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expression is, that"a thing given in particular shall not be taken away by general words.”] Thus,
Limitation of time — Place.— A statute prescribing the time within which a class of offenses must be prosecuted, or the place of the trial, controls a general one, even subsequent in date, creating an offense within the class, and providing for its punishment. And
? Selling liquor in town.— A local act, making finable the unlicensed selling of spirituous liquors in a designated town, is not affected by a subsequent general one regulating the sale of such liquors in the state. So
Bank of Mobile, 33 Ala. 693. See also later general law only when such Zachary v. Chambers, 1 Oreg. 321; S. a legislative intention clearly apv. Bilansky, 3 Minn, 246; St. Martin pears. Essex Co. v. Essex Com., 62 v. New Orleans, 14 La. An. 113; Pease N. J. L 376, 41 Atl. R. 957; P. v. Kel. v. Whitney, 5 Mass. 380; Nichols r. ler, 158 N. Y. 187, 52 N. E. R. 1107; S. Bertram, 3 Pick. 342; S. v. Perrys. v. Stoll, 17 Wall. 436; P. v. Hanra burg, 14 Ohio St. 472; Isham v. Ben- han, 75 Mich. 611, 42 N. W. R. 1124. nington Iron Co., 19 Vt. 230; London, 4 L. R. A. 751; Mallory v. Coin., 115 etc. Ry. Co. v. Wandsworth Board of Pa. St. 25, 7 Atl. R. 790; Keyes v. Works, Law R. 8 C. P. 185, 189; post, N. Y., 57 N. Y. Sup. 1047. Where the $ 156; (Harrisburg v. Sheck, 104 Pa. repeal by general law of a special St. 53; Dick's Appeal, 106 Pa. St. 589; law would render the general law Coats v. Hill, 41 Ark. 149; Wood v. unconstitutional, there is a doubly Election Com., 58 Cal. 561; Mc- strong presumption against repeal. Kenna v. Edmundstone, 91 N. Y. S. v. Collector, 54 N. J. L. 274, 23 Atl. 231; S. v. Stevenson, 44 N. J. L. 371; R. 666. A presumption against reEx parte Schmidt, 24 S. C. 363; 8. v. peal may arise also from the fact Green, 24 Mo. Ap. 227; P. v. West- that no corresponding remedy is chester, 40 Hun, 353; S. v. Fitzporter, given by the new statute. Newman 17 Mo. Ap. 271; Cascades R. R. Co. v. v. Ecton, 100 Ky. 653, 21 S. W. R. Sohns, 1 Wash. T. 557; S. v. Young, 526.] 30 S. C. 399, 9 S. E. R. 355; President 1 Hutton, J., in Standen v. Univer. v. Rushville, 32 Ill. Ap. 320; Musick sity of Oxford. W. Jones, 17, 26; Mc. v. K. C. R. R. Co., 114 Mo. 309, 21 S. Farland v. State Bank, 4 Pike, 410; W. R. 491; S. v. Womble, 112 N. C. Felt v. Felt, 19 Wis. 193. 862, 19 L. R. A. 827, 17 S. E. R. 491; 2 Johnson v. U. S., 3 McLean, 89; S. v. Callac, 45 La. An. 27, 12 S. R. U. S. v. Ballard, 3 McLean, 469; Rex 119; Cook Co. v. Gilbert, 146 Ill. 268, v. Wyndham, Russ. & Ry. 197; S. C. 33 N. E. R. 761; Aldinger v. Pugh, 57 nom. Rex v. Window, 3 Camp. 78; Hun, 181, 10 N. Y. Sup. 684; Re God- Churchill v. Crease, 5 Bing. 177, 180; dard, 94 N. Y. 544; Buffalo Cemetery Gregory's Case. 6 Co. 196; Dwar. Stat. v. Buffalo, 118 N. Y. 61, 22 N. E. R. (2d ed.) 514; Ottawa v. La Salle, 12 962; Com. v. Cain, 14 Bush, 525; Ill. 339. Com. v. Bonne Co., 82 Ky. 632. A 3 McRae v. Wessell, 6 Ire. 153. special earlier law is repealed by a
Jurisdiction to magistrate.— A statute conferring on justices of the peace jurisdiction over offenses punishable by fine not exceeding $7, and another giving a like jurisdiction over enumerated offenses the fine for which is more than $7, may, the former being general and the latter specific, stand together; what is said in general, in the one, being qualified by what is enunciated in particular, in the other.'
$ 126a. Different provisions in one statute.- As this doctrine applies to different statutes, a fortiori it does to different provisions in the same statute.?
$127. Other classes of cases. There are other classes of cases to which the doctrine of this sub-title applies. For example,
Provisions as to punishment — (Larceny). — After a statute had provided a punishment for the larceny of goods exceeding $50 in value, another was enacted ordaining a heavier punishinent for larceny where the goods are of value above $2,000, and repealing inconsistent acts. Thereupon the later statute was held to apply only to the heavier larcenies, while the earlier stood as to those of value between $50 and $2,000.
III. ONE STATUTE EXTENDING ANOTHER. $ 128. Doctrine defined. The doctrine of this sub-title is that, where the harmony of the law requires, one statute will be construed as lengthening out — that is, extending the effect of — another. Thus,
Forbidding clergy. — When clergy was allowed, if a statute took it away from offenses of a designated class, all subsequently-enacted offenses within such class were held to be excluded;5 the earlier statute by construction enlarging the later into the forbidding of clergy to the offender. For —
1 Barnes v. S., 19 Conn. 398. As to Ohio, 225; Tuttle v. Hills, 6 Wend.
4 with Hill v. Hall, 1 Ex. D. 411. 474; Reg. v. Thompson, 4 Eng. L &
23 Inst. 117; Rex v. Armagh, 8 Mod. Eq. 287. 6,8; Clarence Ry. Co. v. Great North 48. v. Grady, 34 Conn. 118.
31 East, P. C. 136; Foster, 190. And Clegg, 16 Q. B. 681.
see 1 East, P. C. 129; Anonymous, T. 3 And see Cincinnati v. Rice, 15 Jones, 233.
Earlier qualifying later.— An earlier enactment may qualify a later, nor are express words required to give it this effect.? Again,
$ 129, Perjury. The act of congress of March 3, 1825, defining the crime of perjury against the United States, was held to apply to false swearing under the statute of bankruptcy, subsequently passed ; the two enactments operating upon and enlarging each other. On the same principle,
Deputy collector — (Administering oath).- The act of congress of March 3, 1817, having conferred on every collector of customs “authority, with the approbation of the secretary of the treasury, to employ within his district such number of proper persons as deputy collectors of the customs as he shall judge necessary, who are hereby declared to be officers of the customs,” the construction was that, wherever in subsequent enactments any authority - as, to administer an oath - was given the collector, the same extended by exposition to his deputy."
$ 130. Salaries under successive statutes.- A statute in Tennessee, after enlarging the duties and jurisdiction of a certain county court, added that “the judge of said court shall have the same salary as the circuit judges of the state.” Afterward another statute increased the salaries of the circuit judges, whereupon the county judge was held entitled to the increased salary also. In Alabama, the pay of the quarter
” master-general having been fixed by a statute at $200 a year, another, repealing this one, placed it at $4 a day while he should be on duty. But the general appropriation act, passed later during the same session, yet approved by the governor the same day, set apart for this oflicer $200 a year for two years; and this was held to postpone the operation of the act making his compensation $4 a day until the two years should expire.
1 Holmes v. Tutton, 5 Ellis & B. 65; SU. S. v. Nihols, 4 McLean, 23. Atty. Gen. v. Moore, 3 Ex. D. 276; 4U. S. v. Barton, Gilpin, 439. See Barber v. Tilson, 3 M. & S. 429. also S. v. Raines, 3 McCord, 533;
2 Reg. v. Smith, Law Rep. 1 C. C. Doebler v. S., 1 Swan (Tenn.), 473; 266, 270; In re Perrin, 2 Drury & Campbell v. P., 8 Wend. 636. Warren, 147, 1 Con. & L. 567; Will. 5 Crozier 2. S., 2 Sneed, 410. iams v. Drewe, Willes, 392; Louis- 6 Riggs v. Pfister, 21 Ala. 469. Comville v. Com., 9 Dana, 70; S. v. Bec- pare with Kinsey V. Sherman, 46 ton, 7 Bax. 138.
Iowa, 463. And see further, concernIV. THE COMMON LAW SHORTENING A STATUTE.
§ 131. Doctrine defined.— The doctrine of this sub-title is that a provision of the common law, like a statutory one,' may, when the harmony of the legal system requires, cut short the effect of a statute. For,
Modify, not repeal.— When the unwritten and the written law, the same as when two statutes, may stand together without conflict up to a given point, there is not properly a repeal; but, at this point, the one or the other simply gives way. For example,
Specific common law and general statute. — The rule as to general and specific in statutes' prevails also in this case. statute general in its terms is construed as subject to any exceptions which the common law requires. Thus,
Infants.— Though, as already seen, infants may be bound by a statute in general terms, they are not always so. The particular instance will be governed by its own reasons. Since the unwritten law restricts or takes away the capacity for crime of those who are below certain ages, the same limitation extends to and qualifies statutes in general terms creating of
Insanity. While insane persons may enforce rights under statutes as well as at the common law, and
be bound by statutes, they are not responsible to the common law for crime, ing the doctrine of this section, Gris. many states still declare the old rule. wold v. Atlantic Dock, 21 Barb. 225. Civ. Code Cal., $ 4; Code Civ. Proc. The appropriations made by the leg. N. Y., $ 3345; McClain, Ann. Iowa islature, where there is no provision Code, $ 3733.] limiting particular cases to a shorter 2 Ante, SS 112a, 1126, 126. period, extend to the end of the first 3 See Wilbur v. Crane, 13 Pick. 284;
quarter after the adjournment U. S. v. Hart, Pet. C. C. 390; C. v. of the next regular session. S. v. Knox, 6 Mass. 76; S. v. Martindale, Babcock, 33 N. W. R. 709, 22 Neb. 33.] 1 Bailey, 163.
[The presumption 4 Ante, $ 117; Beckford v. Wade, 17 that a statute is to be construed Ves. 87; Warfield v. Fox, 53 Pa. St. strictly in derogation of the common 382; Bailey v. Whaley, 14 Rich. Eq. 81.
perhaps amounts to no more 5 Crim. Law, I, SS 367–373; ante,
a presumption against the fur- $ 117; Rex v. Groombridge, 7 Car. & ther change than shown expressly, P.582. And see Sydney v.S.,3 Humph. of either common or statute existing 478.
Many states have adopted stat- 6 2 Bishop, Mar., Div. & S., SS 518 utes changing the old rule; and the 522; Jones v. Green, Law R. 5 Eq. tendency now is as indicated, though 555.
I Ante, $ 126.
therefore they are also excepted by interpretation out of statutes creating crimes. The common law thus limits and cuts short their effects. Also,
Coverture.— The common-law exemption of the wife from responsibility for criminal acts committed in the presence of the husband is, by construction, carried equally into statutory offenses, thus cutting short the effect of the statutes. And a statute in general terms creating a forfeiture is, in like manner, restrained by the common law. It does not include women under coverture. Again,
g 132. Evil intent.— A statute will not generally make an act criminal, however broad may be its language, unless the offender's intent concurred with his act, because the common law does not. Hence
Necessity.- What is done from overwhelming necessity is construed as not violating a statute, however contrary to its general terms. And
Mistake of facts. One who, while careful and circumspect, is led into a mistake of facts, and, doing what would be in no way reprehensible were they what he supposes them to be, commits what under the real facts is a violation of a criminal
1 Crim. Law, I, SS 303a, note, 374 584. But see Reg. v. Armstrong, 1
Crawf. & Dix. C. C. 110: Reg. V. 2 Crim. Law, I, S 356 et seq. And Woodrow, 2 New Sess. Cas. 346. And see Com. v. Hadley, 11 Met. 66. see Reg. v. Tivey, 1 Den. C. C. 63; S.
Martin v. Com., 1 Mass. 347. See v. Nicholas, 2 Strob. 278; Hooper v. also Cornwall v. Hoyt, 7 Conn. 420. S., 56 Ind. 153; Taylor v. Newman, 4 But a feme covert may be proceeded B. & S. 89, 9 Cox C. C. 314. (Where a against under a penal statute with statute makes criminal an act not out joining her husband. Rex v. malum in se, or infamous without Crofts, 7 Mod. 397.
requiring the act to be knowingly + The William Gray, 1 Paine, 16; done, a criminal intent need not be Reg. v. Allday, 8 Car. & P. 136, 139; proved. U. S. v. Leathers, 6 Sawy. 17: Anonymous, 2 East, P. C. 765; Price Gardiner v. P., 62 N. Y. 299; Com. 2. V. Thornton, 10 Mo. 135; Com. v. Wentworth, 118 Mass. 441; Halsted v. Stout, 7 B. Mon. 247; Duncan v. S., 7 S., 41 N. J. L. 552, 32 Am. R. 247; P. v. Humph. 148; Com. v. Slack, 19 Pick. Adams, 16 Hun, 549; S. v. White Co., 304; Reg. v. Page, 8 Car. & P. 122; 111 N. C. 661, 16 S. E. R. 331.) Reg. v. Langford, Car. & M. 602; Reg. 6 Crim. Law, I, a series of chapters v. Caruthers, 3 Crawf. & Dix. C. C. extending from $ 204 to $ 429. 391; Com. v. Fourteen Hogs, 10 S. & 6 The Gertrude, 3 Story, 68; The R. 393; Campbell v. Com., 2 Rob. (Va.) Josefa Segunda, 5 Wheat. 338; Strat791; Reg. v. Philpotts, 1 Car. & K. ton v. Hague, 4 Call, 564. 112; Rex t. Speed, 1 Ld. Raym. 583,