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time, any part of the virile member of the prisoner was within the labia of the pudendum of the prosecutrix; for, if ever it was, no matter how little, that will be sufficient to constitute a penetration." The jury may infer the penetration from circumstances, without direct proof. A court that deems emission essential in rape will hold it to be so also in carnal abuse,3 unless the statute provides the contrary.

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§ 489. What the "abuse." The meaning of the words "carnal abuse" we have already seen." Most of the American statutes, and the English, connect them to "carnal knowledge' by the copulative "and;" so that, without the carnal knowledge, there is no more than an attempt, whatever the "abuse " which comes short. But evidently, where, as in some of our states, the disjunctive "or" occurs in the statute, there may be the complete offense though the effort at penetration was unsuccessful."

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§ 490. Mistake of girl's age.- While, within principles explained in another connection, no one is ever punishable for any act in violation of law whereto, without his fault or carelessness, he was impelled by an innocent mistake of facts, this rule does not free a man from the guilt of this offense by reason of his believing, on whatever evidence, that the girl is above the statutory age. His intent to violate the laws of morality and the good order of society, though with the consent of the girl, and though in a case where he supposes he shall escape punishment, satisfies the demands of the law, and he must take the consequences.

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§ 491. Proof of girl's age. The age, which, we have seen,10 must be averred, must also be proved."

1 Reg. v. Lines, 1 Car. & K. 393. 2 Brauer v. S., supra.

The girl may be a wit

judge dissenting; S. v. Newton, 44 Iowa, 45; [P. v. Ratz, 115 Cal. 132, 46

3S. v. Gray, 8 Jones (N. C.), 170; Pac. R. 915; S. v. Baskett, 111 Mo.

[Reg. v. Marsden, 2 Q. B. 149.]

4 Waller v. S., 40 Ala. 325.

5 Ante. § 487.

6 Dawkins v. S., 58 Ala. 376, [29 Am. R. 754. See Chambers v. S., 46 Neb. 447, 64 N. W. R. 1078.]

7 Crim. Law, I, §§ 301-310. And see particularly the long note at § 303a.

8 Lawrence v. C., 30 Grat. 845, one

271, 19 S. W. R. 1097; S. v. Houx, 109 Mo. 654, 19 S. W. R. 35, 32 Am. St. R. 686.]

9 Crim. Law, I, §§ 327, 330-334. 10 Ante, § 486.

11 Crim. Pro., II, § 976; Rex v. Wedge, 5 Car. & P. 298; Reg v. Weaver, Law R. 2 C. C. 85, 12 Cox, C. C. 527; [S. v. Houx, 109 Mo. 654, 19 S. W. R. 35, 32 Am. St. R. 686.]

ness to her own age. Or her mother may testify to it. Or the records of births and of baptisms may be resorted to, with accompanying evidence of identity. Or, in the absence of better proof, there may be introduced family discussions, and even expert evidence."

III. ATTEMPTS.

§ 492. Statutory, in rape proper.-Though the attempt to commit a rape, whether under a statute or the common law, is a common-law misdemeanor, some of our states have likewise statutes under which it is punishable. The indictment must, as in other cases, substantially cover the essential terms of the statute. But,§ 493.

Commit."-The omission of the word "commit," which is in the California enactment, has been adjudged not to be fatal.

And

§ 494. Actual violence.- Where the statutory terms were, "with actual violence make an assault upon the body of any female with intent to commit a rape," it was held sufficient to allege that the defendant, with force and arms, did make an assault on B., a single woman, and her did then and there beat, wound and ill-treat, with intent violently, and against her will, her feloniously to ravish and carnally know. The idea of "actual" violence was sufficiently conveyed without the word.10

1 Weed v. S., 55 Ala. 13; Hill v. Eldridge, 126 Mass. 234; [C. v. Hollis, 170 Mass. 433, 49 N. E. R. 632; S. v. Bowser, 21 Mont. 133, 53 Pac. R. 179; Dodge v. S., 100 Wis. 294, 75 N. W. R. 954.]

2 Reg. v. Nicholls, 10 Cox, C. C. 476; [Lawrence v. S., 35 Tex. Cr. R. 114, 32 S. W. R. 539.]

3 Rex v. Wedge, supra; Reg. v. Weaver, supra. [The physician who attended her birth; and he may refresh his memory by reference to his cash book. P. v. Vann (Cal.), 61 Pac. R. 776.]

6 Crim. Law, I, SS 727, 728, 733, 736, 746, 762, 772; II, § 1136.

7 Ante, § 486.

8 Crim. Pro., II, § 976. And see Greer v. S., 50 Ind. 267, [19 Am. R. 709; Hall v. S., 40 Neb. 320, 58 N. W. R. 929; S. v. Harney, 101 Mo. 470, 14 S. W. R. 657; Proctor v. Terr. (Okl.), 60 Pac. R. 275; Com. v. Hackett, 170 Mass. 194, 48 N. E. R. 1087.]

9 P. v. Girr, 53 Cal. 629.

10 S. v. Wells, 31 Conn. 210. [See also Hanes v. S. (Ind.), 57 N. E. R. 704; Rookey v. S., 70 Conn. 104, 38 Atl. R. 911; S. v. Carnazy, 106 Iowa, 483, 76

4 Reg. v. Hayes, 2 Cox, C. C. 226; N. W. R. 805; S. v. Frazier, 53 Kan. Bain v. S., 61 Ala. 75.

5S. v. Smith, Phillips (N. C.), 302. And see S. v. Griffith, 67 Mo. 287; 1 Greenl. Ev., SS 104, 116, 493.

87, 36 Pac. R. 58, 42 Am. St. R. 274; S. v. Daly, 16 Oreg. 240, 18 Pac. R. 357.]

§ 495. In carnal abuse (Consent). The carnal act, committed on a female child, is carnal abuse where she consents,1 but it is ordinary rape where she does not. Still, in the former case, the same as in the latter, there may be an indictable attempt; as, for example, where the man's effort at penetration. fails. But,

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§ 496. Assault with intent.—While the common form of attempt to commit the ordinary rape is by an assault with such intent, and on an indictment for rape there may be a conviction of assault if no technical rule prevents, in matter of principle, and by the better judicial determinations, there cannot be, under the common-law rules, an assault with intent to have the criminal carnal knowledge of a girl with her consent; because, by the common law, violence consented to is not an assault,' and the statute which makes her consent immaterial in defense of the carnal knowledge does not extend also to the assault. Still, in respect of the evidence, on the question of an assault, youth, inexperience and subjection in the child will be taken into the account; and often a very small circumstance will be permitted

1 Ante, §§ 485, 486; Lawrence v. Com., 30 Grat. 845; P. v. McDonald, 9 Mich. 150; Givens v. Com., 29 Grat. 830.

2 Ante, § 482; S. v. Worden, 46 Conn. 349; [S. v. Jackson (N. J. L.), 46 Atl. R. 764.]

3 Crim. Law, I, § 762; Reg. v. Beale, Law R. 1 C. C. 10; Williams v. S., 47 Miss. 609; S. v. Johnston, 76 N. C. 209, 211; Givens v. Com., supra.

Ante, §§ 488, 489; [Glover v. Com., 86 Va. 382, 10 S. E. R. 420; Allen v. S., 36 Tex. Cr. R. 381, 37 S. W. R. 429.]

5 Crim. Law, I, §§ 733, 736, 746, 766. 6 Reg. v. Guthrie, Law R. 1 C. C. 241. That is, where the indictment contains, as it commonly does, an allegation of assault. See Reg. v. Allen, 2 Moody, 179, 9 Car. & P. 521; [S. v. Hearsey, 50 La. An. 373, 23 S. R. 372; S. v. Sullivan, 68 Vt. 540, 35 Atl. R. 479; Golden v. S., 104 Ga. 549, 30 S. E. R. 749; Gaskin v. S., 105 Ga. 631, 31 S. E. R. 740; P. v. Stewart, 97 Cal.

238, 32 Pac. R. 8; P. v. Gardner, 98 Cal. 127, 32 Pac. R. 880. See Reagan v. S., 28 Tex. Ap. 227, 12 S. W. R. 601, 19 Am. St. R. 833; McAvoy v. S. (Tex. Cr. R.), 51 S. W. R. 928; Ford v. S. (Tex. Cr. R.), 53 S. W. R. 846.]

7 Crim. Law, I, § 260; II, §§ 35, 36; [S. v. Wheat, 63 Vt. 673, 22 Atl. R.720.] 8 Rex v. Cockburn, 3 Cox, C. C. 543; S. v. Pickett, 11 Nev. 255, [21 Am. R. 754:] Reg. v. Roadley, 14 Cox, C. C. 463; Reg. v. Guthrie, Law R. 1 C. C. 241; Reg. v. Martin, 2 Moody, 123, 9 Car. & P. 213; Reg. v. Johnson, Leigh & C. 632, 10 Cox, C. C. 114; Reg. v. Day, 9 Car. & P. 722; Reg. v. Read, 2 Car. & K. 957, 1 Den. C. C. 377, 3 Cox, C. C. 266; Smith v. S., 12 Ohio St. 466, [80 Am. D. 355; Whitcher v. S., 2 Wash. 286, 26 Pac. R. 268; Warren v. S., 38 Tex. Cr. R. 152, 41 S. W. R. 635; Harden v. S., 39 Tex. Cr. R. 426, 46 S. W. R. 803; Morgan v. S. (Tex. Cr. R.), 50 S. W. R. 718. But see note 5, p. 418, infra.]

to overcome the apparent consent. And a consent procured by fraud is no defense; so that, when a man who had venereal disease, and knew it, induced a girl of thirteen, ignorant of his condition, to consent to a connection by which she was infected, this was ruled to a jury to be an indecent assault.2 A fortiori, a consent obtained by intimidation will be no defense. And,

§ 497. Statutory changes.-- In England, a statute passed in 1880 makes it "no defense to a charge or indictment for an indecent assault on a young person under the age of thirteen to prove that he or she consented to the act of indecency." Moreover,

§ 498. Contrary doctrine. Some of our American courts, without express statutory aid, have held that the girl's legal incapacity to consent to the carnal act extends also to render her incapable of consenting to the violence which, in the absence of her consent, would by all be deemed to constitute an indecent assault. So that, by these opinions, there may be a conviction for assault with intent to commit carnal abuse." Still,

§ 499. Punishable as attempt.-Though, by what we have seen to be the better doctrine, the law does not term this act an assault, by reason of the girl's consent, it is, in states where there are common-law crimes, indictable as an attempt to commit the substantive offense. But in a state where there are

1 Crim. Law, II, § 36; Reg. v. Day, 9 Car. & P. 722; Reg. v. McGavaran, 6 Cox, C. C. 64.

2 Reg. v. Bennett, 4 Fost. & F. 1105. 3 Reg. v. Woodhurst, 12 Cox, C. C. 443.

443 and 44 Vict., ch. 45, § 2.

5 P. v. McDonald, 9 Mich. 150, 152, 153; S. v. Dancy, 83 N. C. 608; S. v. Johnston, 76 N. C. 209; Hays v. P., 1 Hill (N. Y.), 351; Singer v. P., 13 Hun, 418; Brown v. S., 6 Bax. 422; [P. v. Laurintz, 114 Cal. 628, 46 Pac. R. 613; S. v. Wray, 109 Mo. 594, 19 S. W. R. 86; S. v. Grosheim, 79 Iowa, 75, 44 N. W. R. 541; Polson v. S., 135 Ind. 519, 35 N. E. R. 901; S. v. Sargent, 32 Oreg.

110, 49 Pac. R. 889; Farrell v. S., 54 N. J. L. 416, 24 Atl. R. 723; In re Lloyd, 51 Kan. 501, 33 Pac. R. 307. See Comer v. S. (Tex. Cr. R.), 20 S. W. R. 547; Callison v. S., 37 Tex. Cr. R. 211, 39 S. W. R. 300; Croomes v. S. (Tex. Cr. R.), 51 S. W. R. 924. The last case distinctly discredits Harden v. S. (cited p. 417, note 8) as misconstruing the act of 1895. See Stephens v. S., 107 Ind. 185, 8 N. E. R. 94, holding that consent is a defense in assault with intent, and Murphy v. S., 120 Ind. 115, 22 N. E. R. 106, overruling that case.]

6 Ante, § 495; Reg. v. Martin, 2 Moody, 123, 9 Car. & P. 213; Reg. v.

no common-law crimes it is not so indictable; and, in the absence of a statute to meet the case, the offender must escape.1

Beale, Law R. 1 C. C. 10; Reg. v. Ryland, 11 Cox, C. C. 101. [As to distinctions between attempt and assault with intent, see Taylor v. S., 22 Tex. Ap. 529, 3 S. W. R. 753, 58 Am. R. 656; Milton v. S., 23 Tex. Ap. 204, 4 S. W. R. 574; McAdoo v. S., 35 Tex. Cr. R. 603, 34 S. W. R. 955, 60 Am. St.

R. 61; Dockery v. S., 35 Tex. Cr. R. 487, 34 S. W. R. 281; S. v. Smith, 9 Houst. 588, 33 Atl. R. 441. See also Brown v. S., 27 Tex. Ap. 330, 11 S. W. R. 412; Jenkins v. S., 34 Tex. Cr. R. 201, 29 S. W. R. 1078.]

1 Smith v. S., 12 Ohio St. 466, [80 Am. D. 355.] 419

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