attorney subsequently withdraws his appearance, but without first
obtaining leave of court, the record is left in a condition in which
a judgment by default for want of an appearance can be validly en-
tered. Rio Grande Irrigation and Colonization Co. v. Gildersleeve, 603.
See TAX AND TAXATION, 3, 4.

BANKRUPTCY.

As a deed of general assignment for the benefit of creditors is made by
the bankruptcy act alone sufficient to justify an adjudication in in-
voluntary bankruptcy against the debtor making such deed, without
reference to his solvency at the time of the filing of the petition, the
denial of insolvency by way of defence to a petition based upon the
making of a deed of general assignment is not warranted by the bank-
ruptcy law.
West Company v. Lea, 590.

BLOCKADE.

1. A blockade to be binding must be known to exist. The Olinde
Rodrigues, 510.

2. There is no rule of law determining that the presence of a particular
force is necessary in order to render a blockade effective, but, on the
contrary, the test is whether it is practically effective, and that is
a mixed question, more of fact than of law. Ib.

3. While it is not practicable to define what degree of danger shall con-
stitute a test of the efficiency of a blockade, it is enough if the danger
is real and apparent. lb.

4. An effective blockade is one which makes it dangerous for vessels to at-
tempt to enter the blockaded port; and the question of effectiveness is
not controlled by the number of the blockading forces, but one modern
cruiser is enough as matter of law, if it is sufficient in fact for the pur-
pose, and renders it dangerous for other craft to enter the port. Ib.
5. The blockade in this case was practically effective, and until it should
be raised by an actual driving away by the enemy, it was not open to
a neutral trader to ask whether, as against a possible superiority of the
enemy's fleet, it was or was not effective in a military sense. Ib.
6. After the captors had put in their proofs, the claimant, without intro-
ducing anything further, moved for the discharge and restitution of
the steamship, on the ground of the ineffective character of the block-
ade and because the evidence did not justify a decree of condemnation;
and in addition claimed the right to adduce further proofs, if its mo-
tion should be denied. Held, that the settled practice of prize courts
forbids the taking of further proof under such circumstances. Ib.
7. The entire record in this case being considered, the court is of opinion
that restitution of the Olinde Rodrigues should be awarded, without
damages, and that payment of the costs and expenses incident to her

custody and preservation, and of all costs in the cause, except the
fees of counsel, should be imposed upon the ship. Ib.

CAPTURES DURING THE WAR OF THE REBELLION.

1. Whether the capture of a steamboat on the western waters within the
line of the Confederate forces, in February, 1862, by part of the naval
forces of the United States on those waters, commanded by officers
of the Navy, and under the general control of the War Department,
but no land forces being near the scene of the capture or taking any
active part therein, was a capture by the army-quære. Oakes v.
United States, 778.

2. A libel for the condemnation, under the act of August 6, 1861, c. 60,
of a steamboat captured and taken into firm possession by naval
forces of the United States on the western waters during the War
of the Rebellion, was filed by the District Attorney in the District
Court of the United States for a district into which she had been
brought; the libel alleged that she had been seized by a quarter-
master for the reason that she was used with her owners' knowledge
and consent in aiding the rebellion, contrary to that act; she was
taken into the custody of the marshal under a writ of attachment
from the court; notice was published to all persons to appear and
show cause against her condemnation, and no one appeared or inter-
posed a claim. It seems that a decree thereupon rendered for her
condemnation and sale was valid against her former owners and all
other persons. Ib.

3. The act of March 3, 1800, c. 14, § 1, providing that vessels or goods
of a person resident within or under the protection of the United
States taken by an enemy and recaptured by a vessel of the United
States shall be restored to the owner on payment of a certain sum
as salvage, has no application to property captured by the United
States which had come into the enemy's possession by purchase or
otherwise with the consent of the owner or of his agent, and not by
capture or by other forcible and compulsory appropriation. Ib.
4. Communications between high civil and military officers of the so-called
Confederate States, preserved in the Confederate Archives Office, War
Department of the United States, or duly certified copies thereof from
that office, are competent evidence upon the question whether posses-
sion of a steamboat belonging to a citizen of the United States was
obtained by the Confederate States by capture or by purchase. Ib.
5. A petition under the act of July 28, 1892, c. 313, for compensation for
an interest in a steamboat, which alleges that she was captured by
the insurgents and recaptured by the United States during the War
of the Rebellion, is not sustained by evidence that she was captured
by the United States from the Confederate forces after they had
obtained possession of her by purchase. Ib.

CASES AFFIRMED OR FOLLOWED.

1. The decree below, so far as it granted the relief prayed as against the
defendants other than the city of Georgetown and the county of Scott,
is affirmed by a divided court; and, so far as it adjudicated against
the complainant and in favor of the defendants the city of George-
town and the county of Scott, those defendants not having been
parties or privies to the judgments pleaded as res judicata, is affirmed
upon the authority of the decision in Citizens' Savings Bank of Owens-
boro v. Owensboro, 173 U. S. 636. Stone v. Farmers' Bank of Kentucky,
409.

2. On the authority of Citizens' Savings Bank of Owensboro v. Owensboro,
173 U. S. 636, and Stone v. Bank of Commerce, ante, 412, the decrees
below are affirmed.. Fidelity Trust and Safety Vault Co. v. Louisville,

429.

3. Third National Bank of Louisville v. Stone, Auditor, ante, 432, and Louis-
ville v. Third National Bank, ante, 435, followed. Louisville v. Citizens'
National Bank, 436.

A. CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.

1. The provision in § 2 of c. 155 of the acts of Kansas of 1885, entitled
"An act relating to the liability of railroads for damages by fire,"
that, "in all actions commenced under this act, if the plaintiff shall
recover, there shall be allowed him by the court a reasonable attor-
ney's fee, which shall become a part of the judgment," must, for rea-
sons stated in the opinion of the court, be sustained as legislation
authorized by the Constitution of the United States. Atchison, Topeka
& Santa Fé Railroad Co. v. Matthews, 96.

2. Section 944 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri of 1889, provided that,
"Whenever any property is received by a common carrier to be trans-
ferred from one place to another, within or without this State, or
when a railroad or other transportation company issues receipts or
bills of lading in this State, the common carrier, railroad or transpor-
tation company issuing such bill of lading shall be liable for any loss,
damage or injury to such property, caused by its negligence or the
negligence of any other common carrier, railroad or transportation
company to which such property may be delivered, or over whose line
such property may pass; and the common carrier, railroad or trans-

portation company issuing any such receipt or bill of lading shall be
entitled to recover, in a proper action, the amount of any loss, damage
or injury it may be required to pay to the owner of such property,
from the common carrier, railroad or transportation company, through
whose negligence the loss, damage or injury may be sustained." In
commenting on this statute the Supreme Court of Missouri said:
"The provision of the statute is that 'wherever property is received
by a common carrier to be transferred from one place to another.'
This language does not restrict, but rather recognizes the right of the
carrier to limit its contract of carriage to the end of its own route,
and there deliver the property to the connecting carrier. There
can be no doubt, then, that under the statute, as well as under the
English law, the carrier can, by contract, limit its duty and obligation
to carriage over its own route." Held, That the statute as thus inter-
preted could not be held to be repugnant to the Constitution of the
United States. Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railway v. McCann, 580.
3. Sturm sued the railway company in a justices' court in Kansas for

wages due, and recovered for the full amount claimed. The company
appealed to the county district court. When the case was called there
for trial, the company moved for a continuance on the ground that a
creditor of Sturm had sued him in a court in Iowa, of which State the
railway company was also a corporation, and had garnisheed the com-
pany there for the wages sought to be recovered in this suit, and had
recovered a judgment there from which an appeal had been taken
which was still pending. The motion for continuance was denied,
the case proceeded to trial, and judgment was rendered for Sturm for
the amount sued for, with costs. A new trial was moved for, on the
ground, among others, that the decision was contrary to and in con-
flict with section 1, article IV of the Constitution of the United States.
The motion was denied, and the judgment was sustained by the Court
of Appeals and by the Supreme Court of the State. The case was
then brought here. Held, that the Iowa court had jurisdiction, and
that the Kansas courts did not give to the proceedings in Iowa the
faith and credit they had in Iowa, and were consequently entitled to
in Kansas, and the judgment must be reversed. Chicago, Rock Island
and Pacific Railway Co. v. Sturm, 710.

CONTRACT.

1. The city of Portland, in Oregon, proposing to receive bids for the con-
struction of what was called the Bull Run pipe line, Hoffman of Port-
land and McMullen of San Francisco entered into a contract in
writing as follows: "This agreement, made and entered into by and
between Lee Hoffman, of Portland, Oregon, doing business under the
name of Hoffman & Bates, party of the first part, and John McMullen,
of San Francisco, California, party of the second part, witnesseth:

That, whereas, said Hoffman and Bates have with the assistance of
said McMullen at a recent bidding on the work of manufacturing and
laying steel pipe from Mount Tabor to the head works of the Bull
Run water system for Portland, submitted the lowest bid for said
work, and expect to enter into a contract with the water committee
of the city of Portland for doing such work, the contract having been
awarded to said Hoffman and Bates on said bid: It is now hereby
agreed that said Hoffman and said McMullen shall and will share in
said contract equally, each to furnish and pay one half of the expenses
of executing the same, and each to receive one half of the profits or
bear and pay one half of the losses which shall result therefrom. And
it is further hereby agreed that if either of the parties hereto shall
get a contract for doing or to do any other part of the work let or to
be let by said committee for bringing Bull Run water to Portland, the
profits and losses thereof shall in the same manner be shared and
borne by said parties equally, share and share alike." Both put in
bids for the work which forms the subject of dispute in this case.
Hoffman's bid was for $465,722. McMullen's was $514,664. There
were several other bids, but Hoffman's was the lowest of all. The
contract was awarded to him. He did the work and received the pay.
This action was brought by McMullen to recover his portion of the
profit, according to the contract. Held, that this contract was illegal,
not only as tending to lessen competition, but also because the parties
had committed a fraud in combining their interests and concealing
the same, and in submitting the different bids as if they were bona fide,
and that the court will not lend its assistance in any way towards
carrying out the terms of an illegal contract, nor will it enforce any
alleged rights directly springing from such a contract. McMullen v.
Hoffman, 639.

2. While distinguishing Brooks v. Martin, 2 Wall. 70, from this case, the
court holds that, taking that case into due consideration, it will not
extend its authority at all beyond the facts therein stated. Ib.
See TAX AND TAXATION, 2.

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.

A highway in the State of Washington crossed the Northern Pacific Rail-
road at about right angles. It approached the railroad through a
deep descending cut, and the track was not visible to one driving
down until he had reached a point about forty feet from it. Free-
man was driving a pair of horses in a farm wagon down this descent.
When he emerged from the cut and reached the point from which an
approaching train was visible, he was looking ahead at his horses.
A train was coming up. The conductor, the engineer, and the fire-
man testified that the whistle was blown. Three witnesses, who were
not in the employ of the railroad, and who were in a position to have