§ 79. Clerical errors.- As in an indictment, so in a statute, clerical errors do not avoid what to the common understanding is plain. If the true reading is evident, and the meaning is, notwithstanding the errors, certain, the statute stands, and is to be interpreted as though they were corrected." Still this doctrine cannot be carried to all lengths; but,

4

§ 80. To be accepted as enacted.- Except as thus pointed out, a statute must be taken to be what the authoritative record makes it. We cannot, to bring it to our views, import into it words not used by the law-makers; or control it, when unambiguous, though we think it is not what it should be; and, in those cases in which we may bend the meaning of particular words and phrases to the general intent or the like, there is a degree beyond which the process cannot be carried. The degree differs with the circumstances; and to ascertain both is a leading object of these chapters on interpretation. Again,

§ 81. False grammar.-Like an indictment, a statute is not rendered inoperative by false grammar, and inelegancies and impurities of expression. For example,—

Co., 6 Blatch. 509, 511; U. S. v. Three
Railroad Cars, 1 Abb. (U. S.) 196; Ran-
dolph v. Bayue, 44 Cal. 366; Morrill
v. S., 38 Wis. 428, [20 Am. R. 12.]
1 Crim. Pro., I, § 357.

2 See, and compare, Moody v. Stephenson, 1 Minn. 401; Stoneman v. Whaley, 9 Iowa, 390; Bostick v. S., 34 Ala. 266; Gardner v. S., 25 Md. 146; Nazro v. Merchants' Mutual Insurance Co., 14 Wis. 295; Sparrow v. Davidson College, 77 N. C. 35; Tollett v. Thomas, Law Rep. 6 Q. B. 514, 518; Graham v. Charlotte, etc. R. R. Co., 64 N. C. 631; Rolland v. Com., 82 Pa. St. 306, 326, [22 Am. R. 758;] Angell v. Angell, 9 Q. B. 328, 360; Haney v. S., 34 Ark. 263; Turner v. S., 40 Ala. 21; Lindsley v. Williams, 5 C. E. Green, 93; [Landrum v. Flannigan, 60 Kan. 436; Paxton v. Farmers Co., 45 Neb. 884, 64 N. W. R. 343; Hooper v. Birchfield, 115 Ala. 226; Hutchings v. Bank (Va. Ap.), 20 S. E. R. 950; Western Co. v. Murray (Ariz.), 56 Pac. R. 728; S. v. Swift, 35 W. Va.

542, 14 S. E. R. 135; S. v. Stillman, 81 Wis. 124, 51 N. W. R. 260; In re Frey (Pa. St.), 18 Atl. R. 478; Com. v. Grimstead (Ky.), 55 S. W. R. 720.]

3 Ante, § 72; post, §§ 145, 146.

Dwar. Stat. (2d ed.) 579; King v. Burrell, 12 A. & E. 460, 468; Lamond v. Eiffe, 3 Q. B. 910; Rex v. Vandeleer, 1 Stra. 69; Rex v. Pereira, 2 A. & E. 375, 380; Bloxam v. Elsee, 6 B. & C. 169, 176.

5 Bidwell v. Whitaker, 1 Mich. 469; Bartlett v. Morris, 9 Port. 266; Sibley v. Smith, 2 Mich. 486; Green v. Cheek, 5 Ind. 105.

6 Putnam v. Longley, 11 Pick. 487, 490; Pitman v. Flint, 10 Pick. 504, 506; Reg. v. Simpson, 10 Mod. 341, 344; Rex v. The Poor Law Commissioners, 6 A. & E. 1, 7; Rex v. Stoke Dameral, 7 B. & C. 563; Dwar. Stat. (2d ed.) 583 et seq., 595, 598; U. S. v. Warner. 4 McLean, 463.

7 Crim. Pro., I, §§ 348–355.

8 Garrigus v. Parke, 39 Ind. 66. [Grammatical accuracy not so im

Disjunctive and conjunctive.- Conjunctive sentences, describing different branches of the same offense, will be construed as conjunctive or disjunctive according to the evident meaning of the law-makers. And

Inaccurate.-Words and expressions inaccurately used will be given the sense intended where it appears on the whole face of the act. Even in opposition to the strict letter, the clear purpose of the legislature, as apparent on inspection of the statute itself, will be carried out.' But

Limit. This doctrine applies only where the true intent is manifest in the act itself, or in it compared with other acts on the same subject.' Now,

§ 82. Group of doctrines.- Bearing in mind the cardinal purpose of all interpretation,—namely, to ascertain the true legislative intent,— and remembering that each particular rule stands in subordination to this purpose, and is to be followed only when and so far as it contributes to this result, let us arrange around it, as in a cluster, some of the subordinate rules. Thus,

Harmony with intent.—The statute should, if possible, be construed in a way to render each separate provision harmonious with its general intent."

portant as apparent intent. Pease v. Fish, 70 Ill. Ap. 138. Mere grammatical errors will not vitiate a law; and a transposition of words and clauses may be invoked to furnish meaning. Murray v. S., 21 Tex. Ap. 620, 2 S. W. R. 757; Leavitt v. Lovering, 64 N. H. 607, 15 Atl. R. 414.]

Mich. 148; Encking v. Simmons, 28
Wis. 272, 276; Frye v. Chicago, etc.
R. R. Co., 73 Ill. 399; Sussex Peer-
age, 11 Cl. & F. 85; [Miller v. S., 106
Ind. 415, 7 N. E. R. 209; Anderson v.
Railroad Co., 117 IL 26, 7 N. E. R.
129; Selden v. Hall, 21 Mo. Ap. 452;
Middleton v. Greeson, 106 Ind. 18, 5

1 Post, § 243; S. v. Myers, 10 Iowa, N. E. R. 755; Boody v. Watson, 64

448.

Rex v. Bullock, 1 Taunt. 71; Crocker v. Crane, 21 Wend. 211, [34 Am. D. 228;] Alexander v. Worthington, 5 Md. 471; Erwin v. Moore, 15 Ga. 361. See P. v. Clute, 12 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 399; Thorp v. Schooling, 7 Nev. 15; Nichols v. Halliday, 27 Wis. 406.

Ingraham v. Speed, 30 Miss. 410. Ante, § 72; Ezekiel v. Dixon, 3 Kelly, 146: Swift v. Luce, 27 Me. 285; Riddick v. Walsh, 15 Mo. 519.

Ante, § 70; Mardre v. Felton, Phillips (N. C.), 279; Leoni v. Taylor, 20

N. H. 162, 9 Atl. R. 794; U. S. v. Morrissey, 32 Fed. R. 147; Power v. Choteau, 7 Mont. 82, 14 Pac. R. 658; S. v. Hayes, 61 N. H. 264; Vermont Loan Co. v. Whithed, 2 N. Dak. 82, 49 N. W. R. 318; Columbus Co. v. Wright, 89 Ga. 574, 15 S. E. R. 293; St. Louis v. Lane, 110 Mo. 254, 19 S. W. R. 553; Barnard v. Gall, 43 La. An. 959, 10 S. R. 5; S. v. Moore, 45 Neb. 12, 63 N. W. R. 130; Re Salisbury, 44 N. Y. Supp. 291; Hooper v. Creager, 84 Md. 195.]

6 Dwar. Stat. (2d ed.) 582, 597;

Every word and clause a meaning.

Every word and clause should, if possible, have assigned to it a meaning, leaving no useless words.1 And,

Giving effect to whole.- A fortiori, the construction should be such as will not leave the entire enactment without effect."

Repugnancy.Nor should an interpretation be admitted, if avoidable, which will render one clause repugnant to another, but all should stand."

Absurdity — Injustice— Inconvenience.―The interpretation should lean strongly to avoid absurd consequences, injustice,

and even great inconvenience;' for the legislative meaning is to be carried out, and it cannot be supposed to be any of these. So,

Doubtful power. The exercise even of a doubtful power will not be attributed to the legislature; therefore construction will lean against it. And,

Expressed intent-Implied.-If the legislature has expressed its intent in the act, it will be carried out, though to the overriding of the ordinary rules of interpretation; as, in like manner, will its intent in any other way sufficiently appearing.

3

Litigation. An interpretation not opening the door to litigation will be preferred. Also,—

Retrospective. Though statutes are often applied retrospectively, they are not so in general, and in most circumstances construction will lean against it. On the other hand,―

Pick. 304; Meade v. Deputy Marshal, 1 Brock. 324; Murray v. Gibson, 15 How. (U. S.) 421; Ham v. McClaws, 1 Bay, 93, 98; Robinson v. Varnell, 16 Tex. 382; The Ohio v. Stunt, 10 Ohio St. 582; [Lime City Ass'n v. Black, 136 Ind. 544, 35 N. E. R. 829; Carolina Bank v. Evans, 28 S. C. 521, 6 S. E. R. 321.]

IU. S. v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 358, 386; Hughes v. Hughes, Carter, 125, 136; Ayers v. Knox, 7 Mass. 306, 310; Putnam v. Longley, 11 Pick. 487, 490; Associates of Jersey v. Davison, 5 Dutcher, 415. [A construction which would impose a vain and evidently unnecessary proceeding is unauthorized. People's Bank v. Batchelder, 51 Fed. R. 130. A construction will not be adopted which would disfranchise a considerable number of voters, un. less such construction is unavoidable. S. v. Van Camp, 36 Neb. 9, 54 N. W. R. 113. Still no mere general notions that the statute is unjust, impolitic or oppressive, or conflicts with the spirit of the constitution, will justify the court in setting a statute aside. Sawyer v. Dooley, 21 Nev. 390, 32 Pac. R. 437.]

279; [Stanley v. R. R. Co., 100 Mo. 435, 13 S. W. R. 709; Sykes v. Columbus, 55 Miss. 143.]

3 Farmers' Bank v. Hale, 59 N. Y. 53; Chapin v. Crusen, 31 Wis. 209.

Ante, $$ 70, 72, 81; Stowel v. Zouch, 1 Plow. 353, 365; Arthur v. Bokenham, 11 Mod. 148, 161; McDermut v. Lorillard, 1 Edw. Ch. 273, 276; Ayers v. Knox, 7 Mass. 306; Dwar. Stat. (2d. ed.) 593; S. v. Harkness, 1 Brev. 276; Castner v. Walrod, 83 Ill. 171, 179, [25 Am. R. 369;] Smith v. P., 47 N. Y. 330; S. v. King, 44 Mo. 283.

Gale v. Laurie, 5 B. & C. 156, 164. [The courts will not impute to the legislature a purpose to act against religion. Rector v. U. S., 92 U. S. 698, 23 L. ed. 690.]

Post, SS 83-85b; Thompson v. Lack, 3 C. B. 540, 551; 1 Bishop, Mar., Div. & S., §§ 99-103; Moon v. Durden, 2 Exch. 22; s. c. nom. Moore v. Durden, 12 Jur. 138; Plumb v. Sawyer, 21 Conn. 351; Hooker v. Hooker, 10 Sm. & M. 599; Bruce v. Schuyler, 4 Gilman, 221, [46 Am. D. 447;] Barnes v. Mobile, 19 Ala. 707; Torrey v. Corliss, 33 Me. 333; Murray v. Gibson, 15 How. (U. S.) 421, 423; Pritchard v. Spencer,

2 Mardre v. Felton, Phillips (N. C.), 2 Ind. 486; Garrett v. Wiggins, 1

Eluded-Defeated. The court will endeavor so to shape the meaning of a statute that it can neither be eluded 1 nor its purposes defeated.

The parts, and other laws and acts, together. All its parts,' and all acts, "though made at different times or even expired" or repealed, and the entire system of laws,' and the common law, touching the same matter, must be taken together; and,

2 Thompson v. S., 20 Ala. 54; Cook use them in their common-law meanv. Hamilton, 6 McLean, 112.