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$ 1890. Remedial statutes.- A statute which, in a certain sense, works with the prior law, to help it where it is weak, or furnish a remedy it had not,' is, unlike one antagonistic thereto, to receive a wide and liberal construction; expanding the meaning of the words as fully as they will bear, and supplying words where the other rules of interpretation: permit. The common expression of this doctrine is, that remedial statutes are to be interpreted liberally, in aid of the remedy. Every thing to advance the remedy is to be done which can be, consistently with any construction permissible. And —

$ 189e. Numerous other illustrations - of construing statutes liberally, each instance depending on its special reasons in the law, might be given. But some have been mentioned already;? and others, in sufficient numbers to make the doctrine plain, will occur as we proceed. Now,

$ 190. How far expansion permissible. There can be no rule to determine, a priori, how far interpretation may expand a statute beyond the strict meanings of its terms. Each instance must depend on the particular words, the subject, and the other circumstances. Various attempts at laying down doctrine on this topic have been made; such as,

Bringing within mischief Or intent.— We sometimes read that, in liberal interpretation, cases out of the letter of an act, yet within the mischief or cause of making it, should be brought by this power of expansion within its remedy; since the lawmaker could not set down all cases in express terms. The older books, more frequently than the later, employ on occasions very broad language of this sort. For example, it is said in Plowden, that “everything which is within the intent of the makers of the act, although it be not within the letter, is as strongly

1 Avery v. Groton, 36 Conn. 304. 7 Ante, S 120. 2 Ante, SS 92d, 93, 102.

8 Inte, $ 120. 3 Ante, SS 79–81, 145, 146.

9 Broom, Leg. Max. (2d ed.) 59; Co. * Perry v. Jefferson, 94 Ill. 214. Lit. 24b; 3 Bl. Com, 430, 431; Jenk.

5 Ante, s 120; post, $ 192; Avery v. Cent. 58, 60, 226; Bac. Abr., Statute, Groton, supra; Vigo's Case, 21 Wall. I, 5, 6; York r. Middleburgh, 2 Y. & 648; York v. Middleburgh, 2 Y. & J. J. 196; Holbrook v. Holbrook, 1 Pick. 196; Smith v. Stevens, 82 Ill. 554. 248, 254; Brown v. Thorndike, 15

6 Johnes v. Johnes, 3 Dow, 1, 15; Pick. 388, 402; S. u. Stephenson, 2 Atcheson v. Everitt, Cowp. 382, 391; Bailey, 334; Brinker v. Brinker, 7 Pa. S. v. Powers, 36 Conn. 77; Hyde v. St. 53, 55; Van Valkenburgh v. TorCogan, 2 Doug. 699, 706.

rey, 7 Cow. 252.

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within the act as that which is within the letter and intent also.”! And later, said Pratt, J.: “The only question is, whether the case be within the meaning of the act; for no matter whether within the words or not." 2 And Lord Mansfield: “In remedial cases, the construction of statutes is extended to other cases within the reason or rule of them.”3 Some writers have assumed that such is not the law now; and even in our books of reports, instances may be found of judicial dissent. The brief forms of the old English statutes afforded more frequent opportunities for this sort of interpretation than do the plethoric modern ones. And the doctrine does not and never did admit of unreasoning application in all cases of liberal construction. It is greatly limited;* and, it may be, subjected to so many exceptions as itself to become rather the exception than the rule. Still, to its widest bound, it does now, as in former ages, prevail, in all cases of liberal interpretation wherein the court can distinctly see that, without it, the legislative intents will not be carried into effect. Thus,

1 Stowel v. Zouch, 1 Plow. 353a, 366. Even though a remedial statute be

2 Hammond v. Webb, 10 Mod. 281, penal in character it should be con. 283.

strued liberally. Huyler v. Cragin 3 Atcheson v. Everitt, Cowp. 382, Cattle Co., 13 Stew. (N. J.) 392, 2 Cent. 391; [Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N. Y. 506, 204. 22 N. E. R. 188, 5 L. R. A. 340, 12 Am. Smith, Stat. & Const. Law, p. 831. St. R. 819; Sullivan v. Oregon Co., 24 Lord Kenyon, the great conservative Pac. R.408. When statutes confer pow. corrector of what some deemed the ers, impose duties and provide for eccentricities of Lord Mansfield, once many and various objects, they are put the doctrine thus: “In expoundnecessarily couched in general terms; ing remedial laws, it is a settled rule but they carry by implication all of construction to extend the remedy powers necessary for the ends sought as far as the words will admit.to be attained. Re Neagle, 39 Fed. R. Turtle v. Hartwell, 6 T. R. 426, 429. 833, 5 L. R. A. 78. It is an established And see Bac. Abr., Statute, I, 6; rule in the construction of remedial Broom, Leg. Max. (2d ed.) 60; Dwar. statutes, that cases within the rea- Stat. (2d ed.) 622 et seq.; ante, SS 145, son, though not within the letter, of 146. a statute are to be considered as em. 5 Ante, SS 70, 73, 79-81, 145, 146. braced within its provisions; and, on 6 In S. v. Morris Canal and Banking the other hand, cases not within the Co., 1 Green (N. J.), 192, it is said: reason, though in the letter, shall “The case is not within the words of not be taken to be within tho stat- the statute, but is governed by analute. Evansville v. Summers, 108 Ind. ogy thereto." And see other cases 189, 6 West. R. 423; W. U. Tel. Co. v. cited to this section and posts Wilson, 108 Ind. 308, 6 West. R. 548.

$ 190a. “Single woman” construed to include married woman — (Bastardy).— The English statute of bastardy, 7 & 8 Vict., ch. 101, constituting a part of the system of poor laws, provided, in $ 2, “that any single woman who may be with child,” etc., should be entitled to proceed against the putative father in a way pointed out, to enforce contributions for its support. And this privilege was held, by construction, to extend to married women in like circumstances. “The law differently interpreted,” said Lord Denman, C. J., “would fail to reach a very large proportion of illegitimate children;' while the reasons of the law, and plainly enough the real intent of the legislature, extended equally to all. Moreover, this case seems fairly to be within a principle of our language, everywhere recognized, whereby is put a

$ 190b. Part for whole.— By a common figure of speech, we often use a word of narrow meaning to signify the whole of the thing to which it belongs. In this way, for example, the expression “a hundred hands" is understood to denote a hundred working persons, when the connection and obvious intent of the speaker require. And, more largely, a writer sometimes mentions a thing in the form of illustration; meaning, and being understood to mean, not only it, but also all else which it illustrates. In this way, and in proper circumstances, statutes are construed to signify more than they literally express; as, where an act of parliament ? required persons to make oath that, among other things, “our sovereign lord King George is law. ful and rightful king," and they “ will bear faith and true allegiance to bis majesty King George.” The construction given it during a succeeding reign was, not that there should be a swearing to support a dead king, or that the statutory command expired with the life of King George, but that the name of the living sovereign should take the place in the oath of the one deceased. Evidently this rule of construction, sound

1 Reg. v. Collingwood, 12 Q. B. 681, the bastard child of a married 687. The learned judge also points woman, who was to be considered out that this statute but follows the single under the existing circumlanguage of 6 Geo. 2, ch. 31, which it stances and for that purpose.” p. 686. supersedes; “yet Lord Ellenborough See Stacey v. Lintell, 4 Q. B. D. 291. and the whole court in Rex v. Luffe, 26 Geo. 3, ch. 53, & 1. 8 East, 193, held that an order might 3 Miller v. Salomons, 7 Exch. 476 be made on the putative father of

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though it is, can be safely followed only by cautious steps.

Where," said Lord Camden, C. J., “it is clear the person or thing expressed is put by way of example, the judges must fill up the catalogue; yet we ought to be sure, from the words and meaning of the act itself, that the thing or person is really inserted as an example.

Wherever this rule is to take place, the act must be general, and the thing expressed must be particular.

In all cases that fall within this rule, there must be a perfect resemblance between the persons or things expressed and those implied. Thus, for instance, administrators are the same thing with executors; tenant for half a year and tenant for years have both terms for a chattel interest, differing only in the duration of the term; and so of the rest, which I need not repeat one by one. And, in all these cases, the persons or things to be implied are in all respects the objects of the law as much as those expressed." I

$ 190c. In brief.-- The doctrine in brief is that, as many times said in the course of these discussions, the full legislative

1 Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. judges of the common pleas were Tr. 1029, 1060. Wilberforce (Stat. named, and it was held that all other Law, 215, 216) has collected, as, by judges, inferior as well as superior, some opinions, pertaining to the in- were included. 2 Inst. 427; Strother terpretation of the ancient statutes v. Hutchinson, 4 Bing. N. C. 83. So, rather than the modern, the follow- too, in Westminster the First (3 Edw. ing illustrations: “The usual method 1, ch. 46), the judges of the king's in which the language of ancient bench at Westminster were put by statutes is extended consists in the way of example for the purpose of treatment of particular words as if describing all courts of justice. 2 they were put for examples. Thus Inst. 256. In the 4th chapter of the the statute Circumspecte agatis (13 same statute the words 'man, dog or Edw. 1) directs the judges to use cat’ include all animals escaping themselves circumspectly in all mat- alive from a wreck. 2 Inst. 167. ters concerning the Bishop of Nor- Again, the 1 Rich. 2, ch. 12, which wich and his clergy, 'not punishing gives an action for an escape, menthem if they hold plea in Court Chris- tions the warden of the Fleet, but extian of such things as be mere spir- tends to all jailers. Platt v. London, itual.' It was held that the Bishop 1 Plow. 35; Plummer v. Whichcot, T. of Norwich was put for an example, Jones, 60, 62. In the statute of Glouand that the act extended to all cester (6 Edw. 1, ch. 8) the county bishops. 2 Inst. 487. The same view court is named for example, but hunwas taken of the provisions of West- dred courts and courts baron are also minster the Second (13 Edw. 1, stat. within the law, 2 Inst. 311; and in 1, ch. 46), which enumerated wind- ch. 11, London is named for excelmills, sheep-cotes, cow-houses and lency, but the act extends to all cities curtilages. 3 Inst. 476. In the 31st and boroughs which have the same chapter of the same statute the privileges. 2 Inst. 322."

intent, whether awkwardly or well expressed, and whether by the use of accurate language or inaccurate, is, when it can be ascertained from the words of the statute, collated with whatever else is permissible, to prevail, especially in liberal constructions, over both the literal meanings and the omissions of words. And, to reach this end, statutes, as they appear on their face, are by interpretation both contracted and expanded in their meanings. Now,

$ 1900. Extending and shortening compared. While in rare instances statutes may be extended in their meanings as above described, courts less readily and less frequently deal with them so. Oftener the course is to restrain them, so as to exclude cases within the words but not the mischief.? And,

Excepting out of operation. It is common, in the interpretation of statutes of every class, to except out of their operation cases clearly not within the mischief intended to be remedied.' On the other hand,

$ 190e. Penal, not extended.- A penal statute “cannot be extended by implication or construction to cases within the mischief, if they are not at the same time within the terms, of the act, fairly and reasonably interpreted."'4

I And see Houk v. Barthold, 73 Ind. Hart v. Cleis, 8 Johns. 41; Marietta, 21.

etc. R. R. Co. v. Stephenson, 24 Ohio 2 Rex v. Parker, 2 East, P. C. 592. St. 48; S. v. Gregory, 47 Conn. 276; (What is not within the purpose of Ball v. S., 50 Ind. 595; Watson v. Hall, meaning, nor within the mischief to 46 Conn. 204. be remedied by a statute, cannot be 4 Allen, J., in Verona Central held a part of the law, though the Cheese Co. v. Murtaugh, 50 N. Y. 314, literal words include it. This princi- 317; S. v. Jaeger, 63 Mo. 403; Huffman ple is axiomatic. Taylor v. McGill, v. S., 29 Ala. 40; Young v. S., 58 Ala. 6 Lea (Tenn.), 300; Kane v. R. R. Co., 358; Dobson v. S., 57 Ind. 69; Wood 112 Mo. 34, 20 S. W. R. 532; S. v. Mc. v. Erie Ry. Co., 72 N. Y. 196, [28 Am. Lain, 49 Mo. Ap. 398. A statute in- R. 125;] Gibson v. S., 38 Ga. 571; Attending to prohibit an offense will lanta v. White, 33 Ga. 229. See Willnever be applied to an innocent and iams v. Evans, 1 Ex. D. 277; ante, lawful act, and an act which is $ 189a; post, § 194; (Hanks v. Brown, within the prohibitory words may be 79 Iowa, 560, 44 N. W. R. 811; S. v. still shown to be lawful or innocent. Coffing, 3 Ind. Ap. 304, 29 N. E. R. 8. v. Botkin, 71 Iowa, 87, 32 N. W. R. 615; Shultz v. Morgan, 1 Kan. Ap. 185.]

572, 42 Pac. R. 254; Dudley v. W. U. 3 Bac. Abr., Statute, I, 5, 6; Will. Tel. Co., 54 Mo. Ap. 391; Ex parte iams v. Prichard, 4 T. R. 2, 3; Canal Bailey, 39 Fla. 734; P. v. Peacock, 98 Co. v. R. R. Co., 4 Gill & J. 1; Hol- Ill. 172; Siegel v. P., 106 II. 89; Hines brook v. Holbrook, 1 Pick. 248, 254; v. Wilmington Co., 95 N. C. 434; John. Brown v. Thorndike, 15 Pick. 388, 402; son S., 63 Miss. 228.]

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