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§ 781. How this discussion. The statutes on the subject of this chapter are numerous and diverse in their terms. Therefore it will be profitable to direct attention only to leading doctrines, and cite the authorities; assuming that the reader has before him the statutes and decisions of his own state.

§ 782. How chapter divided.- We shall consider, I. The law of the offense; II. The procedure.

I. THE LAW OF THE OFFENSE.

§ 783. Statute of Northampton.-The parent statute on this subject is that of Northampton, 2 Edw. 3, ch. 3, A. D. 1328. It provides that "no man, etc., except the king's servants in his presence, and his ministers in executing of the king's precepts, or of their office, etc., be so hardy to come before the king's justices or other of the king's ministers doing their office, with force and arms, nor bring no force in affray of the peace, nor to go nor ride armed by night nor by day, in fairs, markets, nor in the presence of the justices or other ministers, nor in no part elsewhere, upon pain," etc., making the offense a misdemeanor.1

With us. Notwithstanding the early date of this statute, we have no evidence that it was accepted as common law in our colonies.

But,

1 For the interpretations of this statute, see 1 Hawk. P. C. (Curw. ed.) 488, § 4 et seq.

2 Kilty deems it not "applicable to the circumstances of the people." Kilty, Rep. Stats. 31. The Pennsylvania judges do not mention it. Re

port of Judges, 3 Binn. 599, 610. But, in reason, it would seem adapted to the wants of every civilized community, and fully within the principles on which the early English statutes were received in the colonies.

§ 784. Going armed with dangerous weapons, at common law. Whatever we may deem of this statute, the leading offense punishable by it, namely, riding or going about armed with dangerous or unusual weapons to the terror of the people, was always indictable under the common law of England,1 and it has become a part of the common law of our states.2 And

785. Same under statutes.-This common-law offense has also been extended, regulated and confirmed by statutes in some of our states.3 But,

§ 786. "Secret," "concealed," etc.- Generally in the states which have legislated on the subject, the simple carrying of the weapon, without reference to whether it is open or concealed, or to the terror of people or not, is prohibited; or else the inhibition is limited to the "secret" or "concealed " carrying. The object sought is the protection of the community." Forms of statutes. The statutory terms are numerous and varying. Thus, in Indiana they were at one time, "wear or carry any dirk, pistol, sword in a cane, or other dangerous weapon concealed." Then they were changed to "every person, not being a traveler, who shall wear or carry any dirk, pistol, bowie-knife, dagger, sword in cane, or any other dangerous or deadly weapon concealed, or shall carry or wear any such weapon openly, with the intent or avowed purpose of injuring his fellow-men." In Alabama we have: "Any person who, not being threatened or having good reason to apprehend

14 Bl. Com. 149; 1 Hawk. P. C. (Curw. ed.), p. 488, § 4; Knight's Case, 3 Mod. 117, Comb. 38. [But picking up and holding in one's hands for a few moments and then replacing is not a carrying. Brooks v. S., 15 Tex. Ap. 88. Nor finding in the road and taking home. Mangum v. S., 15 Tex. Ap. 362. See also Presser v. S., 19 Tex. Ap. 52, 53 Am. R. 383. And it is a continuing act, so that having on a pistol at two different houses within a short space of time on the same evening is only one offense. Smith v. S., 79 Ala. 257.]

2S. v. Huntly, 3 Ire. 418, [40 Am. D. 416;] S. v. Roten, 86 N. C. 701.

3 Nunn v. S., 1 Kelly, 243; S. v. Bentley, 6 Lea, 205. The following cases are under statutes relating to the carrying of arms by negroes and slaves: S. v. Harris, 6 Jones (N. C.), 448; S. v. Hannibal, 6 Jones (N. C.), 57; S. v. Chavers, 5 Jones (N. C.), 11; [S. v. Johnson, 16 S. C. 187; Driggers v. S. (Ala.), 26 S. R. 512.]

4

Dycus v. S., 6 Lea, 584.

5 Haynes v. S., 5 Humph. 120; Evins v. S., 46 Ala. 88.

6 S. v. Duzan, 6 Blackf. 31.

7 Bicknell, Crim. Pr. 397, referring to Laws 1859, p. 129; 2 G. & H. 480; [Pluman v. S., 135 Ind. 308, 34 N. E. R. 968.] And see Haynes v. S., supra

an attack, or traveling, or setting out on a journey, carries concealed about his person a bowie-knife, or any other knife or instrument of a like kind or description, or a pistol, or fire-arms of any other kind or description, or an air-gun." Some of the interpretations are

$787. Carries "-" Conceals."-Under the Alabama statute, said Rice, C. J., "the word 'carries' was used as a synonym of 'bears;' and the word 'concealed' means wilfully or knowingly covered or kept from sight. Locomotion is not essential to constitute a carrying within the meaning of that section." So that one who, being in another's room with several persons, has in his vest pocket, out of sight, a pistol, commits the offense. And it is no excuse for a defendant that, at other times than the one in question, he carried the weapon openly; and such, indeed, was his habit.3 A weapon hid from ordinary observation is concealed, though it may be discovered on close scrutiny. On the other hand,—

§ 788. Partly hidden.- Though the weapon is partly hidden, yet if it is exposed so far as to enable every one plainly to see what it is, there is not a concealment within this statute." But, in different words, the Florida enactment makes it punishable "to carry arms of any kind secretly on or about their person, etc. Provided, that this law shall not be so construed as to prevent any person from carrying arms openly outside of all their clothes." And this provision is held to be violated by so carrying the weapon partly concealed."

§ 788a. Statutory exemptions.- Among the exemptions specified in the statutes, from their general terms, are such as that the person is a

Traveler On journey.-"Traveling" implies the going of some distance but no exact distance can be defined; it may be short-from home, beyond the circle of one's immediate

1 Lockett v. S., 47 Ala. 42. And see Owen v. S., 31 Ala. 387.

2 Owen v. S., 31 Ala. 387, 389. Further as to what is a carrying, see Page v. S., 3 Heisk. 198, note.

3 Washington v. S., 36 Ga. 242. And see Hicks v. Com., 7 Grat. 597.

4 Jones v. S., 51 Ala. 16; S. v. Roten, 86 N. C. 701; Carr v. S., 34 Ark. 448, [36 Am. R. 15.]

Stockdale v. S., 32 Ga. 225; Killet v. S., 32 Ga. 292; [S. v. Reams, 121 N. C. 556, 27 S. E. R. 1004; Smith v. S., 96 Ala. 71, 11 S. R. 71; Ramsey v. S., 91 Ala. 29, 8 S. R. 568; Williams v. Com., 18 Ky. L. R. 663, 37 S. W. R. 680.]

6 Sutton v. S., 12 Fla. 135; [S. v. Bios, 37 La. An. 259.]

7 Ante, § 786.

8 Lockett v. S., 47 Ala. 42; [Hath

acquaintances. A man on his daily return from his place of business in the city to his home in the country is not a traveler.2 But one is such who is taking a two days' journey on a river raft, or is passing through the county at the rate of ten miles a day with cattle for a distant market. Not every going from home is a "journey," nor does every pause by a traveler on his way suspend his journey. The question is a mixed one of intent and acts. The protection to a traveler on his journey extends over the whole time; namely, from the setting out to the return.'

§ 788b. "Threatened"-(Self-defense).-The statutory terms exempting persons who are "threatened," or are otherwise acting in self-defense, differ; and they require no special explanations. Though one has been threatened, if he carries the weapon for offense, intending to make or provoke an attack, he is, by construction, not within the exemption. The right to carry the weapon will not extend to one having no rea

cote v. S., 55 Ark. 181, 14 Crim. L. S. (Tex. Cr. R.), 31 S. W. R. 645; Price Mag. 237, 17 S. W. R. 721.] v. S. (Tex. Cr. R.), 31 S. W. R. 380.]

1 Gholson v. S., 53 Ala. 519, [25 Am. R. 652; Lott v. S., 122 Ind. 393, 24 N. E. R. 156; McGuirk v. S., 64 Miss. 209, 1 S. R. 103; Darby v. S., 23 Tex. Ap. 408, 5 S. W. R. 90; McCauley v. S. (Tex. Cr. R.), 45 S. W. R. 576; Stanfield v. S. (Tex. Cr. R.), 34 S. W. R. 116; Davis v. S., 45 Ark. 536; Goss v. S. (Tex. Cr. R.), 40 S. W. R. 725.]

2 Eslava v. S., 49 Ala. 355. [But spending three-fourths of his time between home and his business at a long distance makes him a traveler. Burst v. S., 89 Ind. 133.]

Baker v. S., 49 Ala. 350; [Skeen v. S. (Tex. Cr. R.), 30 S. W. R. 218; Chambers v. S. (Tex. Cr. R.), 30 S. W. R. 357.]

Rice v. S., 10 Tex. Ap. 288.

5 Smith v. S., 3 Heisk. 511; [Shelton v. S., 27 Tex. Ap. 443, 11 S. W. R. 458.] 6 Carr v. S., 34 Ark. 448, [36 Am. R. 15; Ball v. S. (Tex. Cr. R.), 43 S. W. R. 992; Eubanks v. S. (Tex. Cr. R.), 40 S. W. R. 725; Stilley v. S., 27 Tex. Ap. 445, 11 S. W. R. 458; Lawson v.

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7 Coker v. S., 63 Ala. 95. See also, as to the subject of this paragraph, Maxwell v. S., 38 Tex. 170; Ex parte Boland, 11 Tex. Ap. 159; Chaplin v. S., 7 Tex. Ap. 87; [Re Lee, 46 Fed. R. 59, 13 Crim. L. Mag. 719; Campbell v. S., 28 Tex. Ap. 44, 11 S. W. R. 832; West v. S., 26 Tex. Ap. 99, 9 S. W. R. 485; Ratigan v. S. (Tex. Cr. R.), 26 S. W. R. 407; Thomas v. S., 37 Tex. Cr. R. ——, 38 S. W. R. 1011; Scott v. S., 113 Ala. 106, 21 S. R. 355; Dooley S., 89 Ala. 90, 8 S. R. 528; Strictland v. S., 33 Tex. Cr. R. 28 S. W. R. 466; Suddith v. S., 70 Miss. 250, 11 S. R. 680.]

8 Hardin v. S., 63 Ala. 38; Shorter v. S., 63 Ala. 129; Smith v. S., 69 Ind. 140; Polk v. S., 62 Ala. 237; S. v. Carlton, 48 Vt. 636; Bailey v. Com., 11 Bush, 688; Hopkins v. Com., 3 Bush, 480; S. v. Speller, 86 N. C. 697.

Stroud v. S., 55 Ala. 77; [Brown v. S. (Tex. Cr. R.), 29 S. W. R. 1079; Collier v. S., 68 Ala. 499; Bemey v. S., 69 Ala. 233.]

son to apprehend an attack in the particular circumstances, however it might be in others.'

§ 788c. Officers and official places.-There are statutory exceptions in favor of the carrying of weapons by officers and in official places, requiring no special explanations. And there are statutes against carrying them in these and other specified places.3

§ 789. Motive and exemptions by construction.- One, to be punishable under this statute, must intentionally do what it forbids, with any superadded evil intent which it specifies. And doing this with such intent, and no more, he commits the offense. Hence, for example, it is no defense that the motive for carrying the weapon was merely to exhibit it as a curiosity." And, in general, a reasonable occasion for carrying it, of a sort not within the statutory exemptions, will not avail one who has intentionally violated the prohibiting letter of the statute. Nor

1 Chatteaux v. S., 52 Ala. 388; [Strother v. S., 74 Miss. 447, 21 S. R. 147; Brownlee v. S., 35 Tex. Cr. R. 213, 32 S. W. R. 1043; Coleman v. S., 28 Tex. Ap. 173, 12 S. W. R. 590; S. v. Barnett, 34 W. Va. 74, 11 S. E. R. 735; Davenport v. S., 85 Ala. 336, 5 S. R. 576; Alexander v. S., 27 Tex. Ap. 533, 11 S. W. R. 628; McGuirk v. S., 64 Miss. 209, 1 S. R. 103; Short v. S., 25 Tex. Ap. 379, 8 S. W. R. 832; Phillips v. S. (Tex. Cr. R.), 30 S. W. R. 1063; Reach v. S., 94 Ala. 113, 11 S. R. 414; O'Neal v. S., 32 Tex. Cr. R. 42, 22 S. W. R. 25.]

2 O'Conner v, S., 40 Tex. 27; Carmichael v. S., 11 Tex. Ap. 27; Beasley v. S., 5 Lea, 705; Gayle v. S., 4 Lea, 466; Horn v. S., 6 Lea, 335; Brewer v. S., 6 Bax. 446; Miller v. S., 6 Bax. 449; Snell v. S., 4 Tex. Ap. 171; Williams . S., 42 Tex. 466; Featherston v. S., 35 Tex. Cr. R. 612, 34 S. W. R. 276; Corley v. S. (Tex. Cr. R.), 33 S. W. R. 975; Munn v. S. (Tex. Cr. R.), 33 S. W. R. 977; Walker v. Lea, 47 Fed. R. 695; Clayton v. S., 21 Tex. Ap. 343; S. v. Williams, 72 Miss. 992, 18 S. R. 486.]

S. v. Wilforth, 74 Mo. 528; Crim. Law, II, § 309a; [Burns v. S., 36 Tex. Cr. R. 601, 38 S. W. R. 204; Strey v. S. (Tex. Cr. R.), 40 S. W. R. 997; S. v. Hayne, 88 N. C. 625.]

Crim. Law, I, SS 343-345; ante, § 132; Morton v. S., 46 Ga. 292; Cutsinger v. S., 7 Bush, 392; [Straham v. S., 68 Miss. 347, 8 S. R. 844; S. v. Chippey, 9 Houst. (Del.) 583, 30 Atl. R. 438; S. v. Pollock, 49 Mo. Ap. 445.]

5 Walls v. S., 7 Blackf. 572. [Contru, S. v. Murray, 39 Mo. Ap. 127; S. v. Roberts, 39 Mo. Ap. 47; S. v. Larkin, 24 Mo. Ap. 410; Barkley v. S., 28 Tex. Ap. 99, 12 S. W. R. 495; Truax v. S., 14 Ky. L. R. 299.]

Reynolds v. S., 1 Tex. Ap. 616; S. v. Speller, 86 N. C. 697; Preston v. S., 63 Ala. 127; Livingston v. S., 3 Tex. Ap. 74; Cutsinger v. S., supra; S. v. Martin, 31 La. An. 849; Titus v. S., 42 Tex. 578; Carroll v. S., 28 Ark. 99, [18 Am. R. 538.] See Moorefield v. S., 5 Lea, 348; Waddell v. S., 37 Tex. 354; Christian v. S., 37 Tex. 475; Hilliard v. S., 37 Tex. 358. [Contra, Blair v. S., 26 Tex. Ap. 387, 9 S. W. R. 890; Sanderson v. S., 23 Tex. Ap. 520, 5 S.

3 Summerlin v. S., 3 Tex. Ap. 444; W. R. 138; S. v. Gilbert, 87 N. C. 527,

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