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If the act, as it appeared on the statute rolls, had a title, it was the work of the judges, not of parliament. When afterward the statutes came to be drawn up in due form before being enacted, which was perhaps during the reign of Hen. VII.," the title, though one was prefixed, did not “pass the same form as the rest of the act; only the speaker, after the act is passed, mentions the title, and puts the question upon it.” Then it is changed if the members choose. With us the title appears in the bill, subject to the same formalities as any other part of it, during its entire progress through the legislative body. Probably no serious consequences come from this difference, but it is properly to be borne in mind.
§ 45. No part of act.- Equally in ancient and modern times, in England and in this country, the title is regarded as not a part of the act, being likened to the title of a book, which is not a part of the book;i occupying, indeed, a position not unlike that of the caption of an indictment, explained in another connection. Still,
§ 46. Weight to be given title.- In construing a statute, we do not look upon the title as in all circumstances a mere nullity. Perhaps, in England, where it “is usually framed only by the clerk of that house in which the bill first passes, and is seldom read more than once," and the other peculiarities above described exist, it should have less weight in questions of construction than in this country. The doctrine seems indeed to have been there held, that it cannot be taken at all into the consideration. Yet by the better opinion there, certainly here, it may be referred to in a doubtful case in aid of the inquiry into the legislative intent; 8 and, since such intent
1 Attorney-General v. Weymouth, king, 6 Mod. 62; Chance v. Adams, Amb. 20, 23; Dwar. Stat. (2d ed.) 500. 1 Ld. Raym. 77; Rex v. Williams, 1
2 The date is stated by Dwarris, as W. Bl. 93, 95; Bradford v. Jones, 1 above, to be about the eleventh year Md. 351; Ogden v. Strong, 2 Paine, of Henry VIL But it seems that the 584; S. v. Welsh, 3 Hawks, 404; Cohen new practice came gradually into v. Barrett, 6 Cal. 195; Plummer v. use, beginning at a still earlier pe P., 74 Ill. 361; Com. v. Slifer, 53 Pa. riod. And see 16 How. St. Tr. 743, St. 71.
5 Crim. Pro., I, 8 653 et seq. * Attorney-General v. Weymouth,
Dwar. Stat. (2d ed.) 501. supra, at p. 23; Dwar. Stat. (2d ed.)
7 Attorney-General v. Weymouth, 322, 323
Amb. 20, 22. "Bac. Abr., Statute, A.; Mills v. Wil
8 Rex v. Cartwright, 4 T. R. 490;
note; 1 Bl. Com. 183.
may sometimes be controlling in the interpretation, the title may thus restrict the purview. But the cases in which it so operates are exceptional; for commonly it will not extend or restrain any provision in the body of an act. Further than as manifesting the legislative intent, it can have no force; therefore ordinarily, if the words of the enacting clause are larger in meaning than those of the title, they will prevail, even in a penal statute. Where there is no ambiguity in the statute itself, the title is not to be regarded.'
Chapter headings, etc. — The chapter headings and the like, in the revisions of statutes and in codes, are deemed to be of somewhat greater effect than the ordinary titles to legislative acts."
$ 47. Constitutional effect.– We have already seen that, in some of the states, a special effect is given to the title under a constitutional provision.
II. THE PREAMBLE.
8 48. Compared with title. The preamble is similar to the title in its effect on the interpretation, yet of influence somewhat greater. Thus,Stradling v. Morgan, 1 Plow. 199, 203; Bartlett v. Morris, 9 Port. 266; Blue Rex v. Gwenop, 3 T. R. 133, 137; Dwar. v. McDuffie, Busbee, 131. Stat. (2d ed.) 501, 502; S. v. Stephen- * Eastman v. McAlpin, 1 Kelley, son, 2 Bailey, 334; Burgett v. Burgett, 157; In re Boston Mining, etc. Co., 51 1 Ohio, 469, (13 Am. D. 634:] Chesa Cal. 624; Com. v. Slifer, 53 Pa. St. 71; peake & Ohio Canal v. Baltimore & U. S. v. McArdle, 2 Saw. 367. [The Ohio R. R. Co., 4 Gill & J. 1, 90, 91; term “to regulate” in the title of a U. S. v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 358, 386; S. statute relating to the sale of intoxiv. Fields, 2 Bailey, 554; S. v. Smith, cating liquors does not include a Cheves, 157; Bradford v. Jones, 1 Md. provision to “prohibit.” P. v. Gad351; Ogden v. Strong, 2 Paine, 584; way, 61 Mich. 285, 1 Am. St. R. 578, Cohen v. Barrett, 5 Cal. 195; Garri. 28 N. W. R. 101. The title of a statgus v. Parke, 39 Ind. 66; Connecticut ute need not mention the penalty. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Albert, 39 Mo. Plumb v. Christie, 103 Ga. 686, 30 S. 181; Nazro v. Merchants' Mutual Ins. E. R. 759, 42 L R. A. 181.) Co., 14 Wis. 295; U. S. v. Union Pa. 5 Barnes v. Jones, 51 Cal. 303; P. cific R. R. Co., 91 U. S. 72, 82.
v. Molyneux, 40 N. Y. 113; Huff v. TU. 8. v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610, 631; Alsup, 64 Mo. 51; Griffith v. Carter, 8 S. v. Stephenson, 2 Bailey, 334; Field Kan. 565; Battle v. Shivers, 39 Ga. v. Gooding, 106 Mass. 310.
405; S. v. Popp, 45 Md. 432; U. S. v. 2 Hadden v. The Collector, 5 Wall. Fehrenback, 2 Woods, 175; Nichol. 107; P. v. Abbott, 16 Cal. 358.
son v. Mobile, etc. R. R. Co., 49 Ala. *U. S. v. Briggs, 9 How. (U. S.) 351; 205. And see post, $ 61.
6 Ante, S 36a.
No part of statute.— Though enacted with the statute, as the title is in our American legislation, like the latter it is deemed not to constitute of it a part. Still,
Weight.— As showing the inducements to the act, it may have a decisive weight in a doubtful case. But where the body of the statute is distinct, it will prevail over a more restricted preamble.: More particularly,
$ 49. Intent and reasons.- We look to this introductory matter for the general intent of the legislature, the reasons and principles on which the law proceeds. So that, to the extent to which these can influence the interpretation, the preamble becomes important. Hence,
Not control, but explain.— It may, for example, explain an equivocal expression in the enacting clause. It will seldom, at least, extend this clause; in a doubtful case it may restrain it,' — propositions not in their nature absolute. In the words of Ellenborough, C. J.: “In a vast number of acts of parliament, although a particular mischief is recited in the preamble, yet the legislative provisions extend far beyond the mischief
i Mills v. Wilkins, 6 Mod. 62; Bao. Fowler v. S., 5 Day, 81; Gray v. So Abr., Statute, A.; (Yazoo & M. V. R. R. anes, 2 Jur. 1040; Pray v. Edie, 1 T. Co. v. Thomas, 132 U. S. 174; U. S. v. R. 313; Rex v. Corry, 5 East, 372. Oreg. etc. R. R. Co., 164 U. S. 526; And see, as to both title and preLackland u. Walker, 151 Mo. 210, 52 amble, 1 Kent Com. 460; Salkeld v. S. W. R. 414]
Johnston, 1 Hare, 196, 207; Rex v. 2 Mills v. Wilkins, supra; Mason v. Sutton, 4 M. & S. 532; Halton u Cove, Armitage, 13 Ves. 25, 36; Crespigny 1 B. & Ad. 538, 558. v. Wittenoom, 4 T. R. 790, 793; Gray 5 Clark v. Bynum, 3 McCord, 298; V. Soanes, 2 Jur. 1040; The Salters' Woodruff v. Gilchrist, 15 Johns. 89; Company v. Jay, 3 Q. B. 109; Fellows Nash v. Allen, 4 Q. B. 784; [Tripp v. v. Clay, 4 Q. B. 313, 339.
Goff, 1 N. E. R. 806.] * Pattison v. Bankes, Cowp. 540, 543; 6 Id.; Dwar. Stat. (2d ed.) 660, re Lees v. Summersgill, 17 Ves. 508; ferring to Wilson v. Knubley, 7 East, Mace v. Cammel, Lofft, 782; S. v. But- 128. ler, 3 McCord, 383; Rex v. Marks, 3 7 Dwar. Stat. (2d ed.) 661; Ryall v. East, 157; Rex v. Athos, 8 Mod. 136, Rolle, 1 Atk. 165, 174, 182. Contra, 144; Holbrook v. Holbrook, 1 Pick. Copeman v. Callant, 1 P. Wms. 314, 248, 251; Laidler v. Young, 2 Har. & 320; Hughes v. Chester, etc. Ry. Co., J. 69; S. v. Findley, 1 Brev. 107; Blue 1 Drew. & S. 524; [Providence S. F. v. 1. McDuffie, Busbee, 131; U. S. v. Jessup, 6 Kulp, 251.] Briggs, 9 How. (U. 8.) 351; Sussex 8 Kearns v. Cordwainers, 6 C. B. Peerage Case, 11 CL & F. 85, 143; (N. S.) 388; Pattison v. Bankes, Cowp. Caledonian Ry. Co. v. North British 540, 543; Wilmot v. Rose, 3 Ellis & B. Ry. Co., 6 Ap. Cas. 114, 122, 124. 563; Mason v. Armitage, 13 Ves 25, * U. 8. v. Webster, Daveis, D. C. 38; 36.
recited. And whether the words shall be restrained or not must depend on a fair exposition of the particular statute in each particular case, and not upon any universal rule of construction.”! And, on the other hand, if the preamble should be found broader than the act itself, while of its own force it would not enlarge the meaning, it may do in this direction whatever can be accomplished by a consideration of the reasons which impelled the legislative mind.?
$ 50. Recitations of facts.—Commonly a preamble contains recitations of facts. In the interpretation of statutes, as of contracts, the surroundings are taken into the account. And the recitations in the preamble must be accepted as, at least, prima facie, and perhaps conclusively, correct. In a private act they are evidence only as between the state and the private party.s When viewed as a key to the interpretation they should in reason be deemed conclusive of the recited facts; because, whether really true or not, they explain the legislative perspective in enacting the statute, and only this is in any case gained by the interpreter in looking at the surroundings. Therefore, also, such matter is to have no other weight than is given it in other cases of construction, when it comes to the knowledge of the judge through other means.
$ 51. In general.- Dwarris observes: “Lord Coke considered the rehearsal, or preamble, a key to open the understanding of the statute; and it is properly considered' a good mean for collecting the intent, and showing the mischiefs which the makers of the act intended to remedy. The civilians say cessante legis procemio, cessat et ipsa lex; but English lawyers are aware how seldom the key will unlock the casket; how rarely
1 In Rex v. Pierce, 3 M. & S. 62, 66. Haughton, 1 Ellis & B. 501; U. S. v. And see Trueman v. Lambert, 4 M. & Claflin, 97 U. S. 546. S. 234, 239.
Resolutions of legislature.- As 2 And see Bywater v. Brandling, 7 to resolutions of the legislature, see B. & C. 643.
Commissioners v. S.,9 Gill,379; (Lack3 Bishop, Con., $ 371-373.
land v. Walker, 151 Mo. 210, 52 S. W. 4 Sedgw. Stat. Law, 56; Rex v. Sut- R. 414.] ton, 4 M. & S. 532; Elmondorff v. Car- 58. v. Beard, Smith (Ind.), 276, 1 michael, 3 Litt. 472, [14 Am. D. 86;] Ind. 460; Branson v. Wirth, supra. McReynolds v. Smallhouse, 8 Bush, See Edinburgh, etc. Ry. Co. v. Lin447, 456; Allison v. Louisville, etc. lithgow, 3 Macq. H. L. Cas. 691, 704. R. R Co., 10 Bush, 1; Branson v. 6 Dwar. Stat. (2d ed.) 504. Wirth, 17 Wall. 32, 44. See Reg. v. 74 Inst. 330.
the preamble is found to state, besides the primary occasion of the law, the full views of the proposer of it. A particular mischief is often alluded to; but that is soon lost sight of (cessat procemium), wider objects are embraced and a general remedy is provided. It is nothing unusual in acts of parliament,' says Lawrence, J., ‘for the enacting part to go beyond the preamble; the remedy often extends beyond the particular act or mischief which first suggested the necessity of the law.?! 'It certainly does appear, from the preamble of the act,' said Lord Ellenborough in the same case, as if it were mainly directed against combinations for purposes of mutiny and sedition; but there are words sufficient in the enacting part to satisfy the preamble, and, after dealing with offenses of that description, the act goes on in more extensive terms, and embraces other more general objects; and as there is no word of reference in the latter part (as such), I see no reason for restraining the common import of the words used. “Sometimes'– it is well expressed in another report?_ 'the legislature having a particular mischief in view, which was the primary object of the statute, merely state that in the preamble, and then go on in the body of the act to provide a remedy for general mischiefs of the same nature, but of different species, neither expressed in the preamble, nor perhaps then in immediate contemplation.'”
III. THE PURVIEW AND ITS SUBDIVISIONS. $52. Elsewhere.— Something of the subject of this sub-title appears in “Oriminal Procedure," where the indictment on statutes is explained. Yet we shall substantially avoid repetition.
Purview defined.— The purview is “ that part of an act of the legislature which begins with the words "Be it enacted,' etc., and ends with the repealing clause.”+ Such is the full meaning; but the term is sometimes employed in a narrower sense, as excluding provisos, exceptions, and the like. Thus Dwarris says: “The parts of statutes are - in a popular, though not
Rer v. Marks, 3 East, 157, 165.
ferring to Cooke (Tenn.), 330; 3 Bibb, ? Mace v. Cammel, Lofft, 783. And 181; [Anderson's Law Dictionary, see Fellowes v. Clay, 4 Q. B. 313, 339. 848.] * Crim. Pro., I, S 634 et seq.
8 Crim. Pro., I, S 634 * Bouv. Law Dict., tit. Purview, re