commended. Where the indictment is joint against two, and the proof is that one played with a particular third person on one occasion, and the other with another person on another occasion, and no joint guilt is shown, both cannot be convicted." § 913. Statutory modifications of procedure. In some of the states there are statutes special to gaming, simplifying the forms of procedure; as,— Indictment. As early as 1824 it was provided in Tennessee that, in this offense, "no presentment or indictment shall be quashed for want of form; and in all such cases it shall be sufficient to charge the general name of the game at which the defendant or defendants may have played, without setting forth and describing with or against whom they may have bet or played." And the following, drawn on a statute not given in the report, was held to be good: "That A., late of, etc., on, etc., at, etc., was guilty of unlawful gaming, by then and there wagering and betting money on a certain unlawful game and match at cards, contrary to the form of the statute." Again, § 914. Continued. In this condition of the laws it was adjudged sufficient to say that the defendant on, etc., at, etc., "with force and arms, did unlawfully encourage and promote a certain unlawful game and match at cards for money; and then and there unlawfully did play for and bet money at the said game and match at cards, contrary," etc." § 915. Evidence-(Witnesses). We have a few special provisions for compelling evidence,-not of a general char acter." § 916. Limitations. The general principles governing statutes of limitations apply in gaming. The burden is on the state to prove the offense within the statutory period, not on the defendant to show that it is barred. If the statute against 1 Crim. Pro., I, § 476; S. v. Homan, supra. And see Parker v. S., supra. 2 Elliott v. S., 26 Ala. 78. And see Lindsey v. S., 48 Ala. 169. 3 S. v. McBride, 8 Humph. 66. 4 Dean v. S., Mart. & Yerg. 127. And see Dobkins v. S., 2 Humph. 424; S. v. McBride, 8 Humph. 66, 67, 68. 5 Kneeland v. S., 62 Ga. 395; S. v. Henderson, 47 Ind. 127, overruled in Frazee v. S., 58 Ind. 8; Batre v. S., 18 Ante, § 264; Manning v. S., 35 Tex. 723; S. v. Waters, 1 Strob. 59; Stevens v. S., 3 Pike, 66, 70. gaming provides the punishment of both fine and imprisonment, the limitations statute may in a particular case have run as to the one and not as to the other.1 § 917. Other points. Some other points connected with the pleading and evidence appear in the cases cited in the note, but no special explanations of them are deemed important here. Recognizance.— A recognizance has been deemed not good which simply binds the party to answer to a charge of "gaming;" because "gaming is not of itself alone an indictable offense." And it is the same of one to answer to a charge of "playing at a game of cards." But one to appear and answer to an indictment for keeping a gaming-table was sustained." III. SPECIALLY OF BETTING ON GAMES. § 918. Already.- Under the last sub-title much of what would be appropriate under the present one has been explained. § 919. Indictment.- The indictment, which will vary with the statute, is ordinarily sufficient if it covers the statutory, terms in a manner to make the offense affirmatively appear." Counts for exhibiting a faro-bank and for betting on the game may be joined." § 920. Thing bet.- Commonly the thing bet should be stated. Under which rule the words "goods, wares and merchandise, being valuable things," not describing anything more specifically, were held to be too indefinite. 18. v. Dent, 1 Rich. 469. And see ante, § 261d. 2 Harris v. S., 31 Ala. 362; S. v. Stallings, 3 Ind. 531; Com. v. Tiernan, 4 Grat. 545; S. v. Howe, 1 Rich. 260; Stockden v. S., 18 Ark. 186; Durham v. S., 1 Blackf. 33; Ervine v. Com., 5 Dana, 216; Crain v. S., 14 Tex. 634; Willis v. Warren, 1 Hilton, 590; S. v. Noland, 29 Ind. 212; Nuckolls v. Com., 32 Grat. 884; Robinson v. S., 24 Tex. 152. 3 Com. v. West, 1 Dana, 165; S. v. Cotton, 6 Tex. 425. 4 Cotton v. S., 7 Tex. 547. And see McDonough v. S., 19 Tex. 293; Bailes v. S., 20 Tex. 498. But, 5 Whitfield v. S., 4 Pike, 171. 6 Warren v. S., 18 Ark. 195, 198; Drew v. S., 5 Eng. 82; Graham v. S., 1 Pike, 171; S. v. Holland, 22 Ark. 242; Booth v. S., 26 Tex. 203; Ben v. S., 9 Tex. Ap. 107; Anderson v. S., 9 Tex. Ap. 177; S. v. Bristow, 41 Tex. 146; S. v. Blair, 41 Tex. 30; [Fortenburg v. S., 47 Ark. 188; Com. v. Walker, 163 Mass. 226.] 7 S. v. Holland, supra. Ante, § 898-901; Warren v. S., 18 Ark. 195; Bone v. S., 63 Ala. 185; Napier v. S., 50 Ala. 168; Ray v. S., 50 Ala. 172. 9 S. v. Kilgore, 6 Humph. 44, 45. See Bagley v. S., 1 Humph. 486. § 921. Continued. In some of our states there are statutes rendering generally or in particular circumstances this averment unnecessary. So that, for example, it was adjudged sufficient to say that the defendant "unlawfully did bet at a faro-bank, the said faro-bank being then and there kept and exhibited for the purpose of gaming." And the same was held of the allegations that the defendant "did bet at a certain gaming bank, then and there exhibited and kept, called monte;" and that the defendant bet money "at a certain gambling device called rondeau."4 § 922. Describing game. If the game at which was the betting is one of those forbidden by name in the statute, the indictment need only mention it by the name. But if it is pointed to simply by such words as "of the like or similar kind, or of any other description, although not named," the indictment for betting at it must so far describe it as to bring it affirmatively within the statutory inhibition. Simply to say, for example, that the defendant betted "upon and against a certain gambling device, commonly called the blind tiger," where the words "blind tiger" are not in the enactment, is inadequate.5 § 923. Person bet with.-The question of naming or not such person is within principles already explained. It was in one case in Arkansas adjudged unnecessary to allege that the defendant bet with any particular individual.' But under another provision of the act, making it punishable "if any person shall be guilty of betting any money," etc., the court required the name of the player to be given to identify the transaction, a rule afterward changed by a statute which declared it unnecessary to set out the name of the players." § 924. Locality.- If, by construction of the statute, the betting is equally punishable whether the playing is in the same 1 Harrison v. S., 15 Tex. 239; Jacobson v. S., 55 Ala. 151; Mitchell v. S., 55 Ala. 160. 2 Blair v. S., 32 Tex. 474. 3 McKissick v. S., 2 Tex. 356. [See also Thompson v. S. (Tex. Cr. Ap.), 28 S. W. R. 684.] 4 S. v. Mann, 13 Tex. 61. See also Estes v. S., 10 Tex. 300; S. v. Prewitt, 10 Tex. 310; Ramey v. S., 14 Tex. 409; Cohen v. S., 17 Tex. 142. 5 S. v. Grider, 18 Ark. 297. See ante, § 909. 6 Ante, §§ 894, 895. 7 Drew v. S., 5 Eng. 82; & P., in Missouri, S. v. Kyle, 10 Mo. 389. 8 Parrott v. S., 5 Eng. 574; Barkman v. S., 13 Ark. 703. 9 Orr v. S., 18 Ark. 540. or another county, only the betting, not also the playing, is required to be charged as in the county of the indictment.1 § 925. The nature of the game,- as, for example, where the betting is at a faro-bank,- need not be particularized.' § 926. Adequate.- In Missouri, the averments that the defendant "did unlawfully bet a sum of money, to wit, fifty cents, at and upon a game of chance, played with and by means of half-dollars and cracks in the floor of a house, which said halfdollars and cracks were then and there a gambling device, adapted, etc., for the purpose of playing games of chance for money and property," were adjudged sufficient." IV. SPECIALLY OF HORSE-RACING AND THE LIKE. § 927. On highway- (Indictment).- The indictment on a statute forbidding horse-racing "along a public highway" need not set out the termini of the way. Under some of the statutes, if there are two defendants, it must be charged that they ran "together;" to omit which is not always fatal after verdict." § 928. In proof of highway,-it is prima facie sufficient to show that the racing was on a road leading from one town to another in the county." § 928a. Variance. A charge that the defendant suffered his horse to be run in a horse-race is not sustained by proof that he rode a horse, not his own, in the race. § 929. Betting on horse-race.- In Tennessee, an indictment alleging that the defendant "unlawfully did bet $20 upon a horse-race, and . . said horse-race was not run upon a track or path kept for the purpose of horse-racing," was held to be insufficient, because, by the statute, the running of the race was an element in the offense, and this indictment does not show that it was run.10 But an indictment in slightly varied 1S. v. Kyle, 10 Mo. 389; [Withers v. S., 21 Tex. Ap. 210.] 2 S. v. Ames, 1 Mo. 524. And see ante, § 896. 3 S. v. Flack, 24 Mo. 378. 4 Watson v. S., 3 Ind. 123. 5 S. v. Armstrong, 3 Ind. 139; S. v. Burgett, 1 Ind. 479; S. v. Brown, 1 Ind. 532. And see Myers v. S., 1 Ind. 251. 6 S. v. Catchings, 43 Tex. 654; Lewellen v. S., 18 Tex. 538. 7 King v. S., 3 Tex. Ap. 7. 8 Watson v. S., 3 Ind. 123. 10 Dobkins v. S., 2 Humph. 424. Yet, terms, namely, that the defendant "did bet on a horse-race money, etc.; said race not being run on a legally licensed track," was held good under a statute declaring it a misdemeanor "to make any bet or wager for money." § 930. Betting on shooting-match.-The indictment for betting on a shooting-match must, in Tennessee, to render apparent its unlawfulness under the statute, charge that the shooting was within two hundred yards of a public road of the first or second class.2 in an earlier case, an indictment in nearly the same terms was held to be adequate. S. v. Posey, 1 Humph. 384. 599 18. v. Blackburn, 2 Coldw. 235. 2S. v. Bess, 5 Coldw. 55. |