under a general agreement that remittances were to be made by mail,
and that their proceeds were not to be returned to the Capital Bank,
but were to be credited to its constantly overdrawn account; and
when letters containing them were deposited in the postoffice, such
mailing was a delivery to the Chemical Bank, whose property therein
was not destroyed or impaired by the insolvency of the Capital Bank,
taking place after the mailing and before the delivery of the letters
containing the remittances.
Ib.

PATENT FOR INVENTION.

1. Every element of the combination described in the first and second
claims of letters patent No: 450,124, issued April 7, 1891, to Horace
J. Hoffman for improvements in storage cases for books, is found in
previous devices, and, limiting the patent to the precise construction
shown, none of the defendant's devices can be treated as infringements.
Office Specialty Manufacturing Co. v. Fenton Metallic Manufacturing
Co., 492.

POTOMAC FLATS.

See WASHINGTON CITY.

PRACTICE.

For the reasons stated in the opinion of the court, it is precluded from
looking at the so-called statements of facts, and when they are
excluded from the record there is nothing left for review, and the
judgment below is affirmed. Cohn v. Daly, 539.

PUBLIC LAND.

1. The right of Flett, under whom De Lacey claims, was a right of pre-
emption only, which ceased at the expiration of thirty months from
the filing of his statement, by reason of the failure to make proof and
payment within the time required by law, and it is not necessary, in
order that the law shall have its full operation, that an acknowledg-
ment of the fact should be made by an officer in the land office, in
order to permit the law of Congress to have its legal effect; and when
the defendant settled upon the land in April, 1886, and applied to
make a homestead entry thereon, his application was rightfully
rejected. Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. De Lacey, 622.

2. The record shows that at the time of the commencement of this action
the railway company was the owner and entitled to the immediate
possession of the land in controversy, and that it was entitled therefore
to judgment in its favor. Ib.

RAILROAD.

The New Albany Railway Company, whose road was in several States,

guaranteed bonds of a Kentucky Railway Company to a large amount.
It attempted by suit to avoid this guaranty as ultra vires. Its conten-
tion was sustained by the Circuit Court, but its decree was reversed
by the Circuit Court of Appeals, and this court has sustained that
decision. After the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals, Mills, a
creditor of the company, commenced suit in the Circuit Court of the
United States. The company appeared and confessed judgment, and
execution was issued and returned unsatisfied. Thereupon the
creditor filed a bill praying for the appointment of a receiver for the
entire road, and that the court would administer the trust fund, and
order the road sold, and the proceeds from the sale divided among the
different creditors according to their priority. The New Albany
Company admitted the allegations of the bill, and interposed no
objections, whereupon a receiver was appointed. These proceedings
took place on the same day. Subsequently proceedings were com-
menced at different times for the foreclosure of different mortgages,
all of which suits were consolidated. Then the Trust Company, as
holder of some of the guaranteed bonds, intervened. Then a decree
of foreclosure was entered, and a sale ordered, made and confirmed.
Then the Trust Company filed another intervening petition, charging
that Mills' proceedings had been procured by the New Albany Com-
pany for the purpose of hindering and delaying the general or un-
secured creditors in the enforcement of their debts, and praying that
the decree of foreclosure might be set aside, and other prayers. This
was denied, and a sale was ordered. An appeal by the Trust Com-
pany to the Circuit Court of Appeals resulted in the affirmation of
the decree below. The proceedings being brought here on certiorari,
it is Held, that, under the circumstances as presented by this record,
there was error; that the charge of collusion was one compelling
investigation, and that the case must be remanded to the Circuit
Court with instructions to set aside the confirmation of sale; to
inquire whether it is true, as alleged, that the foreclosure proceedings
were made in pursuance of an agreement between the bondholder and
stockholder to preserve the rights of both, and destroy the interests
of unsecured creditors; and that, if it shall appear that such was the
agreement between these parties, then to refuse to permit the confir-
mation of sale until the interests of unsecured creditors have been pre-
served. Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville, New Albany & Chicago
Railway Co., 674.

RECEIVER.

1. A claim was presented against the estate of the Peoria and St. Louis
Railway Company in the hands of a receiver, which the receiver dis-
puted. After reference to a master, and his report, stating the facts,
an order was entered directing the receiver to pay the claim. He
appealed from this decision to the Court of Appeals. The record on
appeal contained the order of reference, the findings of fact, the report
of the master, and the exceptions of the receiver. The Court of
Appeals directed the appeal to be dismissed. Held, That the proper
entry should have been an affirmance of the decree rather than a dis-
missal. Bosworth v. St. Louis Terminal Railroad Association, 182.
2. A receiver may defend, both in the court appointing him and by appeal,
the estate in his possession against all claims which are antagonistic
to the rights of both parties to the suit. Ib.

3. He may likewise defend the estate against all claims which are antago-
nistic to the rights of both parties to the suit, subject to the limita-
tion that he may not in such defence question any order or decree of
the court distributing burdens or apportioning rights between the
parties to the suit, or any order or decree resting upon the discretion
of the court appointing him. 1b.

4. He cannot question any subsequent order or decree of the court dis-
tributing the estate in his hands between the parties to the suit. Ib.
5. He may appeal from an order or decree which affects his personal
rights, provided it is not an order resting in the discretion of the

court. Ib.

6. His right to appeal from an allowance of a claim against the estate does
not necessarily fail when the receivership is terminated to the extent
of surrendering the property in the possession of the receiver. Ib.
See NATIONAL BANK, 1.

RIPARIAN OWNER.

1. The river, Rio Grande, within the limits of New Mexico, is not a
stream over which, in its ordinary condition, trade and travel can be
conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water.
United States v. Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation Co., 690.

2. The unquestioned rule of the common law was that every riparian
owner was entitled to the continued natural flow of the stream; but
every State has the power, within its dominion, to change this rule,
and permit the appropriation of the flowing waters for such purposes
as it deems wise: whether a territory has this right is not decided. Ib.
3. By acts of Congress referred to in the opinion, Congress recognized
and assented to the appropriation of water in contravention of the
common law rules; but it is not to be inferred that Congress thereby
meant to confer on any State the right to appropriate all the waters
of the tributary streams which unite into a navigable watercourse, and

so destroy the navigability of that watercourse in derogation of the
interests of all the people of the United States. Ib.

4. The act of September 19, 1890, c. 907, on this subject, must be held
controlling, at least as to any rights attempted to be created since its
passage. lb.

STATUTE.

A. CONSTRUCTION OF STATutes.

On questions of exemption from taxation or limitations on the taxing
power, asserted to arise from statutory contracts, doubts arising must
be resolved against the claim of exemption. Louisville v. Bank of
Louisville, 439.

B. STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES.

See CAPTURES during the WAR
OF THE REBELLION, 2, 3, 5;
COPYRIGHT;

COURT AND JURY, 2;

CRIMINAL LAW, 1;

CUSTOMS DUTIES;

JURISDICTION, A, 11; B; D, 1, 2;
RIPARIAN OWNERS, 3, 4;
TAX AND TAXATION, 8;
TELEPHONE COMPANIES;
TRIAL BY JURY, 1, 9;
WASHINGTON CITY.

1. It having been settled, by previous decisions of this court, that where a
corporation of one State brings into another State, to use and employ,
a portion of its movable property, it is legitimate for the latter State
to impose upon such property thus used and employed, its fair share
of the burdens of taxation imposed upon similar property, used in
like way by its own citizens, it is now held that such a tax may be
properly assessed and collected when the specific and individual items
of property so used (railway cars) were not continuously the same,
but were constantly changing according to the exigencies of the busi-
ness, and that the tax may be fixed by an appraisement and valuation
of the average amount of the property thus habitually used and em-
ployed; and that the fact that such cars were employed as vehicles
of transportation in the interchange of interstate commerce would not
render their taxation invalid. American Refrigerator Transit Company
v. Hall, 70.

2. Citizens' Savings Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U. S. 636, followed to the point
that in the case of a bank whose charter was granted subsequently to
the year 1856, and which had accepted the provisions of the Hewitt
Act, and had thereafter paid the tax specified therein, there was no
irrepealable contract in favor of such bank that it should be thereafter
and during its corporate existence taxed under the provisions of that
act. Stone v. Bank of Commerce, 412.

3. The agreement set forth in the statement of facts between the city of
Louisville, the sinking fund commissioners of that city, represented
by the city attorney, and the various banks of that city acting by their
attorneys, was not a valid agreement, within the power of an attorney
at law to make.

Ib.

4. An attorney, in his capacity merely as such, has no power to make any
agreement for his client before a suit has been commenced, or before
he has been retained to commence one; and if, under such circum-
stances, he assumes to act for his principal, it must be as agent, and
his actual authority must appear. Ib.

5. An equitable estoppel which would prevent the State from exercising
its power to alter the rate of taxation in this case should be based
upon the clearest equity; and the payment of the money under the
circumstances of this case, not exceeding the amount really legally
due for taxes, although disputed at the time, does not work such an
equitable estoppel as to prevent the assertion of the otherwise legal
rights of the city. Ib.

6. The assertion in this case of an irrevocable contract with the State
touching the taxation of the plaintiff, arising from the Hewitt Act, is
disposed of by the opinion of this court in Citizens' Savings Bank of
Owensboro v. Owensboro, 173 U. S. 636. Third National Bank of Louis-
ville v. Stone, 432.

upon

7. The taxes which it was sought to enjoin in this suit were imposed
the franchises and property of the bank, and not upon the shares
of stock in the names of the shareholders, and were therefore illegal
because in violation of the act of Congress. Ib.

8. Third National Bank of Louisville v. Stone, Auditor, ante, 432, followed
in holding that taxes like those here in question are illegal, because
levied upon the property and franchise of the bank, and not upon the
shares of stock in the names of the shareholders. Louisville v. Third
National Bank, 435.

9. The provision in the act of July 27, 1866, c. 278, exempting from taxa-
tion the right of way granted to the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad
Company, does not operate to exempt the right of way when acquired
from private owners and not from the United States; and the judg-
ment in this case made at this term and reported on page 186 of 172
U. S., having been made under a mistake of facts, is. modified to that
New Mexico v. United States Trust Company, 545.

extent.

10. The assessments on the superstructures, on so much of the right of