felony what before was a misdemeanor, or creates a misde meanor of what was before a felony, the old law is gone by reason of the repugnance, and the offender can be indicted only under the new.1 1 Reg. v. Button, 12 Jur. 1017, 1021; Rex v. Robinson, 2 East, P. C. 1110, 1114, 1115, 2 Leach, 749; Rex v. Walford, 5 Esp. 62; S. v. Wright, 4 McCord, 358; Burton v. Watkins, 2 Hill (S. C.), 674; S. v. Dick, 2 Murph. 388; Warner v. Com., 1 Pa. St. 154, [44 Am. D. 114;] Rex v. Cross, 1 Ld. Raym. 190 711; s. a. nom. Rex v. Crosse, 12 Mod. 634; Rex v. Pim, Russ. & Ry. 425; Hayes v. S., 55 Ind. 99. [The doctrine of merger applies only when the precise act, viewed in respect of its precise consequences, is in question. St. Louis v. Lee, 8 Mo. Ap. 598.] CHAPTER XX. THE CONSEQUENCES FOLLOWING ACTUAL AND ATTEMPTED REPEALS. § 174a. Introduction. 175-180. General doctrine. 181-187. Specific questions. § 174a. Complications of doctrine.- Our written constitutions render, we shall see in this chapter, repeals in some circumstances practically impossible; as, where they would divest vested rights. Complicated with this condition of the law are some nice common-law doctrines relating to the effect of conceded repeals. We shall not undertake to separate these two classes of cases under their distinct heads, but How chapter divided. We shall consider, I. The general doctrine; II. Specific questions. I. THE GENERAL DOCTRINE. § 175. Right and remedy distinguished.- Both in the nature of things and in adjudication, there is a distinction between what pertains to the right and what to the remedy. And our entire law is separable into these two classes. Concerning each.-Rights are the product of the legal rule as prevailing when and where the facts transpired;2 and, when vested, they do not change with changes in the law. Remedies are governed by the law of the place in which the rights are sought to be enforced or their violation avenged, as existing at the time when the proceedings are carried on and the judgment is rendered. 1 Ante, § 85a. Bishop, Con., §§ 567-575; Don v. Lippmann, 5 Cl. & F. 1; Scott v. Seymour, 1 H. & C. 219. Ante, § 85a. * May v. Breed, 7 Cush. 15, 34, [54 Am. D. 700;] Story, Confl. Laws, $556-558; De la Vega v. Vianna, 1 B. & Ad. 284; Fergusson v. Fyffe, 8 CL. & F. 121. 5 Hale v. S., 15 Conn. 242; Lore v. S., 4 Ala. 173; S. v. Fletcher, 1 R. L 193; Davidson v. Wheeler, Morris, 238; Knoup v. Piqua Bank, 1 Ohio St. 603. [Right of appeal is purely remedial. Hale v. Grogan (Ky.), 49 S. W. R. 464.] § 176. Remedy (Procedure).— The procedure in a cause, whether civil or criminal, pertains to the remedy. And, subject to exceptions growing out of special reasons, it must conform to the general law of procedure prevailing at the place and time where and while the cause is instituted and progressing. In respect of past transactions, therefore, the same as of future ones, it may be changed from time to time, at the legislative pleasure.1 Again, Punishment (Ex post facto).— The punishment wherewith the law visits a crime, being, as we have seen, separable from the definition of the crime,' pertains to the remedy. A statute increasing it for offenses already committed would be void as ex post facto; 3 but, subject to this exception, a convicted prisoner may receive whatever sentence the law provides at the time it is pronounced, and no other can be imposed. Now,— § 177. Repeal ends proceedings.- No court can entertain a cause without authority of law. Therefore the repeal of a statute terminates all proceedings And the same rule applies to a municipal by-law. 1 Ante, § 84,85a; Bishop, Con., §§ 571, 572; Brock v. Parker, 5 Ind. 538; Lore v. S., 4 Ala. 173; Hale v. S., 15 Conn. 242; U. S. v. Samperyac, Hemp. 118; Hickory Tree Road, 43 Pa. St. 139; R. R. Co. v. Hecht, 95 U. S. 168; Jones v. Davis, 6 Neb. 33; P. v. Essex, 70 N. Y. 228; De Mill v. Lockwood, 3 Blatch 56; Searcy v. Stubbs, 12 Ga. 437; Ralston v. Lothain, 18 Ind. 303; Read v. Frankfort Bank, 23 Me. 318; Bank of U. S. v. Longworth, 1 McLean, 35; Sutherland v. De Leon, 1 Tex. 250, [46 Am. D. 100;] Hope v. Johnson, 2 Yerg. 125; P. v. Phelps, 5 Wend. 9. See Van Valkenburgh v. Torrey, 7 Cow. 252. [Though pleadings are made under old laws, the procedure must conform to the new. First Church v. Fadden (N. Dak.), 77 N. W. R. 615.] 2 Ante, §§ 166, 167. 3 Crim. Law, I, §§ 279, 281. under it." D. 741:] S. v. Fletcher, 1 R. L. 193; ante, § 166. 5 Hickory Tree Road, 43 Pa. St. 139; Thomas v. S., 3 Tex. Ap. 112; Musgrove v. Vicksburg, etc. R. R. Co., 50 Miss. 677; Smith v. Arapahoe Dist. Court, 4 Colo. 235; Miller's Case, 3 Wils. 420, 1 W. Bl. 451; Hunt v. Jennings, 5 Blackf. 195, [33 Am. D. 465;] Road in Hatfield, 4 Yeates, 392; Directors of the Poor v. R. R. Co., 7 Watts & S. 236; S. v. Lackey, 2 Ind. 285; Reg. v. Denton, 18 Q. B. 761, Dears. 3, 14 Eng. L. & Eq. 124; Com. v. Hampden, 6 Pick. 501, 508; Illinois & Michigan Canal v. Chicago, 14 Ill. 334; North Canal Street Road, 10 Watts, 351, [36 Am. D. 185;] Fenelon's Petition, 7 Pa. St. 173; [Wheeler v. S., 64 Miss. 462, 1 S. R. 632; S. v. Williams, 97 N. C. 455, 2 S. E. R. 55; Kennedy v. Adams (Nev.), 51 Pac. R. 840. The repeal of an act giving certain 4S. v. Williams, 2 Rich. 418, [45 Am. grounds for attachment has no effect Kansas City v. Clark, 68 Mo. 588. In criminal prosecutions. If the common or statutory law, which authorizes a prosecution and conviction for any offense, is repealed or expired1 before final judgment, the court can go no further with the case. Even after verdict rendered against the prisoner,3 or after he has pleaded guilty,' sentence cannot be pronounced; and he must be discharged. The same result follows if there is a judgment which has been vacated by an appeal or a writ of review. But after final judgment, a repeal of the law will not arrest the execution of the sentence. Again, upon attachment proceedings already pending. Mulnix v. Spratlin, 10 Colo. Ap. 390, 50 Pac. R. 1078; Fairchild v. U.S., 91 Fed. R. 297; Wikel v. County, 120 N. C. 451, 27 S. E. R. 117; Detroit v. Chapin, 108 Mich. 136, 66 N. W. R. 587, 37 L. R. A. 391. Most states have a saving clause which applies to such cases where the statute is criminal. Cf. S. v. Hardman, 16 Ind. Ap. 357, 45 N. E. R. 345.] 1The Helen, 6 Cranch, 203; The Rachel v. U. S., 6 Cranch, 329; Yeaton v. U. S., 5 Cranch, 281; The Irresistible, 7 Wheat. 551; Davidson v. Wheeler, Morris, 238; Eaton v. Graham, 11 III. 619. But see post, §§ 181, 182; [S. v. Mansel, 52 S. C. 468, 30 S. E. R. 481; Mahoney v. S., 5 Wyo. 520, 42 Pac. R. 13.] 2Com. v. Kimball, 21 Pick. 373; Com. v. Marshall, 11 Pick. 350, [22 Am. D. 377;] Taylor v. S., 7 Blackf. 93; Mayers v. S., 2 Eng. 68; Anonymous, 2 Lewin, 22; U. S. v. Passmore, 4 Dall. 372; Stoever v. Immell, 1 Watts, 258; Com. v. Beatty, 1 Watts, 382; Scott v. Com., 2 Va. Cas. 54; S. v. Cole, 2 McCord, 1; S. v. Fletcher, 1 R. I. 193; Attoo v. Com., 2 Va. Cas. 382; Com. v. Leftwich, 5 Rand. 657; Anonymous, 1 Wash. C. C. 84; P. v. Townsey, 5 Denio, 70, 72; 1 Kent, Com. 465; S. v. Allaire, 14 Ala. 435; Jordan v. S., 15 Ala. 746; S. v. Lloyd, 2 Ind. 659; Heald v. S., 36 Me. 62; Howard v. S., 5 Ind. 183; The Governor v. Howard, 1 Murph. 465; S. v. O'Conner, 13 La. An. 486; The Rachel v. U. S., 6 Cranch, 5 329; U. S. v. The Helen, 6 Cranch, 203; Yeaton v. U. S., 5 Cranch, 281; Wall v. S., 18 Tex. 682, [70 Am. D. 302;] S. v. Ingersoll, 17 Wis. 631; S. v. Cress, 4 Jones (N. C.), 421; Genkinger v. Com., 32 Pa. St. 99; S. v. Edward, 5 Mart. (La.) 474; Lunning v. S., 9 Ind. 309; Calkins v. S., 14 Ohio St. 222; Griffin v. S., 39 Ala. 541; Reg. v. Denton, 18 Q. B. 761, Dears. 3; S. v. Gumber, 37 Wis. 298; Tuton v. S., 4 Tex. Ap. 472; Halfin v. S., 5 Tex. Ap. 212; Carlisle v. S., 42 Ala. 523; Annapolis v. S., 30 Md. 112; U. S. v. Finlay, 1 Abb. (U. S.) 364; S. v. Long, 78 N. C. 571; Greer v. S., 22 Tex. 588; [Breitung v. Lindauer, 37 Mich. 217; Rood v. R. R. Co., 43 Wis. 146; Van Dyke v. McQuade, 86 N. Y. 38; Wheeler v. S., 64 Miss. 462, 1 S. R. 632; Anding v. Levy, 57 Miss. 51; Snell v. Campbell, 24 Fed. R. 880.] 3 Com. v. Duane, 1 Binn. 601, [2 Am. D. 497;] Keller v. S., 12 Md. 322, [71 Am. D. 596;] Com. v. Pattee, 12 Cush. 501; S. v. Stone, 43 Wis. 481. 4 Whitehurst v. S., 43 Ind. 473; Mullinix v. S., 43 Ind. 511. 5 The Rachel v. U. S., 6 Cranch, 329; Yeaton v. U. S., 5 Cranch, 281; Chaplin v. S., 7 Tex. Ap. 87; Hubbard v. S., 2 Tex. Ap. 506; Montgomery v. S., 2 Tex. Ap. 618; Sheppard v. S., 1 Tex. Ap. 522, [28 Am. R. 422.] See S. v. Brewer, 22 La. An. 273. 6 Lewis v. Foster, 1 N. H. 61. 7S. v. Addington, 2 Bailey, 516, [23 Am. D. 150;] Foster v. Medfield, 3 Met. 1. In penal actions.— For the same reason, in cases where no vested private rights interpose, statutes authorizing qui tam and other penal actions in civil form for violations of public or quasipublic duty, follow the same rules as to the effect of repeal.' But, Before statute is in force.- Between the time of the enactment of a repealing statute and its going into operation, it produces no consequences whatever in any case.2 § 177a. In other civil causes.- Subject to more numerous exceptions, the repeal of an ordinary civil statute is followed by the same results as of a criminal or penal one. The party loses his rights under it, and pending proceedings can be carried no further. With respect to future steps, the repealed act is regarded as having never existed. Yet, Vested rights.- Since, under our written constitutions, vested rights cannot by any form of legislation be divested, while still the remedy may be changed, but not so as to be virtually destroyed, it follows, as a part of the same proposition, that no repeal of a statute can divest this class of rights. We may say 1 Pope v. Lewis, 4 Ala. 487; S. v. Tombeckbee Bank, 1 Stew. 347; Eaton v. Graham, 11 Ill. 619; Sumner v. Cummings, 23 Vt. 427; Lewis v. Foster, 1 N. H. 61; Allen v. Farrow, 2 Bailey, 584; Com. v. Welch, 2 Dana, 330; Saco v. Gurney, 34 Me. 14; Broughton v. Branch Bank, 17 Ala. 828; Engle v. Shurts, 1 Mich. 150; Thompson v. Bassett, 5 Ind. 535; Welch v. Wads worth, 30 Conn. 149, [79 Am. D. 236;] Williams v. Middlesex, 4 Met. 76; Uwchlan Township Road, 30 Pa. St. 156; Gaul v. Brown, 53 Me. 496; Rood v. Chicago, etc. Ry. Co., 43 Wis. 146; Union Iron Co. v. Pierce, 4 Bis. 327; [Westchester v. Dressner, 48 N. Y. Sup. 953. The repeal of a statute providing a penalty in favor of a person injured will not discharge a liability already incurred. Blum v. Widdicomb, 90 Fed. R. 220; S. v. Helms, 136 Ind. 122, 45 N. E. R. 893; Starr v. S., 149 Ind. 592. The rule is that the repeal of a statute affects only rights expressly given by statute. Graham v. R. R. Co., 53 Wis. 473, 10 N. W. R. 609.] 2 Ante, § 31; Grinad v. S., 34 Ga. 270. Surtees v. Ellison, 9 B. & C. 750; Musgrove v. Vicksburg, etc. R. R. Co., 50 Miss. 677; Van Inwagen v. Chicago, 61 Ill. 31; Assessors v. Osbornes, 9 Wall, 567; U. S. v. Six Fermenting Tubs, 1 Abb. (U. S.) 268; Nicholls v. Gee, 30 Ark. 135; Hunt v. Jennings, 5 Blackf. 195, [33 Am. D. 465;] Illinois, etc. Canal v. Chicago, 14 Ill. 334; Macnawhoc Plantation v. Thompson, 36 Me. 365; Uwchlan Township Road, 30 Pa. St. 156; Stephenson v. Wait, 8 Blackf. 508; North Canal St. Road, 10 Watts, 351, [36 Am. D. 185;] Petition of Fenelon, 7 Pa. St. 173; Hickory Tree Road, 43 Pa. St. 139; [North Street, 1 Pears. (Pa.) 199.] Ante, § 85a. Ante, §§ 84, 84a, 176; post, § 178; De Mill v. Lockwood, 3 Blatch. 56; Woodruff v. Scruggs, 27 Ark. 26, [11 Am. R. 777;] McCreary v. S., 27 Ark. |