Recent events supply two apt illustrations of the dependence of law on public opinion. A few months ago an impending national strike on the railways of Great Britain seemed to threaten, by its possible consequences, the whole system of law and government. But as soon as the blow fell, it was at once evident that the general body of the public were wholly opposed to constitutional changes brought about by pressure from any single section of the community, and from that moment the ultimate issue was certain. When, on the other hand, Germany and Austria challenged the public order of Europe in 1914, the challenge was not at once accepted by every member of the family of nations, nor by so many of them as to make the task of the law-breaker hopeless from the outset. And so the issue was long in the balance, and the law of nations was suspended for a time.

But though a comparison between these two cases shows that the sanction of the municipal law of England proved to be stronger than that of the public law between states, the difference between them. was solely one of strength, and not at all a difference in kind. Both systems of law depend for their enforcement upon external power resting upon general consent; neither can ever be wholly exempt from the possibility of breakdown or overthrow.

In truth, there is no alternative to consent as the basis of the law of nations, and there is and can be no substitute for external power as the ultimate means of enforcing it. A mental predisposition to obey the law without doubt forms part of the inheritance of certain peoples, and this, and the law-abiding habit which it engenders, are fostered by many influences which do not owe their compelling power to physical strength. Many thoughtful men who have been impressed by such reflections as these, have contemplated the ultimate establishment of a form of society from which the use of force might be altogether eliminated. There is, however, small ground for hoping that such an organization could be set up to govern the relations between state and state. No community of any size has been able to dispense with force as a background for its political and judicial

8 The fact that international law is not always enforced cannot affect its claim to be regarded as law. "A weak law is nevertheless still law." Oppenheim, International Law, Vol. I, p. 14.

administration; yet in some of them reverence for law has been known to be strong. In the sphere of public international law the lawabiding spirit is weak, and wages an unceasing struggle against national and racial instincts and aspirations. But this is not its only source of weakness. It is probable, as has already been suggested, that the inherited predisposition to obey the law, which is characteristic of some communities, was originally induced by a painful and intimate understanding of the nature of forcible punishment. Moreover, even if a spirit of reverence for law could in fact be established solely by influences removed from all thought of physical compulsion, it could hardly hope to survive in a community where offenders escaped all punishment except moral rebuke and such redress as the sufferer might be able to exact for himself.

The well-known passage in which Maine argues that "the founders of international law, though they did not create a sanction, created a law-abiding sentiment," is liable to misunderstanding. At the time when the modern law of nations came into existence, there had sprung up in western Europe a number of independent states, whose sovereigns or statesmen had already felt the need of some rules to regulate their dealings with one another. The early publicists stepped in to supply the need, and offered a body of rules constructed on a basis partly moral, partly religious, partly scholastic and partly historical.10 Many of them were adopted; they became usages, and in process of time customary rules of law. No doubt, the lessons of respect for law, which these early writers taught, were not without valuable influence upon the men who put the new rules into practice, and so their writings assisted in securing their adoption;" but by the time that some of these rules were regarded no longer as optional but as obligatory, states must have contemplated the prospect of their enforcement by other means than their own reverence for law.

But though a law-abiding spirit cannot be a substitute for force as the sanction of law, its cultivation is of great importance. It

9 International Law, p. 51.

10 Cf. Oppenheim, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 17.

11 Cf. Emerson, Essay on Politics. "The gladiators in the lists of power feel, through all their frocks of force and simulation, the presence of worth."

renders obedience more palatable, since compliance through fear is always distasteful, while to do right without a thought involves no effort at all. Moreover, once it is established, it strengthens the determination of the community that a member who breaks the law should be punished. Respect for law, and the enforcement of the law by external power, are curiously interdependent.

External power, therefore, supported by the general consent of the family of nations, and assisted by such reverence for law as may be found among its members, is the instrument by which the law of nations is enforced. So far the sanction of international law is identical with that of all law. But if we pass on to consider the manner in which this external power is applied, important points of difference begin to appear. For in a modern civilized state, the members of the community do not in a body undertake the enforcement of law, but delegate their powers to a few of their number, specially selected for the task. They set up a government comprising a legislature to make the laws, a judicial branch to expound and apply them, and an administrative organization to enforce them. But the family of nations has evolved no similar machinery,12 and the members themselves, organized hurriedly for the occasion, have to play a direct part in securing obedience to their laws. Intervention by other Powers, or the threat of intervention, constitutes the most important, and the more usual method, of enforcing the law of nations.

It is at all times possible for the nations of the world, if only their will to act is sufficiently strong, to compel a refractory state to obey the rules which they have agreed to regard as obligatory in their mutual dealings. It may not be necessary for them to resort to armed force; a threat to use it, supported by an unequivocal display of determination, may suffice; or again financial or commercial pressure may be an effective means of constraint. During the war, belligerents attached such importance to the good will of neutral states that they spent large sums of money on propaganda, often in countries which

12 Neither the machinery devised at The Hague Conferences nor that contemplated by the Covenant of the League of Nations can be properly regarded as first experiments in international government.

they could not hope to bring into the field on their side; by printed and spoken word, by wireless and by film, each sought to justify his acts by the standard, not only of justice, but also of international law. The desire to have access to the supplies of neutral money and raw materials was the primary motive for this lavish expenditure, and the neutral Powers, being in a position to grant or withhold such aid, might have brought strong pressure to bear upon any belligerents which seemed to them to have violated the law, if the course of the struggle had been somewhat different.

Commercial and financial intervention, combined with naval pressure, was a method of enforcing respect for international obligations upon the smaller states which was adopted during the nineteenth century. It was a measure of restraint short of war, known as "pacific blockade," and it was employed against Greece in 1886, against the Island of Crete in 1897, against Venezuela in 1902, and on other occasions.13 It is probable that the economic boycott, with or without military or naval pressure, will in future play a still more prominent part in enforcing international law.

Another form of intervention without resort to war is by pressure of moral disapprobation. The adverse judgment of the family of nations does, in some cases and to a certain extent, deter or punish; but it is impossible to assess the strength of this elusive form of sanction. For its effectiveness will depend partly on external circumstances, such as the lawbreaker's opportunity for silencing hostile criticism by achieving instant success, or by diverting the eyes of the world to other more sensational objects, partly upon the prevailing international morality, and partly upon the national character of the offending state. This national character does not bear a relation to that of its members which is capable of exact definition," and can only be discovered by special observation and study; but perhaps, as a general rule, states will be less sensitive to the bad opinions of others than would be an individual of similar temperament, both because 13 See Oppenheim, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 48; Hall, International Law, 6th ed., P. 364.

14 "There is a genius of a nation, which is not to be found in the numerical citizens, but which characterizes the society." Emerson, Essay on Nominalist and Realist.

responsibility is more widely diffused and blame less easily assignable, and because a sense of national insularity supported by a strong patriotism is less painful than individual isolation. But however difficult it may be to appraise the strength of moral disapprobation as a sanction of international law, it is not open to question that it sometimes operates to restrain or punish a law-breaker. The law of nations does, to a large extent, supply the standard by which the conduct of states is judged, and whenever it is broken, the offender is always ready with excuse and justification.15 It will be of interest to see how far the feeling recently reported to prevail in some quarters in Germany that the German Empire is an outcast from the civilized world may influence the future development of German national policy and its attitude towards international law.

But if commercial, financial or moral pressure are unavailing, the only means of enforcing the law of nations which remains (other than self-help) is direct intervention by force of arms. 16 This is a means, the effectiveness of which, whether as a deterrent or as an instrument of punishment, and whether in peace or in war, varies with the changing political situation, and its study reveals one of the most important points of contact between international law and diplomacy.

In a period of peace, a state that is anxious to break the law must take into consideration the political and military strength of its friends as compared with that of the states which may be expected to oppose it; it must also consider the manifold influences which may induce friend or opponent to intervene or to stand aside. If irresistible forces appear to be mobilizing to support the law, it will not be lightly broken; and if it is broken, punishment will probably be swift to follow. When, on the other hand, the position of the would-be offender, fortified by the prospective help of his friends, would be hard to assail, and other states show reluctance and hesitation to intervene, he may decide to take the risk.

15 Cf. Oppenheim, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 15.

16 It is impossible to agree with Bonfils (Manuel de droit International Public, 6th ed., p. 12) that war cannot be the sanction of international law in the sense in which the word is used in jurisprudence. It would seem that it can be if the external force is being applied by the general consent of the community and for the purpose of vindicating the law.