ounce

unt of

Charl Itke, 9

35.

aynes per, 5

.285;

post,

CHAPTER VL

THE SEVERAL CLASSES OF STATUTES DISTINGUISHED.

§ 42. In general.- Statutes are divided into a considerable number of classes; and some of the divisions are important, others are of little consequence. Not to enter minutely intc this subject, we shall find the following helpful:

Ancient and modern.-In England, the statutes prior to Edward II. are sometimes termed ancient, while the later ones are called modern. But this is a distinction of no practical

value with us. A division everywhere important is into

§ 42a. Public and private — General and special. These correlate terms are, in practical use, nearly synonymous.2

Public or general, defined.— A public or general statute is one which affects either all of the people of the state; or all of a particular condition, class or locality therein, in distinction from individuals designated by name or description. More specifically,

Explained. The distinction between public and private statutes is, in the old books, somewhat obscure, and considerable numbers of the cases are contradictory. Nor are perfect harmony and precision established in the modern law. But the later tendency of the courts, especially in our own country, is to enlarge, rather than restrict, the class of statutes deemed public; and, on the whole, our definition above indicates, as nearly as general language can, the better modern doctrine. To illustrate,

§ 42b. Local.-A local statute, whereof the precise bounds are not well defined, but it is one limited in its operation to some

Brooks v. Hyde, 37 Cal 366; Cox

v. 8., 8 Tex. Ap. 254, 287, 289, [34 Am. R. 746;] S. v. Baltimore, 29 Md. 516; Jones v. Axen, 1 Ld. Raym. 119, 120; Samuel v. Evans, 2 T. R. 569; Wheeler v. Philadelphia, 77 Pa. St. 338; [Re Wyoming St., 137 Pa. St. 494.]

5 Winooski v. Gokey, 49 Vt. 282.

minor locality within the state,' may be either public or private.

Now,

Municipal charter.— By the prevailing modern authority in this country, perhaps contrary to the old rule,3 a statutory charter of a municipal corporation is a public or general law.* And

Other local statutes.-The broad doctrine may now be laid down, that, if otherwise a statute is public, it is so notwithstanding it has effect only in a particular locality or place." So

6

§ 42c. Classes of persons.-It has been sometimes deemed hat statutes operating only on particular classes of persons are private; but now, where they concern the class, in distinction from the individuals, they are treated as public.' Hence§ 42d. Private or special.-A private or special statute is one which affects only particular persons or things. Thus,Charters of private corporations-are private or special

laws.9

1 Kerrigan v. Force, 68 N. Y. 381; P. v. O'Brien, 38 N. Y. 193, 195; Gaskin v. Anderson, 55 Barb. 259; S. v. Common Pleas, 21 Ohio St. 1; P. v. Allen, 1 Lans. 248; Troy v. Bacon, 2 Abb. Ap. 127; P. v. Harper, 91 Ill. 357; Healey v. Dudley, 5 Lans. 115; P. v. Hills, 35 N. Y. 449, 451; Gaskin v. Meek, 42 N. Y. 186. See Cox v. S., 8 Tex. Ap. 254, 257, [34 Am. R. 746.]

2 Yellow River Imp. Co. v. Arnold, 46 Wis. 214, 222; Kerrigan v. Force, supra; Orr v. Rhine, 45 Tex. 345; P. v. Davis, 61 Barb. 456.

3 S. v. Bergen, 5 Vroom, 438. See, as to the general nature of this sort of statute, Dwar. Stat. (2d ed.) 464, 465; S. v. Parsons, 11 Vroom, 1, 123; S. v. Newark, 11 Vroom, 297; P. v. Wallace, 70 Ill. 680; Brackett v. P., 72 Ill. 593; Kilgore v. Magee, 85 Pa. St. 401; P. v. Cooper, 83 Ill. 585.

4 Winooski v. Gokey, 49 Vt. 282; Dill. Mun. Corp. (2d ed.), § 50; Fauntleroy v. Hannibal, 1 Dill. 118; Belmont v. Morrill, 69 Me. 314, 317.

5 Levey v. S., 6 Ind. 281; In re Wak

ker, Edm. Sel. Cas. 575; Rawlings v. S., 2 Md. 201; Kerrigan v. Force, 9 Hun, 185; S. v. Rauscher, 1 Lea, 96; McCuen v. S., 19 Ark. 630; P. v. Davis, 61 Barb. 456; McLain v. New York, 3 Daly, 32; [Davies v. Los Angeles, 86 Cal. 37, 24 Pac. R. 771.]

6

Ingram v. Foot, 1 Ld. Raym. 708, 709, 12 Mod. 611, 613; Dive v. Maningham, 1 Plow. 60, 65.

7 Wheeler v. Philadelphia, 77 Pa. St. 338. See the old distinctions in Holland's Case, 4 Co. 75a; [Wibbert's Appeal, 21 Atl. R. 74.]

8 Wheeler v. Philadelphia, supra; S. v. Cleland, 68 Me. 258; Estep v. Hutchman, 14 S. & R. 435; Wright v. Ware, 50 Ala. 549; [Anderson's Law Dictionary, 969.]

9 Mandere v. Bonsignore, 28 La. An. 415; Burhop v. Milwaukee, 21 Wis. 258; Perry v. New Orleans, etc. R. R. Co., 55 Ala. 413, [28 Am. R. 740.] See Clark v. Janesville, 10 Wis. 136; S. v. Camden Common Pleas, 12 Vroom, 495.

§ 42e. Common-law modifications-Same under constitutions. With these general distinctions, this chapter will close. The books disclose some modifications of common-law doctrines not necessary to be stated here. And, under our state constitutions, there are still further modifications and distinctions. But to discuss them would take us too far away from the principal object of this volume.

49

CHAPTER VII.

THE SEVERAL PARTS OF A STATUTE CONSIDERED.

§ 43. Introduction.

44-47. The title.

48-51. The preamble.

52-61. Purview and its subdivisions.

62-65. Precedence of provisions.

66, 67. Division into sections.

§ 43. How chapter divided.-We shall consider: I. The title; II. The preamble; III. The purview and its subdivisions; IV. The precedence of provisions; V. The division of a statute into sections.

I. THE TITLE.

§ 44. Different sources of title and manner of making it.The effect of the title, on the construction of a statute, must, in reason, be greater or less according to the manner of making it, by whom made, and its connection with the bill during its passage through the legislative body. In England, the ancient methods of enacting laws were not uniform, and they seem to have varied with the different dates, nor were they at any time the same as now.' "Formerly," it is said in Bacon's Abridgment, describing one of the old methods, "the bill was in the nature of a petition" from the commons to the king. "These petitions were entered upon the lords' rolls, and upon these rolls the royal assent was likewise entered. And upon this, as a ground work, the judges used, at the end of the parliament, to draw up the act of parliament into the form of a statute, which was afterwards entered upon the rolls called the statute rolls, which was different from those called the lords' rolls or the rolls of parliament. Upon which statute rolls, neither the bill, nor petition from the commons, nor the answer of the lords, nor the royal assent, was entered, but only the statute, as it was drawn up and penned by the judges." 2 Bac. Abr., Court of Parl. E.

1 See Preface to Ruffhead's Statutes.

If the act, as it appeared on the statute rolls, had a title, it was the work of the judges, not of parliament. When afterward the statutes came to be drawn up in due form before being enacted, which was perhaps during the reign of Hen. VII., the title, though one was prefixed, did not "pass the same form as the rest of the act; only the speaker, after the act is passed, mentions the title, and puts the question upon it." Then it is changed if the members choose. With us the title appears in the bill, subject to the same formalities as any other part of it, during its entire progress through the legislative body. Probably no serious consequences come from this difference, but it is properly to be borne in mind.

§45. No part of act.-Equally in ancient and modern times, in England and in this country, the title is regarded as not a part of the act, being likened to the title of a book, which is not a part of the book; occupying, indeed, a position not unlike that of the caption of an indictment, explained in another connection. Still,

46. Weight to be given title.-In construing a statute, we do not look upon the title as in all circumstances a mere nullity. Perhaps, in England, where it "is usually framed only by the clerk of that house in which the bill first passes, and is seldom read more than once," and the other peculiarities above described exist, it should have less weight in questions of construction than in this country. The doctrine seems indeed to have been there held, that it cannot be taken at all into the consideration. Yet by the better opinion there, certainly here, it may be referred to in a doubtful case in aid of the inquiry into the legislative intent; and, since such intent

kins, 6 Mod. 62; Chance v. Adams, 1 Ld. Raym. 77; Rex v. Williams, 1 W. Bl. 93, 95; Bradford v. Jones, 1 Md. 351; Ogden v. Strong, 2 Paine, 584; S. v. Welsh, 3 Hawks, 404; Cohen v. Barrett, 5 Cal. 195; Plummer v. P., 74 Ill. 361; Com. v. Slifer, 53 Pa. St. 71.

5 Crim. Pro., I, § 653 et seq.

6 Dwar. Stat. (2d ed.) 501. 7 Attorney-General v. Weymouth, Amb. 20, 22.

8 Rex v. Cartwright, 4 T. R. 490;