From whatever standpoint we approach the question of extradition we see in it the recognition of the solidarity of the nations, because the right of extradition necessarily presupposes that nations are so interested in maintaining the law and order within the family of nations. that they agree to surrender fugitives seeking refuge within their boundaries to the home governments in order that the violations of the law may be properly punished. The right of asylum is thus vanishing from international law and in its place we are recognizing a duty, conventional in form, to aid in the administration of justice. It may be that the extradition of a fugitive from justice is a moral duty, an opinion not countenanced by the weight of authority, but the acceptance of the duty by formal convention binds the nations to surrender, the failure to do which taxes them with a violation of treaty obligations. The conventional nature of the duty is seen in the fact that the extradited fugitive can only be tried for the offense for which he was surrendered and he may not be surrendered for an offense not specified in the treaty of extradition. There can be no objection to the surrender of fugitives charged with the grosser crimes, although it may well be that states are unwilling to surrender their own subjects and citizens for crimes alleged to have been committed in foreign parts. A criminal is none the less a criminal because he is a subject or citizen, but national feeling may well regard him in such a different category as to prevent his surrender.

A very different question is raised when it is proposed to surrender fugitives whose sole offense has been of a political character, that is to say, fugitives who for political purposes, such as to overthrow the government and substitute another in its place, or to modify existing governments, have resorted to force, committed acts of violence, and in not a few cases, crimes of the most serious character. We naturally sympathize with one whose act was for the public good however mistaken his judgment, who exposed himself to the loss of life and property without any immediate hope of profit or gain. It is, however, necessary to define the nature of political offense, lest we include in its protection questionable characters who have taken advantage of disorder and commotion to commit crime, and whose act was neither in furtherance of nor connected with a political movement. It is all the more necessary to determine the nature of a political crime because

many of the treaties exclude " political offences" from extradition without attempt to define them.1 This is not to be wondered at, because it is very difficult to state categorically and in the abstract what is or is not a political offense. As Lord Denman said in the Castioni case (1 Q. B. 149):

"I do not think it necessary or desirable that we should attempt to put into language, in the shape of an exhaustive definition, exactly the whole state of things, or every state of things which might bring a particular case within the description of an offence of a political character. * ** The question really is whether, upon the facts, it is clear that the man was acting as one of a number of persons engaged in acts of violence of a political character with a political object, and as part of the political movement and rising in which he was taking part."

And in the same case Mr. Justice Hawkins said:

"I can not help thinking that everybody knows that there are many acts of a political character done without reason, done against all reason; but at the same time, one can not look too hardly and weigh in golden scales the acts of men hot in their political excitement. know that in heat and in heated blood men often do things which are against and contrary to reason; but none the less an act of this description may be done for purposes of furthering and in furtherance of a political rising, even though it is an act which may be deplored and lamented, as even cruel and against all reason, by those who can calmly reflect upon it after the battle is over."

Whether an act is political or not is therefore largely a matter of interpretation and must be considered in the light of facts and circumstances attending its commission.

It may be questioned whether the progress of constitutional and representative government will not cause political offences to be looked upon with less favor than formerly, and that uprisings against a wellregulated and orderly government will deprive the fugitive of the sympathy lavished upon him not many years ago when constitutional government was being forced from unwilling hands. It is not too much to say that crimes committed by anarchists, by those to whom organized government is repulsive may be excluded from the category of nonextraditable offences, and that the assassination of sovereigns of mon

1 See Supplement to this issue, pp. 144 et seq.

archial countries and chief executives of republican states, will no longer enjoy the immunity to which political fugitives are entitled.

The recent trial of the Russian Rudowitz in Chicago and the refusal to extradite, for the murder in Russia of a fellow-citizen and two defenceless women, accused of betraying revolutionary plots to the Russian government, may well give us pause, lest in our sympathy with alleged political offenders we place a premium upon the commission of unspeakable atrocities. The exclusion of assassins of heads of states and anarchists from the benefit of political offences leads to the conclusion that some limitations must be imposed upon the immunity previously granted and it may be that a reexamination of political offences in the light of experience and practice may suggest further limitations so as to separate ordinary crime from the pretence of politi cal activity. A fugitive who has really committed a political crime should not be surrendered, but international justice and comity demand. that an ordinary crime should not be invested with a political character for the sole purpose of defense. The question is as complicated as it is delicate, but a reexamination of the essentials of a political offence seems necessary in order that a right of asylum may not be abused and that we may not extend protection to unworthy persons.

THE NEWFOUNDLAND FISHERIES QUESTION

The controversy between the United States and Great Britain in relation to the Northeastern or Newfoundland Fisheries, which has been a subject of diplomatic negotiation for nearly seventy years, is to be finally settled by a submission to the Permanent Court at The Hague in accordance with the general treaty of arbitration between the two powers concluded April 4, 1908.3 On January 27th last Secretary of State Root and Ambassador Bryce signed a special agreement as provided by the treaty determining the constitution of the tribunal and reciting the questions to be decided.

The interpretation of the language of article I of the treaty of October 20, 1818, is the subject which has been the cause of difference between the countries and which is to be judicially determined. The text of the article is as follows:

2 See articles quoted in Supplement from treaties with the following countries: Belgium, p. 149; Brazil, p. 147; Denmark, p. 149; Guatemala, p. 150; Haiti, p. 144; Mexico, p. 147; Portugal, p. 163; Russia, p. 145; Spain, p. 150. 3 See Supplement, 2:298.

4 See supplement to this issue, p. 168.

Whereas differences have arisen respecting the liberty claimed by the United States for the inhabitants thereof, to take, dry, and cure fish on certain coasts, bays, harbours, and creeks of His Britannic Majesty's dominions in America, it is agreed between the high contracting parties, that the inhabitants of the said United States shall have forever, in common with the subjects of His Britannic Majesty, the liberty to take fish of every kind on that part of the southern coast of Newfoundland which extends from Cape Ray to the Rameau Islands, on the western and northern coast of Newfoundland, from the said Cape Ray to the Quirpon Islands on the shores of the Magdalen Islands, and also on the coasts. bays, harbours, and creeks from Mount Joly on the southern coast of Labrador, to and through the Straights of Belleisle and thence northwardly indefinitely along the coast, without prejudice however, to any of the exclusive rights of the Hudson Bay Company: and that the American fishermen shall also have liberty forever, to dry and cure fish in any of the unsettled bays, harbours, and creeks of the southern part of the coast of Newfoundland hereabove described, and of the coast of Labrador; but so soon as the same, or any portion thereof, shall be settled, it shall not be lawful for the said fishermen to dry or cure fish at such portion so settled, without previous agreement for such purpose with the inhabitants, proprietors, or possessors of the ground. And the United States hereby renounce forever, any liberty heretofore enjoyed or claimed by the inhabitants thereof, to take, dry, or cure fish on, or within three marine miles of any of the coasts, bays, creeks, or harbours of His Britannic Majesty's dominions in America not included within the above-mentioned limits; provided however, that the American fishermen shall be admitted to enter such bays or harbours for the purpose of shelter and of repairing damages therein, of purchasing wood, and of obtaining water, and for no other purpose whatever. But they shall be under such restrictions as may be necessary to prevent their taking, drying or curing fish therein, or in any other manner whatever abusing the privileges hereby reserved to them.

It will be observed that by this treaty American fishermen were excluded from taking fish in waters within three marine miles of the British colonial coasts except along southern and western Newfoundland, Labrador, and the Magdalen Islands; and that they were also prohibited from landing on the coasts to cure and dry fish except on the Labrador coast and on a small strip of the southern shore of Newfoundland. The American fishing vessels were, however, permitted to enter the prohibited coastal waters for certain purposes, namely, to find shelter, to repair damages, and to procure wood and water, but these privileges were to be exercised under such restrictions as were necessary to prevent their abuse.

The first dispute concerning the treaty arose about twenty-five years after the signature through the seizure by Nova Scotia revenue vessels of American craft, which were claimed to have taken fish within the three-mile limit, a charge denied by the Americans. The question in

controversy was: upon what basis was the prohibited belt of marginal sea to be fixed? In the diplomatic correspondence which followed the British government asserted that the words of the treaty, "coasts, bays, creeks, or barbours" determined that the line, from which the three miles were to be measured, was such that it crossed the entrance of every bay regardless of its width. This the United States denied, claiming that the language referred only to bays, the width of which did not exceed six marine miles.

In 1854 the controversy, which had been dragged out by ingenious arguments upon both sides, came for a time to an end by the reciprocity treaty of that year which gave to the fishermen of the United States and the British colonies mutual privileges of resort to all coastal waters. With the expiration of that treaty in 1866 the question again arose, but was quieted for a few years by a system of licenses granted to American fishermen by the colonial governments. However, it shortly became a cause of irritation through the renewal of the Canadian policy of making seizures, but the Treaty of Washington (1871) ended the difficulty by reestablishing reciprocal trade and fishing privileges. Upon the expiration of that last venture in reciprocity between the United States and its northern neighbors, the colonial authorities commenced once more to make seizures, and the diplomats at Washington and London attempted to reach a settlement by a new agreement. The Bayard-Chamberlain treaty of 1888 was negotiated, but it failed to receive the assent of the United States Senate. Two years later Secretary Blaine and Honorable Robert Bond of Newfoundland came to an agreement in the form of a reciprocity convention, which was to have settled the dispute so far as the Newfoundland fishery was concerned. Canada, however, not being included in the treaty and fearing that it would interfere with its plan of reciprocity with the United States, objected to the ratification and as a result the British government declined to sanction the agreement.

For twelve years after this failure the American fishermen prosecuted their trade without interruption, but Newfoundland being specially desirous of a reciprocity agreement with the United States, Sir Robert Bond made a second visit to Washington and prepared with Secretary Hay a treaty in relation to the fisheries and reciprocal trade, which was signed November 8, 1902; but to it the Senate never gave its assent. With the failure of the Hay-Bond treaty the attitude of Newfoundland toward the American fishermen changed. As a result new ques