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hold that, to work an exception to this rule, the retrospective intent must affirmatively appear in the words themselves." But, at least by the better doctrine,
Exceptions.— Some statutes extend to past transactions, even where their words are not direct to this effect. Thus,
Procedure (including remedy).— Enactments regulating the procedure in the courts and the remedy are commonly applied to the enforcement of rights already accrued,' and even to causes actually in progress. But, in special circumstances, and especially as to causes in progress, this exception, which is
88 Me 273, 34 Ath R. 74; Yates v. [Re Davis, 149 N. Y. 539, 44 N. E R. Milwaukee, 92 Wis. 352, 66 N. W. R. 185; Hennepin Co. v. Baldwin, 62 248; Voight v. Kersten, 164 Ill. 314, Minn. 518, 65 N. W. R. 80; Fitzgerald 45 N. E. R. 543; S. v. Sears, 29 Oreg. v. Phelps, 42 W. Va. 570, 26 S. E. R. 580, 46 Pac. R 785; Chicago Co. v. 315; Bradley v. Norris, 63 Minn. 156, OʻMarr, 18 Mont. 568, 46 Pac. R. 809; 65 N. W. R. 357; P. v. Hawker, 152 Swampland Dist. v. Glide, 112 Cal. N. Y. 234, 46 N. E. R. 607; Phoenix 85, 44 Pac. R 451; Burns v. Woolery, Co. v. Shearman, 17 Tex. Civ. Ap. 15 Wash. 134, 45 Pao. R 894; Re 456, 43 S. W. R. 1063; First M. E. Heilbronn, 14 Wash. 536, 45 Pac. R. Church v. Fadden, 8 N. D. 162, 77 N. 153; Reed v. Swan, 133 Mo. 100, 34 W. R. 615.) & W. R 483; S. v. Kearney, 49 Neb. 4 Mercer v. S., 17 Ga. 146; Jacquins 337, 70 N. W. R 255; City Co. v. Rail. v. Com., 9 Cush. 279; Sampeyreac v. road Co., 166 U. S. 557, 41 L. ed1114; U. S., 7 Pet. 222 (but see P. v. CarWisdom v. Reeves, 110 Ala. 418, 18 S. nal, 2 Seld. 463, and P. v. Clark, 3 R 13.]
Seld. 385); Blair v. Cary, 9 Wis. 543; 18. v. Hays, 52 Mo. 578; 8. v. New McNamara v. Minnesota Cent. Ry. ark, 11 Vroom, 92; 8. v. Thompson, Co., 12 Minn. 388; Com. v. Bradley, 41 Mo. 25; Smith v. Humphrey, 2016 Gray, 241; Henschall v. Schmidtz, Mich. 398; P. V. Columbia, 43 N. Y. 60 Mo. 454; Walston v. Com., 16 B. 130; La Salle v. Blanchard, 1 Bradw. Mon. 15; Rivers v. Cole, 38 Iowa, 677; 635; Finney 1. Ackerman, 21 Wis. Brock v. Parker, 5 Ind. 538; Indian268; S. r. Ferguson, 62 Mo. 77. apolis v. Imberry, 17 Ind. 175. “ When
See Watkins v. Haight, 18 Johns. the effect of an enactment is to take 138; P. v. Carnal, 2 Seld. 463; P. away a right, prima facie it does not x. Clark, 3 Seld. 385; Von Schmidt apply to existing rights; but where r. Huntington, 1 Cal. 55; Adams v. it deals with procedure only, prima Chaplin, 1 Hill Ch. 265; Baldwin v. facie it applies to all actions pend. Newark , 9 Vroom, 158; Sturgis v. ing as well as future.” Kimbray v.
Draper, Law R. 3 Q. B. 160, 163, by * Post, $ 175; Gardner v. Lucas, 3 Blackburn, J., on the authority of Ap. Cas. 582, 601, 603; Rockwell v. Wright v. Hale, 6 H. & N. 227; [ButHubbell
, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 197, [45 Am. ler v. U. S. Loan Co., 97 Tenn. 679, 37 D. 246;) P. v. Peacock, 98 il. 172; S. W. R. 385; Golden City v. Hall
, 68 Edmonds v. Lawley, 6 M. & W. 285; Mo. Ap. 627.]
Hull, 48 Vt. 302
the rule for the litigation within it, gives way to the other and
least the better doctrine — is believed to be general, that, whenever the reason of the new law includes alike past transactions and future ones, and no injustice will result, and no constitutional restriction interposes, general words will be construed both retrospectively and prospectively. Of this sort, by the better opinion, are divorce laws. And –
Liquor laws.— A statute prohibiting the unlicensed sale of intoxicating liquors extends as well to those owned when it is enacted as to subsequent purchases. And one disqualifying
1 Bradford v. Barclay, 42 Ala. 375; Transfer of jurisdiction.—Where, Mann v. McAtee, 37 Cal. 11; Merwin after the commission of a felony, the v. Ballard, 66 N. C. 398; S. v. Smith, jurisdiction to punish it is trans38 Conn. 397; Simco v. S., 8 Tex. Ap. ferred from one court to another, 406; Lee v. Cook, 1 Wy. 413; Chaney the offender, if afterward arrested, v. S., 31 Ala. 342; Mabry v. Baxter, 11 , should be sent for trial to the latter Heisk. 682.
court. Ewing's Case, 5 Grat. 701. Wagers.-- Statutes restrictive of And see S. v. Solomons, 3 Hill (S. C.), suits on wagers are prospective only, 96. [Where a statute provides that not affecting transactions prior to statutes in derogation of the comtheir passage. Doolubdass v. Ram- mon law should be construed liberboll, 7 Moore P. C. 239, 15 Jur. 257, 3 ally, it does not apply to transacEng. L. & Eq. 39.
tions had under the old rule of strict And, generally, of rights of ac- construction. Westheimer v. Good. tion.- No statute, however broad its kind (Mont.), 60 Pac. R. 813.) words, will be construed to interfere 2 And see Tilton v. Swift, 40 Iowa, with existing rights of action, unless 78; Riggins v. S., 4 Kan. 173. Indeed, this intent is expressly stated. Ber- under some circumstances, it is reley v. Rampacher, 5 Duer, 183; Ruth- quired by the mere behests of justice erford v. Greene, 2 Wheat. 196. to give the statute a retrospective
Qualifications of jurors.— A stat- operation; then, by construction, it ute regulating the qualifications of will have such an operation if the jurors is applied as well to past as to words permit. Miller v. Graham, 17 subsequent offenses. Reid v. S., 20 Ohio St. 1; [Conn. Ins. Co. v. Talbot, Ga. 681.
113 Ind. 373, 14 N. E. R. 586; P. v. But, Costs.— In Missouri, a statute Spicer, 99 N. Y. 225, 1 N. E. R. 680; providing that, if the jury fail to de- Larkins v. Saffarans, 15 Fed. R. 147; clare by which party in a prosecu- Excelsior Mfg. Co. v. Keyser, 62 Miss. tion of a county the costs shall be 155; Baldwin v. Newark, 38 N. J. L. paid, the court shall render judg. 158.] ment for them against the prosecu- 81 Bishop, Mar., Div. & S., SS 1477tor, is held not to apply to a prose- 1486, 1487–1491. cution begun before its passage. S. * Com. v. Logan, 12 Gray, 136. v. Berry, 25 Mo. 355.
"every person convicted of felony" to be a retailer includes alike past and future convictions. So
Fencing railroad. A statutory mandate to railroads to fence lands taken for their track extends as well to existing as to subsequently chartered ones.?
$ 85. Ex post facto.- A statute which is ex post facto is rendered null by two clauses of the United States constitution, the one referring to the national and the other to the state legislative power. But —
Simply retrospective.— A statute may be retrospective without being ex post facto; and, when it is, if it does not impair the obligation of contracts,it does not violate the constitution of the United States. In some of the state constitutions there are provisions directly forbidding it, but in most there are not;s or, it is valid in some circumstances, and invalid in others.? In accord with what has been said, ' where such a statute is not constitutionally prohibited, the courts will give effect to its express terms; ' where it is, they will hold it void. Some of the distinctions are that,
§ 85a. Rights vested Not vested.- According to the terms or effect of most or all of our constitutions, a statute
1 Reg. v. Vine, Law R. 10 Q. B. 195; 226;] Comer v. Folsom, 13 Minn. 219; (P. v. Hawker, 152 N. Y. 234, 46 N. E. Wilson v. Buckman, 13 Minn. 411; R. 607. The time of taking effect of Tilton v. Swift, 40 Iowa, 78; S. v. the statute, and not the time of its Newark, 3 Dutcher, 185; S. v. Scudenactment, determines what is a past der, 3 Vroom, 203; Hess v. Johnson, 3 transaction. Galveston R. R. Co. v. W.Va. 645; Stine v. Bennett, 13 Minn. S., 81 Tex. 572, 17 S. W. R. 67.] 153; U. S. v. Samperyac, Hemp. 118;
? Wilder v. Maine Cent. R. R. Co., Stokes v. Rodman, 5 R. I. 405. 65 Me. 332, (20 Am. R. 698.] And see 7 Bruce v. Schuyler, 4 Gilman, 221, Gorman v. Pacific R. R. Co., 26 Mo. [46 Am. D. 447;] Gordon v. Inghram, 441
, [72 Am. D. 220;] Bank of Toledo i Grant (Pa.), 152; West Branch v. Toledo, 1 Ohio St. 622.
Broom Co. v. Dodge, 31 Pa. St. 285; Crim. Law, 1, $ 279; Const. U. S., Dillon v. Dougherty, 2 Grant (Pa.), 99; art. 1, $$ 9, 10; Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall
. 8. v. Atwood, 11 Wis. 422; Kennett's 386, 389; Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet. 88, Petition, 4 Fost. (N. H.) 139; McMan110; Bennett v. Boggs, Bald. 60, 74. ning v. Farrar, 46 Mo. 376.
* Reed v. Beall, 42 Miss. 274; Lane 8 Ante, & 83a. v. Nelson, 79 Pa. St. 407.
9 Barton v. Morris, 15 Ohio, 408; $1 Bishop, Mar., Div. & S., § 1487 New Orleans v. Clark, 95 U. S. 644; et seq.; S. v. Squires, 26 Iowa, 340; P. v. Ulster, 63 Barb. 83; Hagerstown Smith v. Van Gilder, 26 Ark. 527.
v. Sehner, 37 Md. 180. Crim. Law, 1, $ 279; Sedgwick v.
10 Bank of the State v. Cooper, 2 Bunker, 16 Kan 498; Kunkle v. Yerg. 599, [24 Am. D. 517.) Franklin, 13 Minn, 127, [97 Am. D.
cannot divest vested rights;' yet can take away such as are not vested.? And,
Remedy.— At the legislative pleasure it can change the remedy,' yet not to the denial of all remedy,' or even to such a reduction of it as will leave any essential part of the right practically unavailable."
$ 85b. Directing construction of statute.- The legislature cannot direct the courts how to construe a statute, so as to affect past transactions; for such construction is a judicial, not a legislative, question. But the direction, if in adequate terms, will operate as an amendment of the statute for cases on future facts.
1 Crim. Law, I, $ 279; post, § 178; Vroom, 350; Leggett v. Hunter, 19. Burch v. Newbury, 6 Seld. 374; Peters N. Y. 445; Mills v. Charleton, 29 Wis. v. Goulden, 27 Mich. 171. In England, 400, [9 Am. R. 578;] Barton v. School where there are no written constitu- Commissioners, Meigs, 585. [“ Withtions, a statute is not commonly con• out impairing the obligation of the strued to divest vested rights. Couch contract, the remedy may be modiv. Jeffries, 4 Bur. 2460, 2462; Moore v. fied as the wisdom of the nation may Phillips, 7 M. & W. 536; Gilmore v. direct." Marshall, C. J., in Sturges Shuter, T. Jones, 108; & C. nom. Hel. v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheaton, 122; more v. Shuter, 2 Show. 16.
Whitehead v. Latham, 83 N. C. 232.] 2 Harris v. Glenn, 56 Ga. 94; Rotten- 4 Post, $ 178; Seibert v. Copp, 63 berry v. Pipes, 53 Ala. 447; Leib v. Mo. 182; Fisher v. Cockerill, 5 T. B. Wilson, 51 Ind. 550; Ware v. Owens, Mon. 129. 42 Ala. 212, [94 Am. D. 642;] Coffin v. 5 Post, g 178; Holland v. Dickerson, S., 7 Ind. 157; Noel v. Ewing, 9 Ind. 41 Iowa, 367; Josephine v. S., 39 Miss. 37; Bachman v. Chrisman, 23 Pa. St. 613; Smith v. Morse, 2 Cal. 524; Mus. 162; P. v. Frisbie, 26 Cal. 135; Lan- grove v. Vicksburg, etc. R. R. Co., 50 guille v. S., 4 Tex. Ap. 312; Norfolk Miss. 677; Morton v. Valentine, 15 v. Chamberlaine, 29 Grat. 534; Sparks La. An. 150; Smith v. Packard, 12 v. Clapper, 30 Ind. 204.
Wis. 371; Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 3 Templeton v. Horne, 82 III. 491; U. S. 595; (Baldwin v. Newark, 38 N. Petition of Penniman, 11 R. I. 333; J. L. 158; Augusta Bank v. Augusta, Caperton v. Martin, 4 W. Va. 138, [6 49 Me. 507.] Am. R. 270;] Fullerton v. McArthur, 6 Dequindre v. Williams, 31 Ind. 1 Grant (Pa.), 232; S. v. Shumpert, 1 444; Union Iron Co. v. Pierce, 4 Bis. S. C. 85; Brown v. Gilmor, 8 Md. 322; 327; Haley v. Philadelphia, 68 Pa. St. Carnes v. Red River Parish, 29 La. 45, [8 Am. R. 153;] The Governor v. An. 608; Young v. Ledrick, 14 Kan. Porter, 5 Humph. 165; Kelsey v. Ken92; Smith v. Judge, 17 Cal. 547; Ten- dall, 48 Vt. 24; P. v. New York, 16 nessee v. Sneed, 96 U. S. 69; Harde. N. Y. 424; Cambridge v. Boston, 130 man v, Downer, 39 Ga. 425; Fearing Mass. 357; U. S. v. Gilmore, 8 Wall. v. Irwin, 55 N. Y. 486; Bacon v. How- 330; (Lambertson v. Hogan, 2 Pa St. ard, 20 How. (U. S.) 22; S. v. Union, 4 25; Salters v. Tobias, 3 Paige, 338.]
CONSTRUING THE VARIOUS LAWS TOGETHER.
$ 86. Here - Elsewhere (Importance of doctrine).Having already called to mind the doctrine, in its general terms, that all laws are to be construed together as parts of one whole,' we shall in this chapter descend a little into detail; presenting the chief fragmentary forms of the doctrine, and drawing its bounds. In a chapter further on, we shall see, through the help of lines of decisions projected through the legal field, something of the immensity of the conservative force of this doctrine in our jurisprudence, and its overwhelming importance in interpretation.
Full doctrine defined.— The completed doctrine, resulting from a bringing together of its parts, is that all laws, written and unwritten, of whatever sorts and at whatever different dates established, are to be construed together, contracting, expanding, limiting, and extending one another into one system of jurisprudence, as nearly harmonious and rounded as it can be made without violating unyielding written or unwrit
Some of the parts. The emergencies of particular cases do not, in the majority of instances, call for a consideration of the full doctrine, as thus defined. Sometimes it is only necessary to bear in mind that all the parts of the one statute, or the enacting part and the preamble, or some two or more sections or clauses, are to be read and construed together;: sometimes,
1 Ante, SS 5–10, 82. 2 Post, $ 122 et seq.
statute has been said to be to look
into the whole and every part of it, • Ante, $ 82; Rex v. Palmer, 1 the apparent intention derived from Leach, 352, 355; Holbrook v. Hol- the whole, the subject-matter, the brook, 1 Pick. 248; Burke v. Monroe, effects and consequences, and its rea77 DL 610; St. Peter's Church v.
son and spirit; and the meaning of Scott, 12 Minn. 895; Crone v. 8., 49 the legislature thus ascertained will
prevail, though in conflict with the More broadly expressed. – The literal sense of the words. Ryegate true rule for the construction of a v. Wardsboro, 30 Vt. 746; [Stump v.