were particularly enumerated in the instruments themselves, or indispensably necessary to carry into effect those designated. In no part of the constitution was the power proposed to be exercised, of imposing conditions on a new state, given, either in so many words, or by any justifiable or fair inference; nor in any portion of the constitution was the right prohibited to the respective states to regulate their own internal police, of admitting such citizens as they pleased, or of introducing any description of property that they should consider as essential or necessary to their prosperity; and the framers of that instrument seem to have been zealous, lest, by implication or by inference, powers might be assumed by the general gov ernment over the states and people, other than those expressly given: hence they reserve in so many terms to the states and the people, all powers not delegated to the federal government. The ninth article of the amendments to the constitution still further illustrated the position he had taken; it read that "the enumeration in the constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." Mr. S. believed it to be a just rule of interpretation, that the enumeration of powers delegated to congress weakened their authority in all cases not enumerated; and that beyond those powers enumerated they had none, except they were essentially necessary to carry into effect those that were given. The second section of the fourth article of the constitution, which declared that "the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states," was satisfactory, to his judgment, that it was intended the citizens of each state, forming a part of one harmonious whole, should have, in

all things, equal privileges; the necessary consequence of which was, that every man, in his own state, should have the same rights, privileges, and powers, that any other citizen of the United States had in his own state; otherwise discontent and murmurings would prevail against the general government who had deprived him of the equality.

For example, if the citizens of Pennsylvania, or Virginia, enjoyed the right, in their own state, to decide the question whether they would have slavery or not, the citizens of Missouri, to give them the same privileges, must have the same right to decide whether they would or would not tolerate slavery in their state; if it were otherwise, then the citizens of Pennsylvania and Virginia would have more rights, privileges, and powers in their respective states, than the citizens of Missouri would have in theirs. Mr. Scott said he would make another quotation from the same work he had before been indebted to, which . he believed had considerable bearing on this question. "The powers delegated by the proposed constitution to the federal government, are few and defined; those which are to remain in the state governments, are numerous and indefinite; the former will be exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce, with which last the powers of taxation will, for the most part, be connected. The powers reserved to the several states will extend to all the objects, which in the ordinary course of affairs concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the state." The applicability of this doctrine to the question under consideration was so obvious, that he would not detain the house to give examples, but leave it for gentlemen to make the application. He would, however, make one other reference to the constitution, before he proceeded to speak of the practice under it; in the second section of that instrument it was provided, that "representatives, and direct taxes, shall be apportioned among the several states which may be included within this Union, according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other persons." This provision was not restricted to the states then formed, and about to adopt the constitution; but to all those states which might be included within this Union, clearly contemplating the admission of new states thereafter, and providing, that to them, also, should this principle of representation and taxation equally apply. Nor could he subscribe to the construction, that as this part of the constitution was matter of compromise, it was to be limited in its application to the original states only, and not to be extended to all those states that might after its adoption become members of the federal Union; and a practical exposition had been made by congress of this part of the constitution, in the admission of Kentucky, Louisiana, and Mississippi states, all of whom were slaveholding states, and to each of them this principle had been. extended.

Mr. Scott believed, that the practice under the constitution had been different from that now contended for by gentlemen; he was unapprised of any