SERMON IV.

Of the Goodness of God.

PSALMS xxxiv. 8.

TASTE AND SEE THAT THE LORD IS GOOD. BLESS ED IS THE MAN THAT TRUSTETH IN HIM.

IN a former difcourfe from these words, I endeavoured to explain and prove to you the goodnefs of God. I then infifted, among other arguments, on the traces of goodnefs, as well as of wisdom, which we fee in the works of God. Happiness, I obferved, prevails in nature; and all that we know of its conftitution and laws fhews, that the power which gave birth to it, and which prefides in it, is benevolent.

There is one objection to this argument which I will just take notice of, before I proceed to what I principally intend at this

time.

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time. It may occur to fome "that, fince "what we fee of nature is comparatively "nothing, it cannot afford fufficient ground "for any certain conclufion. A malevolent being may fometimes be the cause of happiness, as a benevolent being may of suf ferings. A fingle act cannot be enough "to give a proof of the character of an a "gent, otherwife totally unknown to us. "From what takes place in a point and a "moment, no judgment can be formed of "what takes place univerfally and eter"nally."

In answer to this objection, I would defire you to confider,

First, That, in all cafes, it is most reafonable to judge of what we do not know by what we do know.

We are fure, that happiness prevails in all that we fee of nature; and however little that is, it affords a fair prefumption, that happiness prevails likewife in the reft of

nature.

But fecondly, This evidence from fact is confirmed by arguments, taken from the reafons of things, and the nature of the first cause, as reprefented in my former difcourfe: And, however unfatisfactory this evidence might otherwife have been, it amounts, when taken in this connexion, to one of the strongest proofs. But,

Thirdly,

Thirdly, The truth is, that this evidence, even when taken by itself, is, in a high degree, fatisfactory, and that the objection I have ftated has no tendency to leffen its weight. The following obfervation will, I think, fhew this.-Whatever the character of the Deity may be, his works must, upon the whole, correfpond to it. Particular exceptions to this correfpondence may poffibly take place, at particular times, in particular diftricts; but they muft, without doubt, be fingular and extraordinary. If mifery, therefore, is the end of the Deity, there must have been the greatest chance against our being caft into that part of the creation in which mifery is not prevalent. And, this chance is the fame, whether the creation be more or lefs extenfive.-For this reason, I cannot help reckoning the improbability almoft infinite, of our happening to have been brought into exiitence in that period of duration and district of the universe in which goodness is difplayed, if, indeed, goodness is not the character of the Deity.-This confideration, added to the other arguments on which I have infifted, make my thoughts fo eafy on this moft interefting queftion, that I can fcarcely with for more fatisfaction.

I will now requeft leave to add a few obfervations to guard you against misapprehenfions of God's goodnefs, after which I will

will proceed to an account of fome of the principal effects of it, and the influence which the belief of it ought to have on our tempers and practices.

I have already obferved, that the goodnefs of God is not to be confidered as a propensity in him of which no account can be given, and which produces its effects neceffarily. On the contrary; I have fhewn, that it is implied in the perfect intelligence of the Deity; and that it is to be confidered as under the direction of reason, and as always operating, though certainly, yet freely.

It follows from hence, that we should confider it as a holy and just goodness. This obfervation appears to me of particular importance. If it is not remembered, we shall be in danger of entertaining very groundless expectations from this attribute. God's goodness, when moral agents are confidered as the objects of it, is not a difpofition to make all happy indifcriminately, at any rate, and by any means. Were this true, it would not be an excellence becoming the dignity and wifdom of a Being perfectly reafonable.-On the contrary; it is a difpofition to make the upright and worthy happy, preferably to others. It is a principle which, in all its exertions, is directed by a regard to rectitude, and an averfion to moral evil. The end of it is,

indeed,

indeed, happiness. But it is the righteft happiness. It is happiness enjoyed in the practice of virtue.

In connexion with this, I would obferve, that our expectations from God's goodness fhould be regulated by what we fee to be the established order of nature. This, in all cafes, is the best guide of our expectations and reafonings.We are, in the highest degree, incompetent judges of the method in which Divine goodnefs ought to pursue its end, and it is prefumptuous and foolish to lay a ftrefs, in this cafe, on any theories that we can form. We are no lefs unqualified for governing worlds than we are for making them; and yet this is what in our vain imaginations we are continually doing. Let us study to acquire a jufter fense of our own infufficiency; and learn to fubmit our understandings to that Supreme intelligence which includes in it Supreme benevolence, and which, we may affure ourfelves, will conduct all events in the best ways to the best iffues.-If we will judge by what lies before us, we must be fatisfied that the plan of the Divine government is to make the happiness of reasonable beings to depend on their own endeavours; and alfo within certain limits, on the agency and benevolence of their fellow-beings. The chief bleffings of existence do not fall to our

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