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$ 152. Within “purview." — Another form of direct repeal is by inserting, in a statute, a clause declaring all acts within its “purview” repealed. The meaning of the word “purview,” when indicating a particular part of a statute, is, we have seen, variable;' and, in the present connection, its sense is evidently still different, denoting the scope or sphere of the statute. So that the effect of this expression is to repeal former statutes simply as to cases provided for in the repealing acts. And it does not differ essentially from a repeal of
Inconsistent provisions.- Not unfrequently a clause is inserted in a statute repealing all laws in conflicts or inconsistent with it, “contravening”? it, or the like. If the provisions of the former and present enactments are in direct contrariety, the repeal takes place, but only to the extent of the repugnance.10 If, on the other hand, by any reasonable contracting, expanding, cutting short, or extending of the old laws or the new, as explained in the foregoing chapter, they can be brought into harmony without repeal, the interpretation should be so, and all suffered to stand together. Thus,
General and specific.— As already seen," general and specific provisions in apparent contrariety may subsist together without working a repeal, the specific qualifying and supplying exceptions to the general.12
the erection of any other bridge * Payne v. Conner, 3 Bibb, 180; P.
7 Tims v. S., 26 Ala. 165.
v. Hodge, 72 N. C. 616; 8. v. King, 12 2 Ante, $ 52.
La. An. 593. 3 Webster quotes, to support this 9 Tierney v. Dodge, 9 Minn. 166; P. meaning of the word "purview:” v. Lytle, 1 Idaho, 161. “In determining the extent of infor 10 Elrod v. Gilliland, 27 Ga. 467. mation required in the exercise of a 11 Ante, SS 112a, 126, and places there particular authority, recourse must referred to. be had to the objects within the pur- 12 Dolan v. Thomas, 12 Allen, 421. view of that authority. Federalist, And see Cain v. S., 20 Tex. 355; S. v. Madison"
Macon County Court, 41 Mo. 453; [S.
“Inconsistent” provisions in unconstitutional act. The effect of an express repeal, in an unconstitutional act, of inconsistent provisions, is considered in another connection.' No prior law is inconsistent with a void statute.?
$ 152a. By amendment.-An amendment of a statute, declaring that it shall read in a particular way, repeals all provisions not retained in the altered form. The unaltered provisions remain unaffected by the changes in the rest. The repeal is not retroactive, but the new provisions are treated as fresh enactments," while yet, as to the future, the amended statute operates as if it had always been in its present form. So
“In lieu.”— A provision “in lieu” of another repeals it."
III. REPEALS BY IMPLICATION.
$ 153. Distinction of express and implied. The forms equally of express and implied repeal are numerous and varying. And there are those of each class so allied to the other that the distinction itself seems in a degree arbitrary. Accu
v. Taylor, 7 S. D. 533, 64 N. W. R. 548; 629. And see Longlois v. Longlois, Cantrell v. Seaverns, 168 Ill. 165, 48 48 Ind. 60; Breitung v. Lindauer, 37 N. E. R. 186; Essex Co. v. Essex Com., Mich. 217; (Smith v. Cosgrove, 71 Vt. 62 N. J. L. 41 Atl. R. 957; P. v. Kel. 196, 44 Atl. R. 73.] ler, 158 N. Y. 187, 52 N. E. R. 1107; 4 Moore v. Mausert, 49 N. Y. 332, 5 Brown v. Lowell, 8 Met. 175; S. v. Lans. 173. And see Laude v. Chicago, Stoll, 17 Wall. 436, 21 L. ed. 655; P. v. etc. R. R. Co., 33 Wis. 640; St. Louis Hanrahan, 75 Mich. 611, 42 N. W. R. v. Foster, 52 Mo. 513. 1124, 4 L, R. A. 751; Mallory v. Com., 5 Ely v. Holton, 15 N. Y. 595. 115 Pa. St. 25, 7 Atl. R. 790; Louis- 6 Holbrook v. Nichol, 36 Ill. 161; ville R. R. Co. v. Williams (Ky.), 41 McKibben v. Lester, 9 Ohio St. 627. S. W. R. 287; Louisville v. Water Co. See Tivey v. P., 8 Mich. 128; Grer v. (Ky.), 49 S. W. R. 766; Chew Hing S., 22 Tex. 588; P. v. Montgomery, 67 Lung v. Wise, 176 U. S. 160; Cade v. N. Y. 109. (A statute incorporated Mitchell, 51 La. An. 1493, 26 S. R. 606; by reference in another becomes a Pratt Com. v. Society, 90 Fed. R. 233.] part of it; and though the former stat1 Ante, & 34.
ute be repealed, the latter remains 2 Sullivan v. Adams, 3 Gray, 476; in force. Shull v. Barton, 58 Neb. Harbeck v. New York, 10 Bosw. 366; 741, 79 N. W. R. 732; Turney v. WilChilds v. Shower, 18 Iowa, 261; Devoy ton, 36 Ill. 385; Ex parte Crow Dog, v. New York, 35 Barb. 264; [In re 109 U. S. 556, 27 L. ed. 1030; Viterbo Rafferty, 1 Wash. 382, 25 Pac. R. 465.] v. Friedlander, 120 U. S. 726, 30 L. ed.
3 Goodno v. Oshkosh, 31 Wis. 127; 782; Collins v. Blake 79 Me. 218, 9 Atl. S. v. Andrews, 20 Tex. 230; Mosby v. R. 358.) St. Louis Mutual Ins. Co., 31 Grat. 7 Gossler v. Goodrich, 3 Cliff. 71.
rately viewed, a part of the repeals treated of in this sub-title are express, yet not by express words. Thus,
By negative statute—(Affirmative and negative distinguished). An old division of statutes is into affirmative and negative; the former being such as are in affirmative, the latter in negative, words. A provision, for example, that it shall be lawful for a tenant in fee-simple to make a lease for twenty-one years, or that such lease shall be good, is affirmative; one that it shall not be lawful to make a lease for above twenty-one years, or that a lease for more shall not be good, is negative.? A negative statute, being in its terms a negation, or denial, of the prior law, repeals it;' and obviously this repeal is express.
How interpreted.— Such a statute is, as to the repeal, strictly construed; that is, as abrogating the prior law no further than its actual words require. Herein it follows the same rule as a repugnant affirmative statute, about to be considered.
$ 154, By affirmative statute.- An affirmative statute repeals by implication so much of the prior law as, after the harmonizing work of interpretation is fully done, remains repugnant to it; for it is the last expression of the will of the law-making power. If two acts in seeming conflict can be
1 Bac. Abr., Statute, G.
Stoddard, 8 Blackf. 581; Johnston's ? Dwar. Stat. (2d ed.) 475.
Estate, 33 Pa. St. 511; Vermillion v. 3 Bac. Abr., Statute, G.; Dwar. Potts, 10 Ind. 286; S. v. Wilson, 43 Stat. (2d ed.) 475; Gooch v. Stephen- N. H. 415, [82 Am. D. 163;] 8. v. Macson, 13 Me 371; (City v. Sheck, 104 cuaig, 8 Neb. 215; Greeley v. JackPa St. 53.)
son ville, 17 Fla. 174; 8. v. Chambers4 Ely v. Cash, 15 M. & W. 617; Ely burg, 8 Vroom, 258; Jersey City v. 4. Bliss, 2 De G., M. & G. 459; Marsh- Jersey City, etc. R. R Co., 5 C. E. all v. Martin, Law Rep. 5 Q. B. 239; Green, 360; Union Iron Co. v. Pierce, Evans v. Rees, 9 C. B. (N. S.) 391. 4 Bis. 327; Swinney v. Fort Wayne,
5 Broom, Leg. Max. (2d ed.) 23; Com. etc. R. R. Co., 59 Ind. 205; Grant v. . Cromley, 1 Ashm. 179; Harris v. Sels, 5 Oreg. 243; Hurst v. Hawn, 5 Robinson, 2 C. B. 908, 910; Reg. v. Oreg. 275; Peet v. Nalle, 30 La. An. Salisbury, 2 Q. B. 72, 84; Byrne v. 949; Hayden v. Carroll, 3 Ridgw.P.C. Stewart, 3 Des. 135; Britton v. Com., 545, 599; O'Flaherty v. McDowell, 6 1 Cush. 302; S. v. Miskimmons, 2 Ind. H. L. Cas. 142; Davis v. S., 2 Tex. Ap. 440; V. S. v. Irwin, 5 McLean, 178; 425; Wells v. S., 3 Lea, 70. [In deSullivan r. P., 15 III. 233; Adams v. termining which is the last expresAshby, 2 Bibb, 96; Moore v. Vance, sion of the legislative power, where 1 Ohio, 1; West v. Pine, 4 Wash. C. C. the acts are passed the same day, 691; Morrison v. Barksdale, Harper, their numbers will be taken. S. v. 101; Moore v. Moss, 14 Ill. 106; Ham Davis, 70 Md. 237, 16 Atl. R. 529; P. 0. S., 7 Blackf. 314; McQuilkin v. v. Dobbins, 73 Cal. 257, 14 Pac. R. 860;
reconciled by any fair construction, so that both may stand, they must be; and then no repeal will be held to take place. And it is the same with a provision of the common law and a statute.? So that
How interpreted.— The law does not favor repeals by implication, and they will not be adjudged to occur except when Brown v. Chancellor, 61 Tex. 437; ed. 637; Frost v. Wenie, 157 U. S. 46, Henrietta Co. v. Gardner, 173 U. S. 39 L ed. 614. Special provisions in 123, 43 L. ed. 63T; Mersereau v. Mer- a code or system of laws must, in serau Co., 51 N. J. Eq. 382, 26 Atl. R. any possible way, be so interpreted 682; Albert v. Twohig, 35 Neb. 563, as to bring them into harmony with 53 N. W. R. 582; S. v. Howe, 28 Neb. the general policy of such code. Cin. 618, 44 N. W. R. 874; Penn v. Dunlap, v. Conner, 55 Ohio St. 821, 44 N. E. 112 Ind. 322, 13 N. E. R. 403. A sub- R. 582.] sequent statute prescribing no rem- 2 To effect a repeal of the common edy whatever cannot, in the absence law, said Goldthwaite, J., “the right of a clearly expressed intention, re- which is given by the general law peal a remedy prescribed by a former must be plainly and obviously instatute. Greensborough v. McAdoo, consistent with the existing stat112 N. C. 359, 17 S. E. R. 178.
utes; and, if, upon a just interpreta1 Blain v. Bailey, 25 Ind. 165; S. v. tion of the latter, the two can exist Bishop, 41 Mo. 16; Nixon v. Piffet, 16 together, the intention of the legisLa. An. 379; De Pauw v. New Al. lature that they should both exist is bany, 22 Ind. 204; Mullen v. P., 31 to be presumed.” Tannis v. St. Cyre, Ill. 444; Elliott v. Locknane, 1 Kan. 21 Ala. 449, 452. 126; Conner v. Southern Express Co., 3 Loker v. Brookline, 13 Pick. 343, 37 Ga. 397; P. v. Barr, 44 Ill. 198; 348; Haynes v. Jenks, 2 Pick. 172, Desban v. Pickett, 16 La. An. 350; 176; Snell v. Bridgewater Cotton Gin McCool v. Smith, 1 Black, 459; Mo Man. Co., 24 Pick. 296, 297; Goddard Donough v. Campbell, 42 Ill. 490; v. Boston, 20 Pick. 407; Bowen v. Hume v. Gossett, 43 IIL 297; S. v. Lease, 5 Hill (N. Y.), 221; Wyman v. Young, 17 Kan. 414; Fowler v. Pir- Campbell, 6 Port. 219, [31 Am. D. 677;] kins, 77 Ill. 271; Chamberlain v. Dugan v. Gittings, 3 Gill, 138, [43 Am. Chamberlain, 43 N. Y. 424; U. 8. v. D. 306;] McCartee v. Orphan Asylum Barrels of Spirits, 2 Abb. (U. S.) 305; Society, 9 Cow. 437, [18 Am. D. 516;] S. v. Draper, 47 Mo. 29; St. Louis v. Lichtenstein v. S., 5 Ind. 162; Erwin Independent Ins. Co., 47 Mo. 146; v. Moore, 15 Ga. 361; Aspden's EsCattaragus v. Willey, 2 Lans. 427; tate, 2 Wall. Jr. 368, 431; Hockaday In re Evergreens, 47 N. Y. 216; S. v. v. Wilson, 1 Head, 113; Robbins v. Smith, 59 Ind. 179; Forquerán v. S., 8 Ohio St. 131; S. v. Morrow, 26 Donnally, 7 W. Va. 114; Iverson v. Mo. 131; Swann v. Buck, 40 Miss. 268; S., 52 Ala. 170; S. v. Doherty, 25 La. P. v. San Francisco, etc. R. R. Co., 28 An. 119, [13 Am. R. 131;] Staats v. Cal. 254; Blain v. Bailey, 25 Ind. 165; Hudson River R. R. Co., 4 Abb. Ap. Buckingham v. Steuben ville & Indi287; S. v. Bishop, 41 Mo. 16; Powers ana R. R. Co., 10 Ohio St. 25; S. v. V. Shepard, 48 N. Y. 540; Gropp v. Chambersburg, 8 Vroom, 258; GoodP., 67 Ill. 154; Gohen v. Texas Pac. rich v. Milwaukee, 24 Wis. 422; HorRy. Co., 2 Woods, 346; [Henrietta ton v. Mobile, 43 Ala. 598; Gill v. Co. v. Gardner, 173 U. S. 123, 43 L. S., 30 Tex. 514; Kerlinger v. Barnes,
they are inevitable, or plainly the legislature means them." Such legislative intent is never, prima facie, presumed. Hence, in restraint and limitation of repeals, the statutes are strictly construed. Thus,
$ 155. Derogation of prior law.- As already seen,' statutes in derogation of the common law, or of a prior statute, are construed strictly, not operating beyond their words or the clear repugnance of their provisions; that is, the new displaces the old only as directly and irreconcilably opposed in terms. For when the legislative power professes to add to the law, as it does in the enactment of an affirmative statute, we cannot
14 Minn. 526; [Rosecrans v. U. S., 165 rington, 3 DeG., M. & G. 159; Thames
islature; for “the presumption of so