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$100,000 for the expenses of maintaining diplomatic relations. It may be noted in this connection that for some years prior to recognition of independence, the United States Govermnent had maintained consuls or agents in Latin-America (see Paxson's "Independence of the South American Republics," Ch. 2, passim). In 1810 President Madison had sent the Poinsett Mission to Buenos Aires, etc., with the title of "Agent for Seamen and Commerce in the Port of Buenos Aires” which was raised to that of “Consul General” the following year (1811). President Monroe followed the same practice on a larger scale, but he steadily refused to grant exequaturs to consuls from South America, holding, on the advice of Secretary Adams, that such action would be tantamount to a recognition of independence.

Great Britain had followed a different policy. She did not send consuls or agents to Latin-America until after recognition by the United States, when Canning adopted a new policy. As early as October, 1823, he sent consuls to all the chief cities in revolt. On June 15, 1824, he authorized the British consul at Buenos Aires to negotiate a commercial treaty with that government. And on January 1, 1824, he notified the Powers that England had decided to recognize the independence of Colombia, Mexico and Buenos Aires. Especially notable among the British missions were those of Colonel Hamilton to Colombia in 1824 and Consul-General Parish to Buenos Aires the same year. (See Paxson's “Independence," etc., pp. 221 ff., and 231 ff.)

In his famous speech of June 15, 1824, in the British Parliament on the “Recognition of the Spanish-American States," Sir James Mackintosh (Misc. Works, pp. 549 ff.) reviewed in detail the progress which had then been made by Great Britain in the recognition of these new states. He (of course, erroneously) claimed that the statute 3 Geo. IV, C. 43, III (1822), providing “that the merchandise of countries in America or in the West Indies, being or having been a part of the dominions of the King of Spain, may be imported into Great Britain in ships which are the build of these countries” (this must be the recognition of the “commercial flag" referred to by Phillimore and others) was an acknowledgment of independence," as also the "declaration made in Spain that consuls must be immediately sent to South America.” But he may be said to have demonstrated that virtual or de facto recognition had been given by the British Government.

In his opinion in the case of Thorington v. Smith and Hartley (8 Wallace, 1, 8-10; 1 Moore's Digest, 41; and Scott's Cases, 53) decided in 1868, Chief Justice Chase makes the following interesting remarks on de facto governments :

There are several degrees of what is called de facto government.

Such a government, in its highest degree, assumes a character very closely resembling that of a lawful government. This is when the usurping government expels the regular authorities from their customary seats and functions, and establishes itself in their place, and so becomes the actual government of a country. The distinguishing characteristic of such a government is, that adherents to it in war against the government de jure do not incur the penalties of treason; and under certain limitations, obligations assumed by it in behalf of the country, or otherwise, will, in general, be respected by the government de jure when restored.

Examples of this description of government de facto are found in English history. The statute 11 Henry VII, c. 1 (2 British Stat. at Large, 82), relieves from penalties for treason all persons who, in defense of the King, for the time being, wage war against those who endeavor to subvert his authority by force of arms, though warranted in so doing by the lawful monarch. (4 Comm. 77.)

But this is where the usurper obtains actual possession of the royal authority of the kingdom; not when he has succeeded only in establishing his power over particular localities. Being in possession, allegiance is due to him as king de facto.

Another example may be found in the Government of England under the Commonwealth, first by Parliament, and afterward by Cromwell as Protector. It was not, in the contemplation of law, a government de jure, but it was a government de facto in the most absolute sense. It incurred obligations and made conquests which remained the obligations and conquests of England after the restoration. The better opinion doubtless is, that acts done in obedience to this government could not be justly regarded as treasonable, though in hostility to the king de jure. Such acts were protected from criminal prosecution by the spirit, if not by the letter, of the statute of Henry the Seventh. It was held otherwise by the judges by whom Sir Henry Vane was tried for treason (6 State Trials, 119), in the year following the Restoration. By such a judgment, in such a time, has little authority. ...

But there is another description of government, called also by publicists a government de facto, but which might, perhaps, be more aptly denominated a government of paramount force. Its distinguishing characteristics are (1), that its existence is maintained by active military power, within the territories, and against the rightful authority of an established and lawful government; and (2), that while it exists, it must necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who, by acts of obedience, rendered in submission to such force, do not become responsible, as wrongdoers, for those acts, though not warranted by the laws of the rightful government. Actual governments of this sort are established over districts differing greatly in extent and conditions. They are usually administered directly by military authority, but they may be administered, also, by civil authority, supported more or less directly by military force.

In Williams v. Bruffy (1877, 96 U. S. 176, 185-186 and 1 Moore, 44), Mr. Chase also said that de facto governments are of two kinds. One of them is such as exists after it has expelled the regularly constituted authorities from the seats of power and the public offices, and established its own functionaries in their places, so as to represent in fact the sovereignty of the nation. ... The other kind of de facto governments ... is such as exists where a portion of the inhabitants of a country have separated themselves from the parent state and established an independent government. The validity of its acts, both against the parent state and its citizens or subjects, depends entirely upon its ultimate success. If it fail to establish itself permanently, all such acts perish with it. If it succeed, and become recognized, its acts from the commencement of its existence are upheld as those of an independent nation. Such was the case of the State governments under the old confederation on their separation from the British Crown. Having made good their declaration of independence, everything they did from that date was as valid as if their independence had been at once acknowledged. Confiscations, therefore, of enemy's property made by them were sustained as if made by an independent nation. But if they had failed in securing their independence, and the authority of the King had been reëstablished in this country, no one would contend that their acts against him, or his loyal subjects, could have been upheld as resting upon any legal foundation.

The question of recognition of de facto governments is involved in several recent British decisions. In the West Russian Steamship Co. v. The Gagara (35 The Times L. R. 259) the Court of Appeals of Great Britain was called upon to pass upon the validity of the capture of a ship as prize by the National Council of Esthonia. The Gagara had been seized from the Bolshevists, who in their turn had taken her from the plaintiffs. The case raised the important question as to the political status of the Provisional Government of Esthonia and its recognition by the British Government, inasmuch as the Esthonian Provisional Government, acting as the executive of the Esthonian National Council, claimed ownership in the vessel.

The British Foreign Office, having been asked for information as to the status of the Esthonian Government, had informed the lower court (Admiralty Division) that “the British, French and Italian Governments had, for the time being, provisionally and with all necessary reservations as to the future, recognized the Esthonian National Council as a de facto independent body, and His Majesty's Government had accordingly received a certain gentleman as the informal diplomatic representative of the Esthonian Provisional Government. It was the view of His Majesty's Government, without in any way binding itself as to the future, that the Esthonian Government was such a government as could, if it thought fit, set up a prize court."

In giving judgment (February 14, 1919), Lord Justice Bankes said:

The real question which the Court had to decide was whether the Esthonian National Council was recognized by the government of this country as having the status of a sovereign Power. If that Council was so recognized, it was not disputed that the courts of this country would not allow that government to be impleaded here. That principle was clearly laid down in the cases of The Parlement Belge (5 P. D., 197) and Mighell v. Sultan of Johore (10 The Times L. R., 115; [1894] 1 Q. B., 149). It was a principle arising from the international comity of nations.

His Lordship considered the letters written by the Foreign Office as being statements which fully recognized the sovereignty of the Esthonian Government, subject to the limitation that the recognition would continue only as long as certain conditions should be complied with. His Lordship read the statements as meaning this—that our own as well as the French and Italian Governments would for the time being provisionally recognize the Esthonian Government as a de facto independent government, and that they had accordingly received informal diplomatic representatives.

In the Dora and the Annette (35 Times L. R. 288) it was held, on the other hand, February 26, 1919, (subject, however, to appeal) by the Admiralty Division on information from the British Foreign Office that there was no evidence that the Provisional Government of Northern Russia had been even informally recognized by the British Government.

Mr. Justice Hill read the following letter from the Foreign Office:

I am to inform you that the Provisional Government of Northern Russia is composed of Russian groups who do not recognize the authority of the Russian Central Soviet Government established at Moscow. The seat of the government is Archangel, and it extends its authority over the territory surrounding that port and to the west of the White Sea up to the Finnish frontier. As the title assumed by that government indicates, it is merely provisional in nature, and has not been formally recognized either by His Majesty's Government or by the Allied Powers as the government of a sovereign independent state. His Majesty's Government and the Allied Powers are, however, at the present moment coöperating with the Provisional Government in the opposition which that government is making to the forces of the Russian Soviet Government, who are engaged in aggressive military operations against it, and are represented at Archangel by a British Commissioner. The representative of the Provisional Government in London is M. Nabokoff, through whom His Majesty's Government conduct communications with the Archangel Provisional Government.

Though not strictly pertinent to the subject of this article, I include passages from two recent decisions of our Supreme Court as bearing more particularly upon the legal effects of the recognition of the de facto government of Carranza in Mexico on October 19, 1915.

In Ricaud et al. v. The American Metal Co., Ltd. (this JOURNAL, Vol. 12, p. 417), the United States Supreme Court held on March 11, 1918, that a United States District Court in Texas had jurisdiction in a case involving the claim to ownership of a consignment of lead bullion which had been purchased indirectly from General Pereyra, a commander of the Carranza or so-called Constitutional Army of Mexico, who had seized it from a Mexican mining company in September, 1913.

The court thus stated the first question and answer thereto:

The question is, whether the circumstance that the bullion was seized, condemned and sold under the conditions stated in the question, deprived the court of jurisdiction to go forward and adjudge as to the validity of the title acquired by the seizure and sale by the Carranza forces.

The answer which should be given to this question has been rendered not doubtful by the fact that, as we have said, the revolution

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