"Nor are we exempt from its disorganizing effects. We now begin to experience the danger of admitting so great an error to have a place in the declaration of our independence. For a long time it lay dormant; but in process of time it began to germinate, and produce its poisonous fruits. It had strong hold on the mind of Jefferson, the author of that document, which caused him to take an utterly false view of the subordinate relation of the black to the white race in the south; and to hold, in consequence, that the latter, though utterly unqualified to possess liberty, were as fully entitled to both liberty and equality as the former; and that to deprive them of it was unjust and immoral. To this error, his proposition to exclude slavery from the territory northwest of the Ohio may be traced, and to that the ordinance of 1787, and through it the deep and dangerous agitation which now threatens to engulf, and will certainly engulf, if not speedily settled, our political institutions, and involve the country in countless woes."

The house bill providing a government for Oregon was passed by that body on the second of August, 129 to 71. It contained a provision for extending the ordinance of 1787 over the territory. The bill passed the senate on the

13th August the session closing the next day.

The following letter from Gen. Cass to A. O. P. Nicholson, appeared during the winter of 1847-8. It is regarded as the first well considered enunciation of squatter sovereignty:

WASHINGTON, December 24, 1847.

DEAR SIR: I have received your letter, and shall answer it as frankly as it is written.

You ask me whether I am in favor of the acquisition of Mexican territory, and what are my sentiments with regard to the Wilmot proviso.

I have so often and so explicitly stated my views of the first question, in the senate, that it seems almost unnecessary to repeat them here. As you request it, however, I shall briefly give them.

I think, then, that no peace should be granted to Mexico, till a reasonable indemnity is obtained for the injuries which she has done us. The territorial extent of this indemnity is, in the first instance, a subject of executive consideration. There the constitution has placed it, and there I am willing to leave it not only because I have full confidence in its judicious exercise, but because, in the ever-varying circumstances of a war, it would be indiscreet, by a public declaration, to commit the country to any line of indemnity, which might other wise be enlarged, as the obstinate injustice of the enemy prolongs the contest, with its loss of blood and treasure.

It appears to me, that the kind of metaphysical magnanimity which would reject all indemnity at the close of a bloody and expensive war, brought on by a direct attack upon our troops by the enemy, and preceded by a succession of unjust acts for a series of years, is as unworthy of the age in which we live, as it is revolting to the common sense and practice of mankind. It would conduce but little to our future security, or, indeed, to our present reputation, to declare that we repudiate all expectation of compensation from the Mexican

TO A. O. P. NICHOLSON.

government, and are fighting, not for any practical result, but for some vague, perhaps philanthropic object, which escapes my penetration, and must be defined by those who assume this new principle of national intercommunication. All wars are to be deprecated, as well by the statesman as by the philanthropist. They are great evils; but there are greater evils than these, and submission to injustice is among them. The nation which should refuse to defend its rights and its honor, when assailed, would soon have neither to defend; and, when driven to war, it is not by professions of disinterestedness and declarations of magnanimity that its rational objects can be best obtained, or other nations. taught a lesson of forbearance-the strongest security for a permanent peace. We are at war with Mexico, and its vigorous prosecution is the surest means of its speedy termination, and ample indemnity the surest guaranty against the recurrence of such injustice as provoked it.

The Wilmot proviso has been before the country for some time. It has been repeatedly discussed in congress, and by the public press. I am strongly impressed with the opinion, that a great change has been going on in the public mind upon this subject, in my own as well as others; and that doubts are resolving themselves into convictions, that the principle it involves should be kept out of the national legislature, and left to the people of the confederacy in their respective local governments.

The whole subject is a comprehensive one, and fruitful of important conseIt would be ill-timed to discuss it here. I shall not assume that re quences. sponsible task, but shall confine myself to such general views as are necessary to the fair exhibition of my opinions.

We may well regret the existence of slavery in the southern states, and wish they had been saved from its introduction. But there it is, not by the act of the present generation; and we must deal with it as a great practical question, We have neither the right nor involving the most momentous consequences.

the power to touch it where it exists; and if we had both, their exercise, by any means heretofore suggested, might lead to results which no wise man would willingly encounter, and which no good man could contemplate without anxiety.

The theory of our government presupposes that its various members have reserved to themselves the regulation of all subjects relating to what may be termed their internal police. They are sovereign within their boundaries, except in those cases where they have surrendered to the general government a portion of their rights, in order to give effect to the objects of the Union, whether these concern foreign nations or the several states themselves. Local institutions, if I may so speak, whether they have reference to slavery or to any other relations, domestic or public, are left to local authority, either original or derivative. Congress has no right to say that there shall be slavery in New York, or that there shall be no slavery in Georgia; nor is there any other human power, but the people of those states, respectively, which can change the relations existing therein; and they can say, if they will, 'we will have slavery in the former, and we will abolish it in the latter.'

In various respects, the territories differ from the states. Some of their

rights are inchoate, and they do not possess the peculiar attributes of sovereignty. Their relation to the general government is very imperfectly defined by the constitution; and it will be found, upon examination, that in that instrument the only grant of power concerning them is conveyed in the phrase, "congress shall have the power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory and other property belonging to the United States." Certainly this phraseology is very loose, if it were designed to include in the grant the whole power of legislation over persons, as well as things. The expression, the "territory and other property," fairly construed, relates to the public lands, as such; to arsenals, dockyards, forts, ships, and all the various kinds of property which the United States may and must possess.

But surely the simple authority to dispose of and regulate these does not extend to the unlimited power of legislation; to the passage of all laws, in the most general acceptation of the word; which, by-the-by, is carefully excluded from the sentence. And, indeed, if this were so, it would render unnecessary another provision of the constitution, which grants to Congress the power to legislate, with the consent of the states, respectively, over all places purchased for the "erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards,” etc. These being the property of the United States, if the power to make “needful rules and regulations concerning" them includes the general power of legislation, then the grant of authority to regulate "the territory and other property of the United States" is unlimited, wherever subjects are found for its operation, and its exercise needed no auxiliary provisision. If, on the other hand, it does not include such power of legislation over the "other property" of the United States, then it does not include it over their “territory;” for the same terms which grant the one, grant the other. "Territory" is here classed with property, and treated as such; and the object was evidently to enable the general government, as a property-holder-which, from necessity it must be--to manage, preserve and "dispose of" such property as it might possess, and which authority is essential almost to its being. But the lives and persons of our citizens, with the vast variety of objects connected with them, cannot be controlled by an authority which is merely called into existence for the purpose of making rules and regulations for the disposition and management of property.

Such, it appears to me, would be the construction put upon this provision of the constitution, were this question now first presented for consideration, and not controlled by imperious circumstances. The original ordinance of the congress of the confederation, passed in 1787, and which was the only act upon this subject in force at the adoption of the constitution, provided a complete frame of government for the country north of the Ohio, while in a territorial condition, and for its eventual admission in separate states into the Union. And the persuasion that this ordinance contained within itself all the necessary means of execution, probably prevented any direct reference to the subject in the constitution, further than vesting in congress the right to admit the states formed under it into the Union. However, circumstances arose which required

TO. A. O. P. NICHOLSON.

legislation, as well over the territory north of the Ohio as over other territory, both within and without the original Union, ceded to the general government, and, at various times, a more enlarged power has been exercised over the territories-meaning thereby the different territorial governments-than is conHow far an existing necessity may veyed by the limited grant referred to. have operated in producing this legislation, and thus extending, by rather a violent implication, powers not directly given, I know not. But certain it is that the principle of interference should not be carried beyond the necessary implication which produces it. It should be limited to the creation of proper governments for new countries, acquired or settled, and to the necessary provision for their eventual admission into the Union; leaving, in the meantime, the people inhabiting them, to regulate their internal concerns in their own way. They are just as capable of doing so as the people of the states; and they can do so, at any rate as soon as their political independence is recognized by admission into the Union. During this temporary condition, it is hardly expedient to call into exercise a doubtful and invidious authority, which questions the intelligence of a respectable portion of our citizens, and whose limitation, whatever it may be, will be rapidly approaching its termination—an auif thority which would give to congress despotic power, uncontrolled by the constitution, over most important sections of our common country. For, the relation of master and servant may be regulated or annihilated by its legislation, so may the regulation of husband and wife, of parent and child, and of any other condition which our institutions and the habits of our society recognize. What would be thought if congress should undertake to prescribe the terms of marriage in New York, or to regulate the authority of parents over. their children in Pennsylvania? It would be vain to seek an argument justifying the interference of the national legislature in the cases referred to in the original states of the Union. I speak here of the inherent power of congress, and do not touch the question of such contracts as may be formed with new states when admitted into the confederacy.

Of all the questions that can agitate us, those which are merely sectional in their character are the most dangerous, and the most to be deprecated. The warning voice of him who from his character and services and virtue had the best right to warn us, proclaimed to his countrymen, in his farewell address, that monument of wisdom for him, as I hope it will be of safety for them, how much we had to apprehend from measures peculiarly affecting geographical sections of our country. The grave circumstances in which we are now placed make these words words of safety; for I am satisfied, from all I have seen and heard here, that a successful attempt to engraft the principles of the Wilmot proviso upon the legislation of this government, and to apply them to new territory, should new territory be acquired, would seriously affect our tranquili ty. I do not suffer myself to foresee or to foretell the consequences that would ensue; for I trust and believe there is good sense and good feeling enough in the country to avoid them, by avoiding all occasions which might lead to them. Briefly, then, I am opposed to the exercise of any jurisdiction by congress

over this matter; and I am in favor of leaving to the people of any territory, which may be hereafter acquired, the right to regulate it for themselves, under the general principles of the constitution. Because

1. I do not see in the constitution any grant of the requisite power to congress; and I am not disposed to extend a doubtful precedent beyond its necessity-the establishment of territorial governments when needed-leaving to the inhabitants all the rights compatible with the relations they bear to the confederation.

2. Because I believe this measure, if adopted, would weaken, if not impair, the union of the states; and would sow the seeds of future discord, which would grow up and ripen into an abundant harvest of calamity.

3. Because I believe a general conviction that such a proposition would succeed, would lead to an immediate witholding of the supplies, and thus to a dishonorable termination of the war. I think no dispassionate observer at the seat of government can doubt this result.

4. If, however, in this I am under a misapprehension, I am under none in the practical operation in this restriction, if adopted by congress, upon a treaty of peace, making any acquisition of Mexican territory. Such a treaty would be rejected as certainly as presented to the senate. More than onethird of that body would vote against it, viewing such a principle as an exclusion of the citizens of the slaveholding states from a participation in the benefits acquired by the treasure and exertions of all, and which should be common to all. I am repeating-neither advancing nor defending these views. That branch of the subject does not lie in my way, and I shall not turn aside to seek it.

In this aspect of the matter, the people of the United States must choose between this restriction and the extension of their territorial limits. They cannot have both; and which they will surrender must depend upon their representatives first, and then, if these fail them, upon themselves.

5. But after all, it seems to be generally conceded that this restriction, if carried into effect, could not operate upon any state to be formed from newlyacquired territory. The well-known attributes of sovereignty, recognized by us as belonging to the state governments, would sweep before them any such barrier, and would leave the people to express and exert their will at pleasure. Is the object, then, of temporary exclusion for so short a period as the duration of the territorial governments, worth the price at which it would be purchased?-worth the discord it would engender, the trial to which it would expose our union, and the evils that would be the certain consequence, let the trial result as it might? As to the course, which has been intimated, rather than proposed, of engrafting such a restriction upon any treaty of acquisition, I persuade myself it would find but little favor in any portion of this country. Such an arrangement would render Mexico a party, having a right to interfere in our internal institutions in questions left by the constitution to the state governments, and would inflict a serious blow upon our fundamental principles. Few, indeed, I trust, there are among us who would thus grant to a foreign