all this without any substantial compensating benefits resulting therefrom to their patrons, either shippers or passengers. On the contrary, great detriment to all concerned has been the result.

That these things are true is shown by the official reports and publications with respect to the financial and physical conditions of the railroads appearing in the financial columns of our newspapers almost daily. I pointed all this out in the debates. What I then said does not differ from what we have witnessed, except only as prediction differs from history. In that fact time has brought vindication which I trust I may note with gratification, whether any one else recognizes it

or not.

The following editorial from the New York World of December 11, 1914, is in line with thousands of such publications appearing in the daily press:

SIGNIFICANTLY SILENT.

The Interstate Commerce Commission in its annual report discusses about everything except its own inability constructively to handle its new rate-making power.

These powers were given to the Commission by Congress in 1910. They were first used at that time in vetoing new tariffs proposed by the railroads of official classification territory. It was then asked to reopen the case and refused.

When after three years the five per cent. advance in tariffs came up it was suspended, and in November of last year hearings were begun. They lasted all through the winter. They were followed by a week of argument early last May. This was followed by eighty days of deliberation, after which, or on July 29th, an uncertain decision was handed down which left the carriers just about where they were before. Next day war broke out in Europe, and on Sept. 15, the carriers asked for a rehearing because of conditions made worse by the war, and this is still undecided.

This rate case in general has been before the Commission over three years, without result. It has been in particular before the Commission over one year, without definite result. With all the facts in hand and with railroad earnings seriously affected by the war, the Commission after three months is still deliberating.

Was it the purpose of Congress in the act of 1910 to make railroad rates unchangeable except downward? This is not the understanding or the interest of the country. Railroad conditions change and rates should be elastic enough to change with them. If the Commission can not exercise its new powers accordingly, it is not a fit body to have them.*

Since the text was dictated a dissenting opinion by Mr. Commissioner Harlan of the Interstate Commerce Commission rendered in

And as it has been with the railroads so it is to be next with all other kinds of business. The Federal Trade Commission recently created, the coming of which was plainly foretold, will soon be under full swing, and then the beauties of a paternalistic supervision and espionage by Government as to all kinds of business will be practically illustrated to the satisfaction of all, or rather dis-satisfaction of all.

The President speaks of the order of things so ushered in as a "new freedom" for business. In due time it will be given another and less popular name.

If the people were not literally "cowed" and afraid to act it would not be long until the work would commence of stopping this trend of legislation by abolishing at least half our commissions and restricting the activities of such as may survive. Until then business conditions will continue unsatisfactory and business men will achieve success only at the peril of all the dire punishments appropriate for malefactors of wealth.

what is known as the Western Advance Rate case, just decided, was published in the daily press, August 16, 1915, from which I quote as follows:

"Too much time and labor are expended in these recurring rate contests, and some way should be found under legislative authority for arriving at results more promptly than is now possible under our present powers and practices.

"The Commission should have authority, as we have often pointed out, to fix the minimum as well as the maximum rate.

"A uniform classification upon a normal basis, applicable throughout the entire country, having sufficient elasticity to allow for varying operating costs, density of traffic, circuitous routes, competitive and other conditions under which transportation is conducted in different parts of the country may be possible of attainment, and I am satisfied that some effort looking to that end should be made." In other words, the necessity for allowing the railroads some reasonable flexibility or elasticity in rates is coming at last, through bitter experience, to be recognized.

In the Cincinnati Enquirer of September 10, 1915, President Taft is reported as saying in a speech made at Seattle, September 9th:

"The close and absolute supervision over the management of the railroads, and the restriction upon the rates charged by them in interstate commerce and in commerce within states, together with the increase in cost of maintenance and of wages through the efforts of labor unions has ground the railroads between the upper and nether millstones. All this is to the detriment of the business of the country, and especially to the comfort and happiness of the wage earners dependent on normal business and normal demand for labor." Mr. Taft further said that conditions identical with those affecting the railroads were to be found in all lines of business where large combinations of investment have been made.

ON

CHAPTER XLI.

THE BROWNSVILLE AFFRAY.

N the night of August 13-14, 1906, a shooting affray occurred in Brownsville, Texas, a military post. About two weeks prior thereto three companies, B, C and D of the 25th United States Infantry, colored, were sent there to relieve a battalion of the 26th United States Infantry, white soldiers, who had been stationed there for some time.

The colored battalion was commanded by Major C. W. Penrose. It was well officered and well disciplined and had a good record. Many of the soldiers had served three and four enlistments, and some of them more-a number of them were nearing the length of continuous service that entitled them to retire on three-fourths pay and with other valuable rights and privileges.

Their last station before going to Brownsville was at Fort Niobrara, Nebraska. At that station, and at all other stations they had sustained a good reputation as peaceable, docile, law-abiding, dutiful, well-drilled, well-disciplined, faithful and efficient soldiers.

When it became known that a battalion of colored troops had been ordered to Brownsville there was a protest made by the citizens of that community, on the ground that they were unwelcome because of their color. William H. Taft was then Secretary of War, but neither he nor any of the other authorities paid any attention to this opposition, although it was sanctioned and approved by others of prominence, among them Senator Culberson.

During the two weeks intervening between the arrival of the battalion at Brownsville and the shooting affray there were two or three altercations between citizens and members of Company C. In each case it was shown that the soldiers

were not at fault; that citizens provoked the trouble and the soldiers did not even resist, but rather only evaded and escaped. No member of either Company B or Company D had any trouble of any kind with anybody.

The police officers testified their conduct was better than that of the white soldiers who preceded them.

The soldiers were quartered in barracks situated inside a walled enclosure called Fort Brown.

The first official report was made by Major A. P. Blocksom, Division Inspector General. It was based on the unsworn statements of a number of citizens gathered by a self-constituted citizens committee. According to these statements it appeared that a few minutes before midnight, August 13th, shots were heard in the vicinity of the Fort; according to some of the citizens the first shots were fired inside the Fort. and from the barracks where the soldiers were quartered.

Omitting details, the charge was, and these statements were given to support the charge, that the firing so commenced was by a squad of from eight to twelve or fourteen, or at most, twenty soldiers, who, after the firing commenced, leaped over the wall surrounding the Fort, and went in a body up one of the streets of Brownsville a distance of two or three squares, where they turned about and from there returned to the Fort; that they fired in all some two or three hundred shots, some of them into houses, some into saloons and some into a hotel; that one man was killed and two others wounded.

These citizens, or some of them, claimed that, although it was a dark night, looking out from the windows of their houses they could see not only the firing squad passing up the street and back again, but they recognized them as negroes and soldiers, and claimed they could see that the arms they carried were rifles like those used by the soldiers.

It was further stated that the next morning, when light enough to see, shells and clips and various parts of a soldier's equipment were found scattered along the line of march, and that these shells, clips, etc., were all like those used by the soldiers.

Upon the demand of a local official twelve of the soldiers and an ex-soldier of the battalion who had been discharged a

few days before, were arrested upon suspicion until an investigation by the Grand Jury of the county could be had. The testimony shows that the Grand Jury made a very thorough investigation, but failed to find an indictment against any of the parties under arrest on the usual ground that the testimony presented to them did not show any "probable cause" for charging the men with guilt.

Thereupon the men were released from arrest and allowed to rejoin the battalion which had been in the meanwhile transferred to El Reno, where the testimony of the men was taken in affidavit form before a summary court in accordance with the provisions of the articles of war applicable, and before notaries public and others authorized to administer oaths, and where also the men were visited by General E. A. Garlington, the Inspector General of the Army, and further investigated and where they were given by him an opportunity by special authority from the President to confess that they were guilty of the crime that they were at the same time denying under oath.

Later the statements gathered by the citizens and given to Major Blocksom were supplemented by a report made by him, and later still a report was made by Lieutenant Colonel Leonard A. Lovering, another Division Inspector General, and finally a third report by General Garlington.

General Garlington reported that Major Blocksom's report was "exhaustive" and showed beyond "reasonable doubt" that the soldiers did the firing; that General Lovering's testimony was as to collateral matters, and "did not develop any material facts germane to the main issue;" that his own investigation failed to disclose any additional facts beyond those established by Blocksom, except that the men so uniformly and persistently denied guilt that they appeared to be banded together to "suppress the truth," but that "he could not procure any evidence thereof."

Nevertheless he recommended that as an example to the whole army the whole battalion should be found guilty of the shooting and of the concealment of the facts connected therewith, and be discharged without honor! Upon the case so