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lation to its subject, work a result different from the general one above stated. Thus

§108a. Entire day"-"Day."-The words "entire day," or even "day" alone, in some connections and as applied to some subjects, may include the whole twenty-four hours, from midnight to midnight. Again,

§109. "One day previous."-The Texas constitution having required that bills, to become laws, should be presented to the governor "one day previous to the adjournment of the legislature," this was held to mean not less than twenty-four hours.3 § 110. "Clear."- If the statute requires a given number of “clear days,”— as, "ten clear days,"— neither the first nor the last is counted in the computation. Such is the settled English rule, and there is believed to be nothing adverse to it in this country. So

"At least."- The English courts hold, to regret, and still to adhere to the holding, that the words "at least" have equal effect with "clear; " as, where the expression was "fourteen days at least," "the court was of opinion that fourteen days at least must mean fourteen clear days." The contrary was adjudged in Missouri, in a case where a forfeiture was thus avoided, otherwise the English doctrine would have been followed. And

'Haines v. S., 7 Tex. Ap. 30; Law- quire us to decide. One or the other rence v. S., 7 Tex. Ap. 192. construction must be adopted." p. 145.

Kane v. Com., 89 Pa. St. 522, [33 Am. R. 787]. See S. v. Holliday, 61 Mo. 229; S. v. Holliday, 61 Mo. 400. [Day ordinarily intended is twentyfour hours from midnight to midnight. Zimmerman v. Cowan, 107 Ill. 631; Penn. Co. v. Ins. Co., 189 Pa. St. 255, 42 Atl. R. 138.]

'Hyde v. White, 24 Tex. 127, Roberts, J., observing: "Whether it be held that the word 'day' is twentyfour hours from the moment of adjournment, and used as a measure of time, allowed the governor to consider of and act on the bill, or is an entire day regarded as an intervening point of time between the day of presentation and the day of the adjournment, this case does not re

4 Rex v. Herefordshire, 3 B. & Ald. 581; Rex v. West Riding of Yorkshire, 4 B. & Ad. 685, 690; [Walsh v. Boyle, 30 Md. 262.]

5 Zouch v. Empsey, 4 B. & Ald. 522; Reg. v. Shropshire, 8 A. & E. 173; Mitchell v. Foster, 12 A. & E. 472; Reg. v. Aberdare Canal, 14 Q. B. 854, 867, 868. In Young v. Higgon, 6 M. & W. 49, the statutory expression was "at least one calendar month," and the like construction was put upon it, the court not even mentioning the words "at least," though they may have been in the judicial mind. See also Reg. v. St. Mary, Warwick, 1 Ellis & B. 816; Freeman v. Read, 4 B. & S. 174.

6 S. v. Gasconade, 33 Mo. 102. ["Not

"Before."— In Texas the expression "five days before the return-day" was held to mean five "clear" days.1

"From and after."- The effect of these words has already been considered.2

1

§ 110a. Months unequal in length. In computing time by calendar months, which are of unequal length, the month in which it begins rather than that in which it ends, or any intermediate one, ordinarily furnishes the rule; as, for example, from the fifteenth day of March to the fifteenth day of April, a period of thirty-one days, is one calendar month, and from the fifteenth of April to the fifteenth of May, a period of thirty days, is one calendar month.3 But while so much is reasonably plain, embarrassing questions, not in all particulars adjudicated, arise. Assuming, as established, that a month beginning on the fifteenth of January ends on the fifteenth of February, when does one end which begins on the thirtieth of January? Where twenty-eight days in February alone constitute a full calendar month, plainly, in reason, the thirty-first of January and the first and second of March need not all be added. Though this absurdity cannot be involved in the true answer to the question, there is no possible answer which does not present something not apparently quite right. It is submitted, therefore, as the best solution attainable, that, when February has twenty-eight days, a calendar month beginning the twenty

less than " does not mean clear days. S. v. Winter Park, 25 Fla. 371, 5 S. R. 818.]

1 O'Connor v. Towns, 1 Tex. 107. [If an act is to be done a certain number of days before a given day, that day must not be anted. Salee v. Ireland, 9 Mich. 154.]

2 Ante, § 31a; Goode v. Wehb, 52 Ala. 452; Wood v. Com., 11 Bush, 220; Bemis v. Leonard, 118 Mass. 502, [19 Am. R. 470;] Menges v. Frick, 73 Pa. St. 137, [13 Am. R. 731. "Until:" Time until a certain day may be either inclusive or exclusive of the day mentioned, according to intention. Conway v. Mercantile Co., 44 Pac. R. 940 (Wyo.). "To" a specified day includes that day. Penn. Co. v.

Schreiner, 14 Mont. 141, 35 Pac. R. 878. "At once" means reasonable time. Cohen v. Silverman, 40 N. Y. Sup. 8. See also Warren v. Slade, 23 Mich. 1; Everts v. Fisk, 44 Mich. 515, 7 N. W. R. 81. Where a statute makes a certain act punishable, if committed in the "night-time," it is not night so long as there is light enough to discern a person's features. Klieferth v. S., 88 Wis. 163, 59 N. W. R. 507. "On or before" includes that day. Disney v. Furness, 79 Fed. R. 810.]

3 Freeman v. Read, 4 B. & S. 174; P. v. Ulrich, 2 Abb. Pr. 28; Webb v. Fairmaner, 3 M. & W. 473: Migotti v. Colvill, 4 C. P. D. 233, 235; s. c. nom. Nigotti v. Colville, 14 Cox, C. C. 305.

ninth, the thirtieth or the thirty-first of January ends equally in each instance on the twenty-eighth, or last day, of February.1

§ 110b. Hours.- Sometimes a statute employs the term "hour" or "hours," but there is nothing in its meaning requir ing special consideration.2

§ 110c. Sunday. Whether or not Sunday is to be excluded from a computation will depend largely on the nature of the subject, and in some degree on the statutory terms. As it is not a day for judicial business, it is excluded from computations relating thereto, when consistent with the words. Where, in a case of this sort, the law gives a certain number of hours for the performance of an act, those even of an intervening Sunday are to be left out from the count; the person being allowed hours wherein it is lawful to do the act. And to some extent, and by some opinions, this is so also where the time is given in days, especially when the number is less than seven."

1 Indeed, this may be deemed established by analogy. "In the case of bills of exchange, in which the word 'month' is held to mean 'calendar month,' it is laid down by all the text writers that bills at one month drawn on the 28th, 29th, 30th or 31st of January will fall due (excluding the days of grace) all on the same day, namely, the 28th of February, or, in leap-year, on the 29th. . . . It is no doubt true that the law applicable to bills of exchange depends upon the usage of merchants and is not necessarily applicable to other cases; but, where the question is, what is the true meaning of 'one calendar month?' it is useful to consider how such an expression is regarded in any case in which it is constantly used in familiar legal instruments." Denman, J., in Migotti v. Colvill, supra, at p. 236. In this case it was held that a sentence on the 31st of October to one month's imprisonment expires on the last moment of the last day, being the 30th of November.

2 Franklin v. Holden, 7 R. I. 215; Com. v. Intoxicating Liquors, 97 Mass.

601; Ridgley v. S., 7 Wis. 661; Meng v. Winkleman, 43 Wis. 41.

3 Crim. Pro., I, § 1001; Chapman v. S., 5 Blackf. 111; Langabier v. Fairbury, etc. R. R. Co., 64 Ill. 243, [16 Am. R. 550;] True v. Plumley, 36 Me. 466; Harris v. Morse, 49 Me. 432, [77 Am. D. 269;] Watts v. Com., 5 Bush, 309; [Qualter v. S., 120 Ind. 92, 22 N. E. R. 100; Porter v. Pierce, 120 N. Y. 217, 24 N. E. R. 281, 7 L. R. A. 847; S. v. Harris, 121 Mo. 445, 26 S. W. R. 558; St. Joseph v. Landis, 54 Mo. Ap. 315; First Nat. Bank v. Williams, 110 Mich. 15, 67 N. W. R. 976; S. v. May, 142 Mo. 135, 43 S. W. R. 637; Robin

son v. Templar, 114 Cal. 41, 45 Pac. R. 998; P. v. Rose (Ill.), 47 N. E. R. 547; Johnson v. Merritt, 50 Minn. 303, 52 N. W. R. 863.]

4 Meng v. Winkleman, 43 Wis. 41; Com. v. Intoxicating Liquors, 97 Mass. 601; Ridgley v. S., 7 Wis. 661. But see Franklin v. Holden, 7 R. I. 215. And see S. v. Green, 66 Mo. 631. 5 Chicago v. Vulcan Iron Works, 93 Ill. 222; S. v. Howard, 82 N. C. 623; National Bank v. Williams, 46 Mo. 17; Ridgley v. S., 7 Wis. 661. But see Peacock v. Reg., 4 C. B. (N. S.) 264.

1

Nor is Sunday counted among the days of a term of court.1 But the rule governing most classes of cases is, that it is counted the same as any other day. The cases cited in the notes show some diversities of views, not necessary to be entered into here.

§ 111. Differing words-Subject.- We have already seen that the differing words of statutes enter largely into the questions discussed in this chapter, as do likewise their differing subjects. And, when all is done, the unreconciled conflicts of judicial opinion are numerous. It would be a happy thing if an author could so present this topic as to render doubts or differences impossible hereafter. Since this cannot be, let us here close the chapter with some further references to authorities, chiefly pertinent to the matter of this section, as showing the combined effect of the particular subject and the special words.3

1 Michie v. Michie, 17 Grat. 109; Read v. Com., 22 Grat. 924. And see National Bank v. Williams, 46 Mo. 17; Burton v. Chicago, 53 Ill. 87; Clerks' Sav. Bank v. Thomas, 2 Mo. Ap. 367. 2 Commissioners of Pilots v. Erie Ry. Co., 5 Rob. (N. Y.) 366; Peacock v. Reg., 4 C. B. (N. S.) 264; Taylor v. Palmer, 31 Cal. 240; Miles v. McDermott, 31 Cal. 271; Broome v. Wellington, 1 Sandf. 664; Ex parte Dodge, 7 Cow. 147; Ex parte Simpkin, 2 Ellis & E. 392. And see Hughes v. Griffiths, 13 C. B. (N. S.) 324; [Wood v. Galveston, 76 Tex. 126, 13 S. W. R. 227; Merritt v. Bank, 100 Ga. 147, 27 S. E. R. 979, 38 L. R. A. 749; Heard v. Phillips, 101 Ga. 691, 31 S. E. R. 216; Yocum v. Bank, 144 Ind. 272, 43 N. E. R. 231; Martin v. Tel. Co., 18 Wash. 260, 51 Pac. R. 376.]

3 Sanborn v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 16 Gray, 448, [77 Am. D. 419] ("within");

120

Levert v. Read, 54 Ala. 529 (“within"); P. v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 37 Mich. 287 ("heretofore "); P. v. Walker, 17 N. Y. 502 (“until”); Annan v. Baker, 49 N. H. 161 ("at the end of the year"); Simpson v. Sutton, Phillips (N. C.), 112 ("year and day"); Alger v. Curry, 40 Vt. 437; Swainson v. Bishop, 52 Mo. 227; Northrop v. Cooper, 23 Kan. 432; S. v. McLendon, 1 Stew. 195; Garner v. Johnson, 22 Ala. 494; Boyd v. Com., 1 Rob. (Va.) 691; Owen v. Slatter, 26 Ala. 547, [62 Am. D. 745;] S. v. Schnierle, 5 Rich. 299; Burr v. Lewis, 6 Tex. 76; Com. v Jones, 12 Pa. St. 365; Abrahams v. Com., 1 Rob. (Va.) 675; Kimm v. Osgood, 19 Mo. 60; Peables v. Hannaford, 18 Me. 106; S. v. Godfrey, 3 Fairf 361; Pulling v. P., 8 Barb. 384. [Most of the states have statutes regulating the computation of time.]

CHAPTER XV.

HOW THE SPECIAL MATTER OF A STATUTE INFLUENCES ITS INTERPRETATION.

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§ 111a. Doctrine defined. The doctrine of this chapter is, that the interpretation of a statute is influenced by the special matter comprehended in its terms.

Distinctions.-This doctrine is similar to, yet diverse from, various others prominent in these discussions; such as, that all laws are to be interpreted together as modifying one another,1 and that every writing is to be construed with reference to its subject.2

Illustrations

of the doctrine are such as the following:$112. "May" and "shall."-The words "may" and “shall"— the one permissive and the other imperative, therefore in their primary meanings quite different - are interpreted by the matter of the provision in which they occur; so that practically "may" is almost as often imperative as permissive, and the two admit of being used, to a considerable extent, interchangeably. Still the cases are not numerous in which "shall" alone is held to be permissive like "may" in its primary sense, but they do occur. And the phrase "it shall be lawful," or "it shall and may be lawful," is an equivalent for the latter word, both primarily, and as admitting of either a permissive imperative rendering, to accord with the matter of the statute. The rules to determine when the permissive form is

or an

1 Ante, § 86.

? Ante, § 98a.

Fowler v. Pirkins, 77 Ill. 271; Kane v. Footh, 70 Ill. 587; Steines v. Franklin, 48 Mo. 167, [8 Am. R. 87;] Estate of Ballentine, 45 Cal. 696; P. v. Buffalo, 4 Neb. 150; P. v. Otsego, 51 N. Y. 401; Rockwell v. Clark, 44 Conn. 534; S. v. Buffalo, 6 Neb. 454; [Pueblo Co. v. Smith, 22 Colo. 534, 45 Pac. R. 357, 33. L. R. A. 465; Smith v. King, 14 Oreg. 10, 12 Pac. R. 8; John

ston v. Pate, 95 N. C. 68; Crawford v. Greenleaf, 48 Mo. Ap. 590.]

4 R. R. Co. v. Hecht, 95 U. S. 168; Wheeler v. Chicago, 24 IlL 105, [76 Am. D. 736.] And see Rex v. Flockwold Inclosure, 2 Chit. 251; Hudd v. Ravenor, 2 Brod. & B. 662, 665.

5 Castelli v. Groom, 18 Q. B. 490, 495; Cook v. Tower, 1 Taunt. 372, 377; Rex v. Eye, 1 B. & C. 85, 86; Reg. v. Oxford, 4 Q. B. D. 245, 525; s. c. in H. of L. nom. Julius v. Oxford, 5 Ap.

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