Hence, when a court construes a statute, it does not so arrange and bend the several sections and clauses, or so combine it with the prior law, that a particular transaction shall be included under only one inhibition. It is no objection that it is included under numerous separate inhibitions or statutes, each having a separate penalty of its own.1 Thus, Liquor selling and Lord's day. A sale of intoxicating liquor may violate both a statute prohibiting labor on the Lord's day, and one against the unlicensed selling of the liquor, and the prosecuting officer may proceed for the one or the other offense, at his election. So, 2 Liquor selling and peddling.—A statute against peddling, and another against liquor selling, may be equally violated by one sale. Nor is it material whether the inhibitions are in separate acts or separate clauses of the same act.3 - Proceedings barring one another. Whether, in these cases, one proceeding can be pleaded in bar of another is a question not within the scope of these discussions. Again, § 144. Declaratory statutes.- An enactment in its nature declaratory of the common law will be construed, as far as may be, according to the common law. In like manner, Common-law remedy.— Said a learned judge: "Without any statutory provision giving any specific remedy where a purely statutory right or remedy is asserted, the courts would adopt analogous common-law remedies to forward the ends of justice. 1 Monck v. Hilton, 2 Ex. D. 268, 277, 280; S. v. Williams, 11 S. C. 288; post, § 247. [Where a statute imposes several duties, and a failure to comply with the "conditions " of the section, a disobedience of any one subjects to the penalty. S. v. R. R. Co., 32 Fed. R. 722; Clifton v. S., 73 Ala. 473. Where there is a civil liability by statute, and a criminal one is superadded, the civil proceeding cannot be affected or destroyed by the fact that the criminal law imposes other and further liabilities. Waite v. Bartlett, 53 Mo. Ap. 378.] 2 Com. v. Harrison, 11 Gray, 310; Com. v. Trickey, 13 Allen, 559. Com. v. McConnell, 11 Gray, 204. Compare with U. S. v. Morin, 4 Bis. 93. 4 Crim. Law, I, § 978 et seq.; S. v. Williams, supra; Com. v. Churchill, 5 Mass. 174; Com. v. Cheney, 6 Mass. 347. 5 Freeman v. P., 4 Denio, 9, 29, [47 Am. D. 216;] Com. v. Humphries, 7 Mass. 242; P. v. Butler, 16 Johns. 203; Baker v. Baker, 13 Cal. 87; Hewey v. Nourse, 54 Me. 256. [Statutes in affirmance of the common law will be construed as to their consequences in accordance with the common law. Peterson v. Gittings, 107 Iowa, 306, 77 N. W. R. 1056.] And this has been too long the practice of the courts to be now brought in question. On a like principle,— Revisions of statutes are to be interpreted as were the statutes revised.2 So Local jurisdiction of crime.- As, at the common law, crimes are punishable only in the county where they occurred, if a county is divided, those before committed will, equally with the subsequent ones, be prosecuted each in its particular part of the old county.3 IX. ADHERING IN THE CONSTRUCTION TO THE TERMS OF THE STAT UTES. § 145. Doctrine defined.- The doctrine of this sub-title is simply an expansion of what was laid down in a previous chapter. It is that interpretation cannot, without a sufficient indication in the words employed," aided by such surroundings as the law permits the courts to look into, import words into the statute. The judge is only to expound what he finds written. And there is a degree beyond which the meanings of the written words cannot be bent, or the foregoing rules applied.' Thus, 1 Byrd, J., in Hightower v. Fitzpatrick, 42 Ala. 597, 600. See ante, $114. ? Com. v. Messenger, 4 Mass. 462; Ennis v. Crump, 6 Tex. 34; ante, § 98. [As a general rule, revisions are not construed to alter the law. The intention of the legislature to this effect must be clearly apparent. Clark 7. Powell, 62 Vt. 442, 20 Atl. R. 597; Spencer v. Haug, 45 Minn. 231, 47 N. W. R. 794. Where the act providing for a revision of the code declares acts passed in a certain time should be and remain the law, and directs their incorporation into the code, it does not ratify changes made in the excepted acts by the codifiers. McDaniel v. Campbell, 78 Ga. 188. A mere change of phraseology will not be deemed to work a change in meaning, unless an intent to change is apparent. Brown v. Randolph Co., 45 W. Va. 827, 32 S. E. R. 165. Where a chapter of a revised code contains a provision that this law shall not apply to certain counties, and there is a doubt what laws are meant, the court should refer to the original chapter as it formerly existed. Braun v. S. (Tex.), 49 S. W. R. 620.] 3 Crim. Pro., I, § 49; S. v. Jones, 3 Halst. 307, 357, 372. So, white person and slave, formerly.-While, during slavery, white persons and slaves were punished differently, a white person, accessory to an offense by a slave, was dealt with the same as white persons in other cases were, not as slaves. S. v. McCarn, 12 Humph. 494; Loughridge v. S., 6 Mo. 594. Ante, § 81. And see ante, § 90. 5 Ante, §§ 70–73, 78–81. 6 Ante, §§ 74-77. 7 See 1 East, P. C. 96, 247, 248, 250; "Actually occupy."- While, in general, one who assists another in a crime is to be regarded as a joint doer with him,' the words "actually occupy," referring to the place of committing an offense, seem to have been understood as excluding the idea of guilt in one who did not, in the language of the provision, actually occupy the place. And Nature of offense. The nature of an offense may exclude the idea of criminality in any but the individual personally doing the act.3 § 146. Casus omissus.- When a court has gone to the verge of its powers of construction, there will sometimes remain what is termed a casus omissus,—a case within the general scope and meaning of the amended laws, yet not provided for by them.* Such a case must be disposed of according to the prior law," and the legislature alone can cure the defect." Reg. v. Nickless, 8 Car. & P. 757. And 2 Com. v. Dean, 1 Pick. 387. Reg. v. Wright, 9 Car. & P. 754; 1 Alison, Crim. Law, 153, 158. See, as to the English statutes against poaching, Rex v. Dowsell, 6 Car. & P. 398; Rex v. Nash, Russ. & Ry. 386; Reg. v. Whittaker, 2 Car. & K. 636, 1 Den. C. C. 309; s. c. nom. Reg. v. Whit aker, 3 Cox C. C. 50. And see Crim. Law, I, § 364 et seq. 4 See Rex v. Hill, Russ. & Ry. 483. Broom, Leg. Max. (2d ed.) 37; Hall v. Jacobs, 4 Har. & J. 245. S. 2. 6 Pitman v. Flint, 10 Pick. 504, 506; 4 Bl. Com. 302; Jones v. Smart, 1 T. R. 44, 52; Cobb v. Mid Wales Ry. Co., Law Rep. 1 Q. B. 342. See Kilpatrick v. Byrne, 25 Miss. 571; New York v. Broadway, etc. R. R. Co., 12 Hun, 571; [Clay Co. v. Chickasaw, 64 Miss. 534, 1 S. R. 753. In a penal case there can be no such thing as supplying an omission by intendment. Millner, 131 Mo. 432, 33 S. W. R. 15. Even though acts may involve the same mischiefs which the statute was designed to suppress, they are not to be included unless within the plain statutory provisions. U. S. v. Chase, 135 U. S. 261, 34 L. ed. 117; Sarlls v. U. S., 152 U. S. 575, 38 L. ed. 556; S. v. Hunkins, 90 Wis. 271, 62 N. W. R. 1047; S. v. Piazza, 66 Miss. 426, 6 S. R. 316.] 154 § 147. Power of repeal. It is a principle of legislative law that one legislature cannot bind a subsequent one, or, beyond the operation of its rules of procedure,' even itself, as to future acts. So that no statute can be made which may not afterward be repealed, and no general statutory provision against repeals is effectual. But, in discussions further on, we shall see that our written constitutions indirectly, in some degree, restrain repeals; as, for example, where they would divest vested rights,3 or impair the obligations of a contract. Spencer v. S., 5 Ind. 41; Dwar. Stat. (2d ed.) 530. The former rules of the two houses of parliament, prohibitory of repeals during the session in which an act was passed, were made inoperative by 13 and 14 Vict., ch. 21, § 1. Wilb. Stat. Law, 309. torial legislature will not prevent the legislature from changing the statute. Martin v. Territory, 8 Okl. 41, 56 Pac. R. 712. The action of the legislature in the exercise of its police powers cannot be limited or controlled by the action of a previous legislature, or by the provisions of contracts between individuals or corporations. Buffalo R. R. Co. v. R. R. Co., 111 N. Y. 132, 19 N. E. R., 63; Presbyterian Church v. City of New York, 5 Cow. 538. Even where the Ante, $31; Crim. Law, I, § 35, note; 4 Inst. 42, 43; 1 Bl. Com. 90, 91; Jenk. Cent. 2; Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814: Musgrove v. Vicksburg, etc. R. R. Co., 50 Miss. 677; Oleson v. Green Bay, etc. Ry. Co., 36 Wis. 383; S. ". Pilsbury, 31 La. An. 1; Freleigh v. S., legislature has granted substantiai 8 Mo. 606; Thomas v. Daniel, 2 Mc- privileges, there is always an implied Cord, 354; Kellogg v. Oshkosh, 14 condition that the grantees are to be Wis. 623; Atty. Gen. v. Brown, 1 Wis. subject to the reasonable regulation 513; Wall v. S., 23 Ind. 150; S. v. Craig, 23 Ind. 185; Hamrick v. Rouse, Co. v. Needles, 113 U. S. 574, 28 L. ed. 17 Ga. 56; Shaw v. Macon, 21 Ga. 280; 1084; Erie R. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, Armstrong v. Dearborn, 4 Blackf. 153 U. S. 642, 38 L. ed. 846.] 208; Brightman v. Kirner, 22 Wis. 54. [The unnecessary ratification of a statute within the power of a terri of future legislatures. Chicago Ins. 3 S. v. Pilsbury, supra. 4 Bloomer v. Stolley, 5 McLean, 158. § 148. How chapter divided.-We shall consider, I. Whether non-user works a repeal; II. Repeals by express words; III. Repeals by implication; IV. Repeals in particular states. I. WHETHER NON-USER WORKS A REPEAL. § 149. Opinions that it does. Some have deemed a long course of forbearing to evoke the power under a statute, termed non-user, to be a repeal of it. And in South Carolina it was observed: "The court, in Watson v. Blaylock, declared the act imposing penalties on lay magistrates for solemnizing marriages obsolete and invalid, the only instance in our judicial history in which courts have ventured to declare an act of the legislature inoperative from mere non-user." In a later case this doctrine, that a statute may become inoperative by nonuser, appears to have been recognized. But, That it does not. In reason, and by most of the authorities, the power alone which can make a law is competent to annul one; so that no usage, either negative or positive, can grow into a law adverse to a statute. Should the matter to which it relates no longer exist, it will cease to have a practical operation; or, should the reason for it have passed away, its repeal by the legislature might be judicious; but, by the better opinion, all unrepealed statutes must be enforced when the subject and occasion call; they do not become void by nonuser. Yet, 5 Hill v. Smith, Morris, 70, 76. Dwarris says: "The Scotch lawyers hold that a statute loses its force by desuetude, if it hath not been put in execution for sixty years. Other writers have extended this term to a century, and make a distinction between statutes half obsolete and those in viridi observantia. A vague notion seems, too, from the very frequent renewal of some of our fundamental laws, to have prevailed at different times in England, that a statute might become obsolete; but such opinion is unfounded, and has no warrant in our law." Dwar. Stat. (2d ed.) 529. 4 O'Hanlon v. Myers, 10 Rich. 128. 5 Com. v. Hoover, 1 Browne (Pa. Ap.), 25. "James v. Com., 12 S. & R. 220, 228; S. v. Tidwell, 5 Strob. 1. 7 White v. Boot, 2 T. R. 274; S. v. Findlay, 2 Bay, 418; S. v. Tidwell, supra; Com. v. Hoover, supra; Dwar. Stat. (2d ed.) 529; Snowden v. Snowden, 1 Bland, 550; The India, Browning & L. 221. Contra, James v. Com., supra. [A statute cannot lose its force by non-user unless such nonuser be accompanied by the enact |