within the act as that which is within the letter and intent also." And later, said Pratt, J.: "The only question is, whether the case be within the meaning of the act; for no matter whether within the words or not."2 And Lord Mansfield: "In remedial cases, the construction of statutes is extended to other cases within the reason or rule of them." Some writers have assumed that such is not the law now; and even in our books of reports, instances may be found of judicial dissent. The brief forms of the old English statutes afforded more frequent opportunities for this sort of interpretation than do the plethoric modern ones. And the doctrine does not and never did admit of unreasoning application in all cases of liberal construction. It is greatly limited; and, it may be, subjected to so many exceptions as itself to become rather the exception than the rule. Still, to its widest bound, it does now, as in former ages, prevail, in all cases of liberal interpretation wherein the court can distinctly see that, without it, the legis lative intent will not be carried into effect.

1 Stowel v. Zouch, 1 Plow. 353a, 366. 2 Hammond v. Webb, 10 Mod. 281, 283.

3 Atcheson v. Everitt, Cowp. 382, 391; [Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N. Y. 506, 22 N. E. R. 188, 5 L. R. A. 340, 12 Am. St. R. 819; Sullivan v. Oregon Co., 24 Pac. R. 408. When statutes confer powers, impose duties and provide for many and various objects, they are necessarily couched in general terms: but they carry by implication all powers necessary for the ends sought to be attained. Re Neagle, 39 Fed. R. 833, 5 L. R. A. 78. It is an established rule in the construction of remedial statutes, that cases within the reason, though not within the letter, of a statute are to be considered as embraced within its provisions; and, on the other hand, cases not within the reason, though in the letter, shall not be taken to be within the statute. Evansville v. Summers, 108 Ind. 189, 6 West. R. 423; W. U. Tel. Co. v. Wilson, 108 Ind. 308, 6 West. R. 548.

Thus,

Even though a remedial statute be penal in character it should be construed liberally. Huyler v. Cragin Cattle Co., 13 Stew. (N. J.) 392, 2 Cent. 204.

4 Smith, Stat. & Const. Law, p. 831. Lord Kenyon, the great conservative corrector of what some deemed the eccentricities of Lord Mansfield, once put the doctrine thus: "In expounding remedial laws, it is a settled rule of construction to extend the remedy as far as the words will admit." Turtle v. Hartwell, 6 T. R. 426, 429. And see Bac. Abr., Statute, I, 6; Broom, Leg. Max. (2d ed.) 60; Dwar. Stat. (2d ed.) 622 et seq.; ante, §§ 145, 146.

Ante, §§ 70, 73, 79–81, 145, 146.

6 In S. v. Morris Canal and Banking Co., 1 Green (N. J.), 192, it is said: "The case is not within the words of the statute, but is governed by analogy thereto." And see other cases cited to this section and post.

§ 190a. "Single woman" construed to include married woman (Bastardy).-The English statute of bastardy, 7 & 8 Vict., ch. 101, constituting a part of the system of poor laws, provided, in § 2, "that any single woman who may be with child," etc., should be entitled to proceed against the putative father in a way pointed out, to enforce contributions for its support. And this privilege was held, by construction, to extend to married women in like circumstances. "The law differently interpreted," said Lord Denman, C. J., "would fail to reach a very large proportion of illegitimate children;1 while the reasons of the law, and plainly enough the real intent of the legislature, extended equally to all. Moreover, this case seems fairly to be within a principle of our language, everywhere recognized, whereby is put a

§ 190b. Part for whole.-By a common figure of speech, we often use a word of narrow meaning to signify the whole of the thing to which it belongs. In this way, for example, the expression "a hundred hands" is understood to denote a hundred working persons, when the connection and obvious intent of the speaker require. And, more largely, a writer sometimes mentions a thing in the form of illustration; meaning, and being understood to mean, not only it, but also all else which it illustrates. In this way, and in proper circumstances, statutes are construed to signify more than they literally express; as, where an act of parliament required persons to make oath that, among other things, "our sovereign lord King George is lawful and rightful king," and they " will bear faith and true allegiance to his majesty King George." The construction given it during a succeeding reign was, not that there should be a swearing to support a dead king, or that the statutory command expired with the life of King George, but that the name of the living sovereign should take the place in the oath of the one deceased.' Evidently this rule of construction, sound

1 Reg. v. Collingwood, 12 Q. B. 681, 687. The learned judge also points out that this statute but follows the language of 6 Geo. 2, ch. 31, which it supersedes; "yet Lord Ellenborough and the whole court in Rex v. Luffe, 8 East, 193, held that an order might be made on the putative father of

the bastard child of a married woman, who was to be considered single under the existing circumstances and for that purpose." p. 686. See Stacey v. Lintell, 4 Q. B. D. 291. 26 Geo. 3, ch. 53, § 1.

3 Miller v. Salomons, 7 Exch. 475.

though it is, can be safely followed only by cautious steps. "Where," said Lord Camden, C. J., "it is clear the person or thing expressed is put by way of example, the judges must fill up the catalogue; yet we ought to be sure, from the words and meaning of the act itself, that the thing or person is really inserted as an example. Wherever this rule is to take place, the act must be general, and the thing expressed must be particular. In all cases that fall within this rule, there must be a perfect resemblance between the persons or things expressed and those implied. Thus, for instance, administrators are the same thing with executors; tenant for half a year and tenant for years have both terms for a chattel interest, differing only in the duration of the term; and so of the rest, which I need not repeat one by one. And, in all these cases, the persons or things to be implied are in all respects the objects of the law as much as those expressed."1

§ 190c. In brief. The doctrine in brief is that, as many times said in the course of these discussions, the full legislative

1 Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 1060. Wilberforce (Stat. Law, 215, 216) has collected, as, by some opinions, pertaining to the interpretation of the ancient statutes rather than the modern, the following illustrations: "The usual method in which the language of ancient statutes is extended consists in the treatment of particular words as if they were put for examples. Thus the statute Circumspecte agatis (13 Edw. 1) directs the judges to use themselves circumspectly in all matters concerning the Bishop of Norwich and his clergy, 'not punishing them if they hold plea in Court Christian of such things as be mere spiritual.' It was held that the Bishop of Norwich was put for an example, and that the act extended to all bishops. 2 Inst. 487. The same view was taken of the provisions of Westminster the Second (13 Edw. 1, stat. 1, ch. 46), which enumerated windmills, sheep-cotes, cow-houses and curtilages. 3 Inst. 476. In the 31st chapter of the same statute the

judges of the common pleas were named, and it was held that all other judges, inferior as well as superior, were included. 2 Inst. 427; Strother v. Hutchinson, 4 Bing. N. C. 83. So, too, in Westminster the First (3 Edw. 1, ch. 46), the judges of the king's bench at Westminster were put by way of example for the purpose of describing all courts of justice. 2 Inst. 256. In the 4th chapter of the same statute the words 'man, dog or cat' include all animals escaping alive from a wreck. 2 Inst. 167. Again, the 1 Rich. 2, ch. 12, which gives an action for an escape, mentions the warden of the Fleet, but extends to all jailers. Platt v. London, 1 Plow. 35; Plummer v. Whichcot, T. Jones, 60, 62. In the statute of Gloucester (6 Edw. 1, ch. 8) the county court is named for example, but hundred courts and courts baron are also within the law, 2 Inst. 311; and in ch. 11, London is named for excellency, but the act extends to all cities and boroughs which have the same privileges. 2 Inst. 322.”

intent, whether awkwardly or well expressed, and whether by the use of accurate language or inaccurate, is, when it can be ascertained from the words of the statute, collated with whatever else is permissible, to prevail, especially in liberal constructions, over both the literal meanings and the omissions of words.1 And, to reach this end, statutes, as they appear on their face, are by interpretation both contracted and expanded in their meanings. Now,—

While in

§ 190d. Extending and shortening compared. rare instances statutes may be extended in their meanings as above described, courts less readily and less frequently deal with them so. Oftener the course is to restrain them, so as to` exclude cases within the words but not the mischief." And,—

Excepting out of operation. It is common, in the interpretation of statutes of every class, to except out of their operation cases clearly not within the mischief intended to be remedied.' On the other hand,

§ 190e. Penal, not extended.-A penal statute "cannot be extended by implication or construction to cases within the mischief, if they are not at the same time within the terms, of the act, fairly and reasonably interpreted."

1 And see Houk v. Barthold, 73 Ind. 21.

2 Rex v. Parker, 2 East, P. C. 592. [What is not within the purpose of meaning, nor within the mischief to be remedied by a statute, cannot be held a part of the law, though the literal words include it. This principle is axiomatic. Taylor v. McGill, 6 Lea (Tenn.), 300; Kane v. R. R. Co., 112 Mo. 34, 20 S. W. R. 532; S. v. McLain, 49 Mo. Ap. 398. A statute intending to prohibit an offense will never be applied to an innocent and lawful act, and an act which is within the prohibitory words may be still shown to be lawful or innocent. S. v. Botkin, 71 Iowa, 87, 32 N. W. R. 185.]

Bac. Abr., Statute, I, 5, 6; Williams v. Prichard, 4 T. R. 2, 3; Canal Co. v. R. R. Co., 4 Gill & J. 1; Holbrook v. Holbrook, 1 Pick. 248, 254; Brown v. Thorndike, 15 Pick. 388, 402;

Hart v. Cleis, 8 Johns. 41; Marietta, etc. R. R. Co. v. Stephenson, 24 Ohio St. 48; S. v. Gregory, 47 Conn. 276; Ball v. S., 50 Ind. 595; Watson v. Hall, 46 Conn. 204.

Allen, J., in Verona Central Cheese Co. v. Murtaugh, 50 N. Y. 314, 317; S. v. Jaeger, 63 Mo. 403; Huffman v. S., 29 Ala. 40; Young v. S., 58 Ala. 358; Dobson v. S., 57 Ind. 69; Wood v. Erie Ry. Co., 72 N. Y. 196, [28 Am. R. 125;] Gibson v. S., 38 Ga. 571; Atlanta v. White, 33 Ga. 229. See Williams v. Evans, 1 Ex. D. 277; ante, § 189a; post, § 194; [Hanks v. Brown, 79 Iowa, 560, 44 N. W. R. 811; S. v. Coffing, 3 Ind. Ap. 304, 29 N. E. R. 615; Shultz v. Morgan, 1 Kan. Ap. 572, 42 Pac. R. 254; Dudley v. W. U. Tel. Co., 54 Mo. Ap. 391; Ex parte Bailey, 39 Fla. 734; P. v. Peacock, 98 Ill. 172; Siegel v. P., 106 Ill. 89; Hines v. Wilmington Co., 95 N. C. 434; Johnson v. S., 63 Miss. 228.]

CHAPTER XXII.

TO WHAT STATUTES AND UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES THE PROCESSES OF CONTRACTION AND EXPANSION OF MEANINGS ARE APPLIED.

§ 191. Meaning plain.- When the meaning of a statute of any sort is plain on its face, it can be extended or shortened by the courts only in its effects. They are not justified in interpreting what needs no interpretation; their duty is simply to carry out the expressed legislative purposes and intent.3

2

Elsewhere Here.- It was deemed that the perspicuity and usefulness of these discussions would be promoted by presenting this subject of the strict and liberal interpretation under various aspects, from diverse points of observation. Therefore the general doctrine and distinctions were stated in a chapter a considerable way back. And in the last chapter the topic was further and differently unfolded. The title of this chapter has informed the reader, that in it a third aspect of the doctrine will be presented.

$192. Things odious

Things favored- (Strict Liberal). There are things which the law deems odious; not as being unnecessary, but in the sense in which a father feels it odious to inflict needful chastisement on a child; and, on the other hand, there are things in which the law delights. To things odious is applied the strict interpretation; to things favored, the liberal: as a father, in chastising his child, would keep within the necessity of the case to the letter;' while, in bestowing a merited reward, he would cast in something also from affection. For example,

Instances of liberal—(Remedial - Suppressing fraud-Beneficial). The law loves harmony and right; therefore it construes remedial statutes, made to amend defects in the prior law, liberally; it loves honesty and fair dealing, so construes lib

1 Ante, § 122 et seq.

2 Ante, §§ 72, 116 and note.

3 Ante, § 70. And see Cearfoss v. S., 42 Md. 403.

4 Ante. § 119, 120.

5 Ante, § 190e.

Ante, § 189d; 1 Bl. Com. 86, 87; Broom, Leg. Max. (2d ed.) 60; S. v.