agricultural output did in the first years after the Revolution. Part of the reason, according to the Economic Transformation of Cuba by Boorstein, was that those new plants that were installed were often inappropriate, inefficient, and even counterproductive. One of the more extreme examples was a plant for making jute sacks; after its installation it was discovered that the cost of buying and transporting raw jute to Cuba was greater than the value of the finished sacks. It would have been cheaper to continue importing the finished sacks. Most of the new industrial experiments were somewhat more successful, but in most cases little consideration was given to the cost of raw materials or to the manner in which the new installations would mesh with the economy.

More significantly, the countries that had signed agreements to provide factories slowed down deliveries, presumably because of growing doubts about the practicality of the industrialization plans. By January 1963 less than eleven of the proposed new factories had been completed; most of these were quite small, and their overall effect on levels of production and employment was negligible.

By the end of 1961 the nation's stock of spare parts and finished industrial products was seriously depleted, and it was becoming necessary to run some plants at reduced capacity and to dismantle others for spare parts in order to keep the remainder operating. One of the sectors hardest hit was the sugar industry, partly the result of the low priority assigned sugar and other exports in the early years of the regime. In March 1962 the government announced that six mills in Camagüey were unable to operate and that twenty mills were operating so inefficiently that they might not be used in the next harvest if needed spare parts were not obtained.

In addition, raw materials from new sources were causing trouble. The petroleum refining industry, for example, had trouble adapting its equipment to the high sulfur content of Soviet crude oil.

The shortage of industrial managers and technicians also reduced output and limited the possibilities for expansion. So extreme was this shortage that the nation's complex detergent plant was run for a time by a former physician who happened to know some chemistry. In some instances trained foreign personnel were brought in to help run industries, but where they were not present there was generally little trained administrative or technical talent available. As a consequence of all the problems, industrial production did not rise in the 1959-63 period, and in most sectors output declined significantly. This resulted in a continuing unbalanced drain on the goods and services provided by the Soviet Union and other Communist countries. At least as far as Cuba's backers were concerned this was an untenable state of affairs, and a major policy reversal eventually resulted. The situation reached a head in late 1962, and it was finally announced, in August 1963, that emphasis would henceforth

be placed on agricultural export products rather than on industrialization and import substitution.

Following the government's renewed emphasis on agriculture and exports, the sugar industry and other agriculture-related activities slowly began to recover. There were also noteworthy upsurges in the oil and nickel industries, where high levels of government spending and foreign assistance were maintained. As was to be expected, those industries that received least attention and showed least improvement were those not related in any way to production for export.

There were, however, some notable exceptions. Power-generating capacity increased significantly between 1965 and 1969, and high levels of construction were evident in planned port facilities, factories, and power plants. The government appeared to be assigning a fairly high priority to basic industries related indirectly to export activities and other types of industrial production. By contrast, there was no evidence of any emphasis on consumption-oriented industries, and the level of output of these activities remained extremely low. Definite data is not available, but rationing levels indicate most consumer-oriented industries probably did not keep pace with population growth between 1962 and the end of the decade.

EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES

Mining has never been of major importance to the economy, and the value produced by it has generally remained well below 1 percent of total national income. The reason for this is a serious shortage of readily exploitable metal and fuel resources. Coal is absent, and the very limited petroleum resources available up to 1970 have never supplied more than a small fraction of domestic demand. Extraordinarily large reserves of nickel and iron ores exist, but their extraction and isolation has presented serious technical problems. The economic uncertainty and reorganizations of the postrevolutionary period adversely affected the extractive industries, but most indicators point toward substantial recovery during the years 1963 through 1969. In particular, the output of nickel, by far the most important product in terms of value, was apparently well above prerevolutionary levels at the end of this period, and petroleum production was being maintained well above levels of the 1959-62 period. These two products have been placed high on the government's list of priorities; other types of mineral production seem to have made progress, but were not known to be receiving any unusually large share of official attention or investment.

Metallic Minerals

Nickel and Cobalt

Cuba's nickel reserves are among the largest in the world, being estimated before the Revolution at over 4 million metric tons of pure metal (see ch. 2, Physical Environment). They are difficult to exploit, however, because the nickel ore is associated with other metals-notably iron, chrome, and cobalt-and its extraction is therefore an involved and expensive operation.

Nickel was not exploited until 1943, when the United States government-financed plant at Levisa Bay, run by the Nicaro Nickel Company, commenced operations. Production reached a peak of approximately 20,000 metric tons of nickel in oxide in 1957 but, since intervention by the Cuban government in 1959, the total output of nickel in oxide has run considerably below the plant's theoretical capacity, averaging approximately 15,000 metric tons a year (see table 10).

Overall nickel production was expanded considerably between 1962 and 1969 by the opening of a new extraction plant at Moa Bay in northern Oriente Province. Commercial production of nickel (in sulfide) began in 1962 and output gradually increased to approximately 11,500 metric tons in 1967. The plant's initially planned capacity of 22,500 metric tons per year has never been approached, but total nickel production reached 33,400 metric tons in 1968. Table 10. Cuban Metallic Mineral Production, 1953-671

1

2 Exports.

In thousand metric tons except cobalt and manganese, which are in metric tons.

3 United States imports from Cuba.

Skyrocketing world nickel prices caused heavy emphasis on production in 1969.

Neither the ammonia-leach process used at Levisa Bay nor the acid-leach process employed at Moa Bay provides any way for exploiting the vast quantities of iron and considerable amounts of chrome found in the laterite ore from which the nickel is extracted; these ores contain roughly 40 to 50 percent iron by weight. The Moa Bay process, however, does permit extraction of recoverable cobalt in sulfide, and since 1962 it has provided the basis for a small amount of cobalt production. This output has generally averaged a little less than 10 percent of Moa Bay nickel production, apparently reaching approximately 1,000 metric tons of recoverable cobalt in sulfide in 1967.

Iron

The nation's iron reserves are truly immense, but the problems of extraction and purification are even greater than in the case of nickel. Total iron reserves have been estimated at 3.5 billion tons, or over 5 percent of total world reserves. The major drawback is that the vast majority of these reserves are badly contaminated with nickel, cobalt, alumina, and chrome; no way has been devised to remove these contaminants at less than prohibitive cost.

As a result, Cuban iron production has generally depended on relatively small deposits of less contaminated ore. Output from this type of mining has decreased steadily since 1920, and Cuban government reports indicate iron-ore production during the 1959-69 period was negligible, never exceeding 2,500 metric tons per year.

Chromite

The country has abundant supplies of chromite, a major ore of chromium containing iron and oxygen, and became the world's second-largest chromite producer during World War II. Subsequently, competition with lower cost producers in other areas caused production to drop precipitously, though large amounts of chromite are still mined. The ore deposits, varying in size from small knots to bodies with over 200,000 tons of ore, are found all along the north coast; however, virtually all of the ore extracted in the mid-1960s appears to have come from the rich deposits in the Moa-Baracoa area of Oriente Province.

Manganese

Spurred on by high United States demand during the Korean conflict, the country in the 1950s became the Western Hemisphere's second largest producer of manganese, turning out a peak

of 258,000 metric tons of ore in 1955. As in the case of chromite, however, manganese production plummeted after the war. Problems in manganese mining stem from the low-grade nature of the ore, its location in small pockets, high transportation costs, and a shortage of concentration facilities. During the mid-1960s the largest mine, the Charco Redondo-which is located south of Bayamo-was reported operating at about one-fifth of its peak level of the 1950s, and this appeared fairly typical of manganese extraction activity throughout the country.

Copper and Other Metals

Copper is the nation's second metal in terms of production value. Extraction of the metal dates back over 400 years, and during the nineteenth century Cuba ranked third among the world's copperproducing countries; however, major known deposits had given out well before World War II. Since that time the Matahambre Mines in Pinar del Río Province have been the major source of the metal. The Matahambre Mines possess a modern concentrating plant that is capable of processing over 1,200 metric tons of copper ore per day. Overall, copper production seems to have slipped somewhat since nationalization of the Matahambre Mines in 1960, apparently averaging about 6,000 metric tons of metal in concentrate annually.

An interesting feature of the copper industry is the fact that significant amounts of the metal are obtained from pyrite deposits in Pinar del Río Province. These deposits, mined primarily for their copper content, are also a source of sulfur and of small amounts of lead, zinc, gold, and silver.

It has been reported that 100 metric tons of zinc, 4 metric tons of silver and about 1,000 ounces of gold were produced in 1960, the last year in which comprehensive statistics for these metals are available. Tungsten and antimony are known to exist, but as of 1969 none of the deposits appeared to provide a basis for production on any significant scale.

Nonmetallic Minerals

In terms of number of persons employed and value of output, production of nonmetallic minerals-particularly limestones and clays may well exceed that of all the metallic minerals combined. Reliable statistics are difficult to obtain, however, because output is primarily directed toward local consumption rather than foreign markets. Limestones (including marble), clays, gypsum, and sulfur constitute the more important nonmetallic minerals; exploitable deposits of barite and magnesite also exist, along with a small amount of silica sand; significant amounts of salt are produced by evaporation of sea water (see table 11).