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But by the terms of some of our statutes, matters of this sort will postpone the limitation of a criminal prosecution."
a “Fleeing from justice” — has the like statutory effect in some of the states and under the United States jurisdiction.?
$ 261d. To what offenses.— There are decisions, not requiring special consideration, as to what offenses are within the varying terms of our limitations statutes. Now
Offenses within one another.- In those cases in which a conviction for a minor offense may be had on an indictment for a major, the same as in any other, the particular one for which the verdict is found must not be barred by the statute.
$ 262, Shifting the proceedings – Valid - Erroneous. It is plain that the beginning of a prosecution for one offense will not intercept the running of the statute against another." On the other hand, if the issuing of a warrant is the commencement of a prosecution, the successive steps afterward required by the law are merely a continuance of it, so that the running
1 Jones v. S., 14 Ind. 120; Randolph 1 Kan. 428; S. v. Elrod, 12 Rich. 662; v. S., 14 Ind. 232; Free v. S., 13 Ind. S. v. Abellanado, 18 La. An. 141; S. 324; Robinson v. S., 57 Ind. 113; v. Markham, 15 La. An. 498; Com. v. Ulmer v. S., 14 Ind. 52; (S. v. Hinton, East Boston Ferry Co,, 13 Allen, 589; 49 La. An. 1354, 22 S. R. 617.]
U. S. v. Fehrenback, 2 Woods, 175; S. 2 S. v. Washburn, 48 Mo. 240; U. S. v. J. P., 1 Tyler, 283; S. v. Hunkins, v. O'Brian, 3 Dill. 381; U. S. v. Smith, 43 N. H. 557; P. v. Haun, 44 Cal. 96; 4 Day, 121; R. S. of U. S., & 1045; [P. v. U. S. r. Norton, 91 U. S. 566; Com. v. McCausey, 65 Mich. 72, 31 N. W. R. Edwards, 9 Dana, 447; (S. v. Heller, 770; U. S. v. Hewecker, 79 Fed. R. 59; 76 Wis. 517, 45 N. W. R. 307; P. v. Coleman v. Terr., 5 Okl. 201, 47 Pac. Clement, 72 Mich. 116, 40 N. W. R. R. 1079; Gray v. Fifield, 59 N. H. 131; 190. Imprisonment in state penitenBlackburn v. Blackburn (Mich.), 82 tiary does not suspend the running N. W. R. 835; Payne v. Bowdrie (Ga.), of the statute. In re Griffith, 35 Kan. 36 S. E. R. 89; Porter v. U. S., 91 Fed. 377, 11 Pac. R. 174; Carr v. S., 36 Tex. R. 494; Howgate v. U. S., 7 Ap. D. C. Cr. R. 390, 37 S. W. R. 426.] 217; Whitcomb v. Keator, 59 Wis. 609, 4 White v. S., 4 Tex. Ap. 488; Tur18 N. W. R. 469; Streep v. U. S., 160 ley r. S., 3 Heisk. 11 (overruling CarU. S. 128, 16 S. Ct. 244, 44 L. ed. 365; den v. S., 3 Head, 267); Nelson v. S., Lay v. S., 42 Ark. 105; S. v. Harvell, 17 Fla. 195; Heward v. S., 13 Sm. & 89 Mo. 588, 1 S. W. R. 837; Blackman M. 261; Riggs v. S., 30 Miss. 635; [P. v. v. Com., 124 Pa. St. 578, 17 Atl. R. Picetti, 124 Cal. 361, 57 Pac. R. 156; 194.]
S. v. Bell, 48 La. An. 735, 19 S. R. 38. v. Enos, Kirby, 21; Anschicks 671; S. v. Diskin, 35 La. An. 46; P. v. S., 6 Tex. Ap. 524; U. S. v. Hirsch, v. Burt, 51 Mich. 199, 16 N W. R. 378.] 100 U. S. 33; S. v. King, 29 La. An. 5 Smith v. S., 62 Ala. 29; Buckalew 704; Lamkin v. P., 94 Ill. 501; U. S. v. 2. S., 62 Ala, 334, (34 Am. R. 22; JackIrvine, 98 U. S. 450; White v. S., 4 son v. S., 106 Ala. 136, 17 S. R. 349.) Tex. Ap. 488; Laurent v. Bermier, 6 Ante, 8 261.
of the statute will be stopped. But if one of such steps proves to be erroneous, and is therefore taken again, is the result different? In Alabama, the written law expressly providing that “a prosecution may be commenced, within the meaning of this chapter, by the issue of a warrant, or by binding over the offender,” one thus proceeded against was indicted, the indictment was quashed as erroneous, and then a fresh indictment was found, while still he remained in custody. And this was held to be such a continuous proceeding as prevented the statute of limitations from re-attaching to the case. In North Carolina this doctrine was carried to a point less obviously just in principle. By the statute, “in all trespasses and other misdemeanors, except the offenses of perjury, forgery, malicious mischief, and deceit, the prosecution shall commence within two years after the commission of the said trespasses and misdemeanors, and not after,” etc. And, without reference to the original complaint and warrant, or order of commitment, if such there were, the court held that, where there is an indictment within the statutory period, then it is abated on a plea of misnomer, then another is found against the defendant by his right name after the statutory period has elapsed, this is sufficient. Said the learned chief justice: “The first bill was found within two years after the commission of the offense; the second bill was a continuation and a part of the same proceeding, according to a well-settled principle." There is ap
1 Tully v. Com., 13 Bush, 142. 251. The principle is more fully
2 Foster v. S., 38 Ala. 425. See S. v. stated in S. v. Johnson, supra, where Kreps, 8 Ala. 951; Smith v. S., supra; it is held that if an indictment is S. v. Hazard, 8 R. I 273; S. v. Cason, found, and afterward another one 28 La. An. 40; Lay v. S., 42 Ark. 105; for the same cause, the legal effect is Smith v. S., 79 Ala. 21; White v. S., simply to add a new count to the 103 Ala. 72, 16 S. R. 63. But on re- first, and the two constitute one case. moval of cause from justice court to Whether this is so in the other states circuit court, the statute may not be we need not inquire; since, if it is, it suspended. Bube v. S., 76 Ala. 73; does not follow that the new indictMartin v. S., 79 Ala. 267.
ment is a part of a proceeding already 3 R. S., ch. 35, 88. The statute is not quashed. If it is such part, it is given in the report.
quashed also. It may be further ob4 S. v. Hailey, 6 Jones (N. C.), 42, 43, served of S. v. Hailey, that the point referring to S. v. Johnson, 5 Jones stated in the text was not necessary (N. C.), 221; S. v. Haney, 2 Dev. & to the decision, since the statute conBat. 390; S. v. Tisdale, 2 Dev. & Bat. tained a saving within which the 159; S. v. Hashaw, 2 Car. Law Repos. case clearly fell. Still in an Eng
parently more or less authority quite opposite to this doctrine, to the effect that proceedings declared erroneous or null will not interrupt the running of the statute. But that they may is expressly enacted in some of the states.?
$ 263. Past and future.- As every crime is a wrong committed against the power which makes the laws, and as therefore a statute limiting the period for prosecution is a declaration in the nature of grace to the offender, such a statute, if in general terms, should in reason be applied by the courts to past offenses,' the same as to future ones. This results also from the doctrine 6 that the statute is to be interpreted liberally in favor of the accused. Even a civil statute of limitations, not within these special reasons, is by a part of our courts held, in the language of a learned Vermont judge, to "operate upon an antecedent as well as subsequent cause of action, unless by its terms it is restrained to the latter;"? though some of the other tribunals maintain the contrary. In matter of lish case at the assizes, the learned 236, Wilson, J.; Pritchard v. Spencer, judge had so much doubt on the 2 Ind. 486; Sleeth v. Murphy, Morris, point as to reserve it, though it came 321, [41 Am. D. 232;] Walker v. Bank to nothing, for the prisoner was ac- of Mississippi, 2 Eng. 500; Phares v. quitted on the merits. Rex v. Kil. Walters, 6 Iowa, 106; Root v. Bradminster, 7 Car. & P. 228. And it may ley, 1 Kan. 437; Marston v. Seabury, be that some other judges will take 2 Penning. 435; Brewster v. Brew. the same view as did those of the ster, 32 Barb. 428; [Fish v. Genett North Carolina tribunal. See also S. (Ky.), 56 S. W. R. 813; Morris v. Tripp v. Duclos, 35 Mo. 237; (Reg. v. West, (Iowa), 82 N. W. R. 610; Stoddard v. 18 Cox, C. C. 675.]
Owings, 42 S. C. 88, 20 S. E. R. 25; 1S. v. Curtis, 30 La. An. 1166; S. v. Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Braithwaite, Morrison, 31 La. An. 211; (S. v. Preco 7 N. D. 358, 75 N. W. R. 244, 66 vara, 49 La. An. 593, 21 S. R. 724.] Am. R. 653; Gutterman v. Wishon,
28. v. Duclos, 35 Mo. 237; S. v. 21 Mont. 458, 54 Pac. R. 566; SouthPrimm, 61 Mo. 166; [Stafford v. S., 59 gate v. Frier (Okl.), 57 Pac. R. 841.] Ark. 413, 27 S. W. R. 495; Swalley v. 8 Hull v. Minor, 2 Root, 223; Moore P., 116 Ill. 347, 4 N. E. R. 379; S. v. v. McLendon, 5 Eng. 512; Calvert v. Child, 44 Kan. 420, 24 Pac. R. 952; Lowell, 5 Eng. 147; Central Bank Louisville, etc. R. R. Co. v. Com., 4 Ky. v. Solomon, 20 Ga. 408; Thompson v. Law R. 627. See In re Crandall, 59 Alexander, 11 Ill. 54; Ashbrook v. Kan. 671, 54 Pac. R. 686.]
Quar 15 B. Monr. 20; Whitworth Crim. Law, I, § 32.
V. Ferguson, 18 La. An. 602; Deal v. * Lamkin v. P., 94 Ill. 501; P. v. Patterson, 12 La. An. 728; Stine v. Lord, 12 Hun, 282; (Com. v. Duffy, 96 Bennett, 13 Minn. 153; Carothers v. Pa St. 576.]
Hurley, 41 Miss. 71; Paddleford 5 See ante, SS 83-85a.
v. Dunn, 14 Mo. 517; Weber v. Man. 6 Ante, $ 259.
ning, 4 Mo. 229; Dickson v. Chicago, 7 Cardell v. Carpenter, 42 Vt. 234, etc. R. R. Co., 77 IIL 331; [Fayette
authority it has been held that, prima facie, criminal statutes of limitations dol and do not? include past offenses.
$ 264. How take advantage of statute.- One relying on a statute of limitations need not plead it in bar. The prosecuting power is required affirmatively to show an offense within the period of limitations.
$ 264a. Pertaining to remedy — (Time and place of trial). In general, statutes of limitation, whether civil or criminal, are regarded as pertaining, not to the right, but to the remedy. And, as with other remedies, those which prevail at the time and place of the trial furnish the rule for the suit.? Our written constitutions have created exceptions to this doctrine, but they are not numerous. The chief exception is in the civil department; namely,
ville Bld. & Loan Ass'n v. Bowlin, 63 16, 20; Meek v. Meek, 45 Iowa, 294; Ark, 573, 39 S. W. R. 1046; Gilbert v. Pratt v. Huggins, 29 Barb. 277; Cook Ackerman, 159 N. Y. 118, 53 N. E. R. V. Kendall, 13 Minn. 324; Edwards 753, 45 L R. A. 118; McKenzie v. A. v. McCaddon, 20 Iowa, 520; Cox r. P. Cook Co., 113 Mich. 452, 71 N. W, Berry, 13 Ga. 306; (S. v. Bell, 48 La. R. 868; Seattle v. De Wolfe, 17 Wash. An. 735, 19 S. R. 671.] 349, 49 Pac. R. 553; Nichols v. Nor- 6 Ante, SS 175, 176. folk, etc. R. R. Co., 120 N. C. 495, 26 7 Flowers v. Foreman, 23 How.(U.S.) S. E. R. 643.]
132; Hendricks v. Comstock, 12 Ind. U. S. v. Ballard, 3 McLean, 469; 238, [74 Am. D. 205;] Walworth r. P. v. Roe, 5 Park. Cr. 231; [S. v. Miller, Routh, 14 La. An. 205; Gassaway 4 N. J. L 252; Com. v. Duffy, 96 v. Hopkins, 1 Head, 583; Sampson 1: Pa. St. 506.)
Sampson, 63 Me. 328; Patterson v. 2 Martin v. S., 24 Tex. 61.
Gaines, 6 How. (U. S.) 550; Winston 3 Crim. Pro.,I, S 799. Query whether v. McCormick, 1 Ind. 56; Manchester this is not otherwise in New York. v. Doddridge, 3 Ind. 360; Cook v. KenP. v. Roe, 5 Park. Cr. 231; [and Colo- dall, 13 Minn. 324; Martin v. Martin, rado, Packer v. P. (Colo.), 57 Pac. R. 35 Ala. 560; Howell v. Howell, 15 Wis. 1087.]
55; (Underwood v. Patrick, 94 Fed. R. 4 U. S. v. Smith, 4 Day, 121; Buck468, 46 C. C. A. 330; Holley v. Coffee ner v. S., 56 Ind. 207; Hurt v. S., 55 (Ala.), 26 S. R. 239; Van Santfoord v. Ala. 214; Rex v. Philllips, Russ. & Roethler (Oreg.), 57 Pac. R. 628; Obear Ry. 369; White v. S., 4 Tex. Ap. 488; v. First Nat. Bank, 97 Ga. 587, 25 S. Gore v. S., 58 Ala. 391. See Com. v. E. R. 335; Brunswick Terminal Co. Ruffner, 28 Pa. St. 259; [Warrall v. v. Nat. Bank of Baltimore, 88 Fed. R. S., 27 Fla. 362, 8 S. R. 748; Weinert 607. But several states have adopted V. S., 35 Fla. 229, 17 S. R. 570; P. v. statutes providing a different rule in Lidenborn, 52 N. Y. S. 101, 23 Misc. certain classes of cases. John Shil. R. 426; S. v. Anderson, 51 La. An. litto Co. v. Richardson (Ky.), 42 S. 1181, 25 S. R. 990; S. v. Schuermann, W. R. 847; Robinson v. Moore, 76 70 Mo. Ap. 518.)
Miss. 89, 23 S. R. 931.] *Waltermire v. Westover, 4 Kern.
§ 265. Vested rights - When the time for bringing a civil action has expired, the rights of the parties are ordinarily deemed to have vested, and the legislature cannot then take away what is thus vested by removing the statutory bar.' Again,
Construction of statute.— Though, in general, and by the better opinion, a statute of limitations should be applied to past transactions, the same as to future ones, the complete running of a limitations statute creates a wide difference between cases which are barred by it, even where no rights are vested, and those which are not. Therefore, in reason, a new statute of limitations should not be construed as intended to apply to any case already barred under an old oņe, unless express words in it require. And so are the few authorities which we have.'
. Within the principle involved in this proposition it was held that,
Judgment lien. Though the legislature is not forbidden to alter the limitation period of an existing judgment lien, yet, the power being an extraordinary one, the intent to exercise it will not be inferred from any doubtful expression. So, in the criminal law,
Authorizing criminal prosecution after bar.- Assuming the legislative power to authorize criminal prosecutions for offenses against which the statute of limitations has fully run, the exercise of the power would be a step in legislation so out of the usual course that it should not be inferred from words equally applicable to past offenses not barred. And for this also we have judicial authority. A different question arises as to the
1 Pleasants v. Rohrer, 17 Wis. 577, Gibbs v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 579; Sprecker v. Wakeley, 11 Wis. 79 Ill. Ap. 22; Eingartner v. III. Steel 432; Fears v. Sykes, 35 Miss. 633; Sims Co., 103 Wis. 373, 79 N. W. R. 433.] v. Canfield, 2 Ala. 555; Newcombe v. 2 Ante, S 263. Leavitt, 22 Ala. 631; Winburn v. 8 Thompson v. Read, 41 Iowa, 48; Cochran, 9 Tex. 123; McKinney v. Pitman v. Bump, 5 Oreg. 17; Thomp
5 Springer, 8 Blackf. 506; Piatt v. Vat- son v. S., 54 Miss. 740; (Walker v. tier, 1 McLean, 146; Stipp v. Brown, Burgess, 44 W. Va. 399, 30 S. E. R. 99, 2 Ind. 647; Hill v. Kricke, 11 Wis. 67 Am. St. R. 775.] 442; Knox v. Cleveland, 13 Wis. 245; 4 Miller v. Com., 5 Watts & S. 488; Parish v. Eager, 15 Wis. 532. And [Warner v. Bartle, 56 N. Y. S. 585.] see Cassity v. Storms, 1 Bush, 452; 5 Thompson v. 8., 54 Miss. 740; 8. v. ante, SS 85a, 177a, 178; [Kipp v. John. Sneed, 25 Tex. Supp. 66. son, 31 Minn, 360, 17 N. W. R. 957;