in furtherance of justice." the courts hang or imprison a man by an equitable extension of a statute beyond the fair meaning of its words? Not every act of legislation can, under a just application of judicial rules, do every thing which to the casual observation appears on its face.

In this condition of the laws, will

1S. v. Stoller, 38 Iowa, 321. [In Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, Kentucky, Arkansas, Texas, California, Oregon, Colorado, Washington, North Dakota, South Dakota, Idaho, Wyoming and Utah, the code is to be liberally construed. Statutes in derogation of the com15

225

mon law are not to be strictly interpreted in New York, Ohio, Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, Kentucky, Arkansas, California, Oregon, South Carolina, North Dakota, South Dakota, Wyoming, Utah. See Stimson, Am. St. Law, § 1021 et seq.]

CHAPTER XXIII

EXPOSITIONS OF THE STRICT INTERPRETATION.

§ 199b. Scope and purpose.- Though, as just seen,' the pressure for a strict interpretation is not uniform in the cases wherein it prevails, so that a correct exposition in one instance is not necessarily a reliable guide for another, it, like the liberal,2 has in a general way its bounds. This chapter will attempt, by minuter investigations than were descended to in the foregoing ones, to discover with greater exactness what the bounds

are.

§ 200. Legislative intent.- Equally in strict interpretation as in liberal, the object is simply to ascertain the true legislative will, to arrive at which, is the end of all interpretation.‘ A rendering so strict as to defeat this will is never admissible." Again,

Other rules(Absurd-Eluded-Title- Preamble).— The rule of strict interpretation does not prevent our calling in the aid of other rules, and giving each its appropriate scope, yet not so as to overturn this one. For example, penal statutes, like others, are to be so construed as not to work an absurdity,' or defeat their purpose, or the process of the court instituted for their enforcement, or be eluded; and we may gather light concerning their meaning from the title and preamble.10 So,

§ 201. Intent clear.- Where the legislative intent is clear without interpretation, this rule is, with all the others, quies

1 Ante, §§ 197, 199.

2

Ante, §§ 189d-190d.

Ante, § 194, and places referred to. 4 Ante. § 70, 75, 82; S. v. Brooks, 4 Conn. 446; Rawson v. S., 19 Conn. 292; Com. v. Loring, 8 Pick. 370; The Enterprise, 1 Paine, 32; U. S. v. Wil son, Bald. 78; Pike v. Jenkins, 12 N. H. 255.

5 Walton v. S., 62 Ala. 197.

7 Rawson v. S., 19 Conn. 292; Com. v. Loring, 8 Pick. 370; The Harriet, 1 Story, 251; ante, § 82.

8 Bartolett v. Achey, 38 Pa. St. 273. Compare with ante, § 198.

9 The Emily and The Caroline, 9 Wheat. 381, 388; Com. v. McGeorge, 9 B. Monr. 3; ante, § 82.

10 S. v. Stephenson, 2 Bailey, 334; S. v. Fields, 2 Bailey, 554; S. v. Smith,

6 The Harriet, 1 Story, 251; Pike v. Cheves, 157; ante, §§ 46, 48-51.

Jenkins, 12 N. H. 255.

cent.' Its mission is simply to illumine what is obscure, and help what is weak. Therefore the propositions of this chapter are to be applied only where there is occasion for them,in cases of doubt, not doubt in the uninformed, but in the educated, legal mind. Now,

§ 202. Propositions.- Remembering that what is to be construed strictly is not to be uniformly pressed within the narrowest limits permissible in strict interpretation, for the degrees of strictness vary, let us examine the subject of this chapter under the following propositions:

§ 203. First. Equally in strict interpretation as in liberal, the statutes may be extended by other provisions of statutory law, and by the common law, combining with them:

Explained elsewhere. This doctrine, as to all kinds of statutes, is explained in a previous chapter. And the reader there observed that the illustrations of it are largely from criminal statutes, the construction of which is strict. But it is a doc

trine of the effect of the statutes, not of their interpretation.

204. Secondly. The rule of strict interpretation is not violated by permitting the words of the statute to have their full meaning, or the more extended of two meanings. Otherwise expressed,

Meaning intended.-As already seen, the meaning intended by the legislature is to prevail in strict construction, the same as in any other. And though, by the general rule, legal and other technical words are to be rendered in their narrow, technical sense, they may, even in strict construction, have their wider popular meaning when the court is able to see that the legislature so intended. And all the words are to be taken in such a sense, bent neither one way nor the other, as will best manifest the legislative intent. Thus,

1 Ante. § 191, and places referred to. the six sections next following; also, 2 Ante, §§ 196, 197, 1996. Rex v. Glover, 2 Russ. Crimes (3d Ante, §§ 128-130, 134–137, 139-144. Eng. ed.), 146; Reg. v. Hale, 2 Car. & • Ante, § 200.

Ante, §§ 96, 99.

"Pike v. Jenkins, 12 N. H. 255; P. v. Howell, 4 Johns. 296; The Mayor v. Davis, 6 Watts & S. 269; S. v. Powers, 36 Conn. 77. For illustrations of this doctrine, see the cases cited to

K. 326; Rex v. Taylor, Russ. & Ry. 373; Stone v. S., Spencer, 401; Hodgman v. P., 4 Denio, 235; Rex v. Hickman, 1 Leach, 318, 2 East, P. C. 593; Rex v. Parker, 2 East, P. C. 592; 1 Leach, 320, note; S. v. Anone, 2 Nott & McC. 27; Reg. v. Bowden, 2

§ 205. "Subject."- A foreigner living in England under the sovereign's protection is an English subject, within an act of parliament defining crimes; "but it was admitted that if the

statute had said natural-born subjects, etc., it would not have extended to him."1

"Not authorized by law”—(Lottery).— An act of one of our states, making penal the sale of lottery tickets in "any lottery not authorized by law," prohibits the sale of tickets in lotteries authorized by the laws of other states and countries, unless also authorized by some law, either federal or state, having force in the particular locality. And

Kidnaping by foreign command. A provision to punish those who, without lawful authority, forcibly confine any person in this state, or carry any person out of the state against his will, extends to soldiers coming from another state, by order of its military powers, while it is under martial law in a time of civil insurrection, to seize and carry back its insurgent citizens found here."

Otherwise as to other states, etc. (Larceny of "banknote"- Betting on election - "Exportation").- A statute forbidding the larceny of "any bank-note" extends to banknotes of other states; against betting "upon any election in this state," to a betting, within this state, on an election for president of the United States. So the words "designed for