the rule for the litigation within it, gives way to the other and general rule.

Again,

§ 84a. Reason of the law-(Divorce).- The doctrine - at least the better doctrine-is believed to be general, that, whenever the reason of the new law includes alike past transactions and future ones, and no injustice will result, and no constitutional restriction interposes, general words will be construed both retrospectively and prospectively. Of this sort,

by the better opinion, are divorce laws. And

Liquor laws.-A statute prohibiting the unlicensed sale of intoxicating liquors extends as well to those owned when it is enacted as to subsequent purchases.

1 Bradford v. Barclay, 42 Ala. 375; Mann v. McAtee, 37 Cal. 11; Merwin v. Ballard, 66 N. C. 398; S. v. Smith, 38 Conn. 397; Simco v. S., 8 Tex. Ap. 406; Lee v. Cook, 1 Wy. 413; Chaney v. S., 31 Ala. 342; Mabry v. Baxter, 11, Heisk. 682.

Wagers. Statutes restrictive of suits on wagers are prospective only, not affecting transactions prior to their passage. Doolubdass v. Ramboll, 7 Moore P. C. 239, 15 Jur. 257, 8 Eng. L. & Eq. 39.

And, generally, of rights of action.- No statute, however broad its words, will be construed to interfere with existing rights of action, unless this intent is expressly stated. Berley v. Rampacher, 5 Duer, 183; Rutherford v. Greene, 2 Wheat. 196.

Qualifications of jurors.- A statute regulating the qualifications of jurors is applied as well to past as to subsequent offenses. Reid v. S., 20 Ga. 681.

And one disqualifying

Transfer of jurisdiction.-Where, after the commission of a felony, the jurisdiction to punish it is transferred from one court to another, the offender, if afterward arrested, should be sent for trial to the latter court. Ewing's Case, 5 Grat. 701. And see S. v. Solomons, 3 Hill (S. C.), 96. [Where a statute provides that statutes in derogation of the common law should be construed liberally, it does not apply to transactions had under the old rule of strict construction. Westheimer v. Goodkind (Mont.), 60 Pac. R. 813.]

2 And see Tilton v. Swift, 40 Iowa, 78; Riggins v. S., 4 Kan. 173. Indeed, under some circumstances, it is required by the mere behests of justice to give the statute a retrospective operation; then, by construction, it will have such an operation if the words permit. Miller v. Graham, 17 Ohio St. 1; [Conn. Ins. Co. v. Talbot, 113 Ind. 373, 14 N. E. R. 586; P. v. Spicer, 99 N. Y. 225, 1 N. E. R. 680; Larkins v. Saffarans, 15 Fed. R. 147; Excelsior Mfg. Co. v. Keyser, 62 Miss. 155; Baldwin v. Newark, 38 N. J. L. 158.]

$1 Bishop, Mar., Div. & S., §§ 1477– 1486, 1487–1491.

4 Com. v. Logan, 12 Gray, 136.

"every person convicted of felony" to be a retailer includes alike past and future convictions.1 So

Fencing railroad.-A statutory mandate to railroads to fence lands taken for their track extends as well to existing as to subsequently chartered ones.2

§ 85. Ex post facto.-A statute which is ex post facto is rendered null by two clauses of the United States constitution, the one referring to the national and the other to the state legislative power. But

6

Simply retrospective.—A statute may be retrospective without being ex post facto; and, when it is, if it does not impair the obligation of contracts, it does not violate the constitution of the United States. In some of the state constitutions there are provisions directly forbidding it, but in most there are not; " or, it is valid in some circumstances, and invalid in others." In accord with what has been said, where such a statute is not constitutionally prohibited, the courts will give effect to its express terms; where it is, they will hold it void.10 Some of the distinctions are that,§ 85a. Rights vested - Not vested. According to the terms or effect of most or all of our constitutions, a statute 226;] Comer v. Folsom, 13 Minn. 219; Wilson v. Buckman, 13 Minn. 441; Tilton v. Swift, 40 Iowa, 78; S. v. Newark, 3 Dutcher, 185; S. v. Scudder, 3 Vroom, 203; Hess v. Johnson, 3 W.Va. 645; Stine v. Bennett, 13 Minn. 153; U. S. v. Samperyac, Hemp. 118; Stokes v. Rodman, 5 R. I. 405.

1 Reg. v. Vine, Law R. 10 Q. B. 195; [P. v. Hawker, 152 N. Y. 234, 46 N. E. R. 607. The time of taking effect of the statute, and not the time of its enactment, determines what is a past transaction. Galveston R. R. Co. v. S., 81 Tex. 572, 17 S. W. R. 67.]

2Wilder v. Maine Cent. R. R. Co., 65 Me. 332, [20 Am. R. 698.] And see Gorman v. Pacific R. R. Co., 26 Mo. 441, [72 Am. D. 220;] Bank of Toledo v. Toledo, 1 Ohio St. 622.

3 Crim. Law, I, § 279; Const. U. S., art. 1, § 9, 10; Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 389; Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet. 88, 110; Bennett v. Boggs, Bald. 60, 74. 4 Reed v. Beall, 42 Miss. 274; Lane v. Nelson, 79 Pa. St. 407.

1 Bishop, Mar., Div. & S., § 1487 et seq.; S. v. Squires, 26 Iowa, 340; Smith v. Van Gilder, 26 Ark. 527.

6 Crim. Law, I, § 279; Sedgwick v. Bunker, 16 Kan. 498; Kunkle v. Franklin, 13 Minn. 127, [97 Am. D.

7 Bruce v. Schuyler, 4 Gilman, 221, [46 Am. D. 447;] Gordon v. Inghram, 1 Grant (Pa.), 152; West Branch Broom Co. v. Dodge, 31 Pa. St. 285; Dillon v. Dougherty, 2 Grant (Pa.), 99; S. v. Atwood, 11 Wis. 422; Kennett's Petition, 4 Fost. (N. H.) 139; McManning v. Farrar, 46 Mo. 376.

8 Ante, § 83a.

9 Barton v. Morris, 15 Ohio, 408; New Orleans v. Clark, 95 U. S. 644; P. v. Ulster, 63 Barb. 83; Hagerstown v. Sehner, 37 Md. 180.

10 Bank of the State v. Cooper, 2 Yerg. 599, [24 Am. D. 517.]

cannot divest vested rights;' yet can take away such as are not vested.

Remedy. At the legislative pleasure it can change the remedy, yet not to the denial of all remedy, or even to such a reduction of it as will leave any essential part of the right practically unavailable."

§ 85b. Directing construction of statute.- The legislature cannot direct the courts how to construe a statute, so as to affect past transactions; for such construction is a judicial, not a legislative, question. But the direction, if in adequate terms, will operate as an amendment of the statute for cases on future facts.R

༣

CHAPTER XI.

CONSTRUING THE VARIOUS LAWS TOGETHER.

$86. Here

Elsewhere (Importance of doctrine).— Having already called to mind the doctrine, in its general terms, that all laws are to be construed together as parts of one whole,' we shall in this chapter descend a little into detail; presenting the chief fragmentary forms of the doctrine, and drawing its bounds. In a chapter further on, we shall see, through the help of lines of decisions projected through the legal field, something of the immensity of the conservative force of this doctrine in our jurisprudence, and its overwhelming importance in interpretation.

-

Full doctrine defined. The completed doctrine, resulting from a bringing together of its parts, is that all laws, written and unwritten, of whatever sorts and at whatever different dates established, are to be construed together, contracting, expanding, limiting, and extending one another into one system of jurisprudence, as nearly harmonious and rounded as it can be made without violating unyielding written or unwritten terms.

Some of the parts.-The emergencies of particular cases do not, in the majority of instances, call for a consideration of the full doctrine, as thus defined. Sometimes it is only necessary to bear in mind that all the parts of the one statute, or the enacting part and the preamble, or some two or more sections or clauses, are to be read and construed together; sometimes,

that the original act and its amendments are to be interpreted as one, no portion of either being left inoperative, if without violence to the words effect can be given to the whole;1 sometimes, that a subsequent statute may be looked into for help in discovering the true intent of an earlier one,2-a doctrine to be received with caution, and limited in its application; sometimes, that all acts passed at the same session will be construed as one;' or that all passed on the same day will be; or that, when a statute is made in addition to another on the same subject, without repealing any part of it, both are to be considered together." But the cases equally admit of wider forms of expression; as, that all acts on the same subject, termed in pari materia, including even those which are repealed, are to be interpreted together, and, as far as may be, in harmony with one another."

Hornback, 94 Mo. 26, 6 S. W. R. 356; Chicago R. R. Co. v. Zernecke (Neb.), 82 N. W. R. 26; Standard Co. v. Fox, 85 Ill. Ap. 389.

1 Harrell v. Harrell, 8 Fla. 46; Robbins v. Omnibus R. R. Co., 32 Cal. 472; Griffin's Case, Chase Dec. 364.

v. P., 47 N. Y. 330; Forqueran v. Donnally, 7 W. Va. 114; Bryant v. Livermore, 20 Minn. 313; Rex v. Palmer, supra, at p. 355; Ex parte Copeland, 2 De G., M. & G. 914; McWilliam v. Adams, 1 Macq. Ap. Cas. 120; Tennyson v. Yarborough, 7 Moore, 258, 1

2 McAfee v. Southern R. R. Co., 36 Bing. 24; Bradshaw v. U. S., 14 Ct. of Miss. 669.

Cain v. S., 20 Tex. 355; S. v. Rack ley, 2 Blackf. 249. And see Atty. Gen. v. Brown, 1 Wis. 513.

P. v. Jackson, 30 Cal. 427. And see Fouke v. Fleming, 13 Md. 392; Planters' Bank v. Black, 11 Sm. & M. 43.

844.

Cl. 145; Mobile, etc. R. R. Co. v. Malone, 46 Ala. 391; Com. v. Brennan, 103 Mass. 70; S. v. Lisles, 58 Mo. 359; S. v. Currie, 35 Tex. 17; Com. v. Desmond, 123 Mass. 407; [Gartner v. Cohen, 51 N. J. L. 125, 16 Atl. R. 684; S. v. Babcock, 21 Neb. 599, 33 N. W. R. 247; Hurt v. R. R. Co., 121 Ill. 644,

Pearce v. Atwood, 13 Mass. 324, 19 L. R. A. 649, 13 N. E. R. 176; Daw

Ante, § 82; post, § 124; S. v. Commissioner of Railroad Taxation, 8 Vroom, 228; Merrill v. Gorham, 6 Cal. 41; U. S. v. Collier, 3 Blatch. 325; Bryan v. Dennis, 4 Fla. 445; Wake field v. Phelps, 37 N. H. 295; Harrison v. Walker, 1 Kelly, 32; Billingslea v. Baldwin, 23 Md. 85; McLaughlin v. Hoover, 1 Oreg. 31; Reg. v. St. Giles, 3 Ellis & E. 224; Mitchell v. Duncan, 7 Fla. 13; Bruce v. Schuyler, 4 Gilman, 221, [46 Am. D. 447;] Isham v. Bennington Iron Co., 19 Vt. 230; Smith

son County v. Clark, 58 Neb. 756, 79 N. W. R. 822; Noerr v. Schmidt, 151 Ind. 579, 51 N. E. R. 332. Statutes relating to the same thing or to the same general subject-matter are in pari materia, and must be construed together no matter when passed. S. v. Gerhardt, 145 Ind. 439, 44 N. E. R. 469; S. v. Klein, 116 Mo. 259, 22 S. W. R. 693; Cooper v. Ferguson, 113 U. S. 727, 28 L. ed. 1137; U. S. v. TransMissouri Co., 58 Fed. R. 58; Syracuse Water Co. v. Syracuse, 116 N. Y. 167, 22 N. E. R. 381; P. v. Raymond, 18