the object they are to fulfil, and the size of the proposed garrison will, of course, be decided on beforehand. When the climatic and other conditions are taken into consideration, it is obvious that no less than double the force required to garrison the more healthful places in the United States will be required. Without undertaking to form an estimate of the force required for this purpose, it is obvious that it would exact a tribute from the Treasury, that would be burdensome and, the chances of Congress failing to make the needful appropriations is a contingency that should not be overlooked. Our policy has been and always will be, to keep our military forces down to the lowest notch until war is actually upon us. Our coast defenses are to-day a source of solicitude owing to the fact that we have scarcely enough men to keep the rust from ruining the guns.

The canal, after it is open to navigation, will become a highway of the world's commerce, for, though the distance between the most important European ports and those of the East, is shorter by way of the Suez route than by way of Panama, still, there will unquestionably be a large foreign traffic through it, and all maritime nations. of the world will have acquired rights of navigation that can not be ignored, no matter how inconvenient it may be to ourselves to recognize them. New trade routes will be established which never before existed, and the neutral nations creating them will insist on maintaining them. That this will bring about conditions requiring tact and delicacy in handling can not be doubted. Anything that endangers the freedom of that traffic, such as war between the United States and a maritime power is likely to do, will cause an uneasy feeling on the part of neutrals, and the waters adjacent to the Isthmus will see an accumulation of warships representing those nations. In what way will those conditions affect the question of fortifications? The question answers itself. Fortification and neutralization are not in harmony. According to generally accepted opinions, there can be no neutralization with fortifications and vice versa, the erection of fortifications destroys neutralization. Indeed, the defense of the canal by means of forts, as already stated, is based by its advocates on the theory that there is, in reality, no neutralization of the canal under the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty. As this sentiment

finds adherents in our own country, we must expect others to take that view in other countries. The danger of complication as a result of the construction of fortifications is far greater than the danger to the canal from lack of them.

The canal, so far as respects foreign nations, is, to all intents and purposes, purely a commercial canal. It can not be said to have great military value to any foreign nation, Great Britain alone excepted, and no single nation, not even Great Britain, under existing conditions, could hold it permanently against the power that could ultimately be exerted by the United States. Its loss or prospective loss might induce us to accept terms of peace, that under other circumstances, would not receive consideration, but the inducement of any foreign nation to attack the canal would arise from the injury its loss would be to us and not from the gain to him. Indeed, the capture of the canal by a foreign power might prove to be too heavy a burden for him to carry.

To deprive the United States of its use in war it is not necessary, however, to send a fleet to the Isthmus. A few resolute men landing on the coast nearby could cut an embankment or destroy a lock with a few sticks of dynamite which they could carry on their person. The perimeter of Lake Gatun will be many miles in length, with remote spots where a break could be made in a few hours. Fortifications commanding the entrances afford no protection whatever against this danger. A military police, strong enough to keep up a constant patrol of the weak spots, is what is needed, not forts.

The fear has been expressed that if the entrances to the canal were not defended by fortifications, an enemy in time of war might, by taking advantage of its neutral character, pass through it to attack our cities on the opposite side. Nothing more unlikely to happen could be imagined. No naval commander, be he ever so rash, would be willing to put his fleet so completely at the mercy of his enemy. The canal will have several locks, and when a ship is in one, it will be at the mercy of the lock tenders. When an enemy comes to the canal with the intention of passing through it, he will first try to get possession. To get possession, he must first destroy our fleet which will oppose him outside. After that he must destroy or

capture the army and such part of the navy as will oppose him inside, all of which will be no small undertaking. As a last resort the canal can be disabled by our own forces if needful, to prevent his using it.

In a war between the United States and any single non-signatory power, it is practically certain that with our present naval resources we could keep an unfortified canal open without assistance from any other power. In a war between the United States and a number of non-signatory powers, whose combined strength would be sufficient to menace the safety of the canal, we might reasonably expect that the jeoparded interests of British commerce would come to our assistance, and with British help we could keep the canal open against the world.

When the Russo-Turkish war was in progress in 1877, the British Government, feeling some concern as to the action of Russia in her operations against the Turks with respect to the Suez Canal, sent word to the Russian Ambassador, that

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an attempt to blockade or to otherwise interfere with the canal, or its approaches would be regarded by Her Majesty's Government as a menace to India and a grave injury to the commerce of the world. Her Majesty's Government has formally determined not to permit the canal to be made the scene of any combat or warlike operation.

This was ten years before the Treaty of Constantinople. Great Britain "is determined not to permit the canal to be made a scene of any combat or warlike operation." In other words, she did not propose to allow any force to go to the canal with warlike intentions. She would destroy it before it got there. That is the true and only effectual means of defense. Would she not in the same way aid in keeping the Panama Canal open, if the latter be unprotected by fortifications?

Suppose, on the other hand, the war was with Great Britain. Would not the other maritime nations of the world come to our assistance? This is not a safe reliance, it is true, but after commerce has become accustomed to the new route, and new lines of traffic have been established, anything that looks to a possible interruption of traffic would be regarded as a great calamity by all nations. It

is reasonable to expect them to do those things that will protect their interests.

The idea has been suggested that the canal could be made a good base of operations for our navy; that the large fresh water lake would be a convenient place in which to clean the bottom of our ships and assemble them in readiness for service in either ocean. The idea is fallacious. For operations against the South American or Central American states it would be of service, but for operations against any of them, a naval base is not needed, at least, none other than we already possess. For offensive operations against a European or Asiatic power, it is unsuitable as a base. As a means of transferring our fleet from one ocean to the other, or of dividing it and yet keeping the two parts within supporting distance of each other, the canal will be of great value. In fact, this is its greatest value from a military standpoint, but fortifications do not add to the canal's facilities. A wide, deep channel and commodious locks that will enable a fleet to pass from one ocean to the other in the shortest time, is the important consideration.

The canal will possess one drawback as a base of operations. The channels of exit are long and narrow. An inferior fleet on the outside could bottle up a stronger one inside. The length and narrowness of the channels restrict the formation of a fleet coming out to that of a single column of ships at intervals. An enemy on the outside could deploy and concentrate a heavy fire on the leading ship, to which the latter could reply by only part of her battery. The chances are the leading ship would be sunk before she could get out of the canal, thus blockading the channel for these that follow. Limon Bay the outer end of the channel is some distance beyond the land on which the shore batteries would be built. In Panama Bay this objection would not be so serious, as batteries can be established on islands in the harbor.

In

We now hold positions in the Carribean Sea and Gulf of Mexico that control, in a measure, the approaches to the canal from the eastward. If we held similar positions in the Pacific, our control on the west side would be greatly strengthened. The Gallapagos Islands are well located for controlling the approaches from the west. These

islands belong to Ecuador, and some of them might possibly be purchased for the purpose stated. There are no other islands in the Pacific Ocean that would serve the purpose so well. With the Gallapagos Islands on one side, and stations already held in the Carribean Sea and Gulf of Mexico on the other, backed by a strong navy, no force from east or west could reach the canal, without exposing its line of communication to a dangerous flank attack. Consequently an enemy would be compelled to take these places first, which could be made a very difficult operation. Our position in respect to the canal ought to be similar to that of Great Britain with respect to the Suez Canal. Commanding as she does the Mediterranean and Red Seas, she holds the keys to both entrances to the canal which gives her complete control, and this she could not get from fortifications covering the entrances alone.

With all the defensive appliances that engineering skill, backed by almost inexhaustible resources, could supply, Port Arthur could not hold out against the Japanese after they got control of the China Sea. Twice within the last twenty years Port Arthur, though strongly fortified, has been taken by the Japanese after securing control of the sea in the vicinity. We took Cuba and Porto Rico after our supremacy on the Carribean Sea had been established. We practically captured the Philippines when Dewey destroyed the Spanish fleet at Manila, which gave us command of the waters of that archipelago. It is extremely doubtful whether or not the British could have subdued the Boers if their control of the sea could have been disputed. Napoleon lost Egypt in the naval battle of the Nile. Great Britain herself can not be invaded as long as she controls the seas around her as she does to-day. Many instances might be cited. showing that a nation's outlying possessions can not be held in a war with a power otherwise strong, that controls the sea in their vicinity. The defenses of the canal is a naval function. If our navy be unable to protect it without the little assistance it would get from fortifications, it will not be able to do so with them.

The canal from a defensive standpoint has an advantage in a double line of communications. The one on the Pacific side is long, but not easily reached by the enemy; that on the Atlantic side is