cases of felony." Thereupon it was held that, for a case to be within the former clause, the breaking must be such as amounts to a felony. "So that," observes East, "the general words of it ought to be supplied with an intendment; namely, where the party is convicted of breaking the house in the night burglariously, or in the day, and stealing goods therein." So,Heavier punishment for second offense.- Whenever a statute makes a second offense felony, the first being misdemeanor, or punishes the second more heavily than the first, it is enlarged by construction to mean, after conviction for the first, not merely after it is committed." 12 East, P. C. 625, 631. 255 1 P. v. Butler, 3 Cow. 347. And see Dwar. Stat. (2d ed.) 643. CHAPTER XXV. SOME MISCELLANEOUS DOCTRINES OF STATUTORY INTEPRETA § 241. Introduction. TION. 242-2426. Technical meanings for technical words. 243. Grammatical construction. 244. Provisions in the alternative. 245-2466. General words following particular. 246c-248. Meanings overlying one another. 249, 249a. Express mention implying exclusion. 2496-253. Statutory and common-law remedies mingling. 256a. Concluding suggestions and views. § 241. What for this chapter and how divided.- While the foregoing chapters have brought to view most of the rules of statutory interpretation, a few, of a miscellaneous character, were found not to be distinctly within the scope of any of them. Therefore they were left unexplained, or explained only in part. We shall, in this chapter, consider them under the following heads: I. Giving the technical meanings to technical words; II. Grammatical construction; III. Provisions in the alternative; IV. General words following particular; V. Meanings. overlying one another; VI. The express mention of one thing implying the exclusion of another; VII. How statutory and common-law remedies mingle; VIII. Mandatory and directory statutes; IX. Concluding suggestions and views. I. GIVING THE TECHNICAL MEANINGS TO TECHNICAL WORDS. § 242. In general.- That, prima facie, interpretation is to give to those words of a statute which are technical to its subject their technical meanings we have already seen.' And this is because the legislature may reasonably be presumed to have so intended. The most frequent application of this doctrine is to — Terms of fixed legal meanings.2-As the result of constant adjudication, very many words and phrases commonly em1 Ante, §§ 96-100. 2 Ante, § 96 et seq. ployed in statutes, contracts and pleadings have acquired fixed legal meanings, unlike or more limited or extended than their popular ones. Then, as all laws are to be construed together,' when a statute employs a word or phrase of this sort, it is, in the absence of any express indication to the contrary, to be interpreted in the sense which the law has thus ascertained.' For example, "Infamous crime" (Threatening letters- Solicitations to sodomy).—It having been made punishable in England to send to any person, with an intent mentioned, any letter threatening to accuse him of (among other things) "any infamous crime,"3. the judges "were of opinion that a charge of making overtures to commit sodomy was not within this act; that they were bound to take the word 'infamous' in its legal sense; and that such overtures, however they would disgrace and expose to detestation, would not subject the person making them to an infamous punishment, or prevent his being a witness."". So "Charged with crime"-"Accused of crime"-are severally phrases the meaning of which in the law is familiar. They imply certain legal steps. Therefore a former statute in Alabama, against the concealment or carrying away of any slave "charged with a capital crime," could, as construed by the courts, be violated only after legal proceedings were commenced against the slave. And, in a similar South Carolina statute, the words "accused of crime" were held to mean when complaint is made to a magistrate for the purpose of having a warrant issued." But "Fleeing from justice"-(Limitations).- A "fleeing from justice," within the proviso of a limitations statute, may take place before prosecution begun. 1 Ante, § 86 et seq., 113b et seq. 2U. S. v. Magill, 1 Wash. C. C. 463; Adams v. Turrentine, 8 Ire. 147; U. S. v. Wilson, Bald. 78, 95; Reg. v. Ellis, Car. & M. 564; Kitchen v. Tyson, 3 Murph. 314; Macy v. Raymond, 9 Pick. 285; Bennac v. P., 4 Barb. 164; Eason v. S., 6 Eng. 481; Spencer v. S., 20 Ala. 24; U. S. v. Smith, 5 Wheat. 153; U. S. v. Pirates, 5 Wheat. 184; S. v. Mace, 5 Md. 337; Ex parte Vincent, 26 Ala. 145, [62 Am. D. 714.] 3 Stat. 4 Geo. 4, ch. 54, § 3. Rex v. Hickman, 1 Moody, 34. Substantially the same meaning is given to the words "infamous crime" in the constitution of Pennsylvania. Com. v. Shaver, 3 Watts & S. 338. 6 S. v. Duncan, 9 Port. 260. And see Willington v. Stearns, 1 Pick. 497. 7S. v. South, 5 Rich. 489. 8 U. S. v. Smith, 4 Day, 121. "On complaint."- A statute authorizing a criminal prosecution to be instituted "on complaint," means a complaint as technically understood, usually under oath.' And "Manslaughter"-in a statute has its common-law meaning. So "Negligent escape"-signifies the same in a statute as at the common law.3 Meaning by statutory use.― Statutory use, equally with use at the common law, may have imparted to a word a particular import, so that in a subsequent act it will have the same meaning.1 § 242a. Technical not meant.- Where, from the connection, subject, or otherwise, it is plain that the technical meaning was not intended by the legislature, the court, we have already seen,' will not impute it. To illustrate,— 'Dwelling-house.”- The word "dwelling-house," the meaning of which is fully explained further on," includes, in the law of burglary and generally in the law, a structure for business uses whereof any internally connected room is occupied for sleeping and abode. But if, in a statute exempting property from the claims of creditors, it was given this wide meaning, one might protect against them any amount of real estate by living in some inferior room thereof, to the utter subversion alike of justice and the legislative will. Therefore, in such a statute, the word will not extend to parts of a building devoted to business purposes. Again,— 8 "Outlaw."-The word "outlaw," in a statute, will not have its common-law meaning in a state where outlawry is un 9 1 Campbell v. Thompson, 16 Me. 117. But the requirements of the complaint, under the statutes of our several states, and at the common law, differ. Crim. Pro., I, §§ 152, 230-232. 2 S. v. Fleming, 2 Strob. 464. And see U. S. v. Magill, 1 Wash, C. C. 463; 'S. v. Taylor, 2 McCord, 483. 3 Adams v. Turrentine, 8 Ire. 147. For "rob," "jeopardy," "dangerous weapons," see U. S. v. Wilson, Bald. 78; for "party," see Merchants' Bank v. Cook, 4 Pick. 405, 411. 4 S. v. Nates, 3 Hill (S. C.), 200. 6 Post, §§ 277-290. Post, $$ 280, 282; Samanni v. Com., 16 Grat. 542; S. v. Mordecai, 68 N. C. 207; S. v. Outlaw, 72 N. C. 598; S. v. Potts, 75 N. C. 129. 8 In re Lammer, 7 Bis. 269, 14 Bankr. Reg. 460. 9 Crim. Law, I, § 967; Crim. Pro., I, § 673; ante, § 132. "One who is put out of the protection or aid of the law." Bouv. Law Dict. And see Drew v. Drew, 37 Me. 389; Walker known. Therefore, in Alabama, counties having been made liable for persons killed by outlaws, the court, looking at the condition of the state at the time when the act was passed, deemed it to refer to lawless and disorderly persons roaming about in disguise and habitually committing violence and outrage.1 Now, § 242b. Consequences. The consequences of this sort of interpretation are that, to the extent to which it furnishes the rule, the law is made, as it should be, one system; while, at the same time, the real intent of the legislature is carried out. And the doubts concerning the meanings of statutes are diminished to their smallest possible proportions. For thus an enactment of to-day has the benefit of judicial renderings extending back through centuries of past litigation. II. GRAMMATICAL CONSTRUCTION. § 243. In general. However desirable a correct use of the English language may be, the courts have no jurisdiction to enforce it on the legislature. Therefore, as already seen,3 when the legislative meaning is plain, the exact grammatical construction and propriety of language may be disregarded, even in a penal statute. For example, "And"-"Or."-The conjunction "and" will be read as "or," and "or" as "and," when the sense obviously so requires;* and this, in plain cases, even in criminal statutes against the accused. So, v. Thelluson, 1 Dowl. (N. S.) 578; Loukes v. Holbeach, 4 Bing. 419; Aldridge v. Buller, 2 M. & W. 412; Wharton Peerage, 12 CL. & F. 295; Rex v. Yandell, 4 T. R. 521; Macrae v. Hyndman, 6 Cl. & F. 212. 1 Dale v. Gunter, 46 Ala. 118, 137. 2 Ante, § 113b et seq. Ante, §§ 78-81, 93, 212. 4 Ante, § 81; S. v. Mitchell, 5 Ired. 350; Hall's Case, Cro. Eliz. 307; Creswick v. Rooksby, 2 Bulst. 47; Waterhouse v. Keen, 4 B. & C. 200, 6 D. & R. 257; Dwar. Stat. (2d ed.) 682; Smith, Stat. & Const. Law, 732; Barker v. Esty, 19 Vt. 131; Winterfield v. Stauss, 24 Wis. 394, 406; Townsend v. Read, 10 C. B. (N. S.) 308; Fowler v. Padget, 7 T. R. 509; Com. v. Griffin, 105 Mass. 185; Sparrow v. Davidson College, 77 N. C. 35; P. v. Sweetser, 1 Dak. 308; Rigoney v. Neiman, 73 Pa. St. 330; Green v. Wood, 7 Q. B. 178. 5 S. v. McCoy, 2 Speers, 711; S. v. Miles, 2 Nott & McC. 1; Foster v. Com., 8 Watts & S. 77; Rolland v. Com., 82 Pa. St. 306, [22 Am. R. 758;] S. v. Smith, 46 Iowa, 670; S. v. Brandt, 41 Iowa, 593. Contra, S. v. Kearney, 1 Hawks, 53. So it has been said, by way of dictum, that “and "in a penal |