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heard a whistle if it had been blown, testified that they did not hear
it. When Freeman became conscious of the approaching train, he
tried to avoid it; but it was too late, and he was struck by the train
and was killed. So far as there was any oral testimony on the sub-
ject, it tended to show that Freeman neither stopped, looked, nor
listened before attempting to cross the track. Held, That the testi-
mony tending to show contributory negligence on the part of Free-
man was conclusive, and that nothing remained for the jury, and
that the company was entitled to an instruction to return a verdict
in its favor. Northern Pacific Railroad Co. v. Freeman, 379.
The serial publication of a book in a monthly magazine, prior to any steps
taken toward securing a copyright, is such a publication of the same
within the meaning of the act of February 3, 1831, c. 16, as to vitiate
a copyright of the whole book, obtained subsequently, but prior to
the publication of the book as an entirety. Holmes v. Hurst, 82.
COURT AND JURY.
1. In this case the trial court at the close of the testimony, which is de-
tailed in the opinion of this court, instructed a verdict in plaintiff's
favor, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. This court affirms
the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Israel v. Gale, 391.
2. Spurr was tried in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Mid-
dle District of Tennessee on three indictments, consolidated together,
each of which charged him with having wilfully violated the provi-
sions of Rev. Stat. $ 5208, by wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly
certifying certain cheques drawn on said bank by Dobbins and Dazey,
well knowing that Dobbins and Dazey did not have on deposit with
the bank at the times when the cheques were certified, respectively,
an amount of money equal to the respective amounts specified therein.
It was not denied that the defendant certified the cheques, and that
the account of Dobbins and Dazey was overdrawn when the certifica-
tions took place. The questions for determination were defendant's
knowledge of the state of Dobbins and Dazey's account when the
cheques were certified and his intent in the certifications. After the
case had been committed to the jury, and they had had it under con-
sideration for some hours, they returned to the court room, and asked
the following question, which was written out: “We want the law
as to the certification of cheques, when no money appeared to the
credit of the drawer.” The court read to the jury the first half of
Rev. Stat. § 208, as follows: It shall be unlawful for any officer,
clerk or agent of any national banking association to certify any
cheque drawn upon the association unless the person or company
drawing the cheque has on deposit with the association, at the time
such cheque is certified, an amount of money equal to the amount
specified in such cheque.” The court then inquired: “Does this
auswer your question?” To which the foreman replied: “Yes, sir."
The court again read that part of the section, and made certain
observations; among others that a false certification was “the certi-
fying by an officer of the bank that a cheque is good when there are
no funds to meet it.” As the jury were retiring, counsel for defend-
ant said to the court that he thought what the jury wanted was the
act of 1882 which the court had read to them, and that the court
ought to read and explain that act to the jury. That act provided
that an officer, clerk or agent of a national bank wilfully violating
the provisions of Rev. Stat. § 5208, etc., “should be deemed guilty
of a misdemeanor, and should, on conviction,” “ be fined,” etc. The
court, after asking if the counsel referred to the act prescribing pen-
alty for false certification, and receiving an answer in the affirmative,
said that the jury had nothing to do with that. Held, that the Cir-
cuit Court clearly erred in declining the request of counsel in respect
of the act of 1882. Spurr v. United States, 728.
See EJECTMENT, 1, 4, 5.
1. On the trial of a person charged with feloniously receiving and having
in his possession, with intent to convert them to his own use, postage
stamps which had been feloniously stolen, taken and carried away
from a postoffice by three persons named, although the person so
receiving them well knew that the same had been so feloniously
taken, stolen and carried away, the judgment convicting the said
three persons of stealing the said stamps was received in evidence
against the accused, under the provision in the act of March 3, 1875,
c. 144, § 2, that such judgment "shall be conclusive evidence against
said receiver, that the property of the United States therein described
has been embezzled, stolen or purloined.” The accused having been
convicted, and the case brought here by writ of error, Held, That that
provision of the statute violates the clause of the Constitution of the
United States, declaring that in all criminal prosecutions the accused
shall be confronted with the witnesses against him; and that the
judgment must be reversed. Kirby v. United States, 47.
2. The contention by the defendant that the indictment is defective in
that it does not allege ownership by the United States of the stolen
articles of property at the time that they were alleged to have been
feloniously received by him, is without merit. Ib.
3. The objection that the indictment does not show from whom the
accused received the stamps, nor state that the name of such person
was unknown to the grand jurors, is not well taken. Ib.
See COURT AND JURY.
Sawed boards and plank, planed on one side and grooved, or tongued
and grooved, should be classified under the tariff act of August 28,
1894, 28 Stat. 508, as dressed lumber, and admitted free of duty.
United States v. Dudley, 670.
1. In this action of ejectment, the evidence of adverse possession contained
in the bill of exceptions, and set forth in the opinion of this court, is
sufficient to justify the action of the trial court in submitting the
question to the jury. Davis v. Coblens, 719.
2. By the terms of the statute in force in the District of Columbia, the
time of limitation of this action commenced to run against Lucy T.
Davis, one of the plaintiffs in error, on the death of her mother, and as
her mother's death took place more than ten years after the cause of
action accrued, the term against the plaintiff in error expired in ten
years after it accrued, and no disability on her part arrested its
3. It is the general practice to permit tenants in common to sue jointly or
separately in ejectment; but if they sue jointly it is with the risk of the
failure of all, if one of them fail to make out a title or right to
4. When a cross-examination is directed to ma ers not inquired about in
the principal examination, its course and extent are very largely subject
to the control of the court in the exercise of a sound discretion, and the
exercise of that discretion is not reviewable on a writ of error. Ib.
5. The plaintiff requested the following instruction: “The jury are
instructed that there is no testimony in this case tending to rebut the
testimony of the witness John H. Walter that he never conveyed lot
10, in controversy in this case, to any person other than the conveyance
by the deed to plaintiffs Charles M. N. Latimer, Lucy T. Davis and
others, and the jury would not be justified in finding to the contrary."
The court struck out the words in italics, and inserted instead, “and
the weight to be given his testimony is a proper question for the jury."
Held, that this was not error. Ib.
A court of equity has jurisdiction of a bill by a corporation praying that
See NATIONAL BANK, 3;
Tax AND TAXATION, 5.
The appellant, a Canadian, was extradited from Canada under the extra-
dition treaty between Great Britain and the United States, and, being
brought before a police court of Detroit was charged with larceny,
gave bail for his appearance at the trial, and returned to Canada.
Returning from Canada to Detroit voluntarily before the time fixed
for trial, he was arrested on a capias issued from the District Court of
the United States for the Eastern District of Michigan before his ex-
tradition, charging him with an offence for which he was not extra-
ditable, and was taken into custody by the marshal of that district.
He applied to the District Court of the United States for a writ of
habeas corpus, which was allowed. After hearing and argument his
application for a discharge was refused by the District Court. On
appeal to this court it is Held, That under the circumstances the
appellant retained the right to have the offence for which he was ex-
tradited disposed of, and then to depart in peace, and that this arrest
was in abuse of the high process under which he was originally
brought into the United States, and cannot be sustained. Cosgrove v.
See Contract, 1;
Under a statute authorizing the board of directors of a railroad corporation,
upon the petition of a majority of its stockholders, to direct the execu-
tion by the corporation of a guaranty of negotiable bonds of another
corporation, a negotiable guaranty executed by order of the directors,
and signed by the president and secretary and under the seal of the first
corporation upon each of such bonds, without the authority or assent
of the majority of its stockholders, is void as to a purchaser of such
bonds with notice of the want of such authority or assent; but is valid
as to a purchaser in good faith and without such notice. Louisville,
New Albany & Chicago Railway Co. v. Louisville Trust Co., 552.
There was no proof in this case to overcome the denials in the original an-
swer, and to show that the property seized by the Collector of Internal
Revenue had been forfeited to the United States. United States v.
One Distillery, 149.
See Tax AND TAXATION, 1.
Congress may provide for a review of the action of commissioners and
boards created by it and exercising only quasi judicial powers, by a
transfer of their proceedings and decisions to judicial tribunals for
examination and determination de novo. Stephens v. Cherokee Nation,
A. JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME Court.
1. From the statement of this case made by the Supreme Court of Louisi-
ana in its opinion, quoted in the opinion of this court, it is manifest
that no Federal question was passed upon by that court, but that its
decision was put upon an independent ground, involving no Federal
question, and of itself sufficient to support the judgment below; and
this court therefore dismisses the writ of error. White v. Leovy, 91.
2. If the petition of a woman, claiming to be the widow of a man sup-
posed to have died intestate, for the revocation of letters of adminis-
tration previously granted to his next of kin, and for the grant of
such letters to her, is dismissed by the surrogate's court upon the
ground that a decree of divorce obtained by her in another State
from a former husband is void; and she appeals from the judgment
of dismissal to the highest court of the State, which affirms that judg-
ment, and, pending a writ of error from this court, it is shown that
a will of the deceased was proved in the surrogate's court after its
judgment dismissing her petition, and before her appeal from that
judgment; the writ of error must be dismissed. Kimball v. Kimball,
3. O'Brien being arrested in the State of New York for larceny, Nelson
induced Moloney to join him in becoming O'Brien’s bondsman, and
gave Moloney a mortgage on his (Nelson's) real estate in New York to
the amount of $10,000, to indemnify him. O'Brien having defaulted
in his appearance for trial, Moloney was sued upon the bond, and a
judgment was recovered against him, which was wholly paid by him.
Before paying it he brought suit against Nelson to recover the amount
for which he was so liable, and obtained a judgment in his favor in