pend in part on the terms of the individual statute and the forms of procedure special to the particular locality In civil causes, with us, a suit is generally deemed to be begun when papers for the purpose are filed in court, or the needful process is in good faith made out and delivered to an officer to be served. In some states and circumstances, perhaps generally, not even a delivery of the process to the officer or a filing of papers is necessary; while in others these, or even a service of process will be required. Within this doctrine, it is be 5 tity of base money, such as described in the indictment, some in earlier, some in more advanced stages of the process. The prisoner was apprehended the same evening and lodged in Durham jail. He was afterwards carried before a magistrate, and by warrant dated 8th May was committed to jail, charged on oath with suspicion of high treason in counter feiting the current money of this kingdom, viz. shillings,' etc. The assizes at Durham were holden on the 8th of August, so that more than three months had elapsed between the commission of the offense and the preferring of the indictment. But the judges, at a conference, unanimously held that the information and proceeding before the magistrate was the commencement of the prosecution within the meaning of the act, and that the variance between the manner of laying the offense in the indictment and charging it in the commitment made no difference." The Alabama statute provides that, within the meaning of the act, a prosecution may be commenced "by the issue of a warrant or by binding over the offender." Foster v. S., 38 Ala. 425; [Giles v. S., 88 Ala. 230, 7 S. R. 271; Benson v. S., 91 Ala. 86, 8 S. R. 873; Clayton v. S. (Ala.), 26 S. R. 118.] 1 Bacon v. Gardner, 23 Miss. 60; Dilworth v. Mayfield, 36 Miss. 40; Wright v. Pratt, 17 Mo. 43; Sharp v. Maguire, 19 Cal. 577; Pimental v. San Francisco, 21 Cal. 351; Kinney v. Lee, 10 Tex. 155; Bank of United States v. Lyles, 10 Gill & J. 326; Guild v. Hale, 15 Mass. 455; Ontario Bank v. Rathbun, 19 Wend. 291; [Huysman v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 12 Ap. D. C. 586; City of Belton v. Sterling (Tex. Civ. Ap.), 50 S. W. R. 1027; Johnson v. Davidson, 162 Ill. 232, 44 N. E. R. 499.] 2 Evans v. Galloway, 20 Ind. 479; State Bank v. Bates, 5 Eng. 120; State Bank v. Cason, 10 Eng. 479; Johnson v. Farwell, 7 Greeлl. 370, [22 Am. D. 203;] Hail v. Spencer, 1 R. I. 17; Davis v. Duffie, 18 Abb. Pr. 360; [Chapman v. Goodrich, 55 Vt. 354; Flournoy v. Lyon, 70 Ala. 308; U. S. v. American Lumber Co., 80 Fed. R. 309; Lambert v. Ensign Mfg. Co., 42 W. Va. 813, 26 S. E. R. 431; Collins v. Manville, 170 Ill. 614, 48 N. E. R. 914.] 3 Updike v. Ten Broeck, 3 Vroom, 105; Bunker v. Shed, 8 Met. 150; Jewett v. Greene, 8 Greenl. 447; Gardner v. Webber, 17 Pick. 407, 412; Mason v. Cheney, 47 N. H. 24; Burdick v. Green, 18 Johns. 14; Jones v. Jincey, 9 Grat. 708. See Robinson v. Burleigh, 5 N. H. 225; Graves v. Ticknor, 6 N. H. 537; Garland v. Chattle, 12 Johns. 430; Collins v. Montemy, 3 Bradw. 182; [Lacey v. Newcomb, 95 Iowa, 287, 63 N. W. R. 704.] 4 Baskins v. Wilson, 6 Cow. 471. Taylor v. Taylor, 3 A. K. Mar. 18; [Demple v. Hofman (Kan. Ap.), 57 Pac. R. 234] lieved to be the general understanding in our tribunals that a criminal prosecution is begun when a complaint is made to a magistrate who issues his warrant of arrest. Still, on the other hand, there is American authority for saying that the word "prosecution," in a statute limiting criminal causes, is an equivalent for indictment; so that only on the finding of an indictment will the running of the statute be stayed. A presentment by the grand jury has been held to be and not to be a commencement, a question varying with the case, the statute, and the practice of the court." § 261a. Continuing to run after beginning. After any sort of statute of limitations has attached to a case,- has begun to run,― it, as a general rule, and in the absence of statutory terms otherwise providing, continues its effect, though something intervenes which, if existing before, would have prevented its attaching; as, for example, though for a time there is no party to sue or be sued, or the suit is forbidden, or the 7 1S. v. Howard. 15 Rich. 274; S. v. May, 1 Brev. 160; Newell v. S., 2 Conn. 38; S. v. Groome, 10 Iowa, 308; Ross v. S., 55 Ala. 177; S. v. Gibbs, 1 Root, 171; Reg. v. Lennox, 34 U. C. Q. B. 28; S. v. Miller, 11 Humph. 505; P. v. Clark, 33 Mich. 112, 120; [S. v. Erving, 19 Wash. 435, 53 Pac. R. 717; In re Clyne, 52 Kan. 441, 35 Pac. R. 23; P. v. Clement, 72 Mich. 116, 40 N. W. R. 190; In re Griffith, 35 Kan. 377, 11 Pac. R. 174.] 2 Com. v. Haas, 57 Pa. St. 443; [P. v. Ayhens, 85 Cal. 86, 24 Pac. R. 635; Anderson v. S., 20 Fla. 381; Broughn v. S., 44 Neb. 889, 62 N. W. R. 1094; Ex parte Lacey, 6 Okl. 4, 37 Pac. R. 1095; City of Pilot Grove v. McCormick, 56 Mo. Ap. 530; In re Griffith, 35 Kan. 377, 11 Pac. R. 174.] 6 Ante, § 260a. 9 7 Coventry v. Atherton, 9 Ohio, 34; Cotterell v. Dutton, 4 Taunt. 826; Stevenson v. McReary, 12 Sm. & M. 9, 58, [51 Am. D. 102;] Wynn v. Lee, 5 Ga. 217; Halsey v. Beach, 1 Penning. 122; Ruff v. Bull, 7 Har. & J. 14, [16 Am. D. 290;] Pendergrast v. Foley, 8 Ga. 1; Smith v. Newby, 13 Mo. 159; Dillard v. Philson, 5 Strob. 213; [Asbury v. Fair, 111 N. C. 251, 16 S. E. R. 467; Bowles v. Smith (Tex. Civ. Ap.), 34 S. W. R. 381; Makepeace v. Bronnenberg, 146 Ind. 243, 45 N. E. R. 336; Grady v. Wilson, 115 N. C. 344, 20 S. E. R. 518, 44 Am. St. R. 461; Campbell v. McFadden, 9 Tex. Civ. Ap. 379, 31 S. W. R. 436; Voight v. Raby, 90 Va. 799, 20 S. E. R. 824; Lloyd v. Lloyd's Adm'r (Ky.), 46 S. 3S. v. Cox, 6 Ire. 440; [S. v. Kiefer W. R. 485.] (Ind.), 44 Atl. R. 1043.] 8 Rhodes v. Smethurst, 6 M. & W. 4U. S. v. Slacum, 1 Cranch, C. C. 351, 4 M. & W. 42; Byrd v. Byrd, 28 485. 366 "Pending."— As to what is a "prosecution pending," see S. v. Arlin, 39 N. H. 179; Reg. v. Martin, 8 Q. B. D. 54; Schoeppe v. Com., 65 Pa. St. 51. Miss. 144; Brown v. Merrick, 16 Ark. 612; Tynan v. Walker, 35 Cal. 634, [95 Am. D. 152;] Baker v. Brown, 18 Ill. 91. 9 Houpt v. Shields, 3 Port. 247; Jordan v. Jordan, Dudley (Ga.), 182; [Mc person to be sued is dead,' consequences provided against by the express terms of many of our statutes. Yet, even to this rule the unwritten law has exceptions, which enter into and qualify the statute. Thus, Creditor becoming executor, etc.—If the creditor of a deceased person is made his executor or administrator, this act of the law, rendering a suit for the debt impossible, since one cannot sue himself, yet not extinguishing it, suspends the running of the limitations statute. Again, Rebellion-War.-The mere temporary closing of the courts, in consequence of disturbances from rebellion or war, does not necessarily, or does not in all circumstances, suspend the running of the statute. But those hostilities do, which, by rendering unlawful or impossible the litigation in bar whereof the statute is invoked, constitute the overwhelming necessity to which all laws must yield." Clure v. Melton, 34 S. C. 377, 13 S. E. 1Stewart v. Spedden, 5 Md. 433; 2 Seagram v. Knight, Law R. 2 Ch. Ap. 628, 632; Spencer v. Spencer, 4 Md. Ch. 456; Brown v. Stewart, 4 Md. Ch. 368. See Munroe v. Holmes, 13 Allen, 109. 3 Prideaux v. Webber, 1 Lev. 31; Hall v. Wybourn, 2 Salk. 420. And see Hepburn's Case, 3 Bland, 95. But see observations in Hanger v. Abbott, 6 Wall. 532, 541; U. S. v. Wiley, 11 Wall. 508, 513; Marks v. Borum, 1 Bax. 87, [25 Am. R. 764;] Kilpatrick v. Brashear, 10 Heisk. 372, 375. See, for the principle, Bishop, Con., §§ 577-609. 5 Ante, 24, and places there referred to. 6 Hanger v. Abbott, U. S. v. Wiley, and other cases supra; The Protector, 9 Wall. 687; Harrison v. Henderson, 7 Heisk. 315; Neely v. Luster, 7 Heisk. 354; Braum v. Sauerwein, 10 Wall. 218; Levy v. Stewart, 11 Wall. 244; Stewart v. Kahn, 11 Wall. 493; Coleman v. Holmes, 44 Ala. 124, [4 Am. R. 121;] O'Neal v. Boone, 53 Ill. 35; Mixer v. Sibley, 53 Ill. 61; Sierra v. U. S., 9 Ct. of Cl. 224; The Protector, 12 Wall. 700; Adger v. Alston, 15 Wall. 555; Ross v. Jones, 22 Wall. 576; Gooding v. Varn, Chase, 286; Eddins v. Graddy, 28 Ark. 500; Randolph v. Ward, 29 Ark. 238; Hall v. Denckla, 28 Ark. 506; Bell v. Hanks, 55 Ga. 274; Selden v. Preston, 11 Bush, 191; McMerty v. Morrison, 62 Mo. 140; Pitzer v. Burns, 7 W. Va. 63; Sleght v. Kane, 1 Johns. Cas. 76. And see Shand v. Gage, 9 S. C. 187; Johnston v. Wilson, 29 Grat. 379; Zacharie v. Godfrey, 50 Ill. 186, [99 Am. D. 508;] Delancey v. McKeen, 1 Wash. C. C. 354. § 261b. Exceptions.-Besides the exceptions thus engrafted by the unwritten law on the statute, there are generally in our states others, as already intimated, incorporated into its terms. For example, 3 "Beyond seas."-The statutes of some of the states, following1 mainly the early English ones,2 except out of their operation persons" beyond the seas." In the absence of this statutory exception this fact itself will not work the exemption. The English courts gave to the expression its obvious meaning; so that, for example, Ireland, both before and after the union, was adjudged to be, and Scotland not to be," "beyond the seas." In 1833 this construction was somewhat changed by the statute of 3 and 4 Will. 4, ch. 27, § 19, which declared that, within its provisions and the limitations act of 21 Jac. 1, ch. 16 §7, "no part of the United Kingdom, etc., shall be deemed to be beyond seas." This statute of Will. 4, adopted long after the Revolution, has, of course, no effect with us; but some of our American courts, overlooking it, and overlooking the English decisions pronounced in its absence, have held that the words "beyond the seas" mean simply out of the limits of the state. And, in one way or another, a large proportion of our 1 Vans v. Higginson, 10 Mass. 29; Hall v. Little, 14 Mass. 203. 2 Hall v. Wybank,3 Mod. 311; Beven v. Clapham, 1 Lev. 143; Rochtschilt v. Leibman, 2 Stra. 836; Swayn v. Stephens, Cro. Car. 245; Parry v. Jackson, 4 T. R. 516. 3 Post, § 595. 4 Hall v. Wybourn, 2 Salk. 420; s. c. nom. Hall v. Wyborn, 1 Show. 98; Anonymous, Comb. 190; Swayne v. Stevens, W. Jones, 252. "Nightingale v. Adams, Holt, 426; Anonymous, 1 Show. 91; Gaskin v. Gaskin, Cowp. 657, 658; Lane v. Bennett, 1 M. & W. 70. King v. Walker, 1 W. Bl. 286. And see Lane v. Bennett, supra, at pp. 74-76. 7 And see Chandler v. Vilett, 2 Saund. 120 and notes; Ruckmaboye v. Mottichund, 8 Moore, P. C. 4. 8 For example, in Bank of Alexan dria v. Dyer, 14 Pet. 141, 145, Taney, C. J., delivering the unanimous opinion of the supreme court of the United States, said: "The question presented by these pleadings is the construction of that clause in the Maryland act of limitations which exempts from the operation of the act all persons who are 'beyond the seas,' at the time cause of action accrues, and continues the exemption until they shall return. The words 'beyond the seas,' in this law, are manifestly borrowed from the English statute of limitation of James 1, ch. 21 [21 James 1, ch. 16]; and it has always been held that they ought not to be interpreted according to their literal meaning, but ought to be construed as equivalent to the words 'without the jurisdiction of the state. According to this interpretation, a person residing in any tribunals have reached this conclusion. Other of our courts deny this construction, and hold that, at least, another state of the Union is not "beyond the seas." It is difficult to find any other reason than the blunder just mentioned for adjudging that a man who steps across an invisible line into an adjoining state has, by the one step, taken where there is not a drop either of salt water or fresh, transported himself “beyond the seas." "Even," to quote from Lord Abinger, C. B., if the court were "quite satisfied" that the legislature meant so, it "could not supply the defect." § 261c. Concealment.-On general principles, want of knowledge of an offense, or the defendant's concealing it, or mere ignorance of a civil right, is no answer to the statutory bar. other state of the Union was 'be yond the seas' within the meaning of this act of assembly, and there fore exempted from its operation until he should come within the limits of Maryland." For a review of the decisions of the supreme court of the United States on this question, see Davie v. Briggs, 97 U. S. 628, 637. 1 Murray v. Baker, 3 Wheat. 541; Forbe v. Foot, 2 McCord, 331; Shelby v. Guy, 11 Wheat. 361; Pancoast v. Addison, 1 Har. & J. 350, [2 Am. D. 520;] Wakefield v. Smart, 3 Eng. 488; Denham v. Holeman, 26 Ga. 182, [71 Am. D. 198;] Stephenson v. Wait, 8 Blackf. 508; Galusha v. Cobleigh, 13 N. H. 79; Richardson v. Richardson, 6 Ohio, 125, [25 Am. D. 745.] 2 S. v. Harris, 71 N. C. 174; Mason v. Johnson, 24 Ill. 159, [76 Am. D. 740;] Marvin v. Bates, 13 Mo. 217; Fackler v. Fackler, 14 Mo. 431; Keeton v. Keeton, 20 Mo. 530; Gonder v. Estabrook, 33 Pa. St. 374. There are statutes the special terms of which are so. Hall v. Little, 14 Mass. 203, 204. still, where the question is upon a state statute which has received the other construction from the state tribunal (ante, §§ 35b, 115; Amory v. Lawrence, 3 Clif. 523), it will follow the latter. So it did in passing upon the North Carolina statute, on the ground "that the fixed and received construction by the state courts of local statutes of limitation furnishes rules of decision for this court, so far as such construction and statutes do not conflict with the constitution of the United States." Davie v. Briggs, 97 U. S. 628, 637. Lane v. Bennett, supra, at p. 73. And see Wilson v. Appleton, 17 Mass. 180, 181. 4U. S. v. White, 5 Cranch, C. C. 38; [S. v. Pierre, 49 La. An. 1159, 22 S. R. 373; S. v. Wren, 48 La. An. 803, 19 S R. 745.] 5 Campbell v. Long, 20 Iowa, 382; Abell v. Harris, 11 Gill & J. 367; Davis v.. Cotten, 2 Jones Eq. 430; Bossard v. White, 9 Rich. Eq. 483; Leonard v. Pitney, 5 Wend. 30; [Townsend v. Eichelberger, 51 Ohio St. 213, 38 N. E R. 207; Gore v. Murphy, 18 Mont. 342, State statutes in national courts. 45 Pac. R. 217; School Dist. of Sedalia Though the supreme court of the v. Deweese, 93 Fed. R. 602, Meyer United States has interpreted the Bros. Drug Co. v. Fry (Tex. Civ. Ap.), expression "beyond seas as an 48 S. W. R. 752. equivalent for "out of the state," |