Opinion of the Court. UNITED STATES v. COE. APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF PRIVATE LAND CLAIMS. No. 8 of October term, 1897. Petition for rehearing submitted June 29, 1898. -Denied May 22, 1899. A petition for the rehearing of this case, which was decided May 23, 1898, and is reported 170 U. S. 681, is denied, on the ground that, after a careful reëxamination of the record, the court adheres to the judgment heretofore rendered, remaining of the opinion that from and after the adoption of the Mexican constitution of 1836, no power existed in the separate states to make such a grant as the one in this case. THIS was a motion for leave to file a petition for a rehearing of a case decided at October term, 1897, and reported in volume 170 U. S. at page 681. Mr. Amos Steck for petitioner. Mr. A. M. Stevenson and Mr. John F. Shafroth opposing. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER delivered the opinion of the court. After a careful reëxamination of this record we adhere to the judgment heretofore rendered, and the petition for rehear ing must be denied. In the opinion heretofore delivered, and reported 170 U. S. 681, it was stated that a grant from the state of Sonora was relied on and not a grant from the Mexican government. This was in accordance with the petition originally filed, but it appears that it had been stipulated and agreed below between counsel for the Government and the claimant that the petition should be considered as amended so as to claim title from both the nation and the state. That stipulation, however, did not appear in the record, but this was not material, as we did not regard the grant, whichever its alleged source, as a valid one, for the reasons given. We remain of opinion that, from and after the adoption of the constitution of 1836, no power existed in the separate Opinion of the Court. states to make such a grant as this. Camou v. United States, 171 U. S. 277, related to a grant made prior to 1836, and ruled nothing to the contrary of the decision in this case. Construing the various applicable statutes and decrees in relation to the sale of public lands, which were in force April 12, 1838, the date of the alleged grant, together, we think it clear that the Board of Sales which assumed to act in this matter had no power to sell and convey these lands so as to vest the purchaser with title, unless the sale was approved by the general government, and that it was not so approved. Furthermore, this Board of Sales did not assume to comply with the requirements of the law in making this sale. The members of the board really professed to be officers of the State, and to act for the State, although the grant was declared to be made in the "name of the free, independent and sovereign State of Sonora as well as of the august Mexican government." But it seems to us that they referred to the nation as it existed under the Federal system of 1824, as contradistinguished from the supreme central system that was in existence in 1838. We understand that when this grant purports to have been made, the officers and people of Sonora were undertaking to carry on their government as a sovereign and independent State under the national constitution of 1824 and the laws passed thereunder, as well as the state constitution of 1825, and subsequent laws, in violation of the national constitution of 1836 and the laws promulgated under that instrument. This refusal to recognize their constitutional obligations put them in antagonism to the general government, and, although appellee's counsel deny that Sonora was in rebellion, and say that at the time of the sale she "was a conservative protestant against the dictatorial proceedings which gave rise to the central system," we cannot agree that this sale was conducted in accordance with the paramount law, and it does not appear that the national government ever ratified or approved the grant. The various constitutions and laws bearing on the subject are set out in our previous opinion, and also to a considerable extent repeated in Faxon v. United States, 171 U. S. 244. Petition denied. Opinion of the Court. MISSOURI, KANSAS AND TEXAS RAILWAY COMPANY v. McCANN. ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI. No. 11. Argued October 11, 1898. Decided May 22, 1899. Section 944 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri of 1889, provided that, "Whenever any property is received by a common carrier to be transferred from one place to another, within or without this State, or when a railroad or other transportation company issues receipts or bills of lading in this State, the common carrier, railroad or transportation company issuing such bill of lading shall be liable for any loss, damage or injury to such property, caused by its negligence or the negligence of any other common carrier, railroad or transportation company to which such property may be delivered, or over whose line such property may pass; and the common carrier, railroad or transportation company issuing any such receipt or bill of lading shall be entitled to recover, in a proper action, the amount of any loss, damage or injury it may be required to pay to the owner of such property, from the common carrier, railroad or transportation company, through whose negligence the loss, damage or injury may be sustained." In commenting on this statute the Supreme Court of Missouri said: "The provision of the statute is that 'wherever property is received by a common carrier to be transferred from one place to another.' This language does not restrict, but rather recognizes the right of the carrier to limit its contract of carriage to the end of its own route, and there deliver the property to the connecting carrier. There can be no doubt, then, that under the statute, as well as under the English law, the carrier can, by contract, limit its duty and obligation to carriage over its own route." Held, That the statute as thus interpreted could not be held to be repugnant to the Constitution of the United States. THE statement of the case will be found in the opinion of the court. Mr. George P. B. Jackson for plaintiff in error. Mr. J. H. Rodes for defendants in error. Mr. R. B. Bristow and Mr. Charles E. Yeater were on his brief. MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the court. A statute of the State of Missouri, found in the Revised Statutes of that State, 1889, c. 26, reads as follows: Opinion of the Court. "SEC. 944. Whenever any property is received by a common carrier to be transferred from one place to another, within or without this State, or when a railroad or other transportation company issues receipts or bills of lading in this State, the common carrier, railroad or transportation company issuing such bill of lading shall be liable for any loss, damage or injury to such property, caused by its negligence or the negligence of any other common carrier, railroad or transportation company to which such property may be delivered, or over whose line such property may pass ; and the common carrier, railroad or transportation company issuing any such receipt or bill of lading shall be entitled to recover, in a proper action, the amount of any loss, damage or injury it may be required to pay to the owner of such property, from the common carrier, railroad or transportation company, through whose negligence the loss, damage or injury may be sustained." Whilst this statute was in force the defendants in error shipped from Stoutsville in the State of Missouri, on the line of the Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railway, to Chicago, Illinois, which was beyond the line of that road, ninety-nine head of cattle. At the time of the shipment a bill of lading was delivered to the shippers. The portions of the contract pertinent to the questions here arising for consideration are as follows: "This agreement made between George A. Eddy and H. C. Cross, receivers of the Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railway, parties of the first part, and M. B. Smizer, party of the second part, witnesseth that whereas the receivers of the Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railway transport the live stock as per above rules and regulations, and which are hereby made a part of this contract, by mutual agreement between the parties hereto; now, therefore, for the consideration and mutual covenants and conditions herein contained, said party of the first part is to transport for the second party the live stock described below, and the parties in charge thereof, as hereinafter provided, namely: six cars said to contain 95 head of cattle m. or l. o. r. from Stouts Opinion of the Court. ville Station, Missouri, to Chicago, Illinois, station, consigned to Brown Bros. & Smith, care Union stock yards at Chicago, Illinois, at the through rate of 173c. per hundred pounds, from Stoutsville, Missouri, to Chicago, Illinois, subject to minimum weights applying to cars of various lengths as per tariff rules in effect on the day of shipment, the same being. a special rate, lower than the regular rates, or at a rate mutually agreed upon between the parties, for and in consideration of which said second party hereby covenants and agrees as follows: "1st. That he hereby releases the party of the first part from the liability of common carrier in the transportation of said stock, and agrees that such liability shall be that of a mere forwarder or private carrier for hire. He also hereby agrees to waive release, and does hereby release, said first party from any and all liability for and on account of any delay in shipping said stock, after the delivery thereof to its agent, and from any delay in receiving same after being tendered to its agent." * * * * * "4th. That the said second party for the consideration aforesaid, hereby assumes, and releases said first party from risk of injury or loss which may be sustained by reason of any delay in the transportation of said stock caused by any mob, strike, threatened or actual violence to person or property, from any source; failure of machinery or cars, injury to track or yards, storms, floods, escape or robbery of any stock, overloading cars, fright of animals, or crowding one upon another, or any and all other causes except the negligence of said first party, and said negligence not to be assumed, but to be proved by the said party of the second part." * * * * * "13th. And it is further stipulated and agreed between the parties hereto, that in case the live stock mentioned herein is to be transported over the road or roads of any other railroad company, the said party of the first part shall be released from liability of every kind after said live stock shall have left its road, and the party of the second part |