that, and at the same time continue to treat with them as Spanish subjects.

A further argument was based on the fact that the armed intervention proposed was regarded as of such nature that if Spain refused to abdicate, war would immediately follow, and a declaration to that effect would be necessary, as proved to be the case; but that a declaration of war against Spain would be a declaration of war against all her subjects everywhere. The people of Cuba, including the insurgents, were Spanish subjects in law, and would remain so in our view, as well as that of Spain and the rest of the world, until we recognized their independence. A declaration of war against Spain therefore would be a declaration of war against the Cubans as well as everybody else belonging to Spain; and consequently, as a war measure and as one of the necessities of the case, at least the people of Cuba should be recognized as independent. This view prevailed. It prevailed because it was justified by the facts, and was made necessary as a collateral proposition by the chief proposition of intervention. Independence must go hand in hand with intervention.

For the same reasons, as well as others, the Republic of Cuba should have been recognized as the true and lawful government of the Island. The progress of events will not only make this manifest, but will shortly compel such recognition, practically, if not formally. The chief objection was stated by the President, as follows:

"In case of intervention our conduct would be subject to the approval or disapproval of such government. We would be required to submit to its direction and to assume to it the mere relation of a friendly ally."

A complete answer to this suggestion, in the minds of those who favored such recognition, was found in the fact that, according to all international-law writers, an intervening power never takes orders from anybody, and in the further fact that the whole situation was of such a character as emphatically to negative the idea that the Cuban Republic, or General Gomez, would embarrass us by the assertion of any such right. This is all that need be said upon that point now. In this way the question narrowed itself down to whether or not we were justified, under all the circumstances, in demanding that Spain retire from Cuba, and, upon her refusal, in proceeding to eject her by force of arms.

The general rule established by international law is non-intervention; but the exceptions to this rule have been so often repeated, and on such various grounds, that intervention has become a well recognized right, if not in some instances, an acknowledged obligation.

Prof. Lawrence, in his admirable work on "The Principles of International Law,” after discussing the right of intervention on the ground of self-interest, says, with special reference to cruelties on account of religion:

"Should the cruelty be so long-continued and so revolting that the best instincts of human nature are outraged by it, and should an opportunity arise for bringing it to an end and removing its cause without adding fuel to the flame of the contest, there is nothing in the law of nations which will condemn, as a wrongdoer, the state which steps forward and undertakes the necessary intervention. Each case must be judged on its own merits. I have no right to enter my neigh

bor's garden without his consent; but, if I saw a child of his robbed and ill treated in it by a tramp, I should throw ceremony to the winds, and rush to the rescue without waiting to ask permission." (P. 120.)

In concluding his discussion of the subject, Lawrence says: "They (nations) should intervene very sparingly, and only on the clearest grounds of justice and necessity; but when they do intervene, they should make it clear to all concerned that their voice must be attended to and their wishes carried out." (P. 185.)

All authorities are to the same general effect.

Applying these rules, the war in Cuba has been of long duration. It is more than three years now since it commenced; and the present is but a resumption and continuation of the ten years' war that ended by the treaty of Zanjon in 1878. The struggle has been attended by unusual cruelties from the beginning; and the one feature of international extermination by starvation of the unoffending non-combatants, to the number of hundreds of thousands, is so inhuman and shocking, and has been now so long continued that, without regard to the commercial and property interests involved, we have "the clearest grounds of justice and necessity" for intervention ever presented.

In the language of Historicus (Letters on Some Questions of International Law.-I), it is a case where intervention is "a high act of policy above and beyond the domain of law"-which is the equivalent of saying that it has the most sacred sanction of law.

We were justified, therefore, in intervening; and it was our duty, when we did intervene, adopting the words above quoted, to make it clear to all concerned that our voice must be attended to and our wishes carried out. The resolutions authorizing our intervention meet all these requirements, and do not go beyond. We could not do less than they propose and do our duty. Under all the circumstances we delayed action longer than we should, and have been less harsh and exacting than we might have been.

Spain lost her sovereignty by her own misrule; and she lost all opportunity to retire with dignity and honor, by obstinately refusing the kindest and most generous offers of mediation and by failing to heed repeated and unmistakable warnings of the inevitable. She had a legal right to treat our intervention as an act of war; but she had no moral right to do so. She has been in the wrong and at fault from the beginning. The trouble commenced in her own house. She made it a general nuisance, and persisted in so maintaining it long after she had been notified that it had become insufferable. Now, when she has forfeited all the respect of others, and all her rights, and when ejection has become necessary, she resents it as an act of war, and appeals to the world for sympathy. So far she has not received any; and it is to be hoped she will not. But, however that may be, our only course was to meet war with war. It is a justly dreaded necessity, but not without some compensations. The spirit of patriotism that has been aroused will stir the life blood of the nation, quicken human activities, and efface sectional divisions. Whether the struggle be long or short, we shall emerge from it stronger, more united and more respected than ever before.

J. B. FORAKER.

April 28, 1898.

CHAPTER XXXII.

SAMPSON-SCHLEY CONTROVERSY—A BIG GUN FOR CINCINNATI-CUBAN LEGISLATION.

IT

T IS not within the purpose of these notes to write a history of the Spanish-American War, or to deal with any of its incidents, or any of the questions arising therefrom, except in so far as I may have had a personal relation thereto. The struggle was short, sharp and decisive. Both the Army and the Navy did well according to their respective opportunities, but the brilliant victories at Manila and Santiago caused all to feel that the Navy had done especially well.

It was my good fortune to become well acquainted with Admiral Dewey. I found him such a charming and lovable, modest and unassuming man that it was always a pleasure to know that nobody disputed his right to the first honors that were accorded him.

The controversy between Sampson and Schley always seemed to me as unnecessary as it was unfortunate. It was one of the first quarrels of the war that found its way into the Senate.

There was enough honor and more than enough "to go around," allotting to each a wholesome measure. It was not the fault of Sampson that he was absent when Cervera's fleet came out of the harbor of Santiago.

He was on duty obeying orders, by which he was directed to have a conference with General Shafter at Siboney, eleven miles distant. It was his duty to be where his orders placed him, but nevertheless the fact was that he was there, and not in front of the mouth of Santiago harbor when the battle commenced.

He started to return as quickly as the roar of the guns gave him warning and traveled with all possible speed to the scene of the battle, but unfortunately for him, when the

Spanish fleet came out of the harbor they turned to the right instead of the left, and went at full speed toward the West, our ships engaging and pursuing; and thus the battle continued for forty-three miles, until the Colon, the last of the Spanish fleet, surrendered.

When the New York, Sampson's flagship, arrived the fighting was all over. Schley was in the midst of the battle from the beginning until the end; and Sampson was not in it at ali, and no matter how good the excuses, and they were good, they were only excuses; they did not change the facts.

The testimony showed that each Spanish ship suffered more or less injury from shells fired from the Brooklyn, Schley's flagship, and the only American casualties were on that ship; one wounded and one killed.

It was doubtless a great disappointment to Sampson and his champions in the rivalries of navy circles for him to be absent at the critical moment, and this disappointment, chagrin and mortification were intensified by the fact that the honors Sampson doubtless would have been entitled to claim, had he been present, went of right to Schley, who was present and in command from the beginning until the ending of the battle. But this was no excuse for Sampson and his friends undertaking to make unjust claims; and particularly no excuse for denying to Schley and those who fought the battle the credit to which they were entitled.

The controversy was long, bitter and acrimonious, finally resulting in a refusal of the Senate to confirm the President's promotion of Sampson by eight points while giving only six to Schley; and further resulting, three years after the war, in a Court of Inquiry that was conducted more like a prosecution of Schley than an impartial investigation of great historical facts, and which resulted in a finding by two of the members of the Court that Schley was guilty of a number of charges that had been born of the controversy, some of which seemed absolutely malicious, and most of them without any just foundation in fact. Among these charges was one to the effect that at the beginning of the battle Schley had improperly maneuvered his ship and that he had

done so in an effort to run away from the battle. As to all of these charges Admiral Dewey, the President of the Court, made a minority report in which he found in Schley's favor.

The Senate, the House and a majority of all classes of people at once, according to popular expressions, accepted Dewey's report as justified by the testimony and indignantly rejected and repudiated the report of the majority.

Schley appealed to the Secretary of the Navy, but he approved, and so promptly as to indicate a predisposition in favor of the majority finding.

Thus matters rested for the time being.

From the beginning of the controversy I naturally took pains to keep thoroughly informed. I did not know either Sampson or Schley. I had never met either. I had never even seen either of them. I had of both a good opinion because both had good records, and so far as I could see nothing had happened in connection with the battle to detract from either. I was as free from bias or prejudice with respect to the merits of the controversy as any one well could be.

The testimony seemed to me to be overwhelming in Schley's favor, and therefore, when we came to consider the matter in the Senate in executive session, I was outspokenly on the Schley side of the controversy. The views I then expressed in executive session I expressed afterward in public speech.

As a result, when in time I made the acquaintance of Admiral Schley, a personal friendship commenced that continued until his death. I always felt that the finding of the Court of Inquiry was a gross injustice and hoped that something would happen to bring about its correction; but nothing did happen, so far as I had knowledge, until September 25, 1911, when I read the following in the morning paper:

"BLUNDER" AT SANTIAGO BY SCHLEY NOW IS DESCRIBED BY ADMIRAL SAMPSON'S AIDE AS BRILLIANT NAVAL MANEUVER.

Special dispatch to the Enquirer.

NEW YORK, September 24.-The controversy which followed the naval battle of Santiago and resulted in a Court of Inquiry to consider charges