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zilian sisterhood, Professor Suárez takes occasion to comment on the real sentiments of the Argentine Government and people in respect to the late World War, as being quite favorable to the cause of the Allies. Then he enters into an expression of his own opinions on the matter as well as on the future international organization, holding that while
Sovereignty will continue to be the fundamental law of the state, its absolute character will have to be modified in view of the more absolute nature of the Society of Nations. Just as individualism has been subordinated, sometimes in an exaggerated manner, to the social rights, sovereignty, which is the individualism of states, must be harmonized with the rights of the international community at large.
It would be quite interesting to follow Professor Suárez along the various topics selected by him in his very interesting lectures. There is, for instance, a lecture on the uti possidetis and the boundary disputes of Latin America which well deserves an extensive commentary. In this lecture Professor Suárez expresses quite an exceptional opinion among Spanish-American writers, and says that the uti possidetis juris, of 1810, has been the source and origin of great confusion and embarrassment in boundary disputes among the Latin-American republics. “There is no principle," says Professor Suárez, “which has made the American governments spend more energy and money than this so-called American principle; none has rendered fewer practical results, and none has been so productive of ill-feeling, discord and wars as this uti possidetis juris, of 1810."
As is well known, the uti possidetis juris, of 1810, sprang from the necessity of adopting some rule to fix the boundaries between the Spanish-American republics, which should conform to the peculiar circumstances attending the coming into existence of the new American states. In fact there were no real boundaries. In law there were the political divisions established by the mother country in matters relative to the administration of her American colonies. It was these political divisions which the governments of the new states thought appropriate to adopt as a basis upon which to establish their respective territorial jurisdictions; and in search of a starting point to determine their respective international boundaries they fell upon and adopted as a desirable rule the theoretical possession of Spain in 1810, which was the year when their emancipation began. Aside from the geographical, grammatical and historical obstacles which are often encountered in the application of this principle, it cannot be denied that, in some cases, the uti possidetis juris, of 1810, is in open conflict with the actual and historical possession of the territory in dispute by the respective contending governments, and in those cases the rationale of the principle may be perhaps questionable. But so far as the application of this principle has reference to boundary disputes among the Spanish-American states, its propriety cannot perhaps be successfully controverted. The real trouble, however, arises when it is sought to apply the principle in a controversy where one of the parties is not a Spanish-American state.
Following the lecture on the uti possidetis there is a lecture on the Monroe Doctrine, giving something of its history and its first applications in the Argentine, followed by various appendixes which are really interesting. In this lecture Professor Suárez discusses quite extensively the participation of Canning in the formulation of the principles of the Monroe Doctrine as a positive historical fact. As to its early application in the Argentine, Professor Suárez's discussion is deserving of more than a passing notice, and may be well recommended to those interested in this aspect of the Doctrine.
Then there is a lecture on territorial waters and the industries of the
sea, followed by seven lectures on General Mitre and South American diplomatic relations. A lecture on diplomacy as a career con. stitutes a valuable monograph on this interesting subject, especially in this country where diplomacy cannot as yet be considered as a regular career. Several contributions on economic and commercial subjects complete the volume.
The work is a monument to Professor Suárez's ability as a historian, and shows him to be a careful student of international law and relations, especially as developed in the American Continent.
The book contains an index of names, a table of contents and a list of typographical errors; but, as with most Spanish-American books, it cannot boast of a good analytical index.
Bolivia ante la Liga de las Naciones. By Brissot. La Paz: Gonzales
y Medina. 1919. pp. 246. In this volume the author has reviewed the history of the posses. sion of and successive governments controlling a disputed area on the South Pacific, contested by Peru, Bolivia, and Chile, describing also the various treaties relative to its disposition, and discussing at length the causes of the war between these nations which took place in 1879. He regards the dispute as still properly an open one, and the purpose of the volume—to lay the foundation of an appeal to the League of Nations—is concretely expressed by him in the following words:
By virtue of Article 24 of the Rules of the League of Nations, and in accordance with the doctrine that no nation can exist without communication with the sea, Bolivia asks that there may be restored to it the Province of Antofagasta, upon the Pacific, which belonged to its national patrimony from the time of its discovery.
The author conceives that this demand will have the sympathies of the world and the unconditional support of Peru, and be based upon the firm foundation of justice.
Accepting his statements, the results of apparently very considerable labor, it is difficult to withhold sympathy for Bolivia because of the treatment accorded her at the hands of Chile.
JACKSON H. RALSTON.
The Immunity of Private Property from Capture at Sea. By Harold
Scott Quigley. (Bulletin of the University of Wisconsin, No. 918, Economics and Political Science Series, Vol. 9, No. 2.) Mad
ison : 1918. pp. 200. 25c. There is no adequate treatment of the problem of the freedom of the seas available to the student of international law and relations today. Even Sir Francis Piggott’s recent work on the subject falls short of the desirable study of the question in principle, confining itself largely as it does to the more technical legal aspects of the case. And Dr. Quigley is concerned here with only one section of the very extensive general subject of maritime freedom and authority, and in treating that limited topic he adheres rather closely to the conventional methods.
The work begins with a review of the history of capture in the practice of European States from the revival of international commerce and international war at the close of the Medieval period to 1854. There follow briefer studies of the Declaration of Paris and subsequent European practice, and of the attitude of the United States toward the right of capture. A rather extended review of the theoretical discussions of the immunity of private property at sea in war is then provided, together with an examination of the reform movements of the last century directed toward that end. After some notice of practice by the Allies and Germany during the years 1914-1915, the author gives his conclusions regarding the past, the present, and, to a certain extent, the future.
The defects of the work are chiefly those inseparable from the subject and not defects of treatment; much labor and talent are expended on a dubious topic. In the first place the author is led by his subject into a laborious review, in Chapter I, of the many international treaties concluded prior to 1854 relating to capture at sea. The object, apparently, is to check up the mutations of national policy and the considerations of abstract theory by reference to "history" (p. 5). But it is hard to see that there is any “history” in evidence, that is, any historic progress. During five centuries belligerent nations have been alternately severe and liberal in their exercise of control over neutral and enemy commerce as seemed most useful to them at the time; “as belligerents these nations reproduced the situation demanded by self-interest” (p. 27). The result is an inconsequential and, on the whole, meaningless series of fluctuations in national laws and practices regarding capture at sea.
It is therefore hard to agree that “the history of the development of the law of maritime capture is a record of progress” (p. 169). That conclusion could have been put forward confidently in 1914 at the end of a century of progress in the “liberalization" of maritime law, marked by the Declaration of Paris, 1856, and the unratified but significant Declaration of London, 1909. But this is not 1914, and the recent war saw the abandonment of the results of the progress of 1814-1914. This Dr. Quigley seems to see clearly (pp. 178, 190), but the tradition of liberal progress to 1914 is allowed to stand, nevertheless.
The reversion to the methods of an earlier day is not so much a confession of the wickedness of nations in the face of a sound ideal, but, as Dr. Quigley feels (pp. 191, 192), a revelation of the fact that “immunity of private property at sea in time of war” is an unwieldy concept to attempt to incorporate into the law of nations. Under certain circumstances such a rule would be entirely consonant with the general body of principles regarding war, neutrality, and with the actual character of international trade; at other times it would not. Hence the ideal has prospered under Dutch and American auspices in proportion as international commerce has expanded and has remained in private hands, and in proportion as naval power remained rudimentary and war remained a thing of governments and armies. It has suffered under British power when commercial and neutral influence has waned in strength, as national trade has come under public control and as the actual control of the seas has passed to Britain and war become a general economic struggle between whole nations. And whether liberal—or strict-control of commerce at sea by belligerents in time of war is a good thing depends not upon an a priori judgment in favor of “liberalism” as such, but upon many other factors. Today immunity, privacy, and neutrality all seem to be in the discard. But the maritime practices of 1914-1918, while certainly more like those of the eighteenth century than like those of the early twentieth, are to be judged wholesome or iniquitous not by reference to the formal immunity of private property at sea.
For immunity has never been an end sought or denied in and by itself. That is the fault most frequently found in the theoretical discussions which are reviewed so carefully in Chapter IV, and it renders these materials as little helpful in an understanding of the realities of the problem as are the treaties studied in Chapter I. *These discussions commonly neglect the fact that the degree of authority over commerce at sea which shall be conceded to belligerents must depend, and has always depended, whether this relation has been explicitly recognized or not, upon a conceded right to make war in the first place, a right to remain neutral, in the second, and a right resting in the individual to trade on his own account apart from any authority of his own or foreign governments. To these factors must be added a growing desire, common to the non-mercantile world as well, to restrict the incidence of war as much as possible. Now there is growing into being a disposition to limit the right to make war at all to recognized causes or situations, to limit the right to remain neutral in similar wise, and to increase the control author