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with reasonable certainty what is intended, they will pronounce the enactment void. Yet they will not do this on account of a mere slight inaccuracy of expression.”
see Scrinegrour v. 8., 1 Chand. 48; 476; Ex parte George, T. U. P. Charl [Albert v. Twohig, 35 Neb. 563,53 N. 80; S. ex rel. McLean v. Liedtke, 9 W. R. 582.)
Neb. 468; S. o. Craig, 23 Ind. 185. McConvill v.Jersey City, 10 Vroom, 2 Evans v. Com., 3 Met. 453; Haynes 38; S. v. Boon, Taylor, 246; Cheezem v. 8., 5 Humph. 120; S. v. Cooper, 5 v. S., 2 Ind. 149; King v. S., 2 Ind. Day, 250; P. v. Shepard, 36 N. Y. 285; 523. See Huntsville v. Phelps, 27 8. v. Nichols, 12 Rich. 672. See post, Alan 55; Sullivan th Adams, 3 Gray, SS 79, 81, 145, 146.
per, 5 7285; post,
value with us.
$ 42. In general.- Statutes are divided into a considerable aumber of classes, and some of the divisions are important, others are of little consequence. Not to enter minutely into this subject, we shall find the following helpful:
Ancient and modern.— In England, the statutes prior to Edward II. are sometimes termed ancient, while the later ones are called modern.' But this is a distinction of no practical
A division everywhere important is into $ 422. Public and private - General and special.- These correlate terms are, in practical use, nearly synonymous.?
Public or general, defined.- A public or general statute is one wbich affects either all of the people of the state;: or all of a particular condition, class or locality therein, in distinction from individuals designated by name or description. More specifically,
Explained.— The distinction between public and private statutes is, in the old books, somewhat obscure, and considerable numbers of the cases are contradictory. Nor are perfect harmony and precision established in the modern law. But the later tendency of the courts, especially in our own country, is to enlarge, rather than restrict, the class of statutes deemed public; • and, on the whole, our definition above indicates, as nearly as general language can, the better modern doctrine.
$ 42 b. Local.- A local statute, whereof the precise bounds are not well defined, but it is one limited in its operation to some
11 Dwar. Stat. (2d ed.) 460; Wilb. v. 8., 8 Tex. Ap. 254, 287, 289, [34 Am.
R. 746;] S. v. Baltimore, 29 Md. 516; ? Wilb. Stat. 218; Jacob, Dict., Stat- Jones v. Axen, 1 Ld. Raym. 119, 120; ute; Clark v. Janesville, 10 Wis. 136. Samuel v. Evans, 2 T. R. 569; Wheeler
* Barrington's Case, 8 Co. 1366, v. Philadelphia, 77 Pa. St. 338; [Re 138b; (Anderson's Law Dictionary, Wyoming St., 137 Pa. St. 494.]
5 Winooski v. Gokey, 49 Vt. 282 * Brooks v. Hyde, 87 Cal 366; Cox
minor locality within the state,' may be either public or private. Now,
Municipal charter.— By the prevailing modern authority in this country, perhaps contrary to the old rule,' a statutory charter of a municipal corporation is a public or general law." And
Other local statutes.- The broad doctrine may now be laid down, that, if otherwise a statute is public, it is so notwithstanding it has effect only in a particular locality or place." So
$ 42c. Classes of persons.-It has been sometimes deemed hat statutes operating only on particular classes of persons are private; 6 but now, where they concern the class, in distinction from the individuals, they are treated as public. Hence —
§ 42d. Private or special.- A private or special statute is one which affects only particular persons or things. Thus,
Charters of private corporations — are private or special laws.
1 Kerrigan v. Force, 68 N. Y. 381; ker, Edm. Sel. Cas. 575; Rawlings v. P. v. O'Brien, 38 N. Y. 193, 195; Gas- S., 2 Md. 201; Kerrigan v. Force, 9 kin v. Anderson, 55 Barb. 259; S. v. Hun, 185; S. v. Rauscher, 1 Lea, 96; Common Pleas, 21 Ohio St. 1; P. v. McCuen v. S., 19 Ark. 630; P. v. Davis, Allen, 1 Lans. 248; Troy v. Bacon, 2 01 Barb. 456; McLain v New York, 3 Abb. Ap. 127; P. v. Harper, 91 III. 357; Daly, 32; [Davies v. Los Angeles, 86 Healey v. Dudley, 5 Lans. 115; P. v. Cal. 37, 24 Pac. R. 771.) Hills, 35 N. Y. 449, 451; Gaskin v. Meek, 6 Ingram v. Foot, 1 Ld. Raym. 708, 42 N. Y. 186. See Cox v. S., 8 Tex. 709, 12 Mod. 611, 613; Dive v. ManingAp. 254, 257, [34 Am. R. 746.]
ham, 1 Plow. 60, 65. Yellow River Imp. Co. v. Arnold, 7 Wheeler v. Philadelphia, 77 Pa. St. 46 Wis. 214, 222; Kerrigan v. Force, 338. See the old distinctions in Holsupra; Orr v. Rhine, 45 Tex. 345; P. land's Case, 4 Co. 75a; (Wibbert's v. Davis, 61 Barb. 456.
Appeal, 21 Atl. R. 74.] 38. v. Bergen, 5 Vroom, 438. See, 8 Wheeler v. Philadelphia, supra; as to the general nature of this sort S. v. Cleland, 68 Me. 258; Estep v. of statute, Dwar. Stat. (2d ed.) 464, Hutchman, 14 S. & R. 435; Wright v. 465; S. v. Parsons, 11 Vroom, 1, 123; Ware, 50 Ala. 519; [Anderson's Law S. v. Newark, 11 Vroom, 297; P. v. Dictionary, 969.] Wallace, 70 111. 680; Brackett v. P., 9 Mandere v. Bonsignore, 28 La. An. 72 Ill. 593; Kilgore v. Magee, 85 Pa. 415; Burhop v. Milwaukee, 21 Wis St. 401; P. v. Cooper, 83 11. 585. 258; Perry v. New Orleans, etc. R. R.
4 Winooski v. Gokey, 49 Vt. 282; Co., 55 Ala. 413, (28 Am. R. 740.] See Dill. Mun. Corp. (24 ed.), S 50; Fauntle Clark v. Janesville, 10 Wis. 136; 8. v. roy v. Hannibal, 1 Dill. 118; Belmont Camden Common Pleas, 12 Vroom, v. Morrill, 69 Me. 314, 317.
495. 3 Levey v. S., 6 Ind, 281; In re Wak
$ 42e. Common-law modifications — Same under constitutions. With these general distinctions, this chapter will close. The books disclose some modifications of common-law doctrines not necessary to be stated here. And, under our state constitutions, there are still further modifications and distinctions. But to discuss them would take us too far away from the principal object of this volume.
THE SEVERAL PARTS OF A STATUTE CONSIDERED.
§ 43. Introduction.
§ 43. How chapter divided. We shall consider: I. The title; II. The preamble; III. The purview and its subdivisions; IV. The precedence of provisions; V. The division of a statute into sections.
I. THE TITLE.
$ 44. Different sources of title and manner of making it. The effect of the title, on the construction of a statute, must, in reason, be greater or less according to the manner of making it, by whom made, and its connection with the bill during its passage through the legislative body. In England, the ancient methods of enacting laws were not uniform, and they seem to have varied with the different dates, nor were they at any time the same as now. Formerly," it is said in Bacon's Abridgment, describing one of the old methods, “the bill was in the nature of a petition " from the commons to the king. “These petitions were entered upon the lords' rolls, and upon these rolls the royal assent was likewise entered. And upon this, as a groundwork, the judges used, at the end of the parliament, to draw up the act of parliament into the form of a statute, which was afterwards entered upon the rolls called the statute rolls, which was different from those called the lords' rolls or the rolls of parliament. Upon which statute rolls, neither the bill, nor petition from the commons, nor the answer of the lords, nor the royal assent, was entered, but only the statute, as it was drawn up and penned by the judges.'
1 See Preface to Ruffhead's Statutes.
2 Bac. Abr., Court of Parl. E.