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Whereas, the fact that the consul, without reading it, signed the safeconduct for six persons instead of three and omitted to state that they were of German nationality, as he had prescribed himself, can not be imputed against him except as an unintentional error; and

Whereas, the Moroccan soldier at the consulate, in aiding the deserters to embark, acted only in accordance with orders from his superiors and, by reason of his inferior position, could not have incurred any personal responsibility; and

Whereas, the secretary of the consulate intentionally sought to embark the deserters of non-German nationality as enjoying the protection of the consulate; and

Whereas, for this purpose he deliberately induced the consul to sign the abovementioned safe-conduct and with the same intention took measures both to conduct the deserters to the port and to have them embarked; and

Whereas, in acting thus he exceeded the limits of his authority and committed a grave and manifest violation of his duties; and

Whereas, the deserters of German nationality were found at the port under the actual protection of the German consular authority and this protection was not manifestly illegal; and

Whereas, this actual situation should have been respected by the French military authority as far as possible; and

Whereas, the deserters of German nationality were arrested by said authority despite the protests made in the name of the consulate; and Whereas, the military authority might and therefore ought to have confined itself to preventing the embarkation and escape of the deserters, and, before proceeding to their arrest and imprisonment, to offering to leave them in sequestration at the German consulate until the question. of the competent jurisdiction had been decided; and

Whereas, this mode of procedure would also have tended to maintain the prestige of the consular authority, in conformity with the common interests of all Europeans living in Morocco; and

Whereas, even if we admit the legality of the arrest the circumstances did not warrant, on the part of the French soldiers, either the threats made with a revolver or the prolongation of the shots fired at the Moroccan soldier of the consulate even after his resistance had been overcome; and

Whereas, as regards the other outrages or acts of violence alleged on both sides, the order and the exact nature of the events can not be determined; and

Whereas, in accordance with what was said above, the deserters of German nationality should have been returned to the consulate in order to restore the actual situation which was disturbed by their arrest; and

Whereas, such restitution would also have been desirable with a view to maintaining the consular prestige; however, inasmuch as, in the present state of things, this court being called upon to determine the final status of the deserters, there is no occasion for ordering their provisional and temporary surrender which should have taken place;

Therefore:

The court of arbitration declares and decides as follows:

It was wrong and a grave and manifest error for the secretary of the Imperial German consulate at Casablanca to attempt to have embarked, on a German steamship, deserters from the French foreign legion who were not of German nationality.

The German consul and the other officers of the consulate are not responsible in this regard; however, in signing the safe-conduct which was presented to him, the consul committed an unintentional error.

The German consulate did not, under the circumstances of the case, have a right to grant its protection to the deserters of German nationality; however, the error of law committed on this point by the officers of the consulate can not be imputed against them either as an intentional or unintentional error.

It was wrong for the French military authorities not to respect, as far as possible, the actual protection being granted to these deserters in the name of the German consulate.

Even leaving out of consideration the duty to respect consular protection, the circumstances did not warrant, on the part of the French soldiers, either the threat made with a revolver or the prolongation of the shots fired at the Moroccan soldier of the consulate.

There is no occasion for passing on the other charges contained in the conclusions of the two parties.

Done at The Hague in the building of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, May 22, 1909.

HJ. L. HAMMARSKJÖLD, President.

MICHIELS VAN VERDUYNEN, Secretary General.

BOOK REVIEWS

France and the Alliances. By André Tardieu. Paris.

Mr. André Tardieu's recent book on France and the Alliances is based upon a series of lectures delivered by him at Harvard in 1908 on that subject. The work is both interesting and timely: I say it in no perfunctory spirit: interesting because it deals with the subtle complications of European diplomacy since the Franco-German War, told in graphic and entertaining fashion; timely because the present situation in Europe is causing in many quarters grave apprehension, charged as the atmosphere now is with so much combustible matter. The diplomatic situation of today is one to challenge the interest of all thinking men. To understand the present condition of affairs, some examination of the trend of diplomacy during the past thirty years is necessary. This Mr. Tardieu has undertaken, making, as is natural, his own country the centre. In his own language, he desired to show cultivated Americans

France of to-day, in the presence of Europe and the world, such as she has been shaped, after painful experiences, by thirty-eight years of sustained effort and diplomatic action.

To attempt to epitomize, or even to recapitulate the historical matter of the book, would be impossible in the brief space allotted to a mere reviewer, and would too greatly entrench upon the space allotted to those superior and original thinkers the contributors of leading articles. Should the reviewer succeed in sending students of diplomacy to the book, he will have fully accomplished his object.

After 1871, France had not only lost the dominating position held by her in Europe down to 1866, but broken, dismembered, humiliated, and torn by factions, her prospect of once more playing a leading role seemed distant indeed. Internal prosperity indeed returned more quickly than could have been expected owing to the buoyancy, industry and thrift of the French people; yet externally they were completely isolated.

Mr. Tardieu considers France and Russia natural geographical allies. With Poland, Turkey and Sweden, she had been able in the past to make head against her old enemy Austria: to hold her own against Germany today, the Russian alliance was necessary. Differences in régime; mala

droitness on the part of European administrations; the dominating force, and magnificent skill of Bismarck conspired to keep the allies apart for some time after the German War. In 1875, however, when Germany had made up her mind that France was recuperating too rapidly, and that another humiliation might be necessary, the Russian emperor allowed it to be known through his Minister of Foreign Affairs that “We want France as strong as she was in the past," and another German invasion was averted. Subsequently Russia sought and obtained great loans from France, and France has now become Russia's creditor for twelve billions of francs; many international courtesies were interchanged, and as early as 1891, the Franco-Russian, or dual alliance, had become a fait accompli.

But it insured us in

Its object was not to give us back Alsace-Lorraine. Europe, a moral authority which, since our defeats, had been wanting to us. It augmented our diplomatic value. It opened to us the field of political combinations, from which our isolation had excluded us. From mere observation, we could pass to action, thanks to the recovered balance of power.

France's situation, diplomatically, was thus down to the Russo-Japanese War, fairly assured. The dread of German attack or national humiliation in the diplomatic forum was averted. The consequences of Russia's Manchurian policy, however, were unforeseen. French capital went into the Trans-Siberian Railroad, and the able and brilliant Mr. Delcassé apparently did nothing to divert Russia from her policy and the war with Japan. Bitter was the disappointment in France at the news from the Far East, and the final disaster at Mukden seemed to render the alliance of little value to France, and to place her again in a position of enforced isolation, minus her twelve billions of francs.

The French Foreign Office had, however, done more than effect the Russian alliance. Three centuries of conflict had divided France from England. Clashing colonial interests in all parts of the world, the memory of Egypt abandoned to the English, the unwillingness or inability of the Government to support French explorers in Africa, and the final humiliation of the Fashoda incident, made any rapprochement between the two countries seem a feeble and hopeless dream. Yet in diplomacy it is usually the unexpected that happens. We count too much upon national feelings and sentiments, and do not realize that they in turn are governed largely if not wholly by economic and commercial considerations. Great, therefore, was the surprise, when, on the 8th of April, 1904, the entente cordiale between the two countries became known,

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with an éclaircissement of all the old misunderstandings and a guaranty of friendly co-operation in the future against a disturbance in the balance of power. German commercial conquest pressing on the English markets throughout the world during the last few years had sufficed to obliterate the memory of Cressy, Waterloo, and recent Fashoda. The common dread of German hegemony had turned the hereditary enemies into friends, all in a day. England's reply to Emperor William II's appeal to the German people saying, "our future is on the sea," is to be found in the entente, ably and tactfully initiated by that masterly diplomat - King Edward VII.

The solution of the old quarrel also involved recognition of France's peculiar situation in Morocco, and thus led to the entente being put to a test in short order. But Mr. Delcassé did not only aim at better relations with England. Italy's adherence to the German-Austrian alliance had been largely due to dislike and jealousy of France. Nations are not usually grateful. Louis Napoleon's policy of aiding Italian consolidation, without allowing the monarchy to occupy Rome, had created a condition of "gallophobia," illogical as it may seem. Subsequently, jealousy of France's extension in North Africa, and consequent widening of her influence in the Mediterraneau, embittered relations. This situation was, however, due to sentiment rather than to the real interest of the nation and consequently could have no firm or abiding basis. For Italy, "The financial consequences of the alliance with Germany were disastrous." Friendly relations with the Paris money market were potent to accomplish what Louis Napoleon's quixotic attitude so miserably failed to do. Thus, Mr. Delcassé was able to bring about a rapprochement with Italy, which, without modifying the text of the Triple alliance, made it lose its edge. Italy had been led to interpret it as purely defensive and ceased to be by her provocative attitude an excuse for possible German aggression. The Triple alliance thus became

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Less threatening militarily, more peaceable politically. To Germany, if attacked by France, it leaves the support of the Italian Army; but for an attack on France there is no longer the assistance of Italian provocations.

Again, as part of the skillful policy of the French Foreign Office, close relations were established with Spain. Spain's claims in Morocco, which might have been a source of international irritation, were recognized, and her aid secured to France in her endeavor to tranquillize

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