Statute to take effect on popular approval — Municipal corporation. Whether an individual intrusted with an authority can delegate it to another depends on its nature. An agency with a discretion cannot be delegated, but a mere ministerial one may. Therefore, quite conclusively, a body of official persons, endowed with the discretionary power of making laws, cannot transfer it to other hands. But it is consistent with the nature of a law that it authorize associations of men to govern themselves in their own affairs; therefore, as already seen, a statute may establish a municipal corporation, with power to enact reasonable by-laws. And it was never doubted that such a statute may be submitted, for acceptance or rejection, to the people dwelling in the locality to be affected thereby. Yet considerable numbers of courts have held that an ordinary act of legislation is void, if, by its terms, its going into effect depends on a popular vote. Indeed, a count would probably show a greater number of cases in favor of this doctrine. than against it. We may doubt whether these cases have proceeded on a right view of the question. It is beyond dispute, in general, that the going into effect of a legislative act may be made to depend on the happening of a future event, or a 1 Bishop, Con., § 1067. As to pow. ers more analogous to the law-making, see S. v. Bell, 34 Ohio S. 194; Matthews v. Alexandria, 68 Mo. 115, [30 Am. R. 776;] S. v. Fiske, 9 R. L. 94; Springer v. McSpadden, 49 Mo. 299. 2 Ante, § 18; Covington v. East St. Louis, 78 Ill. 548; Lothrop v. Stedman, 42 Conn. 583. And see P. v. Nally, 49 Cal. 478; [Port Mining Co. t. Hagood (S. C.), 3 L. R. A. 841, 9 S. E. R. 686. 'Taxes, etc. And to levy taxes, and the like. U. S. v. New Orleans, 98 U.S. 381. Barto v. Himrod, 4 Seld. 483, [59 Am. D. 506:] Thorne v. Cramer, 15 Barb. 112; S. v. Parker, 26 Vt. 357; P. v. Collins, 3 Mich. 343; S. v. Copeland, 3 R. L. 33; Parker v. Com., 6 Pa. St. 507, [47 Am. D. 480;] S. v. Scott, 17 Mo. 521; S. v. Field, 17 Mo. 529, [59 Am. D. 275;] Louisville v. Baird, 15 B. Monr. 246; Paterson v. Society, 4 Zab. 385; Maize v. S., 4 Ind. 342; Meshmeier v. S., 11 Ind. 482; Santo v. S., 2 Iowa, 165, [63 Am. D. 487;] S. v. Swisher, 17 Tex. 441; Grant v. Courter, 24 Barb. 232; Clarke v. Rochester, 24 Barb. 446; P. v. Stout, 23 Barb. 349; Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Davidson, 1 Sneed, 637; Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa, 82; Geebrick v. S., 5 Iowa, 491; Bank of Rome v. Rome, 18 N. Y. 38; Peck v. Weddell, 17 Ohio St. 271; Rice v. Foster, 4 Harring. (Del.) 479; Corning v. Greene, 23 Barb. 33; Johnson v. Rich, 9 Barb. 680; Morgan v. Monmouth Plank Road, 2 Dutcher, 99; P. v. Salomon, 46 Ill. 415; S. v. Weir, 33 Iowa, 134; Ex parte Wall, 48 Cal. 279, 313, [17 Am. R. 425;] Brown v. Fleischner, 4 Oreg. 132. 5 Lothrop v. Stedman, 42 Conn. 583; contingency; and that, for example, one expired may be revived on the transpiring of a fact to be established by proclamation.1 The legislature, in exercising its judgment on the advisability of a measure, may well be governed by the yet unascertained fact of the popular approval or disapproval of it; because, as is well known, laws which do violence to public opinion are not enforced, and often tend to evil, while, if such opinion favored them, their results might be good. Therefore to provide for ascertaining the popular opinion by a vote of the people, and to make the going into effect of a statute dependent on the fact thus arrived at, would seem but a legitimate form of contingent legislation, in the highest degree just in all cases where the legislative body doubts concerning such fact and deems it essential. This is not a transferring, by this body, of any part of the legislative power to the people, but intelligently exercising its own. How generally the full doctrine thus stated is, in recent times, held by the courts it would be difficult to ascertain; but, where the submission is of a local statute to the people of the locality, or of a general one to be accepted or rejected in particular places where the vote is taken, popularly termed in some of its forms a local-option law, the constitutional validity of the proceeding is almost universally conceded.3 Smith v. Janesville, 26 Wis. 291; S. v. 505. 1 The Aurora, 7 Cranch, 382. In a Texas case, Lipscomb, J., said: "There is no analogy between the act of our legislature, and the various acts of congress depending upon a future contingency of a rebellion, insurrection, foreign war, a treaty, or the acts of a foreign power. These do not depend upon the vote of the constituency of congress, but on a contingency over which they have no control." S. v. Swisher, 17 Tex. 441, 448. On the other hand, in Virginia, where the validity of statutes depending on a vote of the people was sustained, Lee, J., delivering the opinion of the court, said: "Now, if the legislature may make the operation of its act depend on some contingency thereafter to happen, or may prescribe conditions, it must be for them to judge in what contingency, or upon what condition, the act shall take effect. They must have the power to prescribe any they may think proper." Bull v. Read, 13 Grat. 78, 90, 91. 2 Consult, for the affirmative side of this proposition, Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa. St. 491, [13 Am. R. 716;] for the negative, Ex parte Wall, 48 Cal. 279, 313. 3 Locke's Appeal, supra; Smith v. McCarthy, 56 Pa. St. 359; S. v. O'Neill, 24 Wis. 149; Monroe v. S., 8 Tex. Ap. 343; Anderson v. Com., 13 Bush, 485; S. v. Morris Common Pleas, 7 Vroom, 72; P. v. Reynolds, 5 Gilman, 1; P. v. Salomon, 51 Ill. 37; Erlinger v. Boneau, 51 Ill. 94; Com. v. Dean, 110 By some opinions, at least, it makes no difference that the law affects equally the entire people of the state. In Rhode Island, where this sort of general legislation has been deemed unconstitutional, the courts sustained an act which provided for a popular vote on the question of its repeal, and, if a majority decide for repeal, it shall have no effect after the tenth day from and after the rising of the session of the general assembly at which the votes are to be counted.2 § 36a. One subject, expressed in title. The constitutions of some of the states provide that no statute shall embrace more than one subject, and it shall be expressed in the title.' There are states wherein this provision is deemed directory only, so that a statute enacted in violation of it is good. But generally it is regarded as mandatory, rendering the contravening enactment void. Still, by the common doctrine, as a statute may be good in part and ill for the residue, if the title specifies one subject and no more, and the parts relating to it are separable from the rest, they will be held valid while the residue is adjudged void. The title need indicate the subject only in Mass. 357; Guild v. Chicago, 82 Ill. Parkinson v. S., 14 Md. 184, [74 In re Boston Mining, etc. Co., 51 Cal. 624; S. v. Covington, 29 Ohio St. 102; Pim v. Nicholson, 6 Ohio St. 176, 180: Washington v. Page, 4 Cal. 388; Cooley, Const. Lim. 81, 82, 150. "Cannon v. Hemphill, 7 Tex. 184; Weaver v. Lapsley, 43 Ala. 224; S. v. Miller, 45 Mo. 495; Cannon v. Mathes, 8 Heisk. 504; San Antonio v. Gould, 34 Tex. 49; Gifford v. New Jersey R. R. Co., 2 Stockton, 171; Parkinson v. S., supra; Hill v. Decatur, 22 Ga. 203; Phillips v. New York, 1 Hilton, 483; Madison, etc. R. R. Co. v. Whiteneck, 8 Ind. 217; Bright v. McCullough, 27 Ind. 223; Keller v. S., 11 Md. 525, [69 Am. D. 226;] Cooley, Const. Lim. 141 et seq. 6 Ante, § 34; [E. P. Moore, 62 Ala. 471; P. v. Hall, 8 Colo. 485.] 7 Jones v. Thompson, 12 Bush, 394; Allegheny County Home's Case, 77 Pa. St. 77; Walker v. S., 49 Ala. 329; P. v. Briggs, 50 N. Y. 553; Ex parte Moore, 62 Ala. 471; In re Sackett, etc. Streets, 74 N. Y. 95; Fuqua v. Mullen, 13 Bush, 467; Rader v. Union, 10 Vroom, 509. And see Shields v. Bennett, 8 W. Va. 74; [S. v. Palmes, 23 Fla. 620, 3 S. R. 171.] a general way, without entering into details; and all auxiliary provisions properly attaching to it, and constituting with it one whole, may be embraced within the enactment.1 1 Alabama.- Miles v. S., 40 Ala. 39; Weaver v. Lapsley, 43 Ala. 224; Walker v. S., 49 Ala. 329; Lowndes v. Hunter, 49 Ala. 507; Tallassee Mfg. Co. v. Glenn, 50 Ala. 489; S. v. Price, 50 Ala. 568; Moses v. Mobile, 52 Ala. 198; Key v. Jones, 52 Ala. 238; Boyd v. S., 53 Ala. 601; Adler v. S., 55 Ala. 16; Watson v. S., 55 Ala. 158; [Montgomery v. S., 88 Ala. 141, 7 S. R. 51.] Arkansas.- Fletcher v. Oliver, 25 Ark. 289; Worthen v. Badgett, 32 Ark. 496. Ass'n, 23 Kan. 499; [Humboldt v. McCoy, 23 Kan. 249; Shepard v. Hellmann, 23 Kan. 504.] Kentucky.- Gibson v. Belcher, 1 Bush, 145; Hind v. Rice, 10 Bush, 528; Collins v. Henderson, 11 Bush, 74; Fuqua v. Mullen, 13 Bush, 467; Howland Coal, etc. Works v. Brown, 13 Bush, 681; Allen v. Hall, 14 Bush, 85; [Burnside v. Court, 86 Ky. 423.] [Colorado.- Dallas v. Redman, 10 New Orleans v. Dunbar, 28 La. An. Colo. 297, 15 Pac. R. 397.] 722; S. v. Garrett, 29 La. An. 637; [Florida.-S. v. Palmes, 23 Fla. [S. v. Baurn, 33 La. An. 981.] 620, 3 S. R. 171.] Georgia. Bibb County Loan Ass'n v. Richards, 21 Ga. 592; Allen v. Tison, 50 Ga. 374; Ex parte Conner, 51 Ga. 571; Ayeridge v. Social Circle, 60 Ga. 404; [King v. Banks, 61 Ga. 20; McDuffie v. S., 87 Ga. 687.] Illinois.- Neifing v. Pontiac, 56 Ill. 172; P. v. Wallace, 70 Ill. 680; Burke v. Monroe, 77 Ill. 610; Guild v. Chicago, 82 Ill. 472; Fuller v. P., 92 Ill. 182; [P. v. Nelson, 133 Ill. 565, 27 N. E. R. 217; Thompson v. Akin, 81 Ill. Ap. 62.] Indiana.- Hatwood v. S., 18 Ind. 492; Gabbert v. Jeffersonville R. R. Co., 11 Ind. 365, [71 Am. D. 358;] Igoe v. S., 14 Ind. 239; S. v. Adamson, 14 Ind. 296: Thomasson v. S., 15 Ind. 449; S. v. Young, 47 Ind. 150, 154; Williams v. S., 48 Ind. 306; Henderson v. S., 50 Ind. 234; [Jett v. Richmond, 78 Ind. 316; Com'rs v. Baker, 80 Ind. 374.] Iowa.- Williamson v. Keokuk, 44 Iowa, 88; Farmers' Ins. Co. v. Highsmith, 44 Iowa, 330. Kansas.- Division of Howard, 15 Kan. 194; S. v. Bankers, etc. Benefit Maryland.-Washington v. Franklin R. R. Co., 34 Md. 159; McGrath v. S., 46 Md. 631; [Stiefel v. Blind Institution, 61 Md. 144.] Michigan.-P. v. Wands, 23 Mich. 385; P. v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44, 55, 57, [9 Am. R. 103;] P. v. Bradley, 36 Mich. 447; P. v. Young Men's, etc. Soc., 41 Mich. 67; [McKellar v. Detroit, 57 Mich. 158, 58 Am. R. 357, 23 N. W. R. 621.] Minnesota.-Stuart v. Kinsella, 14 Minn. 524; S. v. Cassidy, 22 Minn. 312, 323, [21 Am. R. 765; Boyle v. Vanderhoof, 45 Minn. 31, 47 N. W. R. 396.] Missouri.-S. v. Miller, 45 Mo. 495; S. v. Bank of the State, 45 Mo. 528; In re Goode, 3 Mo. Ap. 226; Murdock v. Woodson, 2 Dill. 188; [St. Louis v. Weitzell, 130 Mo. 616; S. v. Heege, 135 Mo. 112.] Nebraska.- Smails v. White, 4 Neb. 353; S. v. Lancaster, 6 Neb. 474; [B. & M. R. R. Co. v. Sanders City, 9 Neb. 507; K. C. & O. Ry. Co. v. Frey, 47 N. W. R. 87.] Nevada.-S. v. Silver, 9 Nev. 227. §36b. Other like provisions.-There are other like provisions in the constitutions of some of the states, but discussions of them are not desirable here.1 § 37. Judicial knowledge and proof.- The public statutes are parts of the law of the land, whereof the courts take judi 350; Rader v. Union, 10 Vroom, 509; [Vail v. Railway Co., 44 N. J. L. 237; S. v. Newton, 45 N. J. L. 469.] New York.-Gloversville v. How ell, 7 Hun, 345; P. v. O'Brien, 38 N. Y. 193; P. v. Lawrence, 41 N. Y. 137; Gaskin v. Meek, 42 N. Y. 186; P. v. Rochester, 50 N. Y. 525; P. v. Briggs, 50 N. Y. 553; Harris v. P., 59 N. Y. 599; P. v. Willsea, 60 N. Y. 507; P. v. Banks, 67 N. Y. 568; P. v. Brinkerhoff, 68 N. Y. 259; Kerrigan v. Force, 69 N. Y. 381; Billings v. New York, 69 N. Y. 413; Gloversville v. Howell, 70 N. Y. 287; Sharp v. New York, 31 Barb. 572; Gaskin v. Anderson, 55 Barb. 259; Gaskin v. Meek, 8 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 312; Central Cross-town R. R. Co. v. Twenty-third Street R. R. Co., 54 How. Pr. 168; Hardenbergh v. Van Keuren, 4 Abb. N. Cas. 43; Neuendorff v. Duryea, 6 Daly, 276; [Re Gas Light Co., 85 N. Y. 526; Harris . Supervisors. 33 Hun, 279.] Pennsylvania.— Allegheny County Home's Case, 77 Pa. St. 77; State Line, etc. Railroad's Appeal, 77 Pa. St. 429; City Sewage Utilization Co. v. Davis, 8 Phila. 625; West Philadelphia Passenger R. R. Co. v. Union Passenger R. R. Co., 9 Phila. 495; Com. v. Dickinson, 9 Phila. 561; [Washington v. McGeorge, 146 Pa. St. 248; Re Pottstown, 117 Pa. St. 538, 12 Atl. R. 573.] South Carolina.- Morton v. Comptroller-General, 4 S. C. 430; [S. v. Hoover, 17 S. E. R. 752.] S. v. Shadle, 41 Tex. 404; S. v. MoCracken, 42 Tex. 383; Giddings v. San Antonio, 47 Tex. 548; Peck v. San Antonio, 51 Tex. 490; Albrecht v. S., 8 Tex. Ap. 216, [34 Am. R. 737;] Cox v. S., 8 Tex. Ap. 254, [34 Am. R. 746.] West Virginia.-Shields v. Bennett, 8 W. Va. 74. Wisconsin.- Mills v. Charleton, 29 Wis. 400; Evans v. Sharp, 29 Wis. 564, [9 Am. R. 578.] [United States.- Jonesboro v. Railroad Co., 110 U. S. 192; Otoe County v. Baldwin, 111 U. S. 1.] 1 For example, as to amendatory statutes.- Armstrong v. Berreman, 13 Ind. 422; Greencastle Southern Turnp. v. S., 28 Ind. 382; Jones v. Davis, 6 Neb. 33; Sovereign v. S., 7 Neb. 409; S. v. Parsons, 11 Vroom, 123; S. v. Liedtke, 9 Neb. 490; Plummer v. P., 74 Ill. 361: Blakemore v. Dolan, 50 Ind. 194; S. v. Cain, 8 W. Va. 720; Shields v. Bennett, 8 W. Va. 74. As to special laws.- Devine v. Cook, 84 Ill. 590; Brown v. S., 23 Md. 503; Hart v. P., 89 Ill. 407; Welker v. Potter. 18 Ohio St. 85; In re Clinton Street, 2 Brews. 599; S. v. Cape Girardeau, etc. R. R. Co., 48 Mo. 468; S. v. Thileneus, 48 Mo. 479. Uniform.-Brooks v. Hyde, 37 Cal. 366. Style ofenacting clause.-A clause of the constitution specifying the style of the enacting clause is held by some courts to be only directory. Cape Girardeau v. Riley, 52 Mo. 424, [14 Am. R. 427;] St. Louis v. Foster, 52 Mo. 513; by others, mandatory. S. v. Rogers, 10 Nev. 250, [21 Am. R. Tennessee.-Cannon v. Mathes, 8 |