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may sometimes be controlling in the interpretation, the title may thus restrict the purview. But the cases in which it so operates are exceptional; for commonly it will not extend or restrain any provision in the body of an act. Further than as manifesting the legislative intent, it can have no force; therefore ordinarily, if the words of the enacting clause are larger in meaning than those of the title, they will prevail, even in a penal statute. Where there is no ambiguity in the statute itself, the title is not to be regarded.

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Chapter headings, etc.- The chapter headings and the like, in the revisions of statutes and in codes, are deemed to be of somewhat greater effect than the ordinary titles to legislative acts."

§ 47. Constitutional effect. We have already seen that, in some of the states, a special effect is given to the title under a constitutional provision.

II. THE PREAMBLE.

§ 48. Compared with title.-The preamble is similar to the title in its effect on the interpretation, yet of influence somewhat greater. Thus,

Stradling v. Morgan, 1 Plow. 199, 203; Rex v. Gwenop, 3 T. R. 133, 137; Dwar. Stat. (2d ed.) 501, 502; S. v. Stephenson, 2 Bailey, 334; Burgett v. Burgett, 1 Ohio, 469, [13 Am. D. 634:] Chesapeake & Ohio Canal v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co., 4 Gill & J. 1, 90, 91; U. S. v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 358, 386; S. v. Fields, 2 Bailey, 554; S. v. Smith, Cheves, 157; Bradford v. Jones, 1 Md. 351; Ogden v. Strong, 2 Paine, 584; Cohen v. Barrett, 5 Cal. 195; Garrigus v. Parke, 39 Ind. 66; Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Albert, 39 Mo. 181; Nazro v. Merchants' Mutual Ins. Co., 14 Wis. 295; U. S. v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 91 U. S. 72, 82.

1 U. S. v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610, 631; S. v. Stephenson, 2 Bailey, 334; Field v. Gooding, 106 Mass. 310.

2 Hadden v. The Collector, 5 Wall. 107; P. v. Abbott, 16 Cal. 358.

Bartlett v. Morris, 9 Port. 266; Blue
v. McDuffie, Busbee, 131.

4 Eastman v. McAlpin, 1 Kelley,
157; In re Boston Mining, etc. Co., 51
Cal. 624; Com. v. Slifer, 53 Pa. St. 71;
U. S. v. McArdle, 2 Saw. 367. [The
term "to regulate" in the title of a
statute relating to the sale of intoxi-
cating liquors does not include a
provision to "prohibit." P. v. Gad-
way, 61 Mich. 285, 1 Am. St. R. 578,
28 N. W. R. 101. The title of a stat-
ute need not mention the penalty.
Plumb v. Christie, 103 Ga. 686, 30 S.
E. R. 759, 42 L. R. A. 181.]

5 Barnes v. Jones, 51 Cal. 303; P. v. Molyneux, 40 N. Y. 113; Huff v. Alsup, 64 Mo. 51; Griffith v. Carter, 8 Kan. 565; Battle v. Shivers, 39 Ga. 405; S. v. Popp, 45 Md. 432; U. S. v. Fehrenback, 2 Woods, 175; Nicholson v. Mobile, etc. R. R. Co., 49 Ala.

U. S. v. Briggs, 9 How. (U.S.) 351; 205. And see post, § 61. 6 Ante, § 36a.

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No part of statute.- Though enacted with the statute, as the title is in our American legislation, like the latter it is deemed not to constitute of it a part. Still,

Weight. As showing the inducements to the act, it may have a decisive weight in a doubtful case. But where the body of the statute is distinct, it will prevail over a more restricted preamble. More particularly,—

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849. Intent and reasons.- We look to this introductory matter for the general intent of the legislature, the reasons and principles on which the law proceeds. So that, to the extent to which these can influence the interpretation, the preamble becomes important. Hence,—

Not control, but explain.—It may, for example, explain an equivocal expression in the enacting clause. It will seldom, at least, extend this clause; in a doubtful case it may restrain it,'-propositions not in their nature absolute. In the words of Ellenborough, C. J.: "In a vast number of acts of parliament, although a particular mischief is recited in the preamble, yet the legislative provisions extend far beyond the mischief

Mills v. Wilkins, 6 Mod. 62; Bac. Abr., Statute, A.; [Yazoo & M. V. R. R. Co. v. Thomas, 132 U. S. 174; U. S. v. Oreg, etc. R. R. Co., 164 U. S. 526; Lackland v. Walker, 151 Mo. 210, 52 S. W. R. 414]

'Mills v. Wilkins, supra; Mason v. Armitage, 13 Ves. 25, 36; Crespigny v. Wittenoom, 4 T. R. 790, 793; Gray v. Soanes, 2 Jur. 1040; The Salters' Company v. Jay, 3 Q. B. 109; Fellows v. Clay, 4 Q. B. 313, 339.

'Pattison v. Bankes, Cowp. 540, 543; Lees v. Summersgill, 17 Ves. 508; Mace v. Cammel, Lofft, 782; S. v. Butler, 3 McCord, 383; Rex v. Marks, 3 East, 157; Rex v. Athos, 8 Mod. 136, 144; Holbrook v. Holbrook, 1 Pick. 248, 251; Laidler v. Young, 2 Har. & J. 69; S. v. Findley, 1 Brev. 107; Blue McDuffie, Busbee, 131; U. S. v. Briggs, 9 How. (U. S.) 351; Sussex Peerage Case, 11 CL. & F. 85, 143; Caledonian Ry. Co. v. North British Ry. Co., 6 Ap. Cas. 114, 122, 124.

U. S. v. Webster, Daveis, D. C. 38;

Fowler v. S., 5 Day, 81; Gray v. Soanes, 2 Jur. 1040; Pray v. Edie, 1 T. R. 313; Rex v. Corry, 5 East, 372. And see, as to both title and preamble, 1 Kent Com. 460; Salkeld v. Johnston, 1 Hare, 196, 207; Rex v. Sutton, 4 M. & S. 532; Halton v. Cove, 1 B. & Ad. 538, 558.

5 Clark v. Bynum, 3 McCord, 298; Woodruff v. Gilchrist, 15 Johns. 89; Nash v. Allen, 4 Q. B. 784; [Tripp v. Goff, 1 N. E. R. 806.]

Id.; Dwar. Stat. (2d ed.) 660, referring to Wilson v. Knubley, 7 East, 128.

7 Dwar. Stat. (2d ed.) 661; Ryall v. Rolle, 1 Atk. 165, 174, 182. Contra, Copeman v. Callant, 1 P. Wms. 314, 320; Hughes v. Chester, etc. Ry. Co., 1 Drew. & S. 524; [Providence S. F. v. Jessup, 6 Kulp, 251.]

8 Kearns v. Cordwainers, 6 C. B. (N. S.) 388; Pattison v. Bankes, Cowp. 540, 543; Wilmot v. Rose, 3 Ellis & B. 563; Mason v. Armitage, 13 Ves. 25, 36.

recited. And whether the words shall be restrained or not must depend on a fair exposition of the particular statute in each particular case, and not upon any universal rule of construction." And, on the other hand, if the preamble should be found broader than the act itself, while of its own force it would not enlarge the meaning, it may do in this direction whatever can be accomplished by a consideration of the reasons which impelled the legislative mind."

§ 50. Recitations of facts.-Commonly a preamble contains recitations of facts. In the interpretation of statutes, as of contracts, the surroundings are taken into the account. And the recitations in the preamble must be accepted as, at least, prima facie, and perhaps conclusively, correct. In a private act they are evidence only as between the state and the private party. When viewed as a key to the interpretation they should in reason be deemed conclusive of the recited facts; because, whether really true or not, they explain the legislative perspective in enacting the statute, and only this is in any case gained by the interpreter in looking at the surroundings. Therefore, also, such matter is to have no other weight than is given it in other cases of construction, when it comes to the knowledge of the judge through other means.

§ 51. In general.- Dwarris observes: "Lord Coke considered the rehearsal, or preamble, a key to open the understanding of the statute; and it is properly considered' a good mean for collecting the intent, and showing the mischiefs which the makers of the act intended to remedy. The civilians say cessante legis proamio, cessat et ipsa lex; but English lawyers are aware how seldom the key will unlock the casket; how rarely

1 In Rex v. Pierce, 3 M. & S. 62, 66. And see Trueman v. Lambert, 4 M. & S. 234, 239.

Haughton, 1 Ellis & B. 501; U. S. v.
Claflin, 97 U. S. 546.

Resolutions of legislature.- As

2 And see Bywater v. Brandling, 7 to resolutions of the legislature, see

B. & C. 643.

3 Bishop, Con., § 371-373.

4 Sedgw. Stat. Law, 56; Rex v. Sut ton, 4 M. & S. 532; Elmondorff v. Carmichael, 3 Litt. 472, [14 Am. D. 86;] McReynolds v. Smallhouse, 8 Bush, 447, 456; Allison v. Louisville, etc. R. R. Co., 10 Bush, 1; Branson v. Wirth, 17 Wall. 32, 44. See Reg. v.

Commissioners v. S.,9 Gill,379; [Lackland v. Walker, 151 Mo. 210, 52 S. W. R. 414.]

5 S. v. Beard, Smith (Ind.), 276, 1 Ind. 460; Branson v. Wirth, supra. See Edinburgh, etc. Ry. Co. v. Linlithgow, 3 Macq. H. L. Cas. 691, 704. 6 Dwar. Stat. (2d ed.) 504. 74 Inst. 330.

the preamble is found to state, besides the primary occasion of the law, the full views of the proposer of it. A particular mischief is often alluded to; but that is soon lost sight of (cessat procmium), wider objects are embraced and a general remedy is provided. 'It is nothing unusual in acts of parliament,' says Lawrence, J., 'for the enacting part to go beyond the preamble; the remedy often extends beyond the particular act or mischief which first suggested the necessity of the law.' 'It certainly does appear, from the preamble of the act,' said Lord Ellenborough in the same case, 'as if it were mainly directed against combinations for purposes of mutiny and sedition; but there are words sufficient in the enacting part to satisfy the preamble, and, after dealing with offenses of that description, the act goes on in more extensive terms, and embraces other more general objects; and as there is no word of reference in the latter part (as such), I see no reason for restraining the common import of the words used.' 'Sometimes'-it is well expressed in another report—the legislature having a particular mischief in view, which was the primary object of the statute, merely state that in the preamble, and then go on in the body of the act to provide a remedy for general mischiefs of the same nature, but of different species, neither expressed in the preamble, nor perhaps then in immediate contemplation." "

III. THE PURVIEW AND ITS SUBDIVISIONS.

§ 52. Elsewhere.-Something of the subject of this sub-title appears in "Criminal Procedure," where the indictment on statutes is explained.' Yet we shall substantially avoid repetition.

Purview defined.—The purview is "that part of an act of the legislature which begins with the words 'Be it enacted,' etc., and ends with the repealing clause."4 Such is the full meaning; but the term is sometimes employed in a narrower sense, as excluding provisos, exceptions, and the like. Thus Dwarris says: "The parts of statutes are-in a popular, though not

Rex v. Marks, 3 East, 157, 165. 2 Mace v. Cammel, Lofft, 783. And see Fellowes v. Clay, 4 Q. B. 313, 339. 'Crim. Pro., I, § 634 et seq. 'Bouv. Law Dict., tit. Purview, re

ferring to Cooke (Tenn.), 330; 3 Bibb, 181; [Anderson's Law Dictionary, 848.]

"Crim. Pro., I, § 634.

legal, sense- the title, the preamble, the purview or body of the act, clauses, provisos, exceptions." 1

The parts are chiefly designated as follows:

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§ 53. Clause. This is a word depending largely for its meaning on the connection in which it is employed. It signifies less than "purview," yet not necessarily less than a sentence viewed grammatically. As, in grammar, the word "clause" denotes a part of a sentence, and qualifying words are required to show the particular part, and how much; so, in legal language, it is believed to indicate a part of a statutory provision; the particular part, and how much, to appear from the context. And, though the term "clause" almost always contemplates some portion of the purview, no reason appears why it may not refer also to a member of the preamble.

§ 54. Interpretation clause.- Not all statutes have an interpretation clause. But of late such a clause has become common, especially in England. Ordinarily it occupies one section, sometimes more; in some it is placed at the beginning, in others at the end. Its effect may be to require a different interpretation from what otherwise would be given the statute, or even to impart a novel signification to particular words; and whatever in this respect it provides, the courts, as a general proposition, to which there are possibly exceptions, are bound to accept.

§ 55. Interpreting this clause.-This clause is not always meant to render the meaning plainer. If commonly it is, it often fails in its object; for, first, it must itself be interpreted; and, secondly, the difficulty of interpreting the main provisions may be greater with the rule it furnishes than without." In general this sort of clause, like other provisions in derogation of the common law, is to be construed strictly;' though, on the other hand, it is said not always to be so. Thus,

Gaming (Lottery tickets).—While the general doctrine requires criminal statutes to be subjected to a strict interpre

1 Dwar. Stat. (2d ed.) 500.

2 Crim. Pro., I, § 634.

Denman, C. J., in Reg. v. Cambridgeshire, 7 A. & E 480; Meux u Jacobs,

3 Smith v. S., 28 Ind. 321; P. v. Soto, Law R. 7 H. L. 481.

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