sures ill conducted, we may still entertain some hope, because our errors may be corrected, and the losses from our misconduct retrieved. I have often had occasion to employ this argument, and I know it has been said in reply, that the argument is good when carried to an extreme, but that the natural imperfection common to every man renders it inconclusive in any other case. But when the misconduct was of such a nature as to be capable of being remedied, when the mismanagement was such as ought to be avoided, it showed that the argument was true in a degree, as well as true in the extreme. This I state

as a motive against despair; and I contend, that upon the face of the thing, when we compare the situation to which we are now reduced, with that which we held four years ago, there is ground for presumption, that the change has been in a great measure owing to errors in the conduct of those who have had the management of public affairs. In a survey of the past, the period to which we are naturally apt to recur is the period of the commencement of the war. If we could consider in one debate every particular of the external and internal situation of the country, and more especially the effects which the measures that have been adopted have had on its constitution, we might go farther back; but this would involve a detail too extensive for the discussion of a single night, a field too large for the capacity of the speaker.

I now come to the period at which we began to take an active part in the contest. When our armies first appeared in the field, the enemy were forced to retire from the territories which they had occupied ; they were completely driven out of the Netherlands, and we were in possession of almost all French Flanders. At this period, it was reported that a person of the name of Maret made proposals for peace, on the part of the French, which were not listened to by his majesty's ministers. Why, then, I ask, did you not make peace at this prosperous juncture? when the enemy were defeated in every battle, when they were driven from the frontiers of our allies which they

had occupied; when we had made a considerable impression upon French Flanders; when, excepting Savoy, they had not one foot of land belonging to our allies, and when they might have been disposed to purchase terms of peace by a considerable sacrifice of territory? Why did we not make peace in these circumstances? Why, because the system on which ministers had set out was deserted; because you no longer confined your views to the security of your allies, but, infatuated with success, you began to seek for indemnity. The declining to negociate at this period, I set down as a principal cause of all our succeeding calamities.

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I cannot help remarking, that there has been a good deal of inconsistency in the mode of arguing adopted by those who have been adverse to negociation. When the French were successful, I was asked-What! would you humble the country so far as to beg peace from the enemy, in the moment of her victories? and when the allies were successful in their turn, I was told, that we must not treat at a time when our armies were every where triumphant, and when nothing but disgrace and defeat marked the progress of the enemy; that then was the period to avail ourselves of our good fortune, and reap the fruits of our victories. It was even at one time thought advisable to push our victories so far as to march to Paris. Upon the project of effecting a counter-revolution in France, having said so much on former occasions, I shall not enlarge now. The great defect in the management of the war, however, has, in my opinion, been the want of a determinate object for which you have been contending. You have neither carried on war for the purpose of restoring monarchy in France, nor with a view to your own advantage. While the emperor in Alsace was taking towns in the name of the King of Hungary, your were taking Valenciennes for the emperor-proclaiming the constitution of 1791 at Toulon-and taking possession of Martinique for the King of Great Britain. What has been the consequence of this want of object? You have converted France into an armed nation-you

have given to her rulers the means of marshalling all the strength of the kingdom against you. The royalists in France, also, so little understood your intentions, that they did not join you; and the reason is obvious they did not know whether you were at war for the purpose of re-establishing the ancient monarchy of France, or for the purpose of aggrandizing yourselves, by robbing France of her territories. It might then have been imagined that we would have endeavoured to conciliate the body of constitutionalists. No such thing. We had acted so as to give the impression that we were desirous to show our enmity towards that body of men. The unfortunate De la Fayette, who deserved the praise of being a man of the most uncorrupted nature, who had the merit of steering between the two extremes of the parties that agitated this country; this firm, brave, and steady friend of his sovereign, this gallant and distinguished gentleman, equally the friend of his king. and his country, emigrated after the 10th of August. Upon neutral ground, he was seized by certain robbers in the service of the King of Prussia; he was kept by that monarch for years in prisons and dungeons. It might have been thought, if you had been desirous to conciliate this body of men, whose constitution you announced at Toulon, that you would at least have made a point of procuring the enlargement of this estimable character. It might have been thought, that in return for an enormous subsidy, the King of Prussia could not hesitate at the enlargement of one prisoner. But when a motion on the subject was made by my right honourable friend (General Fitzpatrick) it was said that it was impossible for this government to interfere. He is delivered from the King of Prussia, on his recognition of the French, to the emperor, because, he said, he belonged to the allies generally, and by him he is kept in the same scandalous and inhuman bondage. From this dreadful captivity he endeavours to escape a circumstance not very surprising-he is taken and sent back to his prison, to experience more rigorous treatment. At length, Madame de la Fayette, after enduring a series

of most dreadful sufferings under the brutal Robespierre, from which she escaped by miracle, flew, on the wings of duty and affection, to Vienna, to solicit the emperor for permission to give her husband the consolation of her attentions in prison. The emperor granted her request. But on her arrival at Olmutz, the officer who had the care of M. de la Fayette, told her with openness and candour, that if she resolved to go down to the dungeon to her husband, she must submit to share in all the horrors of his captivity.This, however, had no terrors for her affectionate heart; she plunged into his dungeon, and there they remain together, the living, and yet buried, victims of this inhuman power.

The resemblance which the speeches of Mr. Fox occasionally bear to those of Demosthenes has been frequently noticed-a resemblance which an attentive perusal will convince us is not altogether fanciful. We see, indeed, from this extract, that he was in the habit of using an argument to which, he was very sensible the Grecian Orator had sometimes recourse.

Catholic Relief Bill.-House of Lords, May 17,

1825.

That

THE Earl of Liverpool, after making some observations on the manner in which the Bill had been drawn up, thus proceeds: The Noble Lords opposite maintain, that it is right to grant concessions, because the Catholics are entitled to equal civil rights and immunities with their Protestant brethren. is the plain proposition of the advocates for emancipation; and I will deal plainly with it, for I meet it with a decided negative. The Catholics are not entitled to equal rights in a Protestant country. Upon some points I have been favourable to the Catholics; I do not know but there are others upon which I may still be so, but upon the broad principle-that they are entitled to equal rights, I and their friends

are at issue. I admit, no man can dream of denying it-that all subjects in a free state are entitled to equal rights, upon equal conditions; but then the Catholics, who demand equal rights, with their Protestant fellow-subjects, do not afford equal conditions. The difference is stated in a moment the Protestant gives an entire allegiance to his sovereign; the Catholic a divided one. The service of the first is complete; that of the last only qualified; and unless it can be proved that a half is equal to the whole, I cannot yield to the Catholic claims. Thus, therefore, I take my stand upon the broad principle of justice: I am content to argue the question, at present, as one of expediency; but I maintain that my opposition to the spirit of it is founded on the principles of justice and common sense. It is said, that the practical effect of Catholicism should be looked at; and that the actual operation of that faith is very different from what some of its tenets seem to point to in theory. Practically it is, that I wish to examine the question; and in no other way. I desire to say nothing about theological dogmas-to seek for no obsolete opinion: the doctrines upon which I will rely shall be those laid down in the evidence before the house. First, then, it is admitted unequivocally, both by Dr Doyle and Dr Murray, that the Pope has the supreme power of naming to the vacant dioceses. It is true, the Pope has been in the habit of attending, in his appointment, to the recommendation of the church of Ireland; but this is matter of mere courtesy or hazard; the power is distinctly in himself; and if he thought proper to appoint a foreigner-nay, the foreigner of all Europe the most obnoxious to the government or the country-that foreigner would be, and must continue a Catholic bishop of Ireland. This fact has come out beyond dispute. During the lives of several of the later Princes of the Stuart family, the Pope had been in the habit of appointing Irish Roman Catholic bishops at their nomination. He may now appoint, in the same way, upon the nomination of France or Spain; and the individual so constituted would proceed to exercise influence, and