a day begins at midnight.' But this rule is not unyielding; it bends, permitting the real fact to be shown and prevail, where justice requires. Thus, when a deed was delivered at a certain hour to the register, who immediately commenced the registration of it, but without indorsing on it the time of its delivery, and two hours later an execution was levied on the property it conveyed, the court permitted the hour of delivery for registration to be proved by parol, to give it precedence over the levy.3 And, in general, the priority of acts may be shown when material. Now,— Ex post facto.- Plainly, in reason, if a man does a thing at five o'clock in the morning, and it is then lawful, he cannot be punished for it under a statute passed at five o'clock in the evening of the same day, without violating the constitutional inhibition of ex post facto laws. If the act were performed at five o'clock in the evening, and the statute passed at the same hour the next morning, all would admit that it could not be applied to the transaction; while still it is not easy to see how the one case could differ in principle from the other. Hence,Time of day provable, and when.-In these cases, and in cases less strong, including civil ones where justice imperatively demands, the doctrine, at least the better doctrine, of the present day permits proof, even by parol, of the exact hour when a statute became a law, giving effect to it only from such hour. Accordingly, when a petition in bankruptcy was filed in court about noon, and late in the evening of the same day a bill passed congress and was approved by the president repealing the bankrupt act, but saving cases "commenced before the passage of this act," Story, J., held that the proceeding could go. on to its conclusion. In a general way it has been adjudged that the time when an act is passed and signed can appear only in itself or by the record; but, in reason, a rule of this sort, cinnati Bank v. Burkhardt, 100 U. S. 686. 1 Bishop, Con., §§ 894, 1439; [S. v. Michel, 52 La. An. 936, 27 S. R. 565.] 2 Chick v. Smith, 8 Dowl. P. C. 337; Campbell v. Strangeways, 3 C. P. D. 105; Lockett v. Hill, 1 Woods. 552; Combe v. Pitt, 3 Bur. 1423, 1434; Johnson v. Pennington, 3 Green (N. J.), 188. 3 Metts v. Bright, 4 Dev. & Bat. 173. 4 Lang v. Phillips, 27 Ala. 311; Cin 5 Crim. Law, I, § 279 et seq. "Salmon v. Burgess, 1 Hughes, 356; In re Wynne, Chase Dec. 227, 251. In re Richardson, 2 Story, 571. And see, to the like effect, 3 Opin. Atty. Gen. 82. 8 In re Welman, 20 Vt. 653; Latless v. Holmes, 4 T. R. 660. And see U. S. while convenient in practice, cannot overturn a principle of natural justice, much less control a provision in the constitution. In accordance with this view, it has been held that a court is not forbidden to inform itself of the real date of the president's approval of an act. Therefore, where the date on its face was simply "December 4," it was adjudged competent, in order to ascertain the year, to resort to the records in the secretary of state's office, and to the journals of congress.' Again, Precedence. When the order in which were passed two or more statutes bearing the same date becomes important, the v. Williams, 1 Paine, 261. In P. v. Clark, 1 Cal. 406, the majority of the court held the day to be divisible, as respects the time when a statute goes into operation, being the moment of its passage. See also U. S. v. Arnold, 1 Gallis. 348; Lang v. Phillips, 27 Ala. 311; Kimm v. Osgood, 19 Mo. 60. 1 Gardner v. The Collector, 6 Wall. 499. And see Kennedy v. Palmer, 6 Gray, 316; Turley v. Logan, 17 Ill. 151; Prescott v. Illinois and Michigan Canal, 19 Ill. 324; McCulloch v. S., 11 Ind. 424; Southwark Bank v. Com., 26 Pa. St. 446; post, § 37. The above case of Gardner v. The Collector, and the reasoning of Miller, J., in the opinion, seem in effect to sustain the following just proposition; namely, 1. It being the duty of the judges to take judicial notice of the contents of public statutes, which need not be proved before them as facts, they must also determine the dates of their enactment. 2. In ascertaining these, they should look at whatever is adapted to inform their minds. The date attached to the president's signature, if full, will ordinarily suffice. If not full, resort may be had to the journals, the time of the publication of the statute, and other sources, to supply the deficiency. If the ends of justice require the precise moment to be ascertained, this may be done in any way satisfactory to the minds of the judges. It may even be shown that the date which the president attached to his signature is an error. The learned judge condensed the doctrine thus: "We are of opinion, on principle as well as authority, that, whenever a question arises in a court of law of the existence of a statute, or of the time when a statute took effect, or of the precise terms of a statute, the judges, who are called upon to decide it, have a right to resort to any source of information which in its nature is capable of conveying to the judicial mind a clear and satisfactory answer to such question; always seeking first for that which in its nature is most appropriate, unless the positive law has enacted a different rule." p. 511. Consult, as perhaps contra, S. v. Young, 3 Vroom, 29. President's proclamation.- The president's proclamation of June 13, 1865, annulling restrictions upon internal trade in the late insurgent states, was held to take effect on the beginning of the day. U. S. v. Norton, 97 U. S. 164, decided on U. S. v. Lapeyre, 17 Wall. 191. And, it is believed, any executive act carrying clemency to the subject, and not impairing the rights of other subjects, would be so construed. chapter numbers may be looked into,' as doubtless anything else calculated to inform the judicial mind. § 30. Knowledge of statute impossible. The rule, where a knowledge of the statute could not have reached the person charged with violating it, is considered in another connection.2 § 31. Modifications of foregoing rules. To avoid practical hardships from the foregoing rules, there are in some of the states special provisions of law postponing the taking effect of statutes until a specified time after their enactment, or until they are published. Or the statute itself may, and it often does, fix a time different from the general one, when no constitutional inhibition prevents. But to work this result, its words must be direct and unequivocal. No legislative act can bind future legislation; therefore, if, while there is a general statutory provision postponing the taking effect of statutes until a specified number of days after their publication or enactment, a statute is passed on its face to go into operation immediately, or at a different time from the general one, it does so; this later expression of the legislative will prevailing over the earlier.' Effect of postponing statute.- A statute which is to become law at a future day is a nullity in the meantime. It does not even operate as notice to persons to be affected by it, nor does a repealing clause in it put an end to the law to be reMetropolitan Board of Health v. Hoyt, 14 Wis. 252. See Parkinson Schmades, 3 Daly, 282, 10 Abb. Pr. v. S., 14 Md. 184, [74 Am. D. 522;] S. (N. S.) 205. And see St. Martin v. v. Barrow, 30 La. An. 657; Thomas v. New Orleans, 14 La. An. 113. Scott, 23 La. An. 689; Scott v. Clark, 1 Iowa, 70; Pilkey v. Gleason, 1 Iowa, 522. Crim. Law, I, § 296. Cooper v. Curtis, 30 Me. 488; Chapman v. S., 2 Head, 36; West Feliciana R. R. Co. v. Johnson, 5 How. (Miss.) 273; Files v. Robinson, 30 Ark. 487; S. v. Little Rock, etc. Ry. Co., 31 Ark. 701; Whitehead v. Wells, 29 Ark. 99; Johnson v. S., 3 Lea, 469, [31 Am. R. 648;] Barry v. Viall, 12 R. I. 18. 'Tredway v. Gapin, 1 Blackf. 299; S. . Doneley, 8 Iowa, 396; Calkin v. S., 1 Greene (Iowa), 68; S. v. Stevenson, 2 Pike, 260; S. v. Superior District Court, 29 La. An. 223; Stine v. Bennett, 13 Minn. 153; Smith v. 3 Wheeler v. Chubbuck, 16 Ill. 361; [S. v. Mounts, 36 W. Va. 179, 15 L. R. A. 243, 14 S. E. R. 407. Different provisions of an act may take effect at different times, at the will of the legislature. Plummer v. Jones, 84 Me. 58, 24 Atl. R. 585; Wheeler v Stuht, 52 Neb. 209, 71 N. W. R. 94 But see Finnegan v. Sale, 54 Kan 420, 38 Pac. R. 477.] 6 S. v. Oskins, 28 Ind. 364. 7 Hunt v. Murray, 17 Iowa, 313; Orleans v. Holmes, 13 La. An. 502. 8 Price v. Hopkin, 13 Mich. 318. pealed. One cannot be punished under it for what he does before the day of its taking effect.' 831a. From and after."- If a statute is to take effect "from and after" a day named, there is believed to be no certain rule either that it shall be on such day or on the next following one, but the entire provision and the special nature of the case will determine. Where the words were 66 from and But, after the passage of this act," the day of its enactment was held to be included; Story, J., observing that, by the general rule, "where the computation is to be made from an act done, the day on which the act is done is to be included." where the words were, "from and after" a specified future date, the enactment was held not to go into operation until the day next succeeding such date. And probably many courts will hold to the distinction indicated by these two cases. § 32. Treaties. In international law, and as a contract between nations, a treaty takes effect from the time it is signed; its subsequent ratification relating back to such time. And this is held of our treaties with other nations. They are not, in this respect, affected by the special terms of our constitu See Graves v. S., 6 Tex. Ap. 228; Paddon v. Bartlett, 3 A. & E. 884, 896; Wood v. Riley, Law R. 3 C. P. 26. 1 McArthur v. Franklin, 16 Ohio St. 193; Spaulding v. Alford, 1 Pick. 33. 2 S. v. Bond, 4 Jones (N. C.) 9. [Statutes operate prospectively only, unless a contrary intention is manifest on their face beyond a reasonable question. Shreveport v. Cole, 129 U. S. 36, 9 Sup. Ct. R. 210; Stewart v. Vandervort, 34 W. Va. 524, 12 L. R. A. 50, 12 S. E. R. 736.] Bishop, Con., § 1340; Lester v. Garland, 15 Ves. 248; Pugh v. Leeds, Cowp. 714; Wilkinson v. Gaston, 9 Q. B. 137; Isaacs v. Royal Ins. Co., Law Rep. 5 Ex. 296; Wilcox v. Wood, 9 Wend. 346; Deyo v. Bleakley, 24 Barb. 9; Sheets v. Selden, 2 Wall. 177; Peables v. Hannaford, 18 Me. 106. "Where time is computed from an act done, the general rule is to include the day. Where it is computed from the day of the act done, the day is excluded. . . . It has been adopted by this court, and must be regarded as settled in this commonwealth." Chapman, J., in Atkins v. Sleeper, 7 Allen, 487, 488. Contra, Bemis v. Leonard, 118 Mass. 502, 508, [19 Am. R. 470.] Arnold v. U. S., 9 Cranch, 104; S. P., U. S. v. Williams, 1 Paine, 261; P. v. Clark, 1 Cal. 406. And see Hamlet v. Taylor, 5 Jones (N. C.), 36; In re Welman, 20 Vt. 653. Contra, Rex v. Moore, Jefferson, 9. Koltenbrock v. Cracraft, 36 Ohio St. 584. See S. v. Perrysburg, 14 Ohio St. 472; [Parkinson v. Brandenburg, 35 Minn. 294. Under an act requiring that a bill be returned within five days or it shall become a law without the governor's signature, an intervening Sunday must not be included. S. v. Michel, 52 La. An. 936, 27 S. R. 565.] 6 See the first note to this section; Watson v. Pears, 2 Camp. 294. tion. In a general way, the same rule governs a treaty ceding territory to us. "It is true," said Wayne, J., "that . . . its national character continues for all commercial purposes; but full sovereignty, for the exercise of it, does not pass to the nation to which it is transferred until actual delivery. But it is also true that the exercise of sovereignty by the ceding country ceases, except for strictly municipal purposes, especially for granting lands. And for the same reason in both cases; because, after the treaty is made, there is not in either the union of possession and the right to the territory which must concur to give plenum dominium et utile." Yet, as a "law" under our constitution, and affecting private rights, it, like a statute which is fully enacted only on receiving the executive sanction, dates simply from the ratification.* 1 Haver v. Yaker, 9 Wall. 32; Hylton v. Brown, 1 Wash. C. C. 343, and cases in the next note. See Succes sion of Schaffer, 13 La. An. 113. 2 Davis v. Concordia, 9 How. (U. S.) 280, 289; U. S. v. Reynes, 9 How. (U.S.) 127, 148. And see Montault v. U. S., 12 How. (U. S.) 47; U. S. v. Pillerin, 18 How. (U. S.) 9; U. S. v. Rillieux, 14 How. (U. S.) 189; U. S. 81 |