Opinion of the Court.

of the bond, which the facts stated show that it was not, it follows that when he actually did come back to Michigan he had lost his exemption.

But we cannot concur in this view. The treaty and statute secured to Cosgrove a reasonable time to return to the country from which he was surrendered, after his discharge from custody or imprisonment for or on account of the offence for which he had been extradited, and at the time of this arrest he had not been so discharged by reason of acquittal; or conviction and compliance with sentence; or the termination of the state prosecution in any way. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U. S. 407, 433.

The mere fact that he went to Canada did not in itself put an end to the prosecution or to the custody in which he was held by his bail, or even authorize the bail to be forfeited, and when he reëntered Michigan he was as much subject to the compulsion of his sureties as if he had not been absent.

In Taylor v. Taintor, 16 Wall. 366, 371, Mr. Justice Swayne, speaking for the court, said: "When bail is given, the principal is regarded as delivered to the custody of his sureties. Their dominion is a continuance of the original imprisonment. Whenever they choose to do so, they may seize him and deliver him up in their discharge; and if that cannot be done at once, they may imprison him until it can be done. They may exercise their rights in person or by agent. They may pursue him into another State; may arrest him on the Sabbath; and, if necessary, may break and enter his house for that purpose. The seizure is not made by virtue of new process. None is needed. It is likened to the rearrest by the sheriff of an escaping prisoner. In 6 Modern, 231, it is said: The bail have their principal on a string, and may pull the string whenever they please, and render him in their discharge.' The rights of the bail in civil and criminal cases are the same. They may doubtless permit him to go beyond the limits of the State within which he is to answer, but it is unwise and imprudent to do so; and if any evil ensue, they must bear the burden of the consequences, and cannot cast them upon the obligee."

Opinion of the Court.

We think the conclusion cannot be maintained on this record that, because of Cosgrove's temporary absence, he had waived or lost an exemption which protected him while he was subject to the state authorities to answer for the offence for which he had been extradited.

The case is a peculiar one. The marshal initiated the prosecution in the state courts, and some weeks thereafter the indictment was found in the District Court for the same act on which the charge in the state courts was based. The offences, indeed, were different, and different penalties were attached to them. But it is immaterial that Cosgrove might have been liable to be prosecuted for both, as that is not the question here, which is whether he could be arrested on process from the District Court before the prior proceeding had terminated and he had had opportunity to return to the country from which he had been taken. Or, rather, whether the fact of his going to Canada pending the state proceedings deprived him of the immunity he possessed by reason of his extradition so that he could not claim it though the jurisdiction of the state courts had not been exhausted; he had come back to Michigan; and he had had no opportunity to return to Canada after final discharge from the state prosecution.

We are of opinion that, under the circumstances, Cosgrove retained the right to have the offence for which he was extradited disposed of and then to depart in peace, and that this arrest was in abuse of the high process under which he was originally brought into the United States, and cannot be sustained.

Final order reversed and cause remanded with a direction to discharge petitioner.

Statement of the Case.

AMERICAN REFRIGERATOR TRANSIT COMPANY v. HALL.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF COLORADO.

No. 226. Argued and submitted March 16, 17, 1899.- Decided April 24, 1899.

It having been settled, by previous decisions of this court, that where a corporation of one State brings into another State, to use and employ, a portion of its movable property, it is legitimate for the latter State to impose upon such property thus used and employed, its fair share of the burdens of taxation imposed upon similar property, used in like way by its own citizens, it is now held that such a tax may be properly assessed and collected when the specific and individual items of property so used (railway cars) were not continuously the same, but were constantly changing according to the exigencies of the business, and that the tax may be fixed by an appraisement and valuation of the average amount of the property thus habitually used and employed; and that the fact that such cars were employed as vehicles of transportation in the interchange of interstate commerce would not render their taxation invalid.

IN March, 1896, the American Refrigerator Transit Company, a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Illinois, filed, in the district court of Arapahoe County, State of Colorado, against Frank Hall, treasurer of said county, a bill of complaint seeking to restrain the defendant from enforcing payment by the said transit company of certain taxes assessed upon refrigerator cars owned by the company, and used for the transportation of perishable freight over various lines of railroad throughout the United States. The bill alleged that the business in which said cars were engaged was exclusively interstate commerce business; that the company has and has had no office or place of business within the State of Colorado, and that all the freight transported in plaintiff's cars was transported either from a point or points in a State outside of the State of Colorado to a point within that State, or from a point in the State of Colorado to a point without said State, or between points wholly outside of said State; that said cars had no taxable situs within said State; that said assessment of taxes upon said cars was without authority of

Statement of the Case.

law and void; and that complainant had no plain or adequate remedy at law.

A demurrer to the complaint was overruled and answer was filed denying some and admitting other allegations of the bill. At the trial the parties agreed to and filed the following stipulation:

"1st. That plaintiff is and was during the times mentioned in the petition a corporation duly organized and existing by virtue of the laws of the State of Illinois, with its principal office in the city of East St. Louis, in said State; that it is engaged in the business of furnishing refrigerator cars for the transportation of perishable products over the various lines of railroads in the United States; that these cars are more expensive than the ordinary box or freight car; that the cars referred to are the sole and exclusive property of the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff furnishes the same to be run indiscriminately over any lines of railroad over which shippers on said railroads may desire to route them in shipping, and furnishes the same for transportation of perishable freight upon the direct request of shippers or of railroad companies requesting the same on behalf of shippers, but on the responsibility of the carrier and not of the shipper; that as compensation for the use of its cars plaintiff received a mileage of three fourths of a cent per mile run from each railroad company over whose lines said cars are run, such rate of payment being the same as is paid by all railroad companies to each other for the use of the ordinary freight cars of each when used on the lines of others in the exchange of cars incident to through transportation of freight over connecting lines of railroads; that plaintiff has not and never has had any contract of any kind whatsoever by which its cars are leased or allotted to or by which it agrees to furnish its cars to any railroad company operating within the State of Colorado; that it has and has had during said times no office or place of business nor other property than its cars within the State of Colorado, and that all the freight transported in plaintiff's cars in or through the State of Colorado, including the cars assessed, was transported in such cars either from a point or points in a State of the United

Statement of the Case.

States outside of the State of Colorado to a point in the State of Colorado, or from a point in the State of Colorado to a point outside of said State, or between points wholly outside of said State of Colorado, and said cars never were run in said State in fixed numbers nor at regular times, nor as a regular part of particular trains, nor were any certain cars ever in the State of Colorado, except as engaged in such business aforesaid, and then only transiently present in said State for such purposes. "That, owing to the varying and irregular demand for such cars, the various railroad companies within the State of Colorado have not deemed it a profitable investment to build or own cars of such character, and therefore relied upon securing such cars when needed from the plaintiff or corporations doing a like business.

"That it is necessary for the railroad companies operating within the State of Colorado, and which are required to carry over their lines perishable freight, such as fruits, meats and the like, to have such character of cars wherein they can safely transport such character of freight.

"2d. That the average number of cars of the plaintiff used in the course of the business aforesaid within the State of Colorado during the year for which such assessment was made would equal forty, and that the cash value of plaintiff's cars exceeds the sum of $250 per car, and that if such property of the plaintiff is assessable and taxable within such State of Colorado, then the amount for which such cars, the property of the plaintiff, is assessed by said state board of equalization is just and reasonable, and not in excess of the value placed upon other like property within said State for the purposes of taxation.

"3d. That said company is not doing business in this State, except as shown in this stipulation and by the facts admitted in the pleadings.

"4th. That in case it be found by the court under the undisputed facts set forth in the pleadings and the facts herein stipulated that the authorities of the State of Colorado under existing laws have no power to assess or tax the said property of plaintiff, then judgment shall be entered herein for the