ment that the court which sentences a prisoner to the state prison "shall so limit the time of sentence that it will expire between the months of March and November." A sentence in disregard of it is not void. And largely the statutes relating to the time and manner of summoning and bringing in jurors are of this class. The same is true of those providing for other steps in a judicial cause. But a provision of this or any other sort which, though in the nature of a command to an officer or court, confers rights on parties, is generally or always mandatory. A familiar illustration of this kind of stat v. Eves, 12 Conn. 243; Wan-kon-chawneek-kaw v. U. S., Morris, 332, 335; Walker v. Chapman, 22 Ala. 116; P. r. Cook, 14 Barb. 259; S. v. Click, 2 Ala. 26; McGuffie v. S., 17 Ga. 497; Hart v. Plum, 14 Cal. 148; P. v. Lake, 33 Cal. 487; Wheeler v. Chicago, 24 IIL 105, [76 Am. D. 736;] St. Louis County Court v. Sparks, 10 Mo. 117, [45 Am. D. 355;] Blimm v. Com., 7 Bush, 320; Torrey v. Millbury, 21 Pick. 64; Parchman v. S., 2 Tex. Ap. 228, [28 Am. R. 435;] Lackawana Iron, etc. Co. v. Little Wolf, 38 Wis. 152; Rex v. Sparrow, 2 Stra. 1123; S. v. Camden, 10 Vroom, 620; Lee v. S., 49 Ala. 43; Limestone v. Rather, 48 Ala. 433; Ryan v. Vanlandingham, 7 Ind. 416; Merrill v. S., 46 Ala. 82; Boykin v. S., 50 Miss. 375; Wright v. Sperry, 21 Wis. 331; McRoberts v. Winant, 15 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 210; Le Feuvre v. Miller, 8 Ellis & B. 321. And see, besides the other cases cited to this section, Striker v. Kelly, 7 Hill (N. Y.), 9; Wiggin v. New York, 9 Paige, 16; McBee v. Hoke, 2 Speers, 138; S. v. Hill, 2 Speers, 150; Eustis v. Kidder, 26 Me. 97; Rex v. Page, 12 Mod. 123; Rex v. Ingram, 1 Ld. Raym. 215; Steele v. S., 1 Tex. 142; Dyches v. S., 24 Tex. 266; P. v. Weller, 11 Cal. 49, [70 Am. D. 750; Thomas v. Chapin, 116 Mo. 396, 22 S. W. R. 785; Sacramento v. Dillman, 102 Cal. 107, 36 Pac. R. 385; Lancaster Co. v. Lancaster, 160 Pa. St. 411, 28 Atl. R. 854; 3 Erhardt v. Schroeder, 155 U. S. 124, 39 L. ed. 94; Korb v. Mitchell, 3 Ohio Dec. 267.] 1 Miller v. Finkle, 1 Par. Cr. 374. And see, for a like principle as to the sentence, Brightwell v. S., 41 Ga. 482. 2 S. v. Pitts, 58 Mo. 556; S. v. Gillick, 7 Iowa, 287; S. v. Smith, 67 Me. 328; S. v. Carney, 20 Iowa, 82. See S. v. Maddox, 1 Lea, 671. 3 Dawson v. P., 25 N. Y. 399; S. v. Jolly, 7 Iowa, 15; S. v. Axt, 6 Iowa, 511; Friar v. S., 3 How. (Miss.) 422; Zantzinger v. Ribble, 36 Md. 32; Ottillie v. Waechter, 33 Wis. 252; Body v. Jewsen, 33 Wis. 402; Com. v. Edwards, 4 Gray, 1; Crofoot v. P., 19 Mich. 254; S. v. Baker, 8 Nev. 141; S. v. Scott, 1 Bailey, 294; S. v. Baker, 9 Rich. Eq. 521; Territory v. Anderson, 1 Wy. 20; Charter v. Greame, 13 Q. B. 216; Clark v. Com., 29 Pa. St. 129. 4 Ex parte Jordan, 94 U. S. 248; P. v. Livingston, 68 N. Y. 114; Stacey v. S., 3 Tex. Ap. 121; Satterwhite v. S., 3 Tex. Ap. 428; Wendel v. Durbin, 26 Wis. 390; Newman v. S., 6 Bax. 164; French v. Edwards, 13 Wall. 506; Donlin v. Hettinger, 57 Ill. 348; Blake v. Sherman, 12 Minn. 420; P. v. Erie, 1 Buf. 517; Howard v. Bodington, 2 P. D. 203; Vaux v. Vollans, 4 B. & Ad. 525. See S. v. Cooper, 45 Mo. 64; Long v. S., 4 Tex. Ap. 81. ute is one giving the prevailing party costs; they cannot be withheld at the discretion of the judge. Further to illustrate,Time of executing sentence. If a statute directs within how many days, after judgment, the prisoner in a capital case shall be executed, the court may still order him executed at a differ ent time. Again, Eight-hours law. The act of congress, termed the "Eighthours law," which provided that eight hours should constitute a day's work for all laborers, workmen and mechanics employed by or on behalf of the government of the United States, was held to be a direction to the agents of the government, and not a contract between it and a class of its employees. By agreement, a day's work might still be more or less than eight hours.3 Non-official person.- A provision for a thing to be done by a non-official person may be directory, equally as where the doer is an officer.1 Bonds and other instruments.- Where a statute requires duties, less in amount than two hundred dollars, to be paid in cash, a bond for such less amount is valid. And in other cases bonds, deeds and other instruments, not following a statutory form, may be good, though they are not so always. So may an affidavit, not in statutory form, be good." In part directory.—The reader perceives, from these illustrations, that a directory statute is not necessarily, while yet it may be, such in full; it is oftener directory only in part. 1 First National Bank v. Prescott, 27 Wis. 616. 2 Seaborn v. S., 20 Ala. 15; Rex v. Wyatt, Russ. & Ry. 230. See, on this subject, Reg. v. Hartnett, Jebb, 302; Reg. v. Hogg, 2 Moody & R. 380; Miller v. S., 3 Ohio St. 475. [If a sentence is not, for any reason, executed at the proper time, the court may order the execution and fix the time therefor. Ex parte Bell, 56 Miss. 282; Ex parte Cross, 146 U. S. 271, 36 L. ed. 969.] U. S. v. Martin, 94 U. S. 400. U. S. v. Linn, Crabbe, 307. For 6 Rex v. Lyon, Russ. & Ry. 255; Rex v. Randall, Russ. & Ry. 195. 7 S. v. Dayton, 3 Zab. 49, [53 Am. D. 270. Statutory provisions as to the giving of a bond before entering upon the duties of the office are directory. U. S. v. Eaton, 169 U. S. 331, 42 L. ed. 767.] 8 Woodward v. Sarsons, Law Rep. 10 C. P. 733, 746; Reg. v. Fordham, 11 A. & E. 73; Rex v. Norwich, 1 B. & Ad. 310; Free Press Assoc. v. Nichols, 45 Vt. 7. example, it may be directory as to the time, and mandatory as to the thing itself.1 § 255a. Legislative intent-(Negative words).— Negative or other words indicating a legislative intent may, and often do, cause a statute to be construed as mandatory, which otherwise would be held directory. For example,— § 256. Peremptory language. As expressed by Dwarris, "where affirmative words are peremptory, as that 'the forms of proceedings set forth in the schedule annexed shall be used on all occasions,' Lord Kenyon observed, 'I cannot say that these words are merely directory;' and a material variance from the form prescribed was in that case held fatal, the justices not having pursued the authority of the statute." And it has been laid down that statutes imposing a duty, and giving the means for its performance, are mandatory. Moreover, Franchise."It has frequently been held that, where a power or franchise is created by statute which fixes or prescribes the mode of its exercise, it must be exercised in the mode pointed out by the act, and no other." But a provision, that the officers of a corporation shall be elected annually, does not take away its incidental power to choose them after the election day has, by accident, passed by without an election. Liability of officer. The omission of an officer to perform an act enjoined by statute may, though the statute is construed as directory, render him liable at the suit of a party injured by the neglect. 1S. v. Harris, 17 Ohio St. 608; S. v. 153 Mass. 200, 10 L. R. A. 497, 26 N. Lean, 9 Wis. 279. E. R. 447; Hall v. Schoenecke, 128 Mo. 661, 31 S. W. R. 97.] 2Liverpool Borough Bank v. Turner, 2 De G., F. & J. 502; Howard v. Bodington, 2 P. D. 203, 211; Bladen v. Philadelphia, 60 Pa. St. 464; Hurford v. Omaha, 4 Neb. 336; S. v. Smith, 67 Me. 328; Pearse v. Morrice, 2 A. & E. 84, 96; Reg. v. Fordham, 11 A. & E. 73; Rex v. Newcomb, 4 T. R. 368; Bowman v. Blyth, 7 Ellis & B. 47; P. v. Allen, 6 Wend. 486; Williams v. Swansea Canal Nav. Co., Law Rep. 3 Ex. 158. [Here, as everywhere else, the question is one of legislative intent. U. S. v. Thoman, 156 U. S. 353, 39 L. ed. 450; Suburban Co. v. Boston, Dwar. Stat. (2d ed.) 610; Davison v. Gill, 1 East, 64. And see Rex v. Loxdale, 1 Bur. 445. See S. v. Foster, 61 Mo. 549. 4 Veazie v. China, 50 Me. 518; Milford v. Orono, 50 Me. 529; S. v. Garber, 7 Neb. 14; Wendel v. Durbin, 26 Wis. 390. 5 Smith, Stat. & Const. Law, § 677. 6 S. v. Fairbury, 51 Ill. 149, referring to 2 Kent, Com. 295; Coles v. Allison, 23 Ill. 437; [S. v. So. Kingston, 18 R. L 258, 27 Atl. R. 599, 22 L. R. A. 65.] 7 Brown v. Lester, 13 Sm. & M. 392, Constitution. A constitutional provision may, like a stat utory one, be interpreted as only directory.' Caution. It is well to be cautious not to carry the principle of holding a statute to be merely directory too far. IX. CONCLUDING SUGGESTIONS AND VIEWS. § 256a. In general.— There are a few principles of statutory interpretation, sometimes relied on, not embraced in the foregoing series of chapters. But they are all either of a doubtful nature, or of little or no practical importance. They lie collected before the writer at the present time. Yet after a somewhat careful consideration of the subject, he has deemed it best that these elucidations shall here close.' 1 Ante, §§ 36a, 37; Washington v. preting the qualifying words of a Page, 4 Cal. 388. sentence, the rulo is to apply them to such other words or phrase as shall immediately precede them therein, rather than to those more remote. Gaither v. Green, 40 La. An. 362, 4 S. R. 210.] 2 See Smith, Stat. & Const. Law, S$ 670-681; Dwar. Stat. (2d ed.), S$ 608-612; Stayton v. Hulings, 7 Ind. 144; Webster v. French, 12 IL 802. [If there be difficulty in inter BOOK III. SPECIAL INTERPRETATIONS PERTAINING TO THE CRIMINAL LAW. CHAPTER XXVI. STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS. § 257. At common law - (In England).-There is no rule of the common law limiting the time within which a criminal prosecution must be commenced.' Nor, in England, have there ever been any general statutes of limitations of criminal causes.' "So that," says Chitty, "instances have frequently occurred in which parties have been convicted and punished many years after the crime had been forgotten," a practice, however, not always tolerated by the courts. The prosecution of some forms of high treason was early-by 7 and 8 Will. 3, ch. 3, § 5-limited to three years; and there are statutes of limitations for poaching, and for a few other specific offenses. For penal actions also there are statutes of limitations. trast to this lack of English legislation, 1 Dover v. Maestaer, 5 Esp. 92; Hyde v. Partridge, 3 Salk. 227, 228. 2 Reg. v. Hull, 2 Fost. & F. 16. 31 Chit. Crim. Law, 160. 42 Hale, P. C. 158; Burn, Just., Indictment, III Lieut.-Col. Wall was tried, convicted and executed for a murder committed twenty years before. 4 Bl. Com. (15th ed.) 305, note 2. "In Reg. v. Robins, 1 Cox, C. C. 114, A. D. 1844, which was an odious prosecution for bestiality, it appeared that the prosecuting witness had not complained to a magistrate for nearly two years after the fact was alleged to have transpired, though he said he had mentioned it otherwise. No 5 In con explanation of the delay could be given, and Alderson, B., refused to submit the question of guilt to the jury and ordered an acquittal. And see P. v. Lohman, 2 Barb. 216. 6 Reg. v. Parker, Leigh & C. 459, 9 Cox, C. C. 475; Reg. v. Brooks, 1 Den. C. C. 217; Reg. v. Hull, supra. 7 Archb. Crim. Pl. & Ev. (19th ed.) 79; Reg. v. Thompson, 16 Q. B. 832. 831 Eliz., ch. 5, § 5, followed by some others; Dyer v. Best, Law R. 1 Ex. 152; Cobbett v. Warner, 1 H. & N. 388; Maugham v. Walker, Peake, 163; Attorney-General v. Hall, 11 Price, 760. |