be infallible (when they speak as witnesses of tradition) to shew the opinion of the church of their time; then the opinion of the Chiliasts (which now is a heresy in the church of Rome) was once tradition in the opinion of the church.

Thirdly, Since St. Augustine had an opinion, that of whatsoever no beginning was known, that came from the apostles, many fathers might say things to be tradition upon that ground only; but of this opinion of the Chiliasts, one of the ancientest fathers, Irenæus, says not only, that it was tradition, but sets down Christ's own words when he taught it, and the pedigree of the opinion from Christ to John his disciple; from him to several priests (whereof Papias was one, who put it în writing) and so downwards; which can be shewn from no other father, for no other opinion, either controverted or uncontroverted.

Fourthly, That if Papias, either by his own error, or a desire to deceive, could cozen the fathers of the purest age in this, why not also in other things? Why not in twenty as well as one? Why not twenty others as well as he?

Fifthly, That if the fathers should be cozened, how could general councils escape, who, you say, make tradition one of their rules, which can only be known from the fathers?

Sixthly, If they object, how could errors come in, and no beginning of them known? I pray remember to ask them the same question concerning the millenaries, which lasted uncontradicted until Dionysius Alexandrinus, two hundred and fifty years after Christ; and if they tell you, that Papias was the first beginner, look in Irenæus, and he will tell you to the contrary, loco citato, 1. 5.

c. 33.

Seventhly, Remember that, if I ought not to condemn the church of Rome out of Scripture, because my interpretation may deceive me; then they ought not to build their infallibility upon it (and less upon her own word) because theirs may deceive them; unless the same thing may be a wall, when you lean upon it, and a bullrush when we do.

Eighthly, Remember that they cannot say, they trust not their interpretation in this, but a consent of fathers; because the fathers are not said to be infallible, but as they tell the opinion of the church of their time, which is infallible: therefore they must first prove out of Scripture that she is infallible, or else she (who is herself the subject of the question) cannot be allowed till then to give a verdict for herself.

Ninthly, Remember the Roman church claims no notes of the church, but what agree with the Grecian too (as antiquity, succession, miracles, &c.) but only communion with the pope and splendour; both which made for the Arians in Liberius's time; and it were a hard case, that because the Greeks are poor upon earth, they should be shut out of heaven.

Tenthly, Remember, that if we have an infallible way, we have no use (at least no necessity) of an infallible guide; for if we may be saved by following the Scripture as near as we can (though we err) it is as good as any interpreter to keep unity in charity (which is only needful) though not in opinion and this cannot be ridiculous, because they say, if any man misinterpret the council of Trent, it shall not damn him; and why (without more ado) may not the same be said of Scripture?

VII.-An Argument against the Infallibility of the present church of Rome, taken from the contradictions in your doctrine of Transubstantiation.

Mr. Chillingworth. THAT church is not infallible which teacheth contradictions; but the church of Rome teacheth contradictions: therefore the church of Rome is not infallible.

Mr. Daniel. I deny the minor.

Chill. That church teacheth contradictions, which teacheth such a doctrine as contains contradictions; but the church of Rome teacheth such a doctrine: therefore the church of Rome teacheth contradictions.

Dan. I deny the minor.

Chill. The doctrine of transubstantiation contains contradictions; but the church of Rome teacheth the doctrine of transubstantiation: therefore the church of Rome teacheth such a doctrine as contains contradictions.

Dan. I deny the major.

Chill. That the same thing, at the same time, should have the true figure of a man's body, and should not have the true figure of a man's body, is a contradiction; but in the doctrine of transubstantiation it is taught, that the same thing (viz. our Saviour present in the sacrament) has the true figure of a man's body, and has not the true figure of a man's body, at the same time therefore the doctrine of transubstantiation contains contradictions.

Dan. The major, though not having all rules re

quired to a contradiction (as boys in logic know) yet let it pass.

Chill. Boys in logic know no more conditions required to a contradiction, but that the same thing should be affirmed and denied of the same thing at the same time. For my meaning was, that that should not be accounted the same thing, which was considered after divers manners.

Dan. I deny the minor of your syllogism.

Chill. I prove it, according to the several parts of it: and, first, for the first part. He must have the figure of a man's body in the eucharist, who is there without any real alteration or difference from the natural body of a man; but our Saviour, according to the Romish doctrine of transubstantiation, is in the sacrament without any real alteration or difference from the natural body of a man: therefore, according to this doctrine, he must have the figure of a man's body. To the second part, that he must not have the figure of a man's body, in the sacrament, according to this doctrine, thus I prove it. He must not have the figure of a man's body in the eucharist, which must not have extension there; but our Saviour's body, according to the doctrine of transubstantiation, must not have extension there: therefore, according to this doctrine, he must not have the figure of a man's body there. The major of this syllogism I proved, because the figure of a man's body could not be without extension. The minor I proved thus: that must not have extension in the eucharist, whose every part is together in one and the same point; but, according to this doctrine, every part of our Saviour's body must be here in one and the same point: therefore here it must not have extension.

Mr. Dan. answered, by distinguishing the major of the first syllogism, and said; that he must not have the true figure of a man's body, according to the reason of a figure taken in its essential consideration, which is to have positionem partium sic et sic extra partes; but not the accidental consideration, which is in ordine ad locum. And this answer he applied for the solution of the minor, saying thus: Our Saviour is there without any real alteration intrinsical, but not extrinsical; for he is not changed in order to himself, but in order to place or otherwise, he is not altered in his continual existence, which is only modus essentiæ, and inseparable even by Divine power, though altered in modo existendi, which is situation, and required to figure taken in order to place.

Chill. Against this it was replied by Chillingworth, That the distinction of a man's body, as considered in itself, and as considered in reference to place, is vain, and no solution of the argument: and thus he proved it: If it be impossible, that any thing should have several parts one out of another in order and reference of each to other, without having these parts in several places, then the distinction is vain; but it is impossible, that any thing should have several parts one out of another, without having these parts in several places: therefore the distinction is vain.

The major of this syllogism he took for granted. The minor he proved thus: Whatsoever body is in the proper place of another body, must of necessity be in that very body, by possessing the dimensions of it: therefore, whatsoever hath several parts one out of the other, must of necessity