erally statutes to suppress frauds,' as far as they annul the fraudulent transaction; and, generally, it employs a liberal interpretation for such written laws as operate beneficially for those whom they immediately concern.3 On the other hand,Strict-(Hardships-Forfeitures-Depriving of rights).— Enactments of the opposite tendency, taking away rights, working forfeitures, or creating hardships of any kind, it construes strictly. Again,—

§ 193. In deprivation, strict-(Penal-Forfeiture, again— Against liberty — Summary process).— The law delights in the life, liberty and happiness of the subject; consequently it deems statutes which deprive him of these, or of his property, however necessary they may be, in a sense odious. For which and for kindred reasons,' as well as because every man should

Stephenson, 2 Bailey, 334; Neal v. Moultrie, 12 Ga. 104; Brown v. Thomp son, 14 Bush, 538, [29 Am. R. 416;] S. v. Blair, 32 Ind. 313; ante, § 120.

1 Twyne's Case, 3 Co. 80b, 82a; Cadogan v. Kennet, Cowp. 432, 434.

2 "Statutes against frauds are to be liberally and beneficially expounded. This may seem a contradiction to the last rule [that penal statutes are to be construed strictly], most statutes against frauds being in their consequences penal. But this difference is here to be taken: where the statute acts upon the offender, and inflicts a penalty, as the pillory or a fine, it is then to be taken strictly; but when the statute acts upon the offense, by setting aside the fraudulent transaction, here it is to be construed liberally." 1 Bl. Com. 88. To the last point is also Cumming v. Fryer, Dudley (Ga.), 182; Carey v. Giles, 9 Ga. 253; Smith v. Moffat, 1 Barb. 65. And see Ellis v. Whitlock, 10 Mo. 781.

Bac. Abr., Statutes, 1, 7, 9. [The statutes authorizing a recovery for death by wrongful act are to be construed as remedial acts, liberally. Hayes v. Williams, 17 Colo. 465, 30 Pac. R. 352. Assignment statutes need not be strictly construed. Cunningham v. Norton, 125 U. S. 77, 31

L. ed. 624. Mechanics' lien laws are to be strictly construed. Williams v. Vanderbilt, 145 Ill. 238, 34 N. E. R. 476. Contra, Kendall v. Hymes, 96 Wis. 659, 71 N. W. R. 1039; Pinkerton v. Le Beau, 3 S. D. 440, 54 N. W. R. 97. Homestead laws are to be liberally construed. Wright v. Whittick, 18 Colo. 54, 31 Pac. R. 490; Kolb v. Raisor, 17 Ind. Ap. 551, 47 N. E. R. 177. So statutes relating to adoption of children. Parsons v. Parsons, 101 Wis. 76, 77 N. W. R. 147. So statutes allowing redemption of lands sold for taxes. Poling v. Parsons, 38 W. Va. 80, 18 S. E. R. 379.]

4 Bac. Abr., Statutes, I, 6, 7; Salters v. Tobias, 3 Paige, 338; Smith v. Spooner, 3 Pick. 229; Sewall v. Jones, 9 Pick. 412; Sullivan v. Park, 33 Me. 438; post, § 193.

5 See further, as to these distinctions, Jortin v. Southeastern Ry. Co., 3 Eq. R. 281, 24 Law J. (N. S.) 343, 1 Jur. (N. S.) 433, 31 Eng. L. & Eq. 320.

6 Ante, § 189b; Reg. v. Banes, Holt, 512, 515. [Statutes regulating proceedings for the condemnation of private property are construed strictly. Fork Ridge Ass'n v. Redd, 33 W. Va. 262, 10 S. E. R. 405.]

7" The rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly is perhaps not

be able to know certainly when he is guilty of crime,' statutes which subject one to a punishment or penalty, or to forfeit

those which are enumerated. If this principle has ever been recognized

been in cases of considerable irritation, which it would be unsafe to consider as precedents forming a general rule for other cases." Marshall, C. J., in U. S. v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 95, 96. “When a law imposes a punishment which acts upon the offender alone, and not as a reparation to the party injured, and where it is entirely within the dis cretion of the law-giver, it will not be presumed that he intended it should extend further than is expressed; and humanity would require that it should be so limited in the construction." Johnson, J., in S. v. Stephenson, 2 Bailey, 334, 335. And see Com. v. Loring, 8 Pick. 370; U. S. v. Wigglesworth, 2 Story, 369; Strong v. Stebbins, 5 Cow. 210; Verona Central Cheese Factory v. Murtaugh, 4 Lans. 17.

much less old than construction itself. It is founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of individ- ́în expounding criminal law, it has uals; and on the plain principle that the power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial, department. It is the legislature, not the court, which is to define a crime and ordain its punishment. It is said that, notwithstanding this rule, the intention of the law-maker must govern in the construction of penal as well as other statutes. This is true. But this is not a new, independent rule, which subverts the old. It is a modification of the ancient maxim, and amounts to this: that, though penal laws are to be construed strictly, they are not to be construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious intention of the legislature. The maxim is not to be so applied as to narrow the words of the statute to the exclusion of cases which those words, in their ordinary acceptation, or in that sense in which the legislature has obviously used them, would comprehend. The intention of the legis lature is to be collected from the words they employ. Where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for construction. The case must be a strong one, indeed, which would justify a court in departing from the plain meaning of words, especially in a penal act, in search of an intention which the words themselves did not suggest. To determine that a case is within the intention of a statute, its language must authorize us to say so. It would be dangerous indeed to carry the principle, that a case which is within the reason or mischief of a statute is within its provisions, so far as to punish a crime not enumerated in the statute, because it is of equal atrocity or of kindred character with

1 Beccaria on Crimes, ch. 11; Liv. ingston, J., in The Enterprise, 1 Paine, 32.

2 Ante, § 119; Andrews v. U. S., 2 Story, 202, 213; Com. v. Martin, 17 Mass. 589; Com. v. Keniston, 5 Pick. 420; Carpenter v. P., 8 Barb. 603, 605; S. v. Upchurch, 9 Ire. 454; Van Rensselaer v. Onondaga, 1 Cow. 443; Seaving v. Brinkerhoff, 5 Johns. Ch. 329; Courteen's Case, Hob. 270; Searle v. Williams, Hob. 288; Hall v. S., 20 Ohio, 7; Warner v. Com., 1 Pa. St. 154, [44 Am. D. 114;] S. v. Solomons, 3 Hill (S. C.), 96; Bettis v. Taylor, 8 Port. 564; Van Valkenburgh v. Torrey, 7 Cow. 252; Hughes v. S., 1 Eng. 131; Reed v. Davis, 8 Pick. 514, 517; U. S. v. Starr, Hemp. 469; U. S. v. Ramsay, Hemp. 481; U. S. v. Beaty, Hemp. 487; U. S. v. Ragsdale, Hemp. 497; Lair v. Killmer, 1 Dutcher, 522; Gunter v. Leckey, 30 Ala. 591; S. v.

ure, or a summary process calculated to take away his opportunity of making a full defense, or in any way deprive him of his liberty, are to be construed strictly. And the degree of strictness will depend somewhat on the severity of the punishment they inflict.'

Derogation of common law — (Testify for self).— Though a statute in derogation of the common lawas, for example, permitting a party to testify for himself in his own cause — is to be construed strictly, the reason for this, we have seen,' is different.

Whetstone, 18 La. An. 376; Gibson v. S. v. Bland, 144 Mo. 534, 46 S. W. R. S., 38 Ga. 571. 440, 41 L. R. A. 297.]

1

§ 194. Meaning of strict interpretation. Such statutes are to reach no further in meaning than their words; no person is to be made subject to them by implication, and all doubts concerning their interpretation are to preponderate in favor of the accused. Only those transactions are covered by them which are within both their spirit and their letter.1

§ 195. Revenue laws, including taxation.-It being the duty of all persons to bear their several proportions of the public burden, statutes imposing taxes are not penal, and they should be liberally interpreted. But connected with and aiding in the levying and collecting of taxes, there may be and are penal statutes, to be construed strictly. And so it is with the other classes of revenue laws. Their primary object being the collection of duties, not the punishment of crime, they are in the ordinary case construed liberally as being remedial. 4 Post. §§ 230, 232; Cearfoss v. S., 42 Md. 403.

Ratan, 9 N. M. 70, 49 Pac. R. 898. Aid grants to railroads are to be strictly construed against the company. Demaree v. Johnson, 150 Ind. 419, 49 N. E. R. 1062.]

Taking land.-So of one taking the land of individuals for the public use. Ante, § 119; Sharp v. Speir, 4 Hill (N. Y.), 76; Sharp v. Johnson, 4 Hill (N. Y.), 92, [40 Am. D. 259.] See also Rathbun v. Acker, 18 Barb. 393. 1 Ante, §§ 119, 189a, 190e; P. v. Peacock, 98 Ill. 172.

2 S. v. McOmber, 6 Vt. 215; Rex v. Mitchell, 2 East, P. C. 936, 937; Rex v. Hammond, 2 East, P. C. 1119, 1 Leach, 444; Leonard v. Bosworth, 4 Conn. 421; S. v. Sumner, 10 Vt. 587, [33 Am. D. 219;] S. v. Sanford, 1 Nott & McC. 512, 515; Rex v. Parker, 2 East, P. C. 592, 1 Leach, 320, note; Rex v. Hickman, 1 Leach, 318, 2 East, P. C. 593; U. S. v. Wigglesworth, 2 Story, 369; Rawson v. S., 19 Conn. 292; U. S. v. Wilson, Bald. 78, 102; The Harriet, 1 Story, 251; Bell v. Dole, 11 Johns. 173; post. § 220.

3 The Enterprise, 1 Paine, 32; U. S. v. Wigglesworth, 2 Story, 369; P. v. Howell, 4 Johns. 296; Com. v. Macomber, 3 Mass. 254; Kent v. S., 8 Blackf. 163; post, § 218.

5 Cornwall v. Todd, 38 Conn. 443. But see Daines v. Heath, 3 C. B. 938, 941. And see Alter v. Shepherd, 27 La. An. 207.

Special exemptions.-Correspond-
ingly, therefore, statutes conferring
special exemptions from the general
burdens should be strictly construed.
S. v. Mills, 5 Vroom, 177; [Robertson
v. New Orleans, 45 La. An. 617, 12 S.
R. 753; Louisville v. Bank, 174 U. S.
439, 43 L. ed. 1039; P. v. Seminary,
174 Ill. 177, 51 N. E. R. 198; Ford v.
Delta Co., 164 U. S. 662, 41 L. ed. 590.
Where two constructions are possible
for a salary act, that most advanta-
geous to the state will be adopted.
Madden v. Hardy, 92 Tex. 613, 50 S.
W. R. 926; Tyrrell v. New York, 159
N. Y. 239, 53 N. E. R. 1111.] See also
Com. v. Maryland, 32 Md. 501.

6 Coleman v. Hart, 37 Wis. 180.
7U. S. v. Twenty-eight Packages,
Gilpin, 306, 326. And see Attorney-
General v. Radloff, 10 Exch. 84, 26
Eng. L. & Eq. 413.

8 U. S. v. Hodson, 10 Wall. 395, 406;
Cliquot's Champagne, 3 Wall. 114, 145.

8

LE

But a crime connected with these laws must, in reason, be like any other, requiring the statute creating it to be strictly construed. And it is the same of any penal forfeiture in the nature of punishment.2 The general object of revenue laws being remedial, the forfeitures and penalties by which they are enforced in civil forms of action do not, in principle, require so strict a construction of the provisions which declare them as is given to laws inflicting imprisonment or death. But surely most of them should be deemed equal in this respect to the statutes which give double damages, and which, we have seen, are interpreted strictly. Still the doctrine of the courts appears to be, especially of late, that, even as to these provisions, the revenue laws shall be construed liberally, not in the extreme sense, yet not strictly, but in a sort of equipoise between the two interpretations.

§ 195a. Costs are unknown at the common law; they are the mere creatures of statutes." Where they are simply an indemnity to the party receiving them, for his expenditures in the case, and the like, they would seem in reason to be remedial, requiring a liberal construction of the statute. On the other hand, where they are penal in their nature, the contrary must be the reasonable consequence. The question has not been much illumined by adjudication, but generally the statutes

1 U. S. v. Buzzo, 18 Wall. 125.

2 U. S. v. Eighty-four Boxes of Sugar, 7 Pet. 453, 462, 463. And see Clifton v. U. S., 4 How. (U. S.) 242.

3 Ante, § 195, note. [Revenue statutes must be construed strictly against the government. Rice v. U. S., 53 Fed. R. 910. In case of doubt in the construction of a customs act, the court should resolve the doubt in favor of the importer. American Co. v. Worthington, 141 U. S. 468, 35 L. ed. 821.]

4 U. S. v. Three Tons of Coal, 6 Bis. 379; U. S. v. One Hundred Barrels Spirits, 1 Dill. 49, 2 Abb. (U. S.) 305; U. S. v. Watts, 1 Bond, 580; U. S. v. Barrels of High Wines, 7 Blatch. 459; U. S. v. Mynderse, 7 Blatch. 483; Twenty-eight Cases, 2 Ben. 63; U. S.

v. Olney, 1 Abb. (U. S.) 275; U. S. v. Willetts, 5 Ben. 220; Taylor v. U. S., 3 How. (U. S.) 197. See also Adams v. Bancroft, 3 Sumner, 384; U. S. v. Wigglesworth, 2 Story, 369; Dwar. Stat. (2d ed.) 642; Rex v. Hymen, 7 T. R. 536; Walwin v. Smith, 1 Salk. 177; Mayor v. Davis, 6 Watts & S. 269; [U. S. v. Stovall, 133 U. S. 1, 33 L. ed. 555; Prather v. U. S., 9 D. C. Ap. 82.]

5 Crim. Pro., I, § 1313; S. v. Kinne, 41 N. H. 238; [Atwater v. Russell, 49 Minn. 57, 52 N. W. R. 26; S. v. Duestrow, 70 Mo. Ap. 311; Hodge v. P., 78 Ill. Ap. 378; Wallace v. Sheldon, 56 Neb. 55, 76 N. W. R. 418; Dobler v. Warren, 174 Ill. 92, 50 N. E. R. 1048.] "Harold v. Smith, 5 H. & N. 381. 7 Durkin's Case, 2 Lewin, 163.