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actions advantage agreeable animal Anthropomorphites appear approbation argument arises Atheists attended beauty benevolence betwixt cause cerning character circumstances Cleanthes concerning consider contrary cosmogony degree Deity Demea derived distinct double relation effect emotion entirely esteem evident evil excite experience external feel force give greater Hermippus hope and fear human nature hypothesis imagination immediately impossible impressions and ideas infer influence interest judgment justice kind love and hatred love or hatred mankind manner matter ment mind misery moral motive never notion object obligation observe operation original ourselves pain particular passions pathy person Philo philosophers philosophical scepticism pleasure possession present pride and humility pride or humility principles proceed produce promises qualities reason regard relation of ideas relation of impressions religion render resemblance rience rules satisfaction scepticism sensation sense sensible sentiments sider sions society sophism species suppose sympathy Theism thing thought tion transition uneasiness virtuous
Página 231 - In every system of morality which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs ; when of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not.
Página 432 - The curious adapting of means to ends, throughout all nature, resembles exactly, though it much exceeds, the productions of human contrivance— of human design, thought, wisdom, and intelligence. Since therefore the effects resemble each other, we are led to infer, by all the rules of analogy, that the causes also resemble, and that the Author of nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man, though possessed of much larger faculties, proportioned to the grandeur of the work which He has executed.
Página 218 - Since morals, therefore, have an influence on the actions and affections, it follows, that they cannot be deriv'd from reason; and that because reason alone, as we have already prov'd, can never have any such influence. Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our reason.
Página 432 - Look round the world: contemplate the whole and every part of it: You will find it to be nothing but one great machine, subdivided into an infinite number of lesser machines, which again admit of subdivisions to a degree beyond what human senses and faculties can trace and explain.
Página 159 - And it seems certain, that, however we may imagine we feel a liberty within ourselves, a spectator can commonly infer our actions from our motives and character; and even where he cannot, he concludes in general, that he might, were he perfectly acquainted with every circumstance of our situation and temper, and the most secret springs of our complexion and disposition.
Página 167 - Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger.
Página 447 - Consider, anatomize the eye, survey its structure and contrivance, and tell me, from your own feeling, if the idea of a contriver does not immediately flow in upon you with a force like that of sensation.
Página 500 - And suitably to his own experience, he introduces CATO, the great, the fortunate CATO, protesting in his old age, that, had he a new life in his offer, he would reject the present. Ask yourself, ask any of your acquaintance, whether they would live over again the last ten or twenty years of their lives.
Página 220 - ... either when it excites a passion by informing us of the existence of something which is a proper object of it; or when it discovers the connexion of causes and effects, so as to afford us means of exerting any passion.
Página 231 - Vice and virtue, therefore, may be compar'd to sounds, colours, heat and cold, which, according to modern philosophy, are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind: and this discovery in morals, like that other in physics, is to be regarded as a considerable advancement of the speculative sciences; tho', like that too, it has little or no influence on practice.