In the process of its acquisition of rights of sovereignty over the Island of Tutuila and adjacent islands in the Samoan group, the United States seems to have had recourse to intervention, in so far as it caused the Samoans to accept the form of government prescribed by the General Act of the Conference at Berlin in 1889,1 to yield to a cessation of hostilities in the fight for the kingship, and to bow to the tri-partite agreement of 1899, concluded by the United States with Great Britain and Germany. It was by virtue of British and German renunciations therein of territorial pretensions, rather than by any other means, that the United States appears to have perfected its rights. No native government in those islands seems to have been regarded at that time as possessed of rights of political independence or of property and control which the parties to the arrangement regarded themselves as obliged to respect.3

ment, and his opinion that the United States should proceed to employ such means as might be necessary to secure that result. Those powers were, accordingly, called upon to exert their influence to impress upon Huerta the wisdom of retiring in the interest of peace and constitutional government in Mexico. For. Rel. 1913, 856.

1 President Cleveland, Annual Message, Dec. 3, 1894, For. Rel. 1894, xv-xvi, Moore, Dig., I, 548. For the text of the General Act for the Neutrality and Autonomous Government of the Samoan Islands, concluded June 14, 1889, by the United States, Great Britain and Germany, see Malloy's Treaties, II, 1576.

* Malloy's Treaties, II, 1595.

See, generally, documents in Moore, Dig., I, 536–554.

DEMANDS OF THE ALLIED POWERS ON CHINA FOLLOWING THE BOXER TROUBLES OF 1900. Following the military operations of the allied expedition in China in 1900, to raise the siege of the legations at Peking, the United States in conjunction with Austria-Hungary, Belgium, France, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia and Spain, compelled China to yield to heavy demands. These embraced not only various forms of reparation for wrongs sustained in the course of the so-called "Boxer" troubles, but also measures specially designed to prevent a recurrence of acts such as had been committed. These measures, which were embodied in the final protocol of Sept. 7, 1901, Malloy's Treaties, II, 2006, involved the relinquishment by China of certain important rights. Thus she was obliged to yield the special reservation of the so-called Legation quarter in Peking, together with the exclusive control thereof, embracing the fullest right of defense, to the interested Powers. Art. VII. She was forced to consent to the razing of the forts at Taku and those which might impede free communication between Peking and the sea, Art. VIII, and the occupation by the Powers of certain points for the maintenance of communication between the capital and the sea. Art. IX. She was compelled to agree to prohibit the importation of arms and ammunition, as well as materials used exclusively in their manufacture. Art. V. She was obliged also to transform her Office of Foreign Affairs (Tsungli Yamen) into a Ministry of Foreign Affairs on lines indicated by the Powers, and to give it precedence over the other six Ministries of State, and simultaneously modify the existing ceremonial respecting the reception of foreign diplomatic representatives. Art. XII. Save for these and kindred concessions, the United States had, however, no design which was at variance with the policy announced by Secretary Hay in July, 1900, and which aimed to "preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity." For. Rel. 1900, 299. The interference with the political

The nature and extent of the right asserted by the United States to restrict the freedom of action of foreign powers with respect to certain forms of action affecting States of the American continents, and by virtue of what is known as the Monroe Doctrine, require separate examination.1

h

§ 84. The League of Nations and Intervention.

The Covenant of the League of Nations, in so far as it establishes a right of interference in case of a breach of the agreement by a member of the League, as manifested, for example, in aggression against the territorial integrity or political independence of a member,2 or in disregard of the undertaking not to resort to war under specified conditions,3 is not at variance with any principle of international law pertaining to intervention. It is the consent to interference under the contingencies set forth in the compact which prevents such action when taken against any member proving to be a covenant-breaker from resembling the case where external opposition is in plain defiance of the will of the State which is thwarted,

A different situation is contemplated, however, when it is designed to compel a State which has not accepted the Covenant to refrain from action which as an independent sovereign it sees fit to take. According to Article XVII of the Covenant, in the event of a dispute between a member of the League and a State which is not a member, if the latter refuses the invitation (which is to be made to it upon such conditions as the Council of the

independence of China, manifested in the demands made of her, was a natural incident or consequence of the military expedition of the Powers to relieve the legations, and was necessitated by the nature and extent of the disturbances which led to that expedition. Concerning events which preceded the raising of the siege of the legations, see Landing of Foreign Forces, infra, § 202.

1 The United States at various times objected to the exercise of a protectorate by Great Britain over the Mosquito Indians, on the ground that such action was in violation of the convention between the United States and Great Britain of April 19, 1850, known as the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, as well as in conflict with the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine. See statement of Mr. Buchanan, Minister to Great Britain for the Earl of Clarendon, Jan. 6, 1854, Brit. and For. State Pap., XLVI, 244, 247, H. Ex. Doc. 1, 34 Cong., 1 Sess. 55, Moore, Dig., III, 154, 159; statement of Lord Clarendon for Mr. Buchanan, May 2, 1854, Brit. and For. State Pap., XLVI, 255, H. Ex. Doc. 1, 34 Cong., Í Sess., 80, Moore, Dig., III, 161; Memorandum of General Cass, Secy. of State, of conversations with M. Sartiges, Dec. 1, 1858, MS. Inst. Am. States, XVI, 22, Moore, Dig., III, 178, note; Mr. Bayard, Secy. of State, to Mr. Phelps, Minister to Great Britain, Nov. 23, 1888, For. Rel. 1888, I, 759–767, Moore, Dig., III, 227, 236.

2 Art. X.

3 Arts. XII and XV.

League may deem just) to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of adjusting the dispute, and resorts to war against a member of the League, the war-waging State exposes itself to the drastic measures to be applied by the League and its several members against a covenant-breaker.1 In a word, the States constituting and adhering to the League assert the right to interfere with and prevent the making of war by an outside power upon one of their members save under contingencies which they prescribe. These deserve attention. War is in no case to be made until three months after an arbitral award or a report by the Council of the League. If arbitration is in fact avoided, the issue must be referred to the Council whose report, with its recommendations for the just settlement of the controversy, if unanimously agreed to by the members thereof other than the representatives of the parties to the controversy, deprives the losing State of the right to go to war with its adversary complying with those recommendations. It is the right of an outside State to refuse to submit to such procedure, with the incidental obligation not to fight under such a contingency, which the members of the League of Nations appear to challenge. Technically their interference with such a State must be regarded as amounting to intervention, the propriety of which on principle would depend upon the merits of the particular case, unless it be admitted that the States constituting the League may by virtue of their organization alter the principles of international law. The United States is not as yet prepared to make such an admission.

7

THE MONROE DOCTRINE

§ 85. Preliminary.

a

In examining the practice of the United States in attempting to check the conduct of foreign powers by reason of its special relation to States or territory situated in the Western Hemisphere, the attempt is here made primarily to observe the precise charac

1 Art. XVI. Art. XVII also provides that if both parties to a dispute, when so invited, refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, the Council may take such measures and make such recommendations as will prevent hostilities and will result in the settlement of the dispute. This provision would appear to cover the case where neither party to the controversy is a member of the League.

2 Arts. XII and XV.

ter of acts which have been thwarted, the grounds relied upon in justification of interference, and the mode by which such action has been taken.1 It is not sought to trace the development of a national policy, or to emphasize the extent of the divergence between current interpretations of it and those of 1823. The purpose is rather to take full note of the magnitude of the claims of the United States, however much they may differ from those once put forward in its behalf, and to perceive the legal theory on which they rest.

It has seemed important to observe also the relation of what is asserted by virtue of the Monroe Doctrine, both to international law and to the Covenant of the League of Nations.

§ 86. Prior Events.

b

Some time before President Monroe gave utterance to the policy expressed in his message of December 2, 1823, American statesmen had not infrequently declared that the United States could not, for reasons of self-defense, look with indifference upon certain

1 For bibliographies of the extensive literature dealing with the Monroe Doctrine, see Library of Congress, List of References on the Monroe Doctrine, compiled under direction of Herman H. B. Meyer, Chief Bibliographer, Washington, 1919; also Albert Bushnell Hart, The Monroe Doctrine: An Interpretation, Boston, 1916, 405-421; Herbert Kraus, Die Monroedoktrin, Berlin, 1913, 19-36; Edith M. Phelps, Selected Articles on the Monroe Doctrine, 2 ed., New York, 1916, XVII-XXXIII. These bibliographies are

mentioned in the Library of Congress, List of References.

For documents relative to the origin of the Monroe Doctrine, see collection by Worthington C. Ford from among the papers of John Quincy Adams and from the Department of State, published in Proceedings of Massachusetts Hist. Soc., XV, 373-429; also Moore, Dig., VI, 369-412; Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, comprising portions of his diary from 1795-1848, edited by Charles Francis Adams, Philadelphia, 1875, Vol. VI. The messages and addresses of the Presidents and the diplomatic correspondence of the United States contain the views of responsible American statesmen.

Among the numerous works touching the subject, the few following, which reveal a diversity of views, may be noted: Archibald Cary Coolidge, The United States as a World Power, New York, 1908 (reprinted 1919), 95-120; Thomas Benton Edgington, The Monroe Doctrine, Boston, 1905; John W. Foster, A Century of American Diplomacy, Boston, 1900, 438-478; Albert Bushnell Hart, The_Monroe Doctrine: An Interpretation, Boston, 1916 ; William Isaac Hull, The Monroe Doctrine: National or International? New York, 1915; Herbert Kraus, Die Monroedoktrin in ihren Beziehungen zur amerikanischen Diplomatie und zum Völkerrecht, Berlin, 1913; John Bassett Moore, Principles of American Diplomacy, New York, 1918, Chap. VI; Hector Pétin, Les États-Unis et la doctrine de Monroe, Paris, 1900; William F. Reddaway, The Monroe Doctrine, 2 ed., New York, 1905; Charles H. Sherrill, Modernizing the Monroe Doctrine, Boston, 1916; George F. Tucker, The Monroe Doctrine, Boston, 1885; Hiram Bingham, The Monroe Doctrine: An Obsolete Shibboleth, New Haven, 1915. See, also, series of papers concerning the Monroe Doctrine in Annals of American Academy of Pol. and Soc. Science, entitled "International Relations of the United States", July, 1914, LIV, Part 1; also another series in Proceedings, Am. Soc. Int. Law, 1914, Vol. VIII.

action of European States with reference to the American continents. It was the possible transfer of American colonial possessions by one European power to another, which seems to have been a cause of special anxiety.1

Before the close of the year 1823, the United States had witnessed a series of events in Europe which were productive of grave alarm. As a result of the Holy Alliance of September 26, 1815,2 and of the subsequent Conferences of Aix-la-Chapelle, Troppau and Laybach, the Allied Powers of Europe had not only declared themselves possessed of the right to overthrow governments founded on revolution, but had also proceeded to act upon that principle. In 1822 revolutions in Naples and Piedmont had been suppressed. The following year, in pursuance of an understanding agreed upon at the Congress of Verona in 1822, France had overthrown the constitutional government in Spain, and had reëstablished the Monarchy of Ferdinand VII. It had, furthermore, been made known to the United States by Mr. Canning, the British Foreign Secretary, that upon the achievement of military objects in Spain, proposal would be made for a consultation of the Allies concerning affairs in Spanish-America; that a concerted movement to enable Spain to regain control over her revolutionary colonies in America was to be anticipated., Mr. Canning had

1 Mr. King, Minister to Great Britain, to the Secy. of State, June 1, 1801, Am. St. Pap., For. Rel., II, 509, Moore, Dig., VI, 370; President Jefferson to the Governor of Louisiana, Oct. 29, 1808, Ford's Writings of Jefferson, IX, 212, Moore, Dig., VI, 371.

In pursuance of a recommendation of President Madison, Congress resolved January 15, 1811, that by reason of "the influence which the destiny of the territory adjoining the southern border of the United States may have upon their security, tranquillity and commerce", the United States could not "without serious inquietude, see any part of the said territory pass into the hands of any foreign power", and that regard for the safety of the United States compelled provision under certain contingencies for the temporary occupation of East Florida by the United States. The President was, therefore, authorized to take possession of East Florida in case an arrangement had been made for the transfer of its possession, or in the event of its occupation by a foreign State. His employment of the army and navy of the United States was further authorized, and $100,000 was appropriated to defray expenses. 3 Stat. 471; Am. St. Pap., For. Rel., III, 571; Moore, Dig., VÍ,

372.

2 Brit. and For. State Papers, III, 211.

3 Concerning the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, which was held in 1818, see Nouv. Rec., IV, 549–566. The Conference at Troppau convened in October, 1820, and was removed later to Laybach. See, in this connection, Woolsey, 6 ed., § 47; also Mr. Adams, Secy. of State, to Mr. Thompson, Secy. of Navy, May 20, 1819, 17 MS. Dom. Let. 304, Moore, Dig., VI, 375; Same to Mr. Middleton, American Minister to Russia, No. 1, July 5, 1820, MS. Inst. to U. S. Ministers, IX, 18, Moore, Dig., VI, 376.

The Congress of Verona occurred in the autumn of 1822.

5 Mr. Canning, to Mr. Rush, "private and confidential", Aug. 23, 1823, Moore, Dig., VI, 392.