BOOK II. THE INTERPRETATION OF WRITTEN LAWS ABSOLUTE AND WITH THE UNWRITTEN. CHAPTER VIII. THE PURPOSE AND MEANS OF INTERPRETATION. $68, 69. Introduction. 70-73. What interpretation seeks. 74-77. Into what interpreter looks. § 68. Scope of this series of chapters.- In the chapters constituting the present Book, we shall call to mind those universal doctrines of interpretation which it is necessary for every lawyer to understand, whatever may be his special department. If some of them appear more particularly applicable to civil causes and others to criminal, still all to be here given of each class are essential to a proper apprehension of those of the other class. § 69. How this chapter divided.-We shall consider, I. What it is that interpretation seeks; II. Into what, besides the written words, the interpreter looks. I. WHAT IT IS THAT INTERPRETATION SEEKS. § 70. Meaning of maker.- Laws are expounded and enforced, not made, by the courts. The makers are entitled to have their real meaning, if it can be ascertained, carried out. Hence the primary object of all rules for interpreting statutes is to ascertain the legislative intent; or, exactly, the meaning 1 Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Pet. 627, 662; Brown v. Thorndike, 15 Pick. 388, 402; Winslow v. Kimball, 25 Me. 493; Riddick v. Governor, 1 Mo. 147; Beall v. Harwood, 2 Har. & J. 167, [3 Am. D. 532;] The Sussex Peerage, 11 Cl. & F. 85, 143; Bidwell v. Whitaker, 1 Mich. 469; Ogden v. Strong, 2 Paine, 584; Crocker v. Crane, 21 Wend. 211, [34 Am. D. 228;] Kilby Bank, Petitioner, 23 Pick. 93; Opinion of the Justices, 22 Pick. 571; Si which the subject is authorized to understand the legislature intended. Hence, also, Personal views of judges.- If the courts can ascertain the legislative meaning, their duty is to give it effect, whatever may be the personal opinions of the incumbents of the bench on the policy of the law.2 § 71. Interpretation indispensable.- Were the courts not to interpret the laws, they could not administer them. For, in the words of Lord Chief Justice Eyre, "let the proposition in an act of parliament be what it may, more or less distinct, it is always a question of law what is the meaning and the true import of that act of parliament, and whether any case of fact that can be stated is a case that comes within the meaning of that act of parliament. No distinction can be taken in this case, because it happens that the description of the offense in the statute is comprised in two or three words; the law may be clearer upon that account; but the rule of construc 4 monds v. Powers, 28 Vt. 354; McIntyre v. Ingraham, 35 Miss. 25; Riddick v. Walsh, 15 Mo. 519; Ingraham v. Speed, 30 Miss. 410; P. v. Dana, 22 Cal. 11; Parkinson v. S., 14 Md. 184, [74 Am. D. 522;] P. v. Potter, 47 N. Y. 375; Smith v. P., 47 N. Y. 330; P. v. Weston, 3 Neb. 312; Jones v. S., 1 Kan. 273; U. S. v. Athens Armory, 2 Abb. (U. S.) 129, 137; Albrecht v. S., 8 Tex. Ap. 313; S. v. Blair, 32 Ind. 313; George v. Board of Education, 33 Ga. 344; Emporia v. Norton, 16 Kan. 236; Dwar. Stat. (2d ed.) 556; [Reynolds v. Holland, 35 Ark. 56; S. v. Mack, 23 Nev. 367; In re Salisbury, 44 N. Y. Sup. 291; Edwards v. Morton (Tex.), 46 S. W. R. 792; Rose v. Wortham, 95 Tenn. 505, 32 S. W. R. 458; Turcott v. R. R. Co., 101 Tenn. 106; Bonds v. Greer, 56 Miss. 710; S. v. Hostetter, 137 Mo. 636; S. v. Slover, 126 Mo. 652, 29 S. W. R. 718; Lamb v. Dunwoody, 94 Ga. 58, 20 S. E. R. 637; S. v. Ross, 20 Nev. 61, 14 Pac. R. 827; Roland Park v. S., 80 Md. 448, 31 Atl. R. 298; Bixby v. Mayor, 61 Hun, 496, 16 N. Y. Sup. 364: In re Board, 62 Hun, 499, 16 N. Y. Sup. 894; Will iams v. Com., 78 Ky. 93; Wheeler v. Wheeler, 134 Ill. 530, 25 N. E. R. 588; Soby v. P., 134 Ill. 71, 25 N. E. R. 109; P. v. Blackwelder, 21 Ill. Ap. 254; Hogg v. P., 15 Ill. Ap. 288; Shonkweiler v. Stewart, 104 Iowa, 67.] And see Manuel v. Manuel, 13 Ohio St. 458; Johnson v. Hudson River R. R. Co., 49 N. Y. 455; P. v. Schoonmaker, 63 Barb. 44, 49; Barker v. Esty, 19 Vt. 131; S. v. King, 44 Mo. 283; Cearfoss v. S., 42 Md. 403; Maxwell v. S., 40 Md. 273; Horton v. Mobile, 43 Ala. 598, 604. 2 Post, § 235; 1 Bishop, Mar., Div. & S., §§ 45, 46; S. v. Clarke, 54 Mo. 17, [14 Am. R. 471;] Horton v. Mobile, 43 Ala. 598, 604. In Pray v. Edie, 1 T. R. 313, 314, Lord Mansfield said: "Whatever doubts I may have in my own breast with respect to the policy and expedience of this law, yet, as long as it continues in force, I am bound to see it executed according to its meaning." [Com. v. Shopp, 1 Woodw. 129; Aultman v. Daggs, 50 Mo. Ap. 280; S. v. Willott, 54 Mo. Ap. 310; Smith v. Bowman, 41 Ohio St. 37; Thompson v. Buckley, 1 Tex. 35.] tion, with reference to the question whether it should be taken to be the construction of law, a mere matter of fact, is exactly the same." Still, § 72. Limit of interpretation-(Meaning plain).— Like everything else, interpretation has its limits, beyond which it cannot legitimately go." Where the legislative meaning is plain, there is not only no occasion for rules to aid the interpretation, but it is contrary to the rules to employ them. The judges have simply to enforce the statute according to its obvious terms.' Yet § 73. Importance of rules.-There are large classes of cases dependent even upon technical rules of interpretation. And there are others, not quite like these, wherein still the rules are very helpful. Every statute is presumed to have been penned and enacted by persons familiar with them; so that, without a 'Horne Tooke's Case, 25 How. St. N. Y. 394, 24 N. E. R. 799; Brown v. Tr. 1, 726; post, § 116. 2 Post, § 81. 'Douglass v. Chosen Freeholders, 9 Vroom, 214; Hyatt v. Taylor, 42 N. Y. 258, 260; Sussex Peerage Case, 11 Cl. & F. 85, 143; Benton v. Wickwire, 54 N. Y. 226; Rosenplaenter v. Roessle, 54 N. Y. 262; Woodbury v. Berry, 18 Ohio St. 456; Burgett v. Burgett, 1 Ohio, 469, 477, [13 Am. D. 634]; Procureur v. Bruneau, Law Rep. 1 P. C. 169, 191; Bosley v. Mattingly, 14 B. Monr. 89; Ezekiel v. Dixon, 3 Kelly, 146; Farrel Foundry v. Dart, 26 Conn. 376; Swift v. Luce, 27 Me. 285; U. S. v. Ragsdale, Hemp. 497; [Reese v. S., 73 Ala. 19; Bartlett v. Morris, 9 Port. (Ala.) 266; McGowan v. Insurance Co., 60 N. J. L. 200; Whiting v. Mastin, 62 Mo. Ap. 647; Rex v. Banbury, 1 A. & E. 142; Case v. Wildridge, 4 Ind. 51; S. v. Liedtke, 9 Neb. 469, 4 N. W. R. 61; Fitzpatrick v. Gebhart, 7 Kan. 35; Lake Co. v. Rollins, 130 U. S. 671, 32 L. ed. 1060; U. S. v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 358; Bate Co. v. Sulzburger, 157 U. S. 1, 39 L. ed. 601; Choctaw R. R. Co. v. Alexander (Okl.), 54 Pac. R. 421; In re Manning, 71 Hun, 236, 24 N. Y. Sup. 1039; Bank v. Colgate, 120 R. R. Co., 44 L. R. A. 579, 102 Wis. 137; knowledge of these rules, no one can intelligently practice or administer the laws. II. INTO WHAT, BESIDES THE WRITTEN WORDS, THE Interpreter LOOKS. § 74. Judicial cognizance.-Obviously, in reason, a court in construing a statute is not required to stultify itself; but it may take into the account any pertinent matter whereof it has judicial cognizance.' Hence, among other things, Rules of interpretation.- Knowing the rules of interpretation, it presumes that the legislature also understood them; and, omitting to prescribe other rules, intended the courts should follow them. Then, § 75. In position of legislature.- The court should put itself in the position of the legislature,- stand, in contemplating the statute, where the maker of it stood, the better to discern the reason and scope of the provision. They who voted for the measure must have had in mind a meaning for the enacted words; and the meaning, thus perceived, must be given them by the court. Thus, Time. If the statute is old, or if it is modern, the court should transport itself back to the time when it was framed, consider the condition of things then existing, and give it the meanings which the language as then used, and the other considerations, require. Again, Prior law. The court, knowing the present law, knows also its history, and the prior law 1 See S. v. Nicholls, 30 La. An. 980; Fretwell v. Troy, 18 Kan. 271; Keyport, etc. Steamboat Co. v. Farmers' Trans. Co., 3 C. E. Green, 13; P. v. Schoonmaker, 63 Barb. 44. For a synopsis of what a court takes judicial notice of, see 1 Greenl. Ev., §§ 4-6. 2 Com. v. Churchill, 2 Met. 118, 124; S. v. Brooks, 4 Conn. 446. [Rules of construction are the law itself, and it is presumed that when the legis lature intends to change the rules of construction, it will do so. Sydnor v. Chambers, Dall. (Tex.) 605. Whenever a statute affects a contract, not only the statute itself, but the legal Such prior law the legis construction by the courts, enter into McWilliam v. Adams, 1 Macq. Ap. |